カテゴリ

このアイテムのアクセス数:18,589件（2025-04-02 07:16 集計）

このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください: https://doi.org/10.15057/18779
このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18779

閲覧可能ファイル 

ファイル フォーマット サイズ 閲覧回数 説明
cover_18779 pdf
HJeco0510200430 pdf 311 KB 2,335

詳細情報

詳細情報出力

Title
Optimality of Entry Regulation under Incomplete Information
Creator
Creator Name
Kim, Jaehong Kim, Jaehong
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Handong University
Key Word
Incomplete Information
Excess Entry
Entry Regulation
Signaling
JEL
D82
L51
Abstract
The lack of complete information of the government has been considered as a barrier to the optimal regulation, as it is well-known in price regulations literature. However, it is not true for the entry regulation: This paper shows that the performance of the entry regulation under incomplete information can be better than that under complete information. Under incomplete information, the incumbent firm would deviate from the monopoly behavior to signal itself as an efficient type and to trigger entry regulation which prevents excess entry in case that the incumbent is efficient. As a result, social welfare can be even higher than under complete information, since not only the optimal post-entry market structure is achieved as under complete information but the pre-entry price is even lower than that under complete information.
Publisher
Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2010-12
Language
英語(eng)
Resource Type
departmental bulletin paper（紀要論文）
Version Type
VoR
selfDOI
10.15057/18779
ISSN
0018-280x
NCID
AA00207547
Source Title
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
Volume Number
51
Issue Number
2
Page Start
43
Page End
58
Appears in Collections
Vol. 51, no. 2 (Dec. 2010)
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18779