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Abstract

This paper, using nationally representative household surveys, examines the changes in the membership structure of the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the 1990s. We concentrate on urban China and investigate how socioeconomic characteristics of the region (city) influence the membership structure of the regional party organization, focusing on the CPC members' age structure, structure of educational level, and occupational structure. The major findings and their implications are as follows. First, it is suggested that the marketization makes it more difficult for the party to recruit well-educated and professionally qualified youths. This finding will reflect the fact the marketization has enlarged opportunities for younger generation to gain socioeconomic success without the CPC membership. Second, the finding also implies that the younger generation's incentives for joining the CPC has been increasingly important determinants of the CPC membership structure. Third, as the result, the technocratic reorganization of urban party organization seems to progress through the conventional bureaucratic-elite path in governmental and public-owned sector rather than through the newly emerging qualified professional elite path, suggesting dual elite paths in urban society.

JEL classification: P36

Keywords: economic transition; marketization; communist party; urban China

1. Introduction

Setting the agenda

This paper examines the changes in the membership structure of the Communist Party of China (hereafter referred to as the party) during the 1990s. We concentrate on urban China and investigate how socioeconomic characteristics of the region (city) influence the membership structure of the regional party organization, focusing on the party members' age structure, structure of educational level, and occupational structure.² In doing so, we will be able to understand that it is not easy an easy task for the party to restructure its membership structure to cope with marketization. We will also be able to understand people's changing incentives in pursuing socioeconomic success in a market economy under the one party rule.

The main data source for this paper are nationally representative repeated cross-section surveys on household income conducted in 1988, 1995, and 2002 by the Chinese Household Income Project Team at the Institute of Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (hereafter referred to as the 1988, 1995, and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys). Sample households of the CASS CHIP surveys are subsamples of the official annual household surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). By utilizing the sampling frame of the NBS, the CASS CHIP surveys ensure representativeness for both urban and rural areas.³

We organize the present paper as follows. In the following part of section 1, we firstly summarize the party's membership principle and recruiting policy in the post-reform era. Then we review previous literature. In section 2, we overview changes in the membership structure of the party between 1988 and 2002, focusing on gender, age, educational, and occupational status. In section 3, we conduct city-based estimations of the determinants of the party's membership structure, using OLS. Section 4 concludes.

As the ruling party of the world's largest transition economy, the party has been modifying its primary mission from pursuing the socialist "modernization (*xiandaihua*)" in the early 1980s to building the socialist "market economy (*shichang jingji*)" in the mid-1990s. Regarding to the recruiting policy to pursue the primary mission, the party has

been emphasizing the "four transformations (*sihua*)" of the membership structure: "revolutionized (*geminhua*)"; "younger (*nianqinghua*)"; "intellectual and well-educated (*zhishihua*)"; and "highly professionalized (*zhuaneyehua*)".⁴ Since the "revolutionization" of party members just symbolizes the party's principle and the political screening has been the most basic procedure for recruiting new members, the main emphasis after the 1980s actually has been falling on the latter three qualifications. With regard to the membership principle, it was not until 2001-2002 that the party has explicitly modified the membership principle in order to widen its organizational basis. On July 1, 2002, General Secretary Jiang Zemin declared that the newly emerging social strata such as business founders (*chuangye renyuan*) and technical staffs (*jishu renyuan*) of non-public hi-tech enterprises, managerial and technical staffs of foreign-invested enterprises, the self-employed (*getihu*), private entrepreneurs are also contributors toward the Chinese socialism (*People's Daily*, July 2, 2002). According to this new view of social stratification, the constitution of the party was amended at the 16th national congress of the party held in November 2002. The new party constitution prescribes that, in addition to worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, and intellectual, "any advanced element of other social strata" can apply for party membership (*Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], November 15, 2002).⁵ The term "advanced (*xianjin*)" is based on Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents (*sange daibiao*)" doctrine, which advocates that the party should represent "advanced productive forces," "advanced culture," and the "fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of Chinese people." Entrepreneurs and business elites in non-public owned sector become eligible for party membership because they represent "advanced productive forces" (Jiang 2001). The 16th party congress also advocates that the "governing ability (*zhizheng nengli*)" of the party be improved. From the standpoint of recruiting policy, the improvement of governing ability can be understood that greater emphasis is put on educational and professional competencies (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2004).

Previous literature

Dickson and Rublee (2000), using the below-mentioned 1988 CASS CHIP survey, investigated the relative importance of party membership and educational attainment for socioeconomic success in urban China. They present separate paths in regards to career

mobility: first, on the one hand, for the most socially prestigious jobs, not a party membership but a college degree has become increasingly important; second, on the other hand, intellectuals now have privileged access to the party. This account leads us to an assumption that the importance of education relative to political reliability for party membership will increase. Bian, Shu, and Logan (2001), using sample surveys conducted in Tianjin and Shanghai in 1993, examined how the criteria for political screening and educational credentials evolved in the attainment of party membership during the period between 1949 and 1993. As is summarized below, their empirical analysis on the changes in party membership attainment showed an increasing importance of educational credentials.

Political and sociological studies on Chinese bureaucracy have also illustrated the shift from political loyalty from technocratic ability in the major qualification for bureaucrats. Shirk (1984) discussed that the failures of “virtuocracy” as a management regime in the late-Maoist era. Lee (1991) claimed the decline of revolutionary cadres and the rise of party technocrats. Parish and Tang (2000), using the 1988 CASS CHIP survey, also concluded that the major qualification for bureaucrats has changed from virtuocracy to meritocracy after the economic reform and that the educational level of party members has been increasing.

In this paper, we try to elaborate the previous literature in the following way: first, we utilize recent and more comprehensive data and observe changes in the membership structure during the 1990s; second, in addition to examine the individual characteristics those who have already become the party members, we will investigate the changes in the incentives of people who are possible candidates for the party members by conducting city-based estimations of the determinants of membership structure in 1995 and 2002.⁶

2. Membership structure of the party, 1988-2002

Gender, age, and education

The total number of the party members has been growing rapidly during the 1990s, from 51 million in 1992 to 68 million in 2003. By comparing the 2002 and 1988 CASS CHIP surveys, we firstly overview changes in gender, age, and educational attainments of party members during the 1990s. The following points can be made.

First, gender balance has improved between 1988 and 2002, although the party was still dominated by male members in 2002. Our data report that the proportion of female party members has increased from 24.9 percent in 1988 to 36.0 percent in 2002.

Table 1. Age and education of urban party members, 1988 and 2002

Second, table 1. A reports that the party members' age structure has become older between 1988 and 2002 and that, comparing with the entire population, the party members' age structure is older in both reference years. For example, in 2002, approximately 11 percent of urban party members were between the ages of 18 and 34, whereas in the entire urban population, the proportion of the same age cohort was about 38 percent.⁷

Third, from table 1. B, it is shown that party members' educational level has risen between 1988 and 2002 and that difference in educational level by party membership have also widen between the two reference years. The increase in party members having college graduate or above educational attainment is especially remarkable. Percentage-point difference in the proportion of college graduates by party membership has widened from 16 percentage-points in 1988 to 23 percentage-points in 2002.

Table 2 Distribution of age at joining the party

Fourth, table 2 shows that age at joining the party has been getting older over time, especially after the 1980s. During the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-78), 61 percent of urban members entered the party at ages 18-24. In 1979-88, however, the proportion of members who joined the party at ages 18-24 decreased to 23 percent. This trend accelerated sharply in the 1990s. We assume that this tendency suggests a trade-off between recruiting younger generation and absorbing well-educated and qualified professionals into the party and that incentives of younger generation to joining the party have been declining.

Table 3 Probit estimation of the determinants of party membership

To elaborate the changes in the correlation of individual attributes with the party membership, we have conducted probit estimation of the determinants of party membership

for selected historical periods. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the party membership (1 = party member) of cohorts ages 18-34 in each historical period. Explanatory variables are as follows: gender (dummy for male gender); dummies for educational credentials (college or above, senior high school, junior high school or below); dummy for father's party membership (1 = party member). The selected historical periods are 1966-73 (the Cultural Revolution/9th-10th party congresses), 1987-92 (early reform era, 13th-14th party congresses), and 1997-2002 (15th-16th party congresses).

The estimation results are summarized in table 3, and the following points can be made from the table. First, the positive effect of male gender on membership attainment has been decreasing. Gender has finally become statistically insignificant in the years 1997-2002. Second, the positive effect of educational credentials on membership attainment has increased. Both college and senior high school level educational credentials became positive and significant in the period 1966-73, and the effects have been increasing. Third, although a father's party membership has been less than the significant level of 10 percent in all the selected periods, it is noteworthy that both the coefficient and the significance level have become larger in the current period.

Occupational status

Here we compare the occupational structure of party members and non-party members by table 4. The share of working population with higher occupational status --cadres, executives, professionals/engineers, or private entrepreneurs-- among party members is much higher than in non-party members, as was expected. It is notable that the difference in the proportion of professionals/engineers (*zhuanye jishu ren yuan*) by party membership has narrowed between 1988 and 2002 (from 9 percentage-points to 4 percentage-points). From table 4.B, which extract the composition of urban working population with higher occupational status, it is shown that party members of higher occupational status tend to be in governmental and other public institutions. By contrast, non-party members with higher occupational status are more likely to be professionals/engineers of enterprises, especially non-public enterprises. Summing up, professionalization of the occupational structure of urban party members has been progressing through the conventional bureaucratic-elite rather than through the qualified professional elite, suggesting dual elite paths under the

development of marketization. This is consistent with the discussions by previous literature on social mobility in post-communist countries (Dickson and Rublee 2000, Hanley and Treiman 2003, Walder, Li, and Treiman 2000).

Table 4 Occupational structure of urban party members, 1988-2002

3. Determinants of membership structure, 2002

Working hypothesis

In this section, we conduct a city-based estimation of the determinants of membership structure in 2002 and 1995, using the 2002 and 1995 CASS CHIP surveys. We hypothesize that the membership structure of the party is determined by the interaction of the party's recruiting activities to absorb eligible members and people's incentives to joining the party.

In regard to the party's recruiting policy, Bian, Shu, and Logan (2001) argued that the party has shifted its emphasis from ideological loyalty to educational credentials in order to recruit more technocratic elites. Their data on Tianjin and Shanghai supported their argument. Using event history analysis, they found the following facts: First, educational credentials has emerged to be a significant determinant of party membership in the post-1978 period; second, although political screening has been persistently important in all post-1949 periods, the screening principle has shifted from class status ("redness" in born) and revolutionary ideology to loyalty to the party's mission. Their findings are consistent with the above-mentioned membership principle and recruiting policy after the 1980s. Our findings on the party' membership structure confirm a rising educational attainment of party members compared with non-party members. However, it should be noted that our data also show that the difference in the proportion of professionals/engineers to total number of working population by party membership has narrowed between 1988 and 2002, suggesting an emerging path to qualified professional elites without party membership.

Regarding to people's incentives to joining the party, we assume that, along with the marketization, this factor have become increasingly important in determining the party's

membership structure. This assumption does not necessary mean the decreasing incentives to get party membership. We hypothesize that several opposite factors affect their incentives. First, ideological appeal of communism has declined greatly in recent years and it will give a negative incentive to becoming a party member. Second, as is suggested in table 4, marketization has enlarged people's opportunities for gaining socioeconomic success without the party membership. This will reduce people's incentive for joining the party and will make the party's recruiting policy to absorb well-educated youth more difficult to carry out. Third, there still exist a party member's income premium in labor market, especially in public owned sector (see for example Dickson and Rublee 2000, Sato 2006). Although there is a debate whether the party member's premium is the premium for political status or just for unobserved abilities that made them party members (see Li et al. 2006 for the debate), persisting positive correlation between party membership and income suggests persisting positive incentives for joining the party.

It will be safe to assume that regional variations in the party's membership principles and recruiting policy are very small. Therefore, we hypothesize that, if there are regional differences in the membership structure of the local party organization, they are mainly influenced by the differences in people's incentive structure among regions. We assume that people's incentive structure is affected by the socioeconomic characteristics of the region. Based on these hypotheses, we proceed to the city-based estimation of the determinants of the membership structure.

Analytical framework

Table 5 Analytical framework of the determinants of membership structure

Our estimation framework is shown in table 5. The dependent variables are the party's membership structure. Specifically, we set the following three variables that indicate the outcomes of the party's recruiting policy (the "four transformations") as the dependent variables and conduct city-based OLS estimations by employing explanatory variables on the regional socioeconomic structure. To investigate changes in the determinants of membership structure, we compare estimation results of 2002 and 1995, using the 2002 and 1995 CASS CHIP surveys. We have two reasons not to utilize data for 1988. One reason is

that the variations in regional economic structure (specifically ownership structure and occupational structure) seem to be not diversified enough in 1988. The other reason is that we anticipate some changes in people's incentive structure between 1995 and 2002 because the privatization of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and labor retrenchment (*xiagang*) has accelerated after the mid-1990s.

a. Juvenescence of the age structure

As a measurement of the participation rate of younger generation, we employ logit-transformed proportion of party members at ages 18-34 to the total number of party members in the city.

b. Improvement of educational level

To measure the improvement of *educational level* of party members, we introduce the logit-transformed proportion of well-educated party members to the total number of party members of the city. We define well-educated as an educational level of college or above.

c. The degree of professionalization (Share of qualified professionals/engineers)

Regarding to the professionalization of the party, we focus on to what degree the urban party organizations have absorbed qualified professionals. We define qualified professionals by those who hold the titles of higher (*gaoji*) or intermediate (*zhongji*) levels of professionals/engineers.

The explanatory variables are socioeconomic characteristics of the city level.

1. Overall level of regional *economic development*: We employ average income (per capita annual net income of sample households, including in-kind income) at the city level as the measurement of overall level of regional economic development. We hypothesize that peoples incentives to joining the party are negatively correlated with the income level of the region because, in general, the higher the income level of the region, the wider the socioeconomic opportunities for local people. Moreover, we anticipate that this correlation

will become stronger over time. Therefore we expect increasing negative correlations between the level of regional income and each of the dependent variable.

2. *Level of economic diversification*: As a proxy of the level of marketization of the region, we employ the share of non-public owned sector employment to total working population. The non-public owned sector employment is defined as employment in all the non-public owned workplaces (workplaces other than governmental and other public institutions, SOEs, and collectively owned enterprises). We assume that the incentive of well-educated youths for joining the party will be affected by their evaluation of the ownership structure of the regional economy. When decline of public owned sector in a city is regarded as an unstabilization of local economic environment by well-educated youths, they will incline to stabilize their career paths by joining the party. If well-educated youths see new opportunities for socioeconomic success in the development of non-public owned sector, their incentives to joining the party will decrease. As is suggested above, we hypothesize that people's evaluation of ownership sector has been changing during the 1990s, especially after the mid-1990s, and that well-educated youths have increasingly begun to see new opportunities in non-public owned sector where the party membership is not an indispensable factor for success. Thus we anticipate decreasing positive effects or increasing negative effects of the level of *economic diversification* on the improvement of the party's age, educational, and occupational structures.

3. *Historical basis* of the party: We hypothesize that whether or not the local party organization has a strong historical basis affects the current membership structure. As a proxy of the historical basis of the party, we introduce the proportion of party members whose fathers also have party membership to the total number of party members, that is, the degree of intergenerational transmission of party membership. We hypothesize that the restructuring of the membership structure is easier where the party has stronger historical basis. Thus we anticipate positive correlations of this factor with the measurement of the membership structure. Due to the data availability, this variable is employed only for 2002.

Empirical results

The results of city-based OLS estimations of the membership structure are reported in table 6.

As is summarized below by each explanatory variable, the estimation results basically support our working hypothesis.

Overall level of regional *economic development*: In the case of the *juvenescence* of age structure, the standardized coefficients for the level of regional income are negative and statistically significant both in 1995 and 2002. Regarding to the improvement of *educational level*, the same coefficients show decreasing positive effects, statistically significant in 1995 and has become insignificant in 2002. Concerning to the degree of *professionalization*, the effects of regional income has changed from positive to negative between 1995 and 2002, although both are not statistically significant. Although the results are not so clear-cut, it is suggested that the party has begun to face difficulty in recruiting well-educated youths in higher income cities in 2002.

Level of *economic diversification*: In regard to the improvement of *educational level*, the standardized coefficients for non-public owned sector employment show increasing negative effects between 1995 and 2002. Similarly, the effects of non-public owned sector employment on the *juvenescence* of age structure has changed from positive to negative between 1995 and 2002, although both are statistically insignificant. Moreover, there are negative correlations between the degree of *professionalization* and the share of non-public owned sector both in both reference years and it becomes significant in 2002.⁸ These findings suggest that well-educated youths have increasingly found chances for success in the diversification of ownership structure and thus their incentives for joining the party has been decreasing in the well-developed and economically diversified cities.

Historical basis of the party: It is notable that the transmission of the party membership has significant positive effects on all the three measurements of membership structure. In fact, it is the only statistically significant variable that positively correlates with the degree of *professionalization*. This finding ironically implies that the party's recruiting policy depend considerably on the historical basis of the local party organization.

Table 6 Determinants of membership structure

5. Concluding remarks

In this paper, we have investigated the regional differences in the determinants of the party's membership structure in 1995 and 2002, by conducting the city-based OLS estimations. The major findings and their implications can be summarized as follows.

First, our empirical result suggests that, although the party is eager to restructure its organizational base to cope better with the "socialist market economy," the development of marketization makes it more difficult for the party to recruit well-educated and professionally qualified youths. This finding will reflect the changes in the opportunity structure for urban younger generation. The development of non-public owned sector and the restructuring of the public owned sector (labor retrenchment policy and privatization of medium- and small-sized SOEs) in the 1990s have, on the one hand, enlarged opportunities for younger generation to gain socioeconomic success without the party membership and, on the other hand, have decreased people's confidence in public owned sector.

Second, this finding supports our assumption that, in addition to the party's recruiting policy, people's own incentives for joining the party have been increasingly important determinants of the party's membership structure. The decline of the traditional communist ideology will also foster this tendency. It seems to be ironic that, though the party does not emphasize "men of good stock (*chushen xuetong*)" in its recruiting policy now, in fact, the historical basis of the party plays an important role in staving off the weakening of party organization in urban China.

Third, as the result, the technocratic reorganization of urban party organization seems to progress through the conventional bureaucratic-elite path in governmental and public-owned sector rather than through the newly emerging qualified professional elite path, suggesting dual elite paths in urban society. The party's new membership principle after 2002 that advocates to absorb the newly emerging "advanced elements" such as professional/engineers of non-public hi-tech enterprises can be understood as a countermeasure against the possible diminishment of its organizational base.

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Table 1. Age and education of urban party members, 1988 and 2002

1. A. Age							(%)
		Party members		Total population			
Age cohorts	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	
18-24	1.0	1.2	15.7	10.3			
25-34	12.6	8.9	21.9	15.6			
35-44	31.2	24.4	25.4	25.1			
45-54	34.7	35.2	19.9	28.2			
55-64	17.9	18.6	11.0	12.1			
65-	2.7	11.7	6.2	8.8			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
Number of observations	(4,755)	(4,356)	(23,183)	(16,969)			
1. B. Education							(%)
		Party members		Non-party members		Total population	
	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	
College or above	24.5	42.9	8.1	20.3	11.8	26.1	
Senior high school	33.8	33.8	32.5	38.6	32.8	37.4	
Junior high school	29.6	18.7	38.1	29.6	36.2	26.8	
Primary school or below	12.1	4.6	21.3	11.5	19.2	9.7	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Number of observations	(4,735)	(4,348)	(16,297)	(12,531)	(21,032)	(16,879)	

Note: *Senior high school* includes graduation from *gaozhong* and *zhongzhuan* (technical/vocational school) equivalent to *gaozhong*. *Junior high school* means graduation from *chuzhong* or equivalent educational level. *Primary school or below* includes graduation from primary school and semi-illiteracy.

Sources: The 2002 and 1995 CASS CHIP surveys.

Table 2. Distribution of age at joining the party

	(%)					
Year of joining the party	1949-1965	1966-1978	1979-1988	1989-1995	1996-2002	1949-2002
Age at joining the party						
18-19	18.3	10.7	3.2	1.4	1.8	5.8
20-24	55.9	51.7	20.5	11.4	8.2	26.6
25-29	20.2	19.8	21.2	18.6	16.2	19.2
30-34	4.6	9.4	18.9	20.3	23.1	16.5
35-39	1.3	5.0	15.7	22.4	20.3	14.1
40-44	0.0	2.8	10.0	16.5	15.3	9.8
45-49	0.0	0.6	6.3	6.9	10.6	5.4
50-	0.0	0.1	4.2	2.6	4.6	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of observations	(480)	(890)	(1,175)	(854)	(878)	(4,277)

Sources: The 2002 CASS CHIP survey.

Table 3. Probit estimation of the determinants of party membership in selected historical periods in urban China

Period of joining the party	1966-1973 (9th-10th party congresses)	Margin al effect	1987-1992 (13th-14th party congresses)	Margin al effect	1997-2002 (15th-16th party congresses)	Margin al effect
Male	0.496 (9.31)***	0.061	0.289 (5.97)***	0.027	0.069 (1.11)	0.010
College or above	0.454 (7.30)***	0.056	0.854 (11.69)***	0.080	1.018 (9.70)***	0.147
Senior high school	0.133 (2.29)**	0.017	0.427 (5.78)***	0.040	0.462 (4.17)***	0.067
Father's party membership	0.006 (0.09)	0.001	0.051 (1.04)	0.005	0.094 (1.50)	0.014
Constant	-1.908 (37.35)***		-2.279 (32.46)***		-2.055 (20.46)***	
Number of observations	6, 237		8, 083		3, 455	

Sources: The 1995 and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys.

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the party membership (1 = party member) of age cohort 18-34 years in each historical period. Omitted independent variable is junior high school or below. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.

Table 4. Occupational structure of urban party members, 1988-2002

4.A. Changes in occupational structure, 1988 and 2002

(%)

	Party members		Non-party members	
	1988	2002	1988	2002
Workers/clerical staffs	54.2	44.7	83.3	67.9
Executives of enterprises	5.8	11.6	0.5	2.0
Cadres of governmental and other non-business institutions	16.5	16.5	1.0	1.5
Professionals/engineers	22.6	24.2	13.7	20.0
Private entrepreneurs/owners of family business	0.9	1.4	1.5	6.1
Others	0.0	1.7	0.0	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of observations	(4,271)	(2,911)	(13,810)	(7,238)

4.B. Affiliation of higher status occupations by party membership, 2002

(%)

	Party members	Non-party members
Cadres and professionals/engineers in governmental and other public institutions	58.4	50.8
Executives of public owned enterprises	16.1	5.5
Executives of non-public owned enterprises	4.9	2.5
Professionals/engineers of public owned enterprises	14.2	25.8
Professionals/engineers of non-public owned enterprises	5.8	13.4
Private entrepreneurs	0.7	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0
Number of observations	(1525)	(1731)

Sources: The 1988 and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys.

Note: Non-SOEs include former SOEs reorganized into state-share holding enterprises.

Table 5. Analytical framework of the determinants of membership structure, 1995 and 2002

Variables	Description
Dependent variables at the city/county level (the party's membership structure by city)	
<i>Juvenescence</i> of the age structure (Share of younger members)	Logit-transformed proportion of party members at ages 18-34 to the total number of party members in the city
Improvement of <i>educational level</i> (Share of well-educated members)	Logit-transformed proportion of well-educated members to the total number of party members (college or above for urban area; senior high school or above for rural area)
The degree of <i>professionalization</i> (Share of qualified professionals/engineers)	Logit-transformed proportion of party members who hold the titles of higher or intermediate levels of professionals/engineers to the total number of party members.
Explanatory variables indicating the socioeconomic characteristics of the city	
Overall level of regional <i>economic development</i> (Average income of the city/county)	Per capita annual net income of sample households aggregated at the city level
Level of <i>economic diversification</i> of the region (Share of non-public owned sector employment)	Proportion of non-public owned sector employment to total working population
<i>Educational level</i> of the region (Average educational level of the region)	Proportion of the population of age over 18 having senior high school or above education to the total population over age 18.
<i>Historical basis</i> of the party (Transmission of party membership over generation)	Proportion of party members whose fathers also have party membership to the total number of party members

Source: The authors.

Note: See appendix II for descriptive statistics of each variable.

Table 6. Determinants of membership structure of the party in urban area: city-based OLS estimations, 1995 and 2002.

6.A. 1995

	(a) <i>Juvenescence</i> of the age structure	(b) Improvement of <i>educational level</i>	(c) The degree of <i>professionalization</i>
Average income	-0.364 (-2.95)***	0.350 (2.86)***	0.188 (1.46)
Share of non-public owned sector employment	0.133 (1.08)	-0.267 (-2.18)**	-0.132 (-1.03)
Historical basis of the party	--	--	--
Constant	-1.500 (-4.97)***	-0.932 (-4.98)***	-2.173 (-7.36)***
Number of observations	69	69	69
Adjusted R-squared	0.090	0.102	0.01

6.B. 2002 (not including historical basis of the party)

	(a) <i>Juvenescence</i> of the age structure	(b) Improvement of <i>educational level</i>	(c) The degree of <i>professionalization</i>
Average income	-0.262 (-2.32)**	0.096 (0.88)	-0.011 (-0.10)
Share of non-public owned sector employment	-0.011 (-0.10)	-0.362 (-3.32)***	-0.274 (-2.44)**
Historical basis of the party	--	--	--
Constant	-1.720 (-4.60)***	0.031 (0.14)	-1.593 (-5.15)***
Number of observations	77	77	77
Adjusted R-squared	0.04	0.109	0.050

6.C. 2002 (including historical basis of the party)

	(a) <i>Juvenescence</i> of the age structure	(b) Improvement of <i>educational level</i>	(c) The degree of <i>professionalization</i>
Average income	-0.292 (-2.63)***	0.054 (0.52)	-0.043 (-0.39)
Share of non-public owned sector employment	0.032 (0.28)	-0.303 (-2.90)***	-0.229 (-2.06)**
Historical basis of the party	0.244 (2.18)**	0.332 (3.18)***	0.258 (2.33)**
Constant	-2.388 (-5.01)***	-0.530 (-1.93)*	-2.179 (-5.56)***
Number of observations	77	77	77
Adjusted R-squared	0.090	0.206	0.104

Source: The 2002 and 1995 CASS CHIP surveys.

Notes: Coefficients are standardized regression coefficients. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 2. All dependent variables are logit-transformed.

Appendix I. The CASS CHIP surveys

Number of observations	1988 survey	1995 survey	2002 survey
Cities	71	69	77
Households	9,008	6,931	6,835
Individuals	31,775	21,696	20,632
Number of provinces	10	11	12
Provinces surveyed	Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan, Gansu	Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu	Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu

Sources: The 1988, 1995, and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys.

Appendix II. Descriptive statistics of variables used for the city-based estimations of the party membership structure (tables 5 and 6)

1995

	Number of obs. (cities)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min. Value	Max. Value
Juvenescence of the age structure (%)	69	0.12	0.08	0.01	0.47
Improvement of educational level (%)	69	0.35	0.10	0.08	0.56
The degree of Professionalization (%)	69	0.16	0.07	0.01	0.32
Average income (1000 Yuan)	69	4.56	1.60	1.90	11.24
Share of non-public owned sector (%)	69	0.20	0.09	0.05	0.63

2002

	Number of obs. (cities)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min. Value	Max. Value
Juvenescence of the age structure (%)	77	0.11	0.07	0.01	0.30
Improvement of educational level (%)	77	0.41	0.11	0.13	0.69
The degree of Professionalization (%)	77	0.12	0.06	0.01	0.27
Average income (1000 Yuan)	77	7.73	2.73	3.51	15.41
Share of non-public owned sector (%)	77	0.40	0.12	0.10	0.72
Historical basis of the party (%)	77	0.33	0.10	0.13	0.64

Sources: The 1995 and 2002CASS CHIP surveys.

Appendix III. Comparison of CPC membership structure between urban and rural areas,1988-2002



A. Gender, age, education, and family background

(%)



	1988		2002	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Gender				
Male	75.1	91.2	65.0	85.5
Age				
18-19	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.1
20-24	0.9	1.1	1.1	2.2
25-29	2.2	3.0	2.4	3.5
30-34	10.4	10.2	6.5	6.8
35-39	16.4	18.3	11.9	11.7
40-44	14.8	18.7	12.4	13.8
45-49	17.2	17.1	18.6	16.8
50-54	17.6	15.2	16.4	17.6
55-59	11.7	8.8	10.6	12.1
60-64	6.2	4.5	7.9	7.2
65-	2.7	2.6	11.7	8.2
Educational attainment				
College or above	24.5	0.8	42.9	3.6
Senior high school	33.8	18.0	33.8	29.6
Junior high school	29.6	36.2	18.7	44.7
Primary school or below	12.1	36.5	4.6	19.8
Illiterate	--	8.5	--	2.4
Political credentials				
Parents' party membership	--	--	33.9	19.3
Father's party membership	--	--	31.9	18.3
Number of observations	(4,738)	(1,709)	(4,348)	(2,116)

B. Age structure

Urban area



Rural area



Sources: The 1988 and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys.

Note: *Senior high school* includes graduation from *gaozhong* and technical/vocational schools (*zhongzhuan*) equivalent to *gaozhong*. *Junior high school* means graduation from *chuzhong* or equivalent educational level. *Primary school or below* includes graduation from primary school and semi-illiteracy. *Parents' party membership* indicates membership of either father or mother.

Appendix IV Constitutions of the Communist Party of China

1. Constitution amended at the 16th national congress of the party (November 14, 2002)

General Program

The Communist Party of China is *the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation*. It is the leading core of the missions for the socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The realization of communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.

The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of the "Three Represents" as its guide to action.

Chapter I Membership

Article 1: Any Chinese worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, intellectual, and any *advanced element of other social strata* who has reached the age of eighteen and who accepts the party's principles and constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one of the party organizations, carry out the party's decisions and pay membership dues regularly may apply for membership in the Communist Party of China.

Article 2: Members of the Communist Party of China are vanguard fighters of the Chinese working class imbued with communist consciousness.

2. Constitution amended at the 15th national congress of the party (September 18, 1997)

Chapter I Membership

Article 1: Any Chinese worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, intellectual, and other *revolutionary elements* who has reached the age of eighteen and who accepts the party's principle and constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one of the party organizations, carry out the party's decisions and pay membership dues regularly may apply for membership in the Communist Party of China.

3. Constitution amended at the 12th national congress of the party (September 6, 1982)

General Program

The Communist Party of China is *the vanguard of the Chinese working class* and a faithful representative of the interests of all nationalities in China. It is the leading core of the missions for Chinese socialism. The realization of communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.

The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as its guide to action.

Chapter I Membership

Article 1: Any Chinese worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, intellectual, and other *revolutionary elements* who has reached the age of eighteen and who accepts the party's principle and constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one of the party organizations, carry out the party's decisions and pay membership dues regularly may apply for membership in the Communist Party of China.

Article 2: Members of the Communist Party of China are vanguard fighters of the Chinese working class imbued with communist consciousness.

4. Constitution amended at the 11th national congress of the party (August 18, 1977)

Chapter I Membership

Article 1: Any Chinese worker, poor and lower-middle peasants, member of the

revolutionary armed forces, or other *revolutionary elements* who has reached the age of eighteen and who accepts the Party's Constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one of the party organizations, carry out the party's decisions, observe the party's discipline and pay membership dues regularly may apply for membership in the Communist Party of China.

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- *¹ The surveys on which this paper based on were funded by the Ford Foundation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Asian Development Bank, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, the Grant in Aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society of the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and Hitotsubashi University. The authors are grateful for their generous support. The authors also thank Toyo Bunko for their support during the preparation of this paper.
- ² Regarding to the basic structure of rural party members in comparison with urban members, see Appendix III and Sato and Eto (2006).
- ³ Appendix I shows the distribution the sample households. See for detailed illustration of the CASS CHIP surveys, see Li, Luo, Wei, and Yue (forthcoming).
- ⁴ See Appendix IV for changes in the membership principle of CPC.
- ⁵ The correspondent part in the past constitutions was "revolutionary elements (*gemin fenzi*)." As literature on Chinese politics emphasizes, this is a critical turning point for the party because it implies a change to the party's identity as a working-class party.
- ⁶ It should be noted that this paper, like most of the previous literature, does not cover rural area. We will analyze the membership structure of the rural party organization in our future research.
- ⁷ The total number of party members in our samples is 4774 in 1988 and 4373 in 2002 (the proportion of party members to total number of individuals over 18 years old is 15.0 percent in 1988 and 21.2 percent in 2002 respectively). in 2002. Number of effective observations in each table varies slightly because of missing values. Note that data on occupational structure have relatively large number of missing values (table 4). However we do not see any evidence that missing values on occupational statuses appear disproportionately between party members and non members.
- ⁸ It is quite natural that there is a strong negative correlation between the degree of *professionalization* and the share of non-public owned sector because, as is shown in table 3, party members with qualified professional skills mainly belong to public owned sector. This might draw criticism of tautology. However we expect that the number of qualified professional/engineers in non-public owned sector will increase rapidly and that the correlation will change in the near future. Thus, it will be meaningful to report the relationship between the degree of *professionalization* and ownership structure in 2002 as a benchmark for future research.