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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27159

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Title
Implementation with Transfers
Creator
Creator Name
Chen, Yi-Chun Chen, Yi-Chun
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
National University of Singapore
Creator Name
Kunimoto, Takashi Kunimoto, Takashi
国本, 隆 国本, 隆
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Sun, Yifei Sun, Yifei
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
National University of Singapore
Key Word
Full implementation
universal type space
robustness
transfers
JEL
C72
D78
D82
Abstract (distribution restricted)
We say that a social choice rule is implementable with (small) transfers if one can design a mechanism whose set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that specified by the rule but the mechanism allows for (small) ex post transfers among the players. We then show in private-value environments that any incentive compatible rule is implementable with small transfers. Therefore, our mechanism only needs small ex post transfers to make our implementation results completely free from the multiple equilibrium problem. In addition, our mechanism possesses the unique equilibrium that is robust to higher-order belief perturbations. We also identify a class of interdependent-value environments to which our results can be extended.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2015-03-06
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2015-04
Number of Pages
49
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27159