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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/25902

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Title
Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information
Creator
Creator Name
Einy, E Einy, E
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Creator Name
Haimanko, O Haimanko, O
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Creator Name
Moreno, D Moreno, D
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Creator Name
Sela, A Sela, A
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Creator Name
Shitovitz, B Shitovitz, B
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Haifa
JEL
C72
D44
D82
Abstract (distribution restricted)
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, when players have a common value and a common state independent linear cost function, a two player Tullock contest in which one player has an information advantage has a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium both players exert the same expected effort, although the player with information advantage has a greater payoff and wins the prize less frequently than his opponent. When there are more than two players in the contest, an information advantage leads to higher payoffs, but the other properties of equilibrium no longer hold.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2013-09
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2013-11
Number of Pages
25
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/25902