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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/23159

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Title
Optimal Design of Scoring Auction with Multidimensional Quality
Creator
Creator Name
Nishimura, Takeshi Nishimura, Takeshi
西村, 健 西村, 健
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
社会科学の高度統計・実証分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences
Abstract
This article studies the optimal design of scoring auction used in public procurement. In this auction, each supplier's offer consists of both price and quality, and a supplier whose offer achieves the highest score wins. The environment we consider has the feature that quality is multi-dimensional. We show that there exists a quasi-linear scoring rule which implements the optimal mechanism for the buyer and is supermodular in quality if the virtual surplus is quasisupermodular in quality. We further investigate how the buyer should classify quality attributes when using a scoring rule which is additively separable in the attributes.
Description
May 29, 2012
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2012-07
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series ; No. 238
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/english/index.html
Number of Pages
34
Sponsorship
グローバルCOEプログラム = Global COE Program
Appears in Collections
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/23159