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International Relations in the Formation of Cold War Structure

1945-1955: Western Europe and the United States

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International Relations in the Formation of Cold War Structure 1945-1955: Western Europe and the United States*

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War urges and encourages Cold War historians to write histories from novel perspectives. Before then, they tended to focus their attention on questions concerning why the Cold War began and how it developed. But now, it has become possible for historians to treat the Cold War period as a history that has come to an end and to look at the whole process of the Cold War from a new viewpoint by asking why and how the Cold War was terminated.

The purpose of this essay is to tentatively investigate the formation of the Cold War structure in Western Europe, which has been mainly examined in the context of the origins of the Cold War, from the new viewpoint of the terminating process of the Cold War, or more specifically, by treating the beginning of the Cold War as the beginning of its slow process of termination. In this sense, my main hypothesis is that the process of the Cold War structure formation already

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contained some factors which were to contribute to the termination of that structure.

In this essay, the main analytical focus is placed upon the relations between Western European countries, such as Britain, France and West Germany, and the United States. Although it has been a widely shared view that the Cold War started in Europe and that those Western European states played significant roles in starting and intensifying the Cold War from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s, they also paradoxically tried to restrain the process of its intensification, and indirectly eroded the Cold War structure in that same period. US-Western European relations in the wake of the Cold War seem to be one of the most relevant cases demonstrating the abovementioned complicated and paradoxical nature of the beginning of the Cold War.

Here, I have no ambitious intention to conduct any thorough research based on primary sources. Rather I shall try to draw a rough historical sketch of and form a hypothesis about the origins of the Cold War based on secondary works in order to provide a basis for further empirical historical analysis of Cold War history from a new perspective.

Elements of the Cold War Structure¹

Prior to a historical overview, it is necessary to provide a general picture of the Cold War structure, which was generated in the late 1940s and terminated in the late 1980s.² There are at least the following four interconnected elements characterising the cold war structure.

First, the Cold War structure can be characterised as a prolonged and

tremendously critical security dilemma. The existence of nuclear weapons made it impossible to resolve the dilemma through a major war, as had happened in the First World War and, therefore, the major actors were kept in a state of pseudo-war. Second, within the Cold War structure, the distinction between friends and enemies was decided in terms of their ideologies. In critical periods, actors have tended to define their friends and enemies through ideological classifications clearly enough to persuade their citizens to prepare for a possible outbreak of war. This was the case during the Cold War as a lasting crisis emanating from the security dilemma. Both Eastern and the Western blocs were haunted by a dichotomy of good and evil, which for a long period obstructed communication between them and made the crisis continuous and more dangerous.

Third, the Cold War structure comprised a doubly oppressive order. At the international level, the bipolar power structure operated as a hegemonic order, where the fate of countries depended on the will of the superpowers with which they were allied. At the domestic level, the security dilemma of Cold War power politics placed security interests at the top of the hierarchy of political issues and priorities, which tended to suppress various sub-national interests and limit the freedom of citizens' international and transnational activities, especially when those activities crossed the demarcation lines of the Cold War. The fate of the citizens also depended upon the will and conduct of the superpower with which their governments were aligned. To escape from this oppression, the governments and citizens of both blocs had to resolve the security dilemma of the Cold War. One can find here a great dilemma between the Cold War and

democracy both at international and domestic levels, which could be more generally characterised as a dilemma between power politics and democracy.

Thus, inherent in the Cold War structure was a critical dynamism in which the continuous security dilemma, the dangerous ideological structure of '*feind und freund*', and the dually oppressive order all interacted and were mutually reinforcing. A great paradox of the Cold War is that those elements supporting this Cold War dynamism were simultaneously the very elements with potential to erode it, in the sense that the supporting elements were to generate resisting forces against themselves in a political world which had an undeniably dialectic nature. The same aspect of the security dilemma which could have brought the earth to total destruction was to stimulate efforts to get out of it. For that purpose, one of the most significant obstacles, that is, the ideological '*feind und freund*' rhetoric, had to be overcome. The hegemonic structure was also to be eroded because of the allies' horror at the possibility of total annihilation, particularly in the Western bloc where the allies became, through military and economic assistance from the US, powerful enough to resist both internal and external communist threats. At the domestic level, the citizens were to make efforts to dissolve the oppressive and disturbing situations of the Cold War, for example, through anti-nuclear movements and movements for democratisation in Eastern Europe.

Thus, the Cold War structure had a self-destructive character. As its supporting elements developed, its resisting elements became stronger. In this sense, the evolution of Cold War history can be interpreted as that of a balance between these two kinds of elements. The end of the cold war can be

characterised, therefore, as a result of the latter's prevalence over the former.

Post-War Planning of the 'Big Three'

In the last phase of the Second World War, the wartime leaders of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union were urged to establish and exchange their concrete post-war plans. Their ideas took no so clear a diverging path as seen during the post-war East-West division.

The post-war planning of Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, held that a stable post-war world order should be built on cooperative relations among the so-called 'Big Three'. From Churchill's point of view, the 'Big Three' power cooperation could be maintained by avoiding possible conflicts among them by drawing border lines between the mutually recognised British and the Soviet spheres, and by keeping them not exclusive but leaving communication channels open. In order to maintain these spheres, Churchill regarded the presence of American power in post-war Europe as essential because of the decline of the British power base.³

In a sense, Churchill was one of the champions in the 20th century of European classical balance of power diplomacy, or 'realpolitik', the most important principle of which is to maintain a status quo of balance of power among the major powers.⁴ In the same context, he was also very well aware of the danger of exclusively closed spheres of influence, and emphasised the indispensability of communication channels with post-war Russia in order to prevent the spheres of influence from generating mutual suspicion among the

major powers.⁵ Here, one can see a reflection of the 19th century diplomatic principle of 'congress diplomacy'.⁶

The post-war planning of the Soviet Union also reflected 19th century principles of diplomacy. Premier Joseph Stalin was willing to accept Churchill's proposal in the percentage deal, and the post-war Soviet self-restraint with regard to civil wars in Yugoslavia and Greece demonstrate that Stalin intended to base the post-war stability and international order on the mutual recognition of spheres of influence. It should be noted, however, that the unique historical experiences of Russia and the Soviet Union in the world of power politics significantly affected their post-war planning in Eastern Europe. Their historical experiences of being intruded upon by various external actors, as is well known, caused the Russians to become excessively sensitive in security considerations. To avoid a repetition of history, it was regarded as necessary for them to establish 'absolute security' by imposing very firm control over their neighbouring states, in effect making them satellite states. This peculiar notion of security seems to have accelerated Russia's rush to establish a firm sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, which was to evoke American suspicion. In spite of its diplomatic tendency towards 'realpolitik', the Russian drives for 'absolute security' were to intensify the security dilemma with the Western states and eventually destroy their initial post-war plans.

Like Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US President, was also faced with a dilemma between the idea of classical diplomacy and the peculiar American diplomatic ideology. The latter was a combination of American internationalism, exceptionalism, and isolationism. Post-war stability based on worldwide

international organisation, both political and economic, the pet policy of FDR and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, reflected the internationalist orientations. It also reflected the exceptionalism that the United States should not take the same diplomatic course as the Europeans. In other words, American exceptionalism preferred diplomacy within a multilateral framework, often described as 'new diplomacy', to balance of power or 'old diplomacy'. The stability through the multilateral framework would lighten the expected burdens on the Americans after the Second World War, which would fit their isolationist tendencies.

In a practical sense, or in a rather a paradoxical way, FDR had to rely on an idea with a more classical nature: mutual recognition of spheres of influence with the Soviet Union. In order to make the United Nations operate effectively for post-war stability, it was necessary for Washington to build up cooperative relations with Moscow. In order to establish firm cooperation with Moscow, the United States also had to recognise the Soviet sphere of influence. It is well known that FDR embraced the idea of the 'Four Policemen', which was based on the idea of dividing the world into four spheres of influence among the 'Big Three' and China. Here, one should note that FDR showed positive attitudes towards the idea of spheres of influence. FDR understood the oversensitive security considerations of the Soviet leaders.⁷ Although he did not publicly advocate Churchill's initiative for the percentage deal, considering the negative impact it would have on American public opinion, FDR implicitly accepted the Anglo-Soviet deal of spheres of influence.⁸ Thus, he was searching for a way to materialise the post-war cooperation among the big powers through his

personal relationships with British and Soviet leaders both by building international organisations and by recognising spheres of influence, though his people were sharply against the idea of the old style of diplomacy. For Churchill, this American tendency was a source of anxiety. For him, a repetition of the American retreat from Europe after WWI was a nightmare. Churchill reiterated FDR's concerns about future threats from the Soviet Union.

Thus, all three shared the objectives of establishing spheres of influence mutually recognised as one of the essential conditions for post-war world stability. There were, however, significant dilemmas which were to create conditions that brought an end to the Cold War. One of the dilemmas could be seen between the necessity for classical diplomacy and the straitjacket of peculiarity of the would-be superpowers.⁸ Another dilemma existed between the Soviet Union and the United States, that is, the potentiality of clash of their own peculiarities: between the Soviet efforts to establish firm control over Eastern Europe, which could be more within the framework of the old diplomacy, and the negative public opinion in the US with regard to 'realpolitik' or the old diplomacy, which was directed at such Soviet attempts.

Before the end of the Second World War, the 'Big Three' did not have to become involved in serious and inescapable conflicts because they could rely on the shared aspects of post-war planning goals. But immediately after the Second World War, those dilemmas mentioned above gradually became salient and a focus of their attention, and were to lead to the security dilemma.

The Formation of the Cold War Structure: from Cooperation to

a Security Dilemma

After VE Day, there could be seen several significant political and economic conditions emerging as decisive factors which pushed the world from the wartime cooperation towards the world of a security dilemma.

The first was the devastation of Europe. The deteriorated economic and military situation in Europe raised serious questions: who was going to fill the perceived 'power vacuum' in Europe and how? It can be safely argued that who would assist European reconstruction would go on to decide the division of Europe. The Truman Doctrine in March and the Marshall Plan in June 1947 played the role of drawing the demarcation line between Western and the Eastern Europe.

Second, it should be pointed out that though the US became a superpower who seemed to embrace power resources available to set up a stable order, she did not have any intention nor any clear blueprint about the post-war world order. This could be called a problem of 'situational hegemony'.⁹ As had been seen immediately after the First World War, strong isolationist sentiments emerged in the US after VE and VJ Days. In order for the United States to be closely and positively involved with the efforts to establish a post-war international political order, the Truman administration, which succeeded the FDR administration after FDR's sudden death, had to overcome the isolationist attitudes of the American public. Discovering or devising some persuasive rationales, rhetorical or not, to change the isolationist trends in the American public opinion was an urgent issue. The rationales were to take the shape of

ideological rhetoric designed to inflame a sense of threat from the Soviet Union. It should be pointed out here that there was still a psychological afterimage of ideological rhetoric which had been used during the Second World War: totalitarianism versus democracy. During the Second World War, this ideological distinction was used for clarifying the *'feind und freund'* structure in the war. This rhetorical distinction was still useful in manipulating the masses in the post-war period, because it had been deeply ingrained in people during the war.

Third, the change of US Presidents at the last stage of the war enormously affected the development of US-Soviet relations. After the sudden death of FDR in April 1945, Harry S. Truman, who had no notable diplomatic experience and had not at all been informed of the details of FDR's grand but subtle design for the post-war world order, became President. This certainly created discontinuity in American attitudes towards the Russian drive to establish her own sphere of security influence. The death of FDR was, in a sense, the death of the idea of building and institutionalising the big powers' cooperative relations based on a mutual understanding of the necessity to set up their respective spheres of influence.

On the other hand, Stalin demonstrated a certain consistency in his idea of the post-war world order. Under these circumstances, both superpowers could not avoid falling into serious mutual suspicion about each other's intentions.¹⁰

Fourth, the end of the Second World War brought the personal diplomacy conducted by FDR and other wartime leaders to an end. In other words, the intensity of democratic control over diplomacy increased after the end of the war.

Post-war diplomacy became more subject to public opinion in the US, which had demonstrated strong antipathy towards the old diplomacy of spheres of influence or balance of power diplomacy. This American exceptionalism in public opinion was to exert a more direct influence on Truman's policy towards the Soviet Union. The grave dilemma between classical diplomacy and American democracy limited the policy options of the post-war US government. In fact, the moves the Soviet Union took to establish its own security zone in Eastern Europe raised strong suspicions among the American public after the Second World War, which made the administration adopt a more hard-line policy towards Moscow.¹¹

Finally, the advent of the atomic bomb accelerated the process of the development security dilemma between the US and the Soviet Union. In particular, the fact that Truman showed his intention to use a US monopoly of the 'winning weapons' during the Potsdam Conference undoubtedly stimulated Soviet suspicions and a sense of threat.¹²

Thus, those factors and conditions generated during this transition period transformed the relations among the wartime leaders, originally intent on building confidence based on mutual recognition of spheres of influence, into the power-political mechanism that created the security dilemma, which was sustained and deepened by the mutual suspicion. Europe was to be divided in this development of events.

Western Europe and the Formation of the Cold War Structure

The increasing tensions between the superpowers that became the Cold War was in various forms beneficial for Western European states, who were urged to revive their economic viability and security. This fact led them to support and help American Cold War policies. At the same time, however, the Cold War imposed serious risks and costs on these states, which were regarded by Western Europe as extremely significant. Within this complicated context of costs and benefits of the Cold War, the Western European states sometimes supported but sometimes eroded the Cold War structure. In other words, the relations between the costs and the benefits shaped the relations between the United States and the Western European states. The latter could be characterised as the intersection of cooperation and friction.¹³

First of all, thanks to the Cold War, the Western European states were able to obtain economic assistance from the United States, where an isolationist mood clearly prevailed. The US government suspended the lend-lease to Britain on 21 August 1945, which symbolised the negative attitudes of the Americans towards any contribution to European economic reconstruction. The intensification of the Cold War tension between the superpowers provided the Americans with a good reason for using the taxes of American people for reconstructing Western Europe.

As Lundestad suggests, the Western European states invited in 'the American empire' for their own post-war economic reconstruction. It is known that Churchill sent numerous letters to FDR warning against the danger of Soviet Russia before the President's sudden death. Even after he went out of office, Churchill went so far as to try to talk directly to the American people

about the Soviet menace in the infamous 'Iron Curtain' speech in March 1946. This policy was also inherited by the Labour government of Clement Attlee. The Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan brought what the Western European nations needed.¹⁴

On the other hand, it should be noted that the division of Europe reaffirmed by the Marshall plan inflicted significant costs on Western Europe: the loss of their pre-war market in the Eastern Europe. Britain, for instance, which had acquired cheap food and timber from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before the Second World War lost that commercial channel.¹⁵ In fact, the British government demonstrated their anxiety over the loss and tried to retain the channel by concluding a trade agreement with the Soviet Union at the end of 1947. In January 1948, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, also stated in Parliament that the government intended to continue British trade with the Eastern European countries.¹⁶ These moves indicate the British concerns over the possibility of an economically divided Europe. Even during the negotiations on the acceptance of the Marshall Plan, the British government tried to prevent the Plan from dividing Europe. It is well known that Bevin made every effort to persuade V.I. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, to participate in the Plan.¹⁷

Indeed, the costs mentioned above were problems expected to occur after the immediate stages of reconstruction for which the Marshall Plan had an overwhelming significance. But after the early 1950s, when the first stages of reconstruction appeared successful, the limitation of economic activities in the European continent began to be perceived as a central issue of friction in US-European relations.

Second, the Cold War benefited the Western European countries in terms of post-war security, which was a complicated issue. The Western European countries were under several potential sources of threat. Two of those sources were the Soviet Union and the possible resurgence of German militarism. The latter was more specifically related to the traditional threat of the 'German problem'. Until the former became the central menace, the German problem was a more salient common issue for the Western Europeans. In addition, the existence of the Soviet-US security dilemma itself was a source of threat. Western Europeans could not deny the possibility that the dilemma strongly defined by the dangerous ideological rhetoric of moral dichotomy could erupt into a third world war over some remote events having nothing to do with vital Western European interests and that the war would be fought in European theatres. In this sense, the United States was also one of the sources of threat, albeit indirectly. Especially after the advent of nuclear weapons in the mid 1950s, this anxiety was to be amplified.¹⁸

Under these circumstances, Western Europe was also faced with an interplay of costs and benefits. First, the Cold War seemed to solve the long traditional 'German problem' by dividing her. Until West Germany was established in 1949 (and even later), France and Britain were anxious about the possible resurgence of German militarism and the possibility of a united Germany being pulled into the communist orbit. The dismemberment of Germany dissolved these possibilities.¹⁹ On the other hand, the establishment of West Germany was to make the issue of rearming her an urgent matter for the western allies in the near future, which would inevitably evoke among the French a sense of

threat. The increasing pressure from the US government to rearm West Germany and the diplomatic agony felt by the French led to the complication of the issues surrounding the European Defence Community (the EDC) in the first half of the 1950s.²⁰

Even from the viewpoint of West Germany, the Cold War was beneficial. As a result of division and US-Soviet confrontation, West Germany was offered a significant amount of economic assistance which it would not have been able to otherwise obtain. The West Germans, as a divided people, were faced with the dilemma of desiring reunification and at the same time needing to demonstrate loyalty to the western alliance. To solve this dilemma, Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of West Germany, chose to place priority on becoming a loyal ally to the Western bloc and achieving the reunification on that basis.

As for the threat from the Soviet Union, the Western European states made the best use of the Cold War. Lacking sufficient resources for their own defence, they had to and could rely on the dominating military power of the United States. By 1948, the centre of threat for Western Europe shifted from Germany to the Soviet Union. Even for the French, the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 became a turning point.²¹ The establishment of the Brussels Treaty Organization in 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, and the Western European Union in 1954 clearly divided Europe but assured security against the Soviet Union.

The US-Soviet security dilemma was also utilised by the Western European states in some of their regional conflicts not necessary within the context of the Cold War. Britain and France, in the process of decolonisation, tried to involve

the US and its military power in conflicts such as the Suez Crisis and the First Indochina War in the mid 1950s. The French government managed in 1953 to persuade the Americans to get involved in Indochina by putting the colonial war against the Vietminh led by Ho Chi Min into the context of the Cold War. The Eisenhower administration responded to the French appeal by proposing a tripartite intervention with Britain, which was in vain because of British opposition.²² The Eden government also rhetorically defined the British relations with Nasser's Egypt as a Cold War struggle and tried to drag the Americans into the conflict, but the Eisenhower administration was not persuaded.²³ The British government failed to obtain the needed support from the U.S. and their invasion of the Canal Zone came to an end as one of the greatest fiascos in British diplomatic history.

On the other hand, the Western European states were under great strain generated by the Cold War, from which they attempted to escape. As mentioned above, the dangerous security dilemma itself was regarded as a source of threat. The establishment of the western collective defence systems in Western Europe evoked anxieties among Western Europeans. Before NATO was established, there had emerged a sharp disagreement between Britain and the U.S. over the nature of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in 1948. While the US insisted that the defence system should be a multilateral one, like the Rio Pact, the British objected that it would inevitably provoke Moscow too much and preferred a combination of bilateral security treaties among the Western European countries.²⁴

What Britain and France adopted in those situations was a policy guideline

called 'the third force thesis'. Bevin asserted that Britain should contain East-West tensions by standing between the superpowers by consolidating her relations with France and mobilising support from the British Commonwealth countries.²⁵ The French government showed a more ambivalent attitude, reflecting the uncertainty in its domestic politics. They were to eventually follow the British in the 1960s, when De Gaulle finally put to an end the domestic instability.

The purpose of the third force option was for the British and the French to diminish the danger of the US-Soviet security dilemma by acting as honest brokers between the superpowers and to regain European influence in world politics. It reflected the European historical experiences of traditional diplomacy in the 19th century and their distrust towards the diplomatic immaturity of the United States, which did not know how to use her overwhelming physical power and could destroy Europe by misusing it. The distrust was amplified as the US increased her ideological rigidity against Russia.²⁶ Thus, it can be argued that the third force option served to as a force of resistance towards the security dilemma and domination or hegemony by the United States. In other words, Western Europe, which had invited in American material power, did not intend to accept her ideology of power politics but to control the US in the actual deployment of that power. The pressure of insufficient resources and the urgency of reconstruction forced, however, the Western European states to abandon their pet policy. They had to be content with a temporary retreat from the third force option, and had to support the American initiatives in the Marshall Plan and the building of the western defence systems.

Even so, the third force option continued to be embraced by European leaders, and it resurfaced in the 1950s when reconstruction had to a certain extent been achieved. Even so, the third force option continued to be embraced by European leaders, and it resurfaced in the 1950s when reconstruction had to a certain extent been achieved. For example, when the Truman administration suggested an atomic attack on the North Koreans and the Chinese at the opening stages of the Korean War in November 1950, Attlee and Bevin flew to Washington and warned the President against the idea.²⁷

The Soviet success in developing an atomic bomb in 1949 and the resulting increased Cold War tensions pushed the British even more in this direction. In 1950, Prime Minister Churchill made a proposal for convening an East-West summit.²⁸ Three years later, Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, firmly rejected the American request for British participation in military intervention in the Indochina War to save Dien Bien Phu. Instead, Britain took the co-chairmanship with the Soviet Union at the Geneva Conference and pressured the Eisenhower administration to terminate the war in Indochina.²⁹

Moreover, the Eden government took the initiative to hold the Geneva Summit in July 1955 by persuading the reluctant President.³⁰ After the mid 1950s, Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, visited Moscow and tried to keep negotiating channels with the Soviet Union open during the Second Berlin Crisis. Then, in the 1960s, French President De Gaulle acted in the same vein and decided to walk out of the military command of NATO in 1966.

Thus, Britain and France were presented with a serious dilemma on security issues. Although being gravely concerned with the spiralling tensions in

the security dilemma, they chose to be protected by the U.S. and to make use of the Cold War to bring American material power to bear for their own benefit. But this fact does not lessen the significance of British and French efforts to keep communication channels with their communist adversaries open. It may be said that these efforts for crisis management were continued in various manners, eventually contributing to the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which played a vital role in ending the Cold War in the 1980s. This being so, one might suggest that the Western European resistance to the Cold War itself was one of the potential factors leading the Cold War to its termination.

I have so far tried to analyse Western European attitudes towards the formation of the Cold War structure within the context of power politics. What have been described are their efforts and quests for limited autonomy and security in the emerging hegemonic order by struggling with the policies and ideas derived from their historical experiences of 19th century classical diplomacy. It should be noted, however, that during the formation of the Cold War structure they also began efforts towards a goal which was contrary to or looked beyond power politics: European integration.

European Integration and the Cold War

The European Coal and Steel Community established on 19 March 1951 is assumed to be the starting point of the process creating a 'non-war community' in Western Europe.³¹ Since then, Western Europe has been achieving the

political dynamism and rules of the game clearly different from those of the power politics which characterised the Cold War. It has gone through a learning process of trial and error while heading towards the European Communities and the European Union.

The international history of Europe is a history of power politics. Criticisms¹⁹ of power politics have been, however, very often expressed as the result of experiences of great wars. During the interwar period from 1919 to 1939, movements for lasting peace by establishing a European federation or the united states of Europe, such as Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Movement, progressed so far as to lead to the more concrete and official appeal by Aristide Briand, the French Prime Minister in the 1930s.³² The ideas had an anti-power-political nature at their core. But one should not ignore the paradox of history that the Cold War provided great opportunities and suitable conditions accelerating the integration of Western Europe.

The Marshall Plan was proposed by the Truman administration on the condition that Europe would compose an integrated reconstruction programme for utilising the aid. This conditional offer by the US encouraged the Europeans to establish the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and to develop economic integration through stronger internal cooperation.³³

The Cold War division also created conditions suitable for consolidating ties among Western European countries. The existence of a common enemy, the Soviet Union, prevented what might have been serious conflicts and hostilities among these countries. American military protection also facilitated their economic activities by lessening the burden of military expenditures. The

Europeans could concentrate on economic reconstruction and expansion. The rapid revival of economic vitality in Western Europe certainly encouraged 'informal integration' at the economic and social level, as suggested by William Wallace.³⁴ The western part of Germany was wealthier and more apt to accept democratic rules than the eastern part. Although the division of Germany did not completely wipe away the French anxiety over a possible resurrection of German militarism, it certainly diminished the sense of the German threat and made it easier to integrate the former enemy. In addition, the division offered the precious opportunity and incentives for Western Europeans to keep 'Germany' weak by firmly integrating the western part into the western alliance.

In economic terms, the division of Europe urged the Western European states to develop and increase their economic transactions by removing any obstacles to smooth inter-regional commercial activities in order to compensate for the loss of the Eastern European market. The process of development of economic integration seems to have been accelerated by this fact.

Thus, the Cold War provided many of favourable conditions contributing to European integration. It should not be overlooked, however, that the Cold War placed Western European countries into dilemmas of various kinds. These dilemmas encouraged integration, which ran against the current of the power politics of the Cold War.

As international tensions intensified, it became necessary for the western world to place West Germany into the framework of their alliance as a reliable state with sound economic power. Given the remnants of anti-German sentiment, the French were put under contradictory pressures. They needed a

strong West Germany which would no longer threaten their security. To contain the German menace, France had traditionally formed an alliance with Britain. Around 1950, however, France could not rely on the traditional method because of the undesirability of military confrontation in Western Europe. In this situation, the idea of a European integration pronounced by Jean Monnet appealed to French policy makers, in particular, to Robert Schuman, the Foreign Minister of France. The option of setting up a supranational organisation controlling the commerce and production of coal and steel in Europe was chosen as the best method for France to escape from the dilemma with which it was confronted. They expected that this option would deprive the reconstructed Germany of the opportunity to rise again as a strong military power by utilising these strategic materials. The option of integration was also regarded as favourable and necessary to European economic recovery. As a consequence, Robert Schuman issued a statement which came to be called 'the Schuman Plan', and the ECSC was established along the lines of the plan in 19 March 1951.³⁵

In the same vein, other efforts for more intensive integration came from France in the military security sphere, though they were at the time rejected: the attempts to create the EDC and the European Political Community from 1950 to 1954. As mentioned above, the international tensions intensified by the outbreak of the Korean war pressed the Truman government to urge Western Europeans in September 1950 to accept the rearmament of West Germany. France was again thrown into a serious dilemma and again proposed the establishment of a supranational European military organisation, which was announced by French Defence Minister Rene Pleven, in October 1950, which

came to be known as the Pleven Plan. The Plan took shape as the EDC treaty signed in 1952 by the ECSC members. But the EDC was aborted because the French national assembly refused to ratify the treaty. French nationals decisively rejected the idea of renouncing their sovereignty for the sake of their national defence and security. They were not yet ready for integration concerning high political issues as in the case of the ESCS. This case clearly demonstrates that European integration was not entirely promoted by the Cold War. The Cold War could not hasten the Europeans to an integration not supported by the internal dynamism of Western Europe.

The cases of the ECSC and the EDC confronted West Germany with the reality that she could restart as a legitimate partner to the rest of the Western European states only by placing herself within the framework of European integration. As mentioned above, Germany had to be recognised as a nation distinct from Hitler's Germany in order to reunite their forcefully divided country. In this sense, there was an interesting paradox here in that they tried hard to promote European integration for their own nationalist aims. In other words, to reunite their nation, they had to transform themselves into a *post-power-political* nation-state, or 'civilian power'.

This being so, it should be argued that European integration itself generated a factor eroding the Cold War confrontation in Europe. It has been already suggested that the German reunification in 1991 could not have materialised without the widely recognised alteration of the past nature of Germany and the Germans. The reason is that West Germany accumulated through her positive activities within the European Communities the proof that she would no longer

behave like the Nazi Germany. The Europeans and the Russians finally came to realise that they would no longer have to be threatened by Germany, which had thoroughly lost her power-political nature in the process of integration. Thus, European integration clearly created the conditions for reunification of Germany, which would mean the end of the symbol of the East-West confrontation in Europe.³⁶

One of the more significant eroding factors in the integration was the European desire for regaining autonomy from American control. The real author of the Schuman plan was Jean Monnet, who is famous as the most influential founding father of European integration. But Monnet was deeply involved in the post-war reconstruction of France.³⁷ Here again, one can see the amalgamation of nationalist purposes and the integration which was to make the “nation-state” unable to be called so in the traditional sense. More importantly, the nationalist purpose also encompassed Monnet’s quest for autonomy from the US, or more broadly speaking, from the predominant structure of the Cold War. In order to escape from these Cold War shackles, it was necessary for the Europeans to go so far as to transform their nation-state and promote European integration.

It is easily understandable that European integration was in the same context as the third force thesis in that both were aimed at resisting the hegemonic Cold War power structure. But, more importantly, the former had clearer *anti*-power-political implications than the latter. The political dynamism emerging within an integrated Western Europe worked against the dynamism of power politics. In this sense, European integration provided an alternative to the power model of world politics. By showing how to create a ‘non-war community’

in non-military ways, European integration seems to have played a significant role in eroding Cold War power politics. It is an urgent academic task for us to conduct empirical research to prove any direct causal connection between the abovementioned fact and the end of the Cold War. But it is worth presenting the hypothesis above with regard to the impact of European integration on the Cold War.

I do not intend here to underestimate factors not directly related to the Cold War. In fact, there were essential conditions for integration that had nothing²⁴ to do with the developments of the Cold War, namely the widely shared doubts and disappointments about the nation-state itself. Immediately after the Second World War, the Europeans realised that their states had not at all protected their possessions and lives. In particular, compared with the Americans, they found it more difficult to distinguish the victorious from the vanquished. In addition, antipathy to nationalist sentiments was evoked because of the fact that the Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan were brought into the war by their ultra-nationalist ideas. Indeed, it should not be ignored that the European people expected the revival of their own countries after the end of the Second World War. But what they really wanted from their states was not the same as what they had wanted before. They came to give priority to welfare rather than military security. The decision by the British to elect the Labour Party and Clement Attlee, not the wartime hero Churchill, as Prime Minister immediately after VE Day proved this. As Milward suggests, the post-war European states had to reform and transform themselves into what could not be characterised as the traditional nation-state in order to succeed in their reconstruction.³⁸ This suggests that

European integration was a phenomenon developing in the much broader context of the history of the nation-state system. In other words, the citizens' disappointment in their nation-states of a power-political nature supported European integration and indirectly eroded the doubly oppressive structure of the post-war world. Thus, it can be said that the big historical tide of democracy in Europe gradually created the conditions necessary for the demise of the Cold War structure.

Conclusions: the Origins of the Cold War as the Origins of its Termination

If the analysis developed above is correct, what does the formation process of the Cold War structure imply in the context of the 20th century world order? The world order was built up in a process in which the post-war planning based on the mutual recognition of spheres of influence and cooperation between the major powers degraded to power struggles over the reconfirmation of their own spheres, and was marked by a lack of efforts for confidence building and institutionalisation of crisis management. Then, the Cold War began. To escape from the dilemma between the classical nature of the sphere-of-influence policy and the domestic assertion of democracy, the Truman administration employed rigid ideological rhetoric, which intensified the mutual distrust between the superpowers and deprived the East-West security dilemma of any easy solution.

Although the Western European states were gravely anxious about the

dangerous security dilemma, they had to follow in substance the American Cold War policies for their reconstruction. But they simultaneously made efforts to create various factors rejecting the Cold War as a legitimate order. What supported their efforts were, firstly, their know-how, based on their historical experience of power politics, and secondly, their post-power-political tendencies, which were also derived from their experiences of the futility of power politics in their long history of diplomacy since the Westphalian Peace Treaty. The former was embodied in the third force thesis, and the latter in European integration. In this sense, Western Europe accepted the Cold War as long as the Cold War benefited it, but when the threat and the costs exceeded the benefits, Western Europe began to play a role in the demise of the Cold War order. In other words, the formation process of the Cold War order developed around the following two interwoven sets of confrontations: 'the classical European diplomacy of the 19th century vs. the American democratic diplomacy of the 20th century', and 'Cold War power politics' vs. 'post-power-political trends created by European integration'.

The Cold War ended because the superpowers and the world they gambled with tried to resolve and escape from the security dilemma. In addition, the interdependence of transnational relations and the polycentralisation of world politics were enhanced under the Cold War structure and then destroyed the hegemonic structure of Cold War power politics. This process is embodied most clearly in European integration. If so, the divergence between the US and Western Europe seen during the period of Cold War formation could be characterised as a prelude to the end of the Cold War and a feature of the

post-Cold War international political order. The Cold War structure subsumed from its beginning the factors ending and replacing it.

¹ The word 'structure' does not mean just a power structure, or a state of power distribution. I use the word as more descriptive concept indicating a complex of various inter-connected factors: e.g., power distribution, perception, economic relations, etc.

² It is needless to mention that the general picture of the Cold War structure described here is a heuristic one, which should be subject to future amendments as results of the further and thorough empirical historical research to be attempted throughout the whole period of the Cold War from this new perspective.

³ John W. Young, *Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951-1955*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp.14-8.

⁴ See Kenneth W. Thompson, *Winston Churchill's World View: Statesmanship and Power*, (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1983).

⁵ For his emphasis on the importance of keeping the communication channels, see Anthony Sheldon Churchill's *Indian Summer: the Conservative Government 1951-1955*, (London: Hodde and Stoughton, 1981), p.396. His negative attitude towards the exclusive sphere of influence can also be seen in his initiative for the famous 'percentage deal' with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in October 1944. For details of the deal, see Fraser J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America and the Origins of the Cold War*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp.74-75. In the percentage deal, Churchill intended to establish co-existence between British and Russian influence in some regions such as Hungary, Bulgaria, and even in Romania.

⁶ For rules of the game in the congress diplomacy of 19th century Europe, see Ian

Clark, ◆◆

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) pp.135-6.

⁸ Osamu Ishii, 'Taikoku no gaikou to sengo Europe seijitaisei no keisei—Europe bundanka no katei, 1941-1949' (the diplomacy of great powers and the formation of post-war European system: process of division in Europe, 1941-1949), in Ishii (ed.) *1940 Nendai Europe No Seiji To Reisen* (Cold War and politics in Europe in the 1940s), (Tokyo: Mineruva 1992) pp.18-9.

⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete?: the Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, Summer, 1966, p.873.

¹⁰ Voltech Mastny points out that Stalin did not expect to encounter the strong accusation from the Truman administration over the Russian efforts to establish firm control over her own sphere of influence tacitly accepted by FDR. Stalin's

surprise reflected the sudden change in U.S. attitudes caused by the discontinuity in U.S. design of the post-war world order. Mastny, 'Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War' *International Security*, winter, 1984/1985, vol.9, No.3, p.111.

¹¹ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, *op. cit.*, chapter 7.

¹² David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

¹³ Walter LaFeber suggests that the Cold War contained a significant aspect of conflicts between Western Europe and the United States, by raising a question: an end to which Cold War. LaFeber, 'An End to Which Cold War?' in Michael J. Hogan (ed.) *The End of the Cold War: its Meaning and Implications*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chapter 2, pp.21-39.

¹⁴ Geir Lundestad argues that one of the most important factors contributing to the beginning of the Cold War was the Western European efforts to drag US power into the European theatre and that the Western European countries also invited American control over themselves. Lundestad called this process 'Empire by Invitation'. See, Lundestad, 'Empire by invitation?: the United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.23, no.3, pp.263-277.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Barker, *The British between the Superpowers, 1945-1950*, (London, Macmillan, 1983), p. 87.

¹⁶ Allan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1950*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), p.502.

¹⁷ Among the many studies of this issue, see, for example, Henry Pelling, *Britain and the Marshall Plan*, (London: Macmillan press, 1988) pp.11-14; Baraker, *op. cit.*, pp.86-88.

¹⁸ For this complicated structure of 'friends and enemies', see my 'Indoshina Kainyu wo Meguru Bei-Ei Seisaku Tairitsu: Reisenseisaku no Hikaku Kenkyu' (The Anglo-American Policy Divergence over the Intervention in the Indo-China War: a Comparative Approach to the Cold War History), *Ikkyo Ronso* vol.114, no.1, 1995, pp.60-61.

¹⁹ A.W. DePorte, *Europe Between Superpowers: the Enduring Balance*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), chapter 6.

²⁰ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980) chapter 9.; Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (London: Thanos and Hudson, 1957).

²¹ Georges-Henri Soutou, 'France' in David Reynolds (ed.) *Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 4, pp.96-120, esp. p.106.

²² See, Tanaka, *op. cit.* in footnote 18. Also see, James Cable, *Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

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- ²³ David Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis*, (Oxford: Blackwells, 1988).
- ²⁴ Geoffrey Warnter, 'The Labour Government and the Unity of Western Europe, 1945-51' in Ritchie Owendale (ed.), *Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, 1945-1951*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), chapter 4, pp.61-83; John Baylis, 'Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment', *International Affairs*, Vol.60, No.4, 1984, pp.615-29.
- ²⁵ For the 'third force thesis', see John W. Young, *Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe 1945-51*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984); John Kent, 'The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49,' in Anne Deighton (ed.) *Britain and the First Cold War*, (London and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
- ²⁶ Terry H. Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-1947*, (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1981, p.85.
- ²⁷ Chihiro Hosoya, *Sanfuranshisuko Kouwa eno Michi*, (The Road to the San Francisco Peace Treaty) (Tokyo: Chuokouron Publishers, 1984), esp. chapter 6; Peter Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948-1953*, (Manchester and N.Y.: Manchester University Press, 1997), chapter 11.
- ²⁸ For example, Churchill made a statement of the proposal on 14 December 1950 in the House of Common. See Robert Rhodes James (ed.) *Churchill Speaks: Winston S. Churchill in Peace and War, Collected Speeches, 1897-1963*, (New York and London: Chelsea House, 1980), pp.935-936.
- ²⁹ Robert F. Randle, *Geneva 1954: the Settlement of the Indochinese War*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
- ³⁰ David Reynolds, 'Great Britain' in Reynolds (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp.77-95, esp. pp.90-92.
- ³¹ Takehiko Kamo, *Yoroppa Tougou*, (The European Integration), (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1992), chapter 3. The concept of a 'non-war community' was devised by Karl W. Deutsch. See Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), chapter 2. Also, *Deutsch, Analysis of International Relations*, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), chapter 18.
- ³² Derek W. Urwin, *Community of Europe: a History of European Integration since 1945*, (London and New York: Longman, 1991), pp.4-6; Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1992), chapter 6.
- ³³ Michael Horgan, *The Marshall Plan*, (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- ³⁴ William Wallace, *Transformation of the Western Europe*, (London: RIIA, 1990), pp.21-28.
- ³⁵ Roy Pryce emphasises the significance of the fact that France did not adopt the traditional anti-German security method. For the historical process making the ECSC, see Allan S. Milward, *European Rescue of the Nation-State*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992).

³⁶ Takehiko Kamo, 'Kokusai Tougou: Tougou Riron no Shusei to Kadai' (International Integration: Amendments and Problems of Integration Theory), in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.) *Sekaiseiji no Kouzou Hendou 2: Kokka* (Structural Transformation of World Politics Volume 2: Nation-State), (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1995), pp.113-117; Barbara Libbert and Rosalind Stevens-Strohmann, *German Unification and European Integration: German and British Perspectives*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), chapter 2.

³⁷ Kamo, 'Kokusai Tougou' *op. cit.*, p.112; Francois Duchene, *Jean Monnet: the First Statesman of Interdependence*, (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), chapter 5.

³⁸ See Milward, *op. cit.* I must emphasise that Milward's phrase, 'the European rescue of the nation-state', is too rhetorical. It seems more appropriate to say that the Europeans tried to rescue the nation-state but for that purpose they altered the nation-state so much that they realised that they lost the original and traditional version of nation-state. In short, again paradoxically, they destroyed the nation-state by trying to rescue it.