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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/28105

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Title
Pharmaceutical Patents and Generic Entry Competition: A New View on the Hatch-Waxman Act
Creator
Creator Name
MIYAGIWA, Kaz MIYAGIWA, Kaz
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Florida International University
Creator Name
WAN, Jiangyun(Yunyun) WAN, Jiangyun(Yunyun)
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Key Word
pharmaceutical innovation and patents
generic entry competition
Hatch-Waxman
marketing exclusivity
JEL
I18
K23
L13
Abstract
We present a formal analysis that sheds new light on the Hatch-Waxman Act. Hatch-Waxman restores incentives to develop new drugs by extending the patent life for them, but also promotes generic entry by reducing entry costs and by providing 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first challenger to the patent. Although these two objectives appear incompatible, our model shows that marketing exclusivity, with a significant entry cost reduction, contributes to incentive restoration. It finds however that social welfare is lower with marketing exclusivity. Finally, our analysis suggests that marketing exclusivity not be granted in the case of drugs for rare diseases.
Description
Revised on July 11, 2016
Publisher
Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2016-07
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
IIR Working Paper ; No. 15-18
Number of Pages
43
Appears in Collections
IIR Working Paper
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/28105