Category

Number of Access this item:895（2024-04-25 21:10 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/23295

Link to primary information 

File Format Size Views Description
cover_23295 pdf
0101209601 pdf 206 KB 1,172

Item Information

Output File

Title
Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Creator
Creator Name
KOSFELD, Michael KOSFELD, Michael
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University Frankfurt
Creator Name
OKADA, Akira OKADA, Akira
岡田, 章 岡田, 章
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
RIEDL, Arno RIEDL, Arno
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Maastricht University
Rights
Copyright © 2009 American Economic Association All rights reserved.
JEL
C72
D02
H41
Abstract
Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process.
Publisher
American Economic Association
Issued Date
2009-09
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
journal article
Version Type
AM
Is Version OfRelation -
Related Identifier
DOI
  10.1257/aer.99.4.1335
ISSN
00028282
NCID
AA00021334
Source Title
American Economic Review
Volume Number
99
Issue Number
4
Page Start
1335
Page End
1355
Appears in Collections
010a Journal Articles　=　雑誌掲載論文
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/23295