Plato says about truth and falsity in the *Sophista* as follows:

**Stranger.** And moreover we agree that any statement must have a certain character.

**Theaetetus.** Yes.

**Str.** Then what sort of character can we assign to each of these?

**Theaet.** One is false, the other true.

**Str.** And the true one states about you the things that are (or the facts) as they are.

**Theaet.** Certainly.

**Str.** Whereas the false statement states about you things different from the things that are.

**Theaet.** Yes.

**Str.** And accordingly states things that are-not as being.

**Theaet.** No doubt. (*Soph.* 263 A–B)

This passage of the dialogue reminds us of the famous words, *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*, attributed by St. Thomas to Isaac, an early Jewish philosopher. And this traditional definition of truth has strictly dominated the world of philosophy as hardly unquestionable since St. Thomas; it is said that even Kant could not overturn it with his 'Copernican Inversion.'

Furthermore, in the present age also, various attempts have been made by numerous philosophers and logicians to justify this traditional definition, and it is not difficult to find even earnest supporters and advocates of it. However, here we are unable to take up the perplexing, though quite interesting and fructuous,
work of tracing the whole history of development of this adaequatio-definition of truth. To us, what is more important is the generally recognized fact that Aristotle is also a representative spokesman of this idea of truth. And his statement in the De Interpretatione (IX, 19 a 33) that "the truth of propositions consists in corresponding with facts," seems to verify such an interpretation. Thus, people think that the study of truth in the Aristotelian philosophy is not a subject of philosophy as a real and practical science but rather of formal logic, and they turn their eyes to the logical treatises called the Organon. Indeed, there is sufficient reason to say that Aristotle played an important role in the formation of the idea of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus, as well as the idea that logic is one of the intrinsic and particular fields of the researches in truth. But even if we acknowledge this presupposition, the Aristotelian logic is, I think, not simply formal logic of the sort expounded in school. This is clear from his cautious prescription of principium contradicitionis and medium having foundation in being, in his Metaphysics and Analytics. Therefore, in order to study the nature of Aristotelian concept of truth and realize his own meaning of it, it would be more reasonable and desirable to examine closely the Metaphysics in the places where he remarks on truth and falsity.

I. Veritas Intellectus

If we consider the above-mentioned traditional idea of truth as self-explanatory and make it the starting point of our argument, we must ask the following question after Thomistic formula: Utrum veritas sit in re, vel tantum in intellectu. For if truth is taken to be the equation of thing and thought, it must be either thing or thought which takes the leading position in that equation. In the former case, truth becomes ontological, in the latter logical. As is well known, in answer to this question, St. Thomas quoting the Metaphysics and the Categories, makes


Aristotle says, sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, opinio vel oratio vera vel falsa est, secundum Philosophum in Praedicam (4 b 8). Ergo veritas magis est in rebus. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit 6 Metaph. (1027 b 25) quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu. But the situation is, it seems to me, rather more complicated, as is the case with other important termini technici which were coined and brought into the philosophic world by the genius of the Stagirite. He never speaks of the concept of truth with such clarity that his meaning is easily arrived at. As there are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, so is it with truth and the meanings of it are not always coherent.

Aristotle explains the meaning of being qua truth (τὸ ἔστι ὡς ἀλήθεια) in three places in the Metaphysics, i.e., Book V (A) 7, Book VI (E) 4 and Book IX (Θ) 10. His statements given in these places, however, should be compared with one another and scrutinized philosophically as well as philologically, with much care. Needless to say, the Aristotelian Metaphysics are nothing other than the study of being qua being, but judging by the consentient opinions of most Aristotelian scholars in the modern age, it was in A 7 that the four distinctions of being were made for the first time. There, after writing that “things are said to be in accidental sense, or by their own nature, i.e. by the figures of prediction,” he says about truth and falsity as follows:

Again, being (τὸ ἔστι) and is (τὸ ἐστὶ) mean that a statement is true, not-being that it is not true but false,—and this alike in the case of affirmation and of negation; e.g. ‘Socrates is musical’ means that this is true; but ‘the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side’ means that it is false to say it is.

Here being qua truth means, as can be surmised from the expression ἐστὶ·, ἔστι·, the copula which connects the subject and the predicate. But according to Aristotle, a copula cannot logically indicate things by itself without substratum. For we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled. Generally speaking, truth and falsity imply combination and separation of thoughts. Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added to them, are like thoughts without combina-

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10 Metaph. A 7, 1017 a 31-35. All the Aristotelian quotations in this article are from the Oxford Translation under the editorship of J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross, with some alteration and omission, when necessary.

11 De interpr. 3, 16 b 22-25.
tion or separation, and involve neither truth nor falsity. Thus the copula which is the bearer of truth or falsity is the core of judgement, and by force of this *proposition*, judgement becomes possible. For every sentence is not a proposition nor a judgement; only such sentences are propositions or judgements that have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false. Now the truth of judgement is formed when the copula shows an appropriate and valid relation between the subject and the predicate to exist (to be), and the falseness, when such a relation is shown not to exist (not to be). For being means nothing other than being which is combined and is one, and not-being nothing more than not being combined but more than one, so far as Aristotle asserts. In this sense truth always stands on the affirmative side, while falsity always is on the negative side. But it is necessary for us logically to observe this relation in more detail. In the same book of the *Metaphysics*, where he discusses the various senses of falsity, Aristotle distinguishes between a false thing, a false logos and a false man. On the false logos, he says as follows:

A false logos is the logos of non-existent objects, in so far as it is false ($\varphi \varphi \nu \delta \varsigma$). Hence every logos is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; e.g. the logos of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. (*Metaph.* A 29, 1024 b 26-28)

But when a logos of non-existent objects is claimed to be false, *in so far as it is false*, is not this qualifying phrase compelled to fall into *petitio principii*? For example, when the account of a figure bounded by a line, all the points on which are equidistant from a point called the centre—the account of a circle—is applied, when speaking of a triangle, it is false because such a triangle does not exist, but it is also true of something else, i.e. the circle. Therefore, in other formal words, A is false when applied to something that has not proper content thereof, i.e. when the predicate is not to be, and conversely it is true when non-A is applied to the predicate not to be, and vice versa. Therefore the logos of non-existent objects is false only as far as it has the fundamental formula of falsity: $A$ is non-$A$ or non-$A$ is $A$. We must say that the truth or falsity of a logos is essentially formed by complying or not complying with this fundamental formula, which is the basic law of thought. Such form of truth may be called *formal truth* according to general usage of that concept. And when the copula, *to be or not to be* is interpreted in this way as the relation of logical coherence or uncoherence between the subject and the predicate, it is apparent that the affirmative is always true and the negative is always false. We must say it is quite natural and reasonable that Aristotle proposed such formal truth at the beginning of his metaphysical speculation.

However we cannot linger over this point of the subject; we must inquire

12 *De interpr.* I 16 a 9-18. Categ. 4, 2 a 7-10.
13 *De interpr.* 4, 17 a 1-5.
more deeply into the Stagirite's statements concerning truth, and obtain perfect understanding of its meaning. Now "every assertion is the saying of something concerning something, e.g. affirmation, and is in every case either true or false." The copula to be or not to be should not only indicate the logical validity of the combination of the subject and the predicate, but also at the same time bear the 'beingness' of the object. A proposition is not true because it does not include contradiction within itself, conforming to logical rules. Though that may be an indispensable condition for truth, it is not yet sufficient in itself. For the proposition 'A is B' to be true, it is necessary that A should not be contradictory to B, and in addition that A should exist as B. That is why Aristotle says, "the truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities." Suppose, for example, that a man is here. Then the proposition a man is true, and contrariwise, for the proposition a man is to be true a man should be here. However, a true proposition is not the cause of the being of an object; rather the object is the cause of a true proposition. This is most clearly substantiated in the following passage from the Metaphysics E 4, which is looked upon by many scholars as the fountainhead of Aristotle's idea of truth.

That which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements (for the true judgement affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the false judgement has the opposite of this allocation). (Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 18-23).

Being qua truth and not-being qua falsity stated above do not mean the copula which combine the subject and the predicate, but rather the being or not-being of the subject as the predicative qualification. F. Brentano sharply points out the discrepancy of meaning between being qua truth in A 7 and that in E 4. In the former instance, being qua truth is the element of the proposition made as the copula of judgement that connects the subject and the predicate, and therefore it may be represented by the formula of A is B. In the latter, however, the proposition itself takes the position of subject, and to be is added as the predicate signifying that the judgement corresponds with the thing that is, which can be

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17 Categ. 5, 4 b 8-10. Cf. 4 a 36-b 1.
shown by the formula \((A \ is \ B)\ is \ true\). In the former, truth is always on the affirmative side and falsity is on the negative side, while in the latter, truth or falsity may be used for either affirmative or negative. In other words, the truth of judgement is established not only when it does not contradict itself, but also when it states something that is in agreement with the thing or when it denies an element in existence that does not agree with it. Therefore Aristotle says, "to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true." Here without doubt, we come to that traditional proposition on truth—*veritas est aequipatio rei et intellectus; rei et intellectus converutuntur*. And we may call this form of truth real truth in contrast to the forementioned formal truth.

Now we can recapitulate in two points the essentials of *veritas intellectus*—I use this term letting it comprehend both formal or logical truth and real or material truth.

1. Truth always anticipates the combination or separation of the objects of thought, and therefore it only comes into operation in judgement as its proper field.

2. Truth is established by the equation of thought and thing.

Thus it seems apparent that truth is, so far as understood in this sense, is not the subject of metaphysics but of logic. And that also appears to have been the Stagirite's real intention, for following the statement quoted above from the *Metaphysics* E 4, which St. Thomas made the source of his interpretation, he says:

For falsity and truth are not in things—it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false—but in thought. But since the combination and the separation are in thought and not in the things, and that which is in this sense is a different sort of 'being' from the things that are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either the subject's 'what' or its having a certain quality or quantity or something else), that which is accidentally and that which is in the sense of being true must be dismissed (ἀφίκεται). For the cause of the former is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some affection of the thought, and both are related to the remaining genus of being, and do not indicate the existence of any separate class of being. Therefore let these be dismissed (ἀφειαζω), and let us consider the causes and the principles of being itself, *qua* being. (*Metaph.* E 4, 1027 b 25–1028 a 4)

If the theme of the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* is limited to the being indicated by the figures of category and by the potency or actuality, and if *veritas intellectus* alone is Aristotle's idea of truth, being *qua* truth is surely reduced to a *pathos*

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of thought, and the idea of truth, as it is a thing of thought, must be excluded from the *Metaphysics*. As Professor W. Jaeger pointed out, the fact is emphatically expressed in this passage, ἀφεττεῖν ἀφεττέσθω and in addition, we find no such adverbial expression τὸ ὑπὸ, τὴν πρῶτην which is commonly used when discussion provisionally is left over to some later passage. This should be a convincing testimony for the postulated interpretation.

II. *Veritas Rei*

When truth is defined as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, what is it that guarantees that *adaequatio* and gives it a standard? Here again we must examine this initial question of vital importance. Concerning this St. Thomas says, veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium. In my opinion, however, Aristotle recognizes a more positive and cogent meaning in *veritas rei aut in re*. He tells us how much sensation depends on the sensible, and how much knowledge on the knowable, in a way that reminds us of the *Intentionalität* of the Husserlian phenomenology as follows:

And in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be nothing if animate things were not; for there would be no faculty of sense. Now the view that neither the sensible qualities nor the sensations would exist is doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata which cause the sensation should not exist even apart from sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case. (*Metaph. I* 5, 1010 b 30–1011 a 2)

Protagoras says, “man is the measure of all things,” because man has respectively knowledge and perception, which, we say, are the measures of objects. But such thinkers are saying nothing then, while they appear to be saying something remarkable. Knowledge and perception, we may call the measure of things because we come to know something by them, while as a matter of fact they are measured rather than measure other things. In other words, while knowledge might be thought to be measure, and the knowledge the thing measured, the fact is that all knowledge is knowable, but not all that is knowable is knowledge, because in a sense knowledge is measured by the knowable.

But does not such an idea of the primacy of objects as the criterion of truth

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13 *Metaph.* I 1, 1053 a 31–33. 6, 1057 a 7–12.
lead to an inevitable contradiction? That is, by what means can sufficient knowledge become obtainable of the object itself which is the standard of truth premised in the adaequatio-proposition? If it again requires adaequatio-proposition, we can not help falling into regressus in infinitum. This aporia has already been very precisely shown by Kant. But it is not reasonable to believe that Aristotle who had the correct and sufficient reflection of τὸ αἰτείωθαι τὸ εὖ δρχῖν did not realize this difficulty in the definition of truth. For he argues that besides the logical truth stated above, the intuitive cognition of the object itself must be assumed, i.e. the truth of the incommensurate, the simple and the formal essence of objects, must be grasped in a different way. Only by this new gleam of truth can the whole structure of the philosopher's being qua truth be completely revealed, and the traditional idea of truth we have dealt with also be founded on its ontological basis. Then what the Metaphysics give as the explanation of the truth of the object itself, the so-called veritas rei aut in re? Does the distinction between falsity qua thing and a false logos in A 29 quoted above, indicate something significant to solve this problem? It is stated there as follows:

"The false means that which is false as a thing, and that because it is not put together or cannot be put together, e.g. 'that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side' or 'that you are sitting'; for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses that they are non-existent. There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e.g. a sketch or a dream; for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. We call things false in this way, then,—either because they themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist." (Metaph. A 29, 1024 b 17-26)

What is here called 'a false thing' may be interpreted as 'an object of judge-

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25 Anal. pr. B 16, 64 b 28–65 a 9. Since we get to know some things naturally through themselves, and other things by means of something else (the first principles through themselves, what is subordinate to them through something else), whenever a man tries to prove what is not self-evident by means of itself, then he begs the original question.
ment' (Brentano) or 'contents or matter of judgement' (Maier), and it has apparently two meanings. Firstly, it means that we are talking of a false thing, when there is nothing real that corresponds to the object of thought, in other words, when the contents of judgement do not correspond with the combination or separation of objects in reality. For example, the proposition 'you are sitting' is false, if the person referred to is not actually sitting, and the proposition 'the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side' is also false, for in reality the diagonal of a square cannot by any means be commensurate with the side. Secondly, there are cases where, in spite of something existing at the basis of the object expressed, a false predicate happens: that is to say, when an idea aroused by something existent does not agree with the original existence, the statement is false, whether it brings about no perfect image of being (sketch) or does but express something unreal (dream). Therefore, 'falsity as a thing' means in the end, despite of the phrasing, only the discordance between the idea of the object in thought and the object itself in actual existence, and we must conclude that it has no relation with the intuitive cognition of things as the mark of truth. Hence, with sufficient reason E. Lask in his excellent book on judgement distinguished Aristotle's concept of truth into three classes i.e., 'truth without opposition' (eine gegensatzlose Wahrheit), 'truth of things' (eine sachartige Wahrheit) and 'truth of judgement' (die Wahrheit der urteilenden Aussage), and he called the first a 'super-contrary truth' (eine übergegensätzliche Wahrheit) and either of the last two, a 'contrary truth' (eine gengensätzliche Wahrheit).

Thus, we must observe that 'falsity qua thing' discussed in A is a concept of falsity in the field of logic, that is, the formal falsity (loγες φευγός) or material falsity, but not the metaphysical. From this we may argue that the truth of the simple or of the thing itself as the subject of metaphysics cannot be found in this part of the work, which belongs to the early stage of development of the Aristotelian Metaphysics. It is in E 4 that we can find the first explicit reference to the intuitive and metaphysical truth. It may be convenient for us to subdivide this chapter by content into three sections. The first section, as can be seen

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26 E. Lask, Die Lehre vom Urteil (Gesammelte Schriften hrsg. v. E. Herrigel. II) 1923. p. 404 note 3. Es sind somit bei Aristoteles drei Wahrheitsbegriffe auseinanderzuhalten: eine gegensätzlose Wahrheit, eine sachartige und endlich die Wahrheit der urteilenden Aussage, also eine übergegensätzliche und zwei gegensätzliche. Es reicht darum nicht aus, mit Maier 1, 10, 13, 39 nur zwischen der sachlichen und der Urteilswahrheit zu unterscheiden und in der ersteren die gegensätzlose und die positive Wahrheit zusammenzufassen.

in the quotation made before, is one where it is the case that being *qua* truth and not-being *qua* falsity are in an appropriately logical relation of subject and predicate, agreeing with the combination or separation of things. And then the following passage occurs.

It is another question (ἀλλὸς λόγος), how it happens that we think things together or apart; by ‘together’ and ‘apart’ I mean thinking them so that there is no succession in the thoughts but they become a unity.\(^{31}\)

ἀλλὸς λόγος means that the question of truth and falsity in this sense is a matter that properly belongs to logic or psychology.\(^{32}\) Indeed for this reason, in the third section of the chapter under discussion, as has been shown, the assertion is made that being *qua* truth as well as accidental being must be dismissed from the main theme of the *Metaphysics*. But such an assertion as below found in the second section that comes in between, is embarrassing enough to us.

For falsity and truth are not in thing—it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false—but in thought; while with regard to simple concepts and what (περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλὰ καὶ τὰ τὶ ἔστω) falsity and truth do not exist even in thought:—this being so, we must consider later (ὅτερον ἔπισκεπτέον) what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or not in this sense. (Metaph. E 4. 1027 b 25–29).

We might roughly interpret the philosopher’s thought stated here as follows: Truth is the theoretical end that our intellect should aim at, while good is the practical end that our *pathos* or *habitus* should achieve. And the truth of cognition depends on the idea of thing in the mind of the person who cognizes, but the good of deed, on the adaptation to the desired object by the person who desires. Therefore, truth is the *pathos* of intellect, but good is that of things. And thus, unless the concept of truth is analogically synonymous with that of good, as in Plato’s *Philebus*, truth will not dwell in things themselves.\(^{33}\) The truth of the simple and the formal essence of things, however, are not in thought but rather in the things themselves. The question, in what sense is it so, is to be answered in a later place.

If it is possible to interpret Aristotle’s argument in this way, we can clearly recognize in this place the two concepts of truth, i.e., *veritas intellectus* and *veritas rei*. How can this be reconciliated with the emphasized declaration that truth

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\(^{30}\) p. 61.

\(^{31}\) Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23–25.

\(^{32}\) H. Bonitz refers these words to Metaph. Z 12 (Comm. p. 293), H. Maier, however, to De an. Γ' 6 (Syllog. d. Arist. I p. 24. not. 2).

\(^{33}\) Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*. Par. I Quest. 16. art. 1. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter intellectum et appetitum, sive quamquamque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente; appetitus autem secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili; sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu.
should be dismissed from the domain of the *Metaphysics* (ἀριστερία ὑπερβολή θεω). Professor Jaeger shrewdly points out this difficulty, and from the fact that in thought the second section of Ε 4 has no mutual relation with both the preceding and succeeding sections, but rather it is contradictory to them and that in content this part is closely connected with Θ 10, supposes that Aristotle inserted it there as supplement, simultaneously with Θ 10 at his last stage of the development of the *Metaphysics*. And he explains further that the contradiction in Aristotle's concept of truth did not exist in the original form of the *Metaphysics*, but it crept in afterwards when that supplementary section was added. We can not, however, here go far into the chronological problems of the origin of Ε 4. All we can say with certainty by bringing a little further ahead Jaeger's ingenious interpretation, is that, no matter whether the second part of Ε 4 was placed as it is now from the beginning or it was added there later, the thought of truth in things as stated here should be considered as a new idea or foundation of the concept of truth which the very structure of logical truth necessarily required. Therefore, the two forms of truth, logical and metaphysical, in the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* should not be regarded as a contradiction but rather as the realization of its essence, not a "supplementary addition" but rather an expected development.

In the *Analytics* which belongs to his earlier period, Aristotle often refers to the fact that logical cognition by intellect (διάνοια) requires intuitive cognition by reason (λογικός). That seems to suggest metaphysical truth, but really, it is still a matter of logic, and not of metaphysics. Generally speaking, the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* was evolved according to the development of the meaning of 'being qua being' (ὁν ὑψ. ἀληθείας), from the transcendental ontology in his early period into the ontological ontology of his later period. In the same way, his concept of truth also had in it what was destined to grow up from the early logical form into the later ontological or metaphysical one through the self-development of the idea of 'being qua truth' (ὁν ὑψ. ἀληθείας).

What does Aristotle say about this in his *Metaphysics* Θ 10. and how should it be interpreted? However, we must give our full thought to the problem at a later occasion, as Aristotle says—διατερον ἐπισκεπτόν.

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