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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/22210

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Title
Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal
Creator
Creator Name
Nishimura, Takeshi Nishimura, Takeshi
Editor
Contributor Name
社会科学の高度統計・実証分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences
Abstract
This paper considers a scoring auction used in procurement. In this auction, each supplier offers both price and quality, and a supplier whose offer achieves the highest score wins. The environment we consider has two features: the buyer has private information and quality is multi-dimensional. We show that a scoring auction implements the ex ante optimal mechanism for the buyer when the value complementarity between quality attributes is sufficiently greater than the cost substitutability. We further show how the buyer should design scoring rules.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2012-02
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series ; No. 224
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/english/index.html
Number of Pages
22
Sponsorship
グローバルCOEプログラム = Global COE Program
Appears in Collections
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/22210