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このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください: https://doi.org/10.15057/18774
このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18774

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Title
Anti-Limit Pricing
Creator
Creator Name
Jun, Byoung Heon Jun, Byoung Heon
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Korea University
Creator Name
Park, In-Uck Park, In-Uck
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Bristol
Key Word
Dynamic Signaling
Limit Pricing
Entry Deterrence
JEL
D42
D43
D82
L11
Abstract
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent may use its current price to signal its strength, in order to deter entry. In contrast with conventional limit pricing, we show the entry of weaker firms. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this phenomenon to arise in equilibrium, in the benchmark cases that no second entry is profitable.
Publisher
Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2010-12
Language
英語(eng)
Resource Type
departmental bulletin paper（紀要論文）
Version Type
VoR
selfDOI
10.15057/18774
ISSN
0018-280x
NCID
AA00207547
Source Title
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
Volume Number
51
Issue Number
2
Page Start
1
Page End
22
Appears in Collections
Vol. 51, no. 2 (Dec. 2010)
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18774