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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/22200

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Title
The Nash Bargaining Solution in General n-Person Cooperative Games
Creator
Creator Name
OKADA, Akira OKADA, Akira
岡田, 章 岡田, 章
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Rights
Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Key Word
Nash bargaining solution
Noncooperative bargaining
Coalition
Externality
Core
n-Person cooperative games
JEL
C71
C72
C78
Abstract
We present a noncooperative foundation for the Nash bargaining solution for an n-person cooperative game in strategic form. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach yields a new core concept, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game based on a consistency principle. We prove that the Nash bargaining solution can be supported (in every subgame) by a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if and only if the Nash bargaining solution belongs to the Nash core.
Publisher
Elsevier
Issued Date
2010-11
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
journal article
Version Type
AM
Is Version OfRelation -
Related Identifier
DOI
  10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.001
ISSN
00220531
NCID
AA1153521X
Source Title
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume Number
145
Issue Number
6
Page Start
2356
Page End
2379
Appears in Collections
010a Journal Articles　=　雑誌掲載論文
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/22200