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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27590

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Title
On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts
Creator
Creator Name
HIRATA, Daisuke HIRATA, Daisuke
平田, 大祐 平田, 大祐
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
KASUYA, Yusuke KASUYA, Yusuke
糟谷, 祐介 糟谷, 祐介
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Yokohama National University
Key Word
matching with contracts
stability
strategy-proofness
uniqueness
efficiency
irrelevance of rejected contracts
Abstract (distribution restricted)
This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one. Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is shown to be the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Third, a stable and strategy-proof rule, when exists, is shown to be second-best optimal for doctor welfare, in the sense that no individually-rational and strategy-proof rule can dominate it. This last result is further generalized to non-wasteful and strategy-proof rules. Notably, all those results are established without any substitutes conditions on hospitals' choice functions, and hence, the proofs do not rely on the "rural hospital" theorem. We also show by example that the outcomes of a stable and strategy-proof rule do not always coincide with those of the cumulative offer process; hence, the above results hold NOT because the cumulative offer process is the only candidate for stable and strategy-proof rules.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2015-09-25
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2015-10
Is Replaced ByRelation -
Related Identifier
HDL
  http://hdl.handle.net/10086/28238
Related Identifier
HDL
  http://hdl.handle.net/10086/28237
Relation
Related Title
This version has been revised. The new version is available at No.2016-13 [http://hdl.handle.net/10086/28238]. See also No.2016-14 [http://hdl.handle.net/10086/28237].
Number of Pages
30
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27590