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Title
Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management: Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan
Creator
Creator Name
Hanazaki, Masaharu Hanazaki, Masaharu
花崎, 正晴 花崎, 正晴
ハナザキ, マサハル ハナザキ, マサハル
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Development Bank of Japan
Creator Name
Souma, Toshiyuki Souma, Toshiyuki
相馬, 利行 相馬, 利行
ソウマ, トシユキ ソウマ, トシユキ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Kyoto Gakuen University
Creator Name
Wiwattanakantang, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Yupana
ウィワッタナカンタン, ユパナ ウィワッタナカンタン, ユパナ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Key Word
Corporate Governance
Ownership Structure
Managerial Entrenchment
Shareholders Activism
JEL
G21
G33
G38
Abstract
We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system since the 1990s. Following Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2001), we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of largest shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these "entrenched banks" extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2004-01
Language
英語(eng)
Resource Type
technical report（テクニカルレポート）
Version Type
VoR
Relation - Is Part Of
Related Title
CEI Working Paper Series ; No. 2004-1
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/index.html
NCID
AA11590659
Number of Pages
36
Appears in Collections
CEI Working Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/13937