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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/29292

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Title
Big Business Owners in Politics
Creator
Creator Name
Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
ESCP-EAP European School of Management
Creator Name
Wiwattanakantang, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Yupana
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Abstract
This paper investigates a little studied but common mechanism that firms use to obtain state favors: business owners themselves seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that the more business owners rely on government concessions or the wealthier they are, the more likely they are to run for top office. Once in power, the market valuation of their firms increases dramatically. Surprisingly, the political power does not influence the financing strategies of their firms. Instead, business owners in top office use their policy-decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. Such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but also foreign investors. As a result, these politically connected firms are able to capture more market share.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2008-08
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
CEI Working Paper Series ; No. 2008-17
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/index.html
NCID
AA11590659
Number of Pages
50
Appears in Collections
CEI Working Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/29292