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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/26832

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Title
Cooperation and Institution in Games
Creator
Creator Name
Okada, Akira Okada, Akira
岡田, 章 岡田, 章
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
JEL
C71
C72
C78
D02
Abstract (distribution restricted)
Based on recent developments in non-cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. The first part presents basic results of the random-proposer model and applies them to the problem of involuntary unemployment in a labor market. Extensions to cooperative games with externality and incomplete information are discussed. The second part considers enforceability of an agreement as an institutional foundation of cooperation. I re-examine the contractarian approach to the problem of cooperation under the view that individuals may voluntarily create an enforcement institution.
Publisher
一橋大学大学院経済学研究科
Issued Date
2014-09
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2014-11
Number of Pages
55
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/26832