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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27667

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Title
Firms' Incentive Provisions: Tournament Structure and Worker Flow
Creator
Creator Name
Kambayashi, Ryo Kambayashi, Ryo
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Ueno, Yuko Ueno, Yuko
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
Research Center for Economic and Social Risks, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Key Word
Promotion tournament
internal competition
worker separation
wage progression
JEL
M51
M52
J31
J63
Abstract
This study aims to empirically examine how establishments employ various tools, including promotion, threat of dismissal, progressive base wages, and bonuses, to motivate workers. Starting with the standard tournament model, we incorporate the link between the tournament structure and the worker separation that affects the degree of internal competition for managerial positions. By using an establishment-level panel data set, we find that the average policy of human resource management in Japan, particularly since the global financial crisis, is consistent with tournament theory. Further, there is evidence that establishments use a positive selection scheme for determining the set of candidates. The progressive base wage schedule and the smaller portion of bonus payments for employees who remain are also consistent with the selection scheme.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2015-12
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
RCESR Discussion Paper Series ; No. DP15-11
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://risk.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/English/index.html
Number of Pages
33
Appears in Collections
RCESR Discussion Paper Series / Research Center for Economic and Social Risks
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27667