THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION—
WILL IT GIVE RISE TO A GREAT POWER AGAIN?*

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I.

International power is a social relation with various aspects but always has some simple
components which themselves are special kinds of power. Each kind alone can establish
great international power but no great power in permanence. International power, and
especially great power, needs a combination of the following kinds of power:

—Military power, i.e. direct ability to force.

—Economic power. Here we have to distinguish between (1) wealth, i.e. purchasing
or demand power and (2) supply power, i.e. the disposal of goods, information or capa-
bilities which are not offered by other suppliers at the same quality, quantity or price. The
extreme is called a monopoly. (3) autarky, i.e. economic selfsufficiency, esp. during crises.

—Socio-cultural power, i.e. model institutions, organizations, levels of moral and cul-
tural achievements. They perfect a stage of development (in a good or bad sense) which
is attained also by others, but in a less perfect form. Or they innovatively lead on an
entirely new stage of development. These kinds of institutions, organizations etc. can
generate military or economic power, yet socio-cultural power by itself is no direct power
but rather influence, i.e. indirect power generated by prestige. Other peoples support or
imitate the subject of socio-cultural power because they view it as a model and desire to
be appreciated by it. But they do it voluntarily and are not forced by direct, military or
economic power.

—At last there is an area-specific organizational power, i.e. a capacity for prompt and
appropriate reaction to international problems. It is based upon international experience,
information, rationality of internal organization etc. and should be well distinguished from
the other kinds of power.

Further we have to mention that power, also international power, is relative. More
precisely said: power is asymmetrically reciprocal. The power of a country A, in relation
to country B, is the greater the smaller the power of B is. The power of A exists only by
the weakness of B. This need not mean an absolute powerlessness of B, but it means higher
risk of loss and damage than A has in case of conflict. As power depends upon the weakness
of others, it turns out to be unstable in the field of international relations. For the weaker
often strive, of course, to change the unequal relation which is to their disadvantage. The
international system is, therefore, when mainly consisting of power relations, very unstable

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Admittedly, there are not only power relations in the international system but also traditional customs and usages, e.g. religious or ethnic-cultural relations, contractual relations, and relations under international law. And in our century increasingly moral relations are emerging, which is one of the very few signs for hope. All these relations put restrictions on the powers—however, when facing massive power interests they prove to be rather feeble.

Within the realm of power relations there is also a tendency to seek stability, but only in the interest of one or several powers. A great power is defined as a power which excels most other powers in its region or in the world and has consolidated its superiority by a considerable and apparently lasting margin. Great powers on a global scale are called world powers or super powers. Generally a great power also wields hegemony, i.e. power which has established international domination by contracts, institutions and legitimizing ideologies (hegemony, by the way, must be distinguished from colonial or neocolonial domination, though the boundary cannot be marked exactly). The stability of hegemony is founded in the voluntary support and following the hegemon can reckon upon. There is its direct power too, but the following countries must get some valuable benefits like military protection or economic aid and see some model features in the hegemonial society.

A great power normally does not exist alone, but in competition with other great powers. The competition can be more or less balanced or can be unequal. Within some decades, most balances change as well as most inequalities between great powers. Although there are many regional great powers that last for a longer time, the greater powers in modern times (and the more the more modern the times), especially the world powers, do not enjoy longevity. Power relations are unstable by their very nature. The instability will last either until a single global hegemony has established its rule like the ancient Roman empire which could maintain its supremacy for some centuries—but in our times of limitlessly dynamic capitalism a repetition of this pattern seems extremely improbable—or until international relations turn from power to moral and morally approved contract.

As we have seen, international power is a result of combining special kinds of powers: military, economic, socio-cultural and area-specific organizational power. These powers have, of course, their own external and internal conditions. External conditions include the political environment constituted by other powers, e.g. their military weakness or pacifism which conditions the power of a fixed amount of military force because it renders it greater than it would be if the other powers commanded a stronger military. Among the internal conditions the following groups seem to be most important:

—Natural resources: territory and its raw materials, population. To this also belongs the geostrategic position.
—State of development of the societal competences (technologies, organizational capacities, strategies, morals and legal systems, cultural codes etc.) in comparison with the average of all countries.
—Motivation for achievement and obedience, support and cooperation of the power elites and the masses.

To put it in a short and naturally simplifying thesis: the three groups of power conditions are factors, and power is the outcome or product of their multiplication. The bigger a factor, the more it can compensate for weakness in the other factors. But no factor can be zero. And
the bigger all factors the greater their product: power.

I cannot now analyze the relation of each factor to each kind of power and the relation of the kinds of power to each other (e.g. the interesting relation of military to economic power), but, for the last theoretical issue, I shall briefly explicate what in general (seen on a very abstract level) the societal-internal conditions of imperialism (colonial or neocolonial empire) and hegemony are. The most important conditions are

—to be a great power, as I said before, and

—expansionism, i.e. the drive of a great power to turn its superiority into domination by military or economic occupation and favourable terms of trade or by unequal contracts and ideology etc.

A great power can exist without colonial empire or hegemony—certainly a rare case but possible. China e.g. was such a great power sometimes, for a while she was even an explicitly antihegemonial power.

Expansionism is usually caused, singularly or in combination,

—by a dynamic economy dependent upon permanent growth like modern capitalism,

—by unchecked power elites, especially of exploitative state bureaucracies which want to annex more domains,

—by a variously repressive society which vents its internal frustrations and aggressions against the outside,

—by an aggressive ideology calling in some way for the conquest or conversion of foreign countries, like ethnocentrist, racist or fanatic religious creeds, also in liberal and democratic versions,

—by a high degree of socio-psychological authoritarianism in the population, at least in the vast majority. Authoritarian persons deify the hierarchies of their society and turn their aggressions, caused by their total obedience, against minorities and foreigners. Their mind revolves around the axis of superior vs. inferior and the axis of “we vs. they”.

II.

Let us now leave grey theory and enter colourful history in order to apply our theoretical concepts. Among the great powers of the 19th and 20th century we can distinguish two types: Russia, the USA and China (in future perhaps also India, Indonesia or Brazil) belong to the first type. They are endowed with such giant amounts of many natural resources and large populations that they are predisposed to world power. To the other type belong France, Britain, Germany and Japan who lack the natural base for world power. Let us consider two of them.

In spite of her lack of natural power base Britain was the leading world power from 1814 till 1914, one century. She ruled a huge colonial empire and hegemonial sphere wider than the world had ever seen before. What were the conditions of this world power? For except for coal and some iron-ore, sheep and herring the little British archipelago had no important natural resources. It is true, Britain enjoys a favourable geostrategic position, but much more important were evolutionary innovations in many dimensions: in technology, economy, politics, culture and in the psychological structure. These innovations rapidly cumulated after the 17th century, fructified and furthered each other and at last reached
the stage of modernity in many fields. Also after other societies had caught up and reached this stage, Britain had a great head start in quality and at the end at least in quantity. The great evolutionary head start, together with a strong and to a high degree internalized discipline and motivation for achievement and cooperation which was another evolutionary innovation, was the condition of British world power. We can resume this process with the concepts of liberalism and primary industries. Britain was the pioneer power of liberalism and primary industries in their progressive era. She, therefore, exerted a global hegemony for one century until she was replaced, after an intermediate era 1914–45, by the USA, the pioneer power of democracy and Fordism. Let us not forget that British liberalism, the first mature form of modernity, also comprised universalist principles of morality and right (the liberal rights of man, freedom of the press etc.) without which British hegemony would not have advanced so far and would not have been accepted for so long a time. So, British expansionism and even its imperialism is as ambivalent as the US-American: beside or often mixed up with suppression, exploitation and brutality there are the grand modern ideas of everyman's liberties. Long after the end of the British colonial empire and global hegemony the states which have risen from the British colonies foster political institutions and customs formed according to British liberalism (down to the powdered wig of Nigerian judges) and bear witness to the fact that the past British world power was created by evolutionary progress.

Somewhat different are matters concerning the great power of Germany. After her medieval empire and hegemony had decayed in the early modern times and broken down in the 17th century to be replaced by Spain and then by France, Germany came up again in the 19th century and rose to power status by her military victory over France in 1870/71. In the 1880's she started competing with Britain and Russia for trans-European hegemony. Germany had natural resources about double those of the British, but compared with Russia or the USA she was and is tiny. And her geostrategic position in the open center of Europe without natural borders can be called at best ambivalent. What are the conditions of the great power of Germany 1871–1945 and of her temporary hegemony over North and Southeast Europe and some trans-European regions? Having analyzed these conditions I guess we can easily answer the title question: will the reunified Germany rise to great power again?

To summarize in advance: the conditions of modern Germany's great power and of her expansionist drive were

1. evolutionary innovations of modernity in
   - state administration, especially modern state bureaucracy
   - military, especially the modern army
   - modern technology, e.g. chemical industry, automobile
   - religion (reformation), philosophy, arts (especially in music and literature),
     sciences and humanities.

But this was by far not sufficient to set up a great power that was the second largest industrial power of the world (behind the USA). Like Britain it needed a special high motivation. This existed in the form of

2. an extreme degree of socio-psychological authoritarianism of all kinds, which led, together with other conditions and reasons, to the German expansionism.

   Besides the trivial condition, namely modern capitalism, the other reasons were these:
   - premodern power elites not or hardly checked by democracy,
very repressive institutions and rigid, anti-individualistic life forms,
—premodern oriented and imperialist nationalism.

III.

For illustrating these theses let us make an excursion in the structural history.

Germany is situated in the center of Europe and borders upon nine different neighbours. She has never had natural borders, on the contrary her borders have incessantly shifted in both directions, inwards and outwards. She has been the transit country, the bridge between the big parts of Europe. Whoever goes from West Europe to East Europe, from North Europe to South Europe and inversely, passes through Germany. There is hardly a people of Europe and even of the world that has not warred against or in Germany. She is the country in which in modern times most wars have taken place. But I do not want to present her as a victim—Germany started a lot of wars herself.

Many who have been warring with or passing through Germany begot children or settled down. In spite of the Nazi delusion of race purity the Germans are the most mixed and heterogeneous people of Europe. And they are the most divided and torn apart by differences, contrasts, oppositions and antagonisms. If there are nations proud of their racial and cultural homogeneity and harmony, the Germans could be proud of the opposite: of their diversity and habits of conflict and strife. In Germany every position develops its own metaphysical system deduced from axiomatic grounds which by definition does not permit any compromise or emotion. For centuries in the modern age the Germans were known for their rigid-rationalist, and sometimes also bizarre, excessive phantasy and dogmatic and queer spirituality which created the great composers and the great philosophers and macro-theorists, e.g. Böhme, Leibniz, Herder, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Bachofen, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Freud, Frege, Weber, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Popper, Benjamin, Bloch, Adorno, Habermas, Luhmann. In politics, however, this phantasy and dogmatism advanced the march into the German catastrophes of the 20th century.

As the Germans never for a long time lived under quiet conditions and within safe borders, they could never build a strong societal identity of the modern type. Therefore, the borders were not only changing by force, but also peripheral parts of Germany separated and became independent nations, partially speaking German still today and considering themselves provinces of the German speaking culture. Germany today is surrounded by a circle of small countries and parts of other countries that originally belonged to the old German empire: Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and North Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine, South Tyrol, Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia. Also in the central regions of Germany the so-called particularism was triumphant from the decay of the medieval empire until the middle of the 19th century. The central government in these early modern times was weak, sometimes little more than a grandiose title with plenty of prestige. Germany was divided in more than 1000 small and medium states almost sovereign and often allied with foreign powers against the imperial government. Besides the ethничal, political and economic heterogeneity and contrasts a new and dangerous division rose after Luther's reformation: the division into creeds hostile to each other.
This caused decades of religious wars. For centuries the forces of systemic and social integration were dispersed and it looked like Germany would never unite again and the German people would dissolve in a not too far future and leave behind only a language and some memories of past glory like so many other peoples in world history.

But there were not only the forces of disruption in German history. As the second fundamental feature of Germany, it must be mentioned that a kind of, so to say, dialectical integration developed out of the center position. Germany was the bridge and crossing of two civilization exchanges which form the fundamentals of European history.

The first exchange is between north and south. The south represents warmth, luxury, passion. The north cold, austerity, soberness and rationality. The flood usually follows the age-old desire which already led most indoEuropean tribes, the Illyrians, Greeks, Hitites and Aryans and later also the Teutons from north to south. And yet there is, especially in modern times, an inverse stream: to the north.

The second exchange is between west and east. As the Greek-Roman civilization and christianity took their way from the south via Gallia, i.e. the country which later became France, and via the British archipelago to central Europe and from there to the rest of Europe, the west represents civilization and advanced learning. The east stands for natural vigour and archaic customs unspoiled by civilization, for native wisdom and mystical piety.

Germany is situated in the middle of both exchanges. She trades, transports and bridges, mediates and synthesizes (and developed rapidly at the end of the middle ages). This position provides the chance of a, though weak, identity for her. It is a shaky integration of the opposite sides, an integration which sometimes attained the level of a fertile synthesis. Towards each side Germany has to keep up the other side. If she would have given up this difficult dialectical identity and fallen for one side, she would have lost the richness and complexity of the various elements. It would have been an evolutionary regression whatever advantages a more quiet, solid and homogeneous position could offer. The weak identity survived all the centuries of disruption and disintegration, a dialectical identity of mutual defense and mediation.

The rapid development in the 15th century generated a blossoming trade capitalism and already a considerable manufacture capitalism, the first process of cultural modernization (Luther's Reformation) and the peasants' revolution against the feudal agriculture in the 16th century. However, these modernization attempts failed due to the "particularism", i.e. the splintering of regions and provinces. At the end the feudal order emerged stronger than before. In the 17th century Germany was so disrupted that almost all neighbour countries were involved in her interior politics and at last the tensions and conflicts escalated to the Thirty Years War 1618-48. The terrible devastations broke the civilization in major parts of Germany and threw back her development by a century. For a long time after the war Germany was stagnant and her culture came under the hegemony of France which accomplished her absolutist unity in the 17th century and rose to supremacy in Europe.

An independent German culture worth mentioning did not reappear before the middle of the 18th century. The forces of modernization increased again in many fields but were hemmed by the numerous borders of the small absolutist states covering the whole area of Germany and strictly curbing all developments that could endanger them. Only Austria
and, later, Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria offered larger space for development.

Under these conditions a peculiar structure of German modernization grew up in the 18th and 19th century and had a deep impact on world history in the 20th century. Let us briefly remember what the primary modernization which realizes the ideas of liberalism and democratism means in the different societal dimensions:

1. **in economy**
   - primary industrialization and
   - development of modern capitalism.

2. **in politics**
   - rights of man,
   - general suffrage,
   - modern parliament and free political public,
   - modern law system and independent justice,
   - modern bureaucratic administration and military,
   - nation state.

3. **in culture**
   - universalist-individualist procedure morality in religion or philosophy,
   - secular arts,
   - modern sciences and humanities,
   - modern educational system; compulsory elementary education.

In contrast to West Europe the German economy developed very slowly due to the break-down of civilization in the 17th century and to the splintering into small states. Industry and production capitalism reached the phase of take-off not before the 1840's and 1850's, seventy years after Britain, forty years after France. For a long time the economically independent bourgeoisie remained small in numbers and weak in politics. Accordingly, the nation state was attained not before 1871, full parliamentarism and democracy not before 1918 after the defeat in the First World War. Democracy was lost in the Nazi empire 1933-45 and regained after the defeat in the Second World War.

Germany led the evolutionary progress to modernity in state administration, military and many technologies. This is no wonder because Germany had been the war theater of Europe and been divided in a great number of sovereign absolutist-bureaucratic states, between 30 and 40 even in the middle of the 19th century. It was not only ill-famed Prussia who brought forth these ambivalent pioneer innovations; some other German states had part in them as well.

On the other hand Germany, partially still at present, excelled in the innovations in culture, especially in religion, philosophy, music, literature and in many sciences and humanities. This is the result of the following factors:

- The dialectical synthesis of the enormous diversity, heterogeneity and contradictions.
- The splintering, provincialism and isolation, however, hindered the relativism and pragmatism, the softening of opposite positions which a big metropolis like Paris and London furthers. The German provincialism enhanced the starry-eyed and ivory-towered abstractness, eccentric radicalism and abstruse subjectivity. The forces of integration could only ensure a weak national identity, a common standard language and some other traditions and a moderately intensive exchange.
- Protestantism was secularized to a similar defiant-subjectivist idealism.
As the bourgeois forces were strongly checked in economy and politics by the small states well into the first half of the 19th century, they shifted their interest to culture as a substitute. This was happening with an intensity (and starry-eyed idealism) that caused foreign astonishment. In German culture public servants, especially teachers, professors, parsons and their offspring were dominant till into the late 19th century.

In the late 18th century the secularized Protestantism, the rationalist and mystical philosophy and some influence by the enlightenment of the more advanced West Europe gave rise to a subjectivist universalism in Germany. Its main ideals were the free, godlike allround development of everyman and the family-like harmonious community of mankind, interior and exterior nature. It was passionately opposed to capitalist modernity and its universalism of instrumental rationality, i.e. of technology, market, and bureaucracy. This modernist antimodernism associated, on the one hand, with the common feudal-premodernist opposition towards all modernity (the old conservativism or traditionalism). This marriage created romanticism from which via late and neoromanticism the racist, reactionary nationalist and fascist ideologies descended in the 20th century. On the other hand via Hegelian dialectic the modernist antimodernism led down to the aftermodernism of Marx etc. and of some anarchisms. So in German culture we see the bizarre constellation that an extremely abstract and, therefore, in society hardly influential modernism is confronted with a strong double-headed antimodernism which has digested modernist subjectivism: romantic premodernism on the right and Marxist aftermodernism on the left, but both with latent exchanges. The descendants of romanticism, the chauvinist and fascist ideologies, and Marxism became the contrasting theoretical instructions and legitimations for the now definitively failed attempts of the 20th century to correct or overcome the late modernity which follows a path of recurrent crises and crisis managements. These crises and crisis managements of modernity and the attempts of antimodernisms made the core of world history in the metropolitan modernized countries in the 20th century.

Under guidance by state bureaucracy (especially in Prussia), which had learned the necessity of some modernization from its defeats by the revolutionary and then Napoleonic France 1792–1807 (as later the Tsarist bureaucracy learnt from its defeat in the Crimea War 1853–56 or the Japanese from the forced kaikoku of 1856), German industrial capitalism quickly grew to the greatest industrial power of Europe. France and Russia were dethroned from their continental supremacy from the middle of 19th century. In this era the fundamental structure of the heterogeneous modernity was formed which E. Bloch called "nonsimultaneous". We may call it also "partial modernity". I think, it is a societal structure of utmost importance. It appears in almost all late, catching-up modernizations except Scandinavia, Canada and Australia. It was first outlined in the Russian catching up with early modernity in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Germany, especially Prussia, developed it into its complete shape in the 19th century and fostered it to a kind of counter-paradigm against the West until the era of deep change 1964–78. I give a rough sketch:

(1) The whole range of legitimizing politics (political public, parliament etc.), the family and similar institutions of leisure time, the educational system and culture remain premodern, at most modernized only to a small degree. Beside the pre- and partially modern power elites (feudal aristocracy, priest hierarchy, upper echelons of absolutist state bureaucracy and of military) there are genuinely modern power elites (modern capitalists,
modern bureaucracy), but they play only a junior role or are melted down by marriage into the traditional power elites.

(2) The opposite happens in the range of the societal functional systems providing the power means (economy, state administration and military as systems, technology and infra-structure). Except for the sectors that are the economic base of the premodern power elites (mostly large-scale agriculture and some time-honoured bureaucracies), in all these systems modernization is pressed on with strongest efforts of the government, often with state capitalist participation. The "developmental capitalist state" concentrates and dedicates all its strength and resources to the rapid growth of power. A more or less neoclassical economic policy and all kinds of promising measures are taken without much regard to premodern ideological restrictions. The premodern power elites view a strong and highly concentrated capitalism, a rational and efficient state administration, a supreme military, and superior technology as necessary means to ensure their domination inward and to realize their expansionist drive outwards by participating in the international imperialist rat race.

In general, the power elites in this type of society want the socio-culture and politics to be as premodern and backward, i.e. antiliberal, undemocratic, antisocialist, as possible. The systems of power means, on the contrary, should be as modern as possible. The anti-modernism in socio-culture and politics and the promodernism in economy, administration and military share the same goal: defending and enhancing the position of the power elites.

This linking of patriarchal ideology, militarist and authoritarian state with an expansive capitalism usually generates

—grave frictions between premodern and modern structures so that more conflicts are added and often intertwined with the normal conflicts in modern society, e.g. the struggle between capitalists and workers.

—The patriarchalist familism means a lack of modern liberties, especially of individual autonomy and of institutions for collective conflict processing and solving. This societal authoritarianism dams up aggressions and frustrations. Under the surface of rigid harmony a general aggressivity, anxiety and cold ritualism dyes the whole social atmosphere which leads to common hypocrisy and an all-day masquerade in order to keep up the conventional harmony. As the non-democratic power elites need not care for the freedom, happiness and welfare of the masses or see in them only means for keeping them quiet and working, the masses mostly have to lead a dreary life of labour, austerity and servility for which they are compensated by the collective narcissism of chauvinist propaganda.

—Instead of the modern, institutionalized universalism a very reactionary ethnocentrism in the form of expansionist and racist chauvinism fills the minds and media. There are megalomaniac messianic ideologies of an unique uniqueness, of a role as world saver or world leader endowed by nature or God. Paranoid ideas of world conspiracies against and encirclements of the nation swiftly recur whenever a crisis stirs up society. These ideologies direct most of the dammed-up aggressions and frustrations outwards: against minorities and foreigners.

—The traditional authoritarianism of the mind which is fixed on firm hierarchies takes in more and more narcissist elements while living with modern rationality and perceiving how traditional religions and the sacralized father authority are hollowed. The traditional authoritarianism, thus, grows into a modern one which is most adequately represented by
the type of phallic rebel who can shift his delusions of persecution, grandiosity and expansion from his ego to dynamic brother- and mother-collectives (as class, race, nation, mankind) and back. No matter whether retainer or leader of fervent ambitions, he always harbours vehement aggressions which drive him by paranoid projections against exterior enemies and direct his megalomania toward expansions in order to conquer and control the world.

In all ranges, as we see, in economy, politics, culture and socio-psychological structures the partial or heterogeneous modernity leads to aggression and directs the aggression toward minorities and foreigners. The authoritarianism and xenophobic aggressiveness reenforce the political and socio-cultural backwardness. For their modernization is shown as an invasion by hostile aliens. And they strengthen the modernization of the functional systems by more discipline and efforts, also by the sham reasoning that the defence against the hostile aliens needs more means of power. The increased societal structure of heterogeneity again generates more aggressions etc. The circle clashes, of course, also with hindrances, experiences defeats, comes across counter-currents and encounters oppositions— which altogether can weaken or even neutralize it. In case of additional favourable circumstances however, as with Germany, Japan or Russia, the thesis of this circle may explain why these great powers ventured on an extremely expansionist course.

The structure of heterogeneity usually undergoes a deep change earlier or later in the 20th century. It does not change its core but enhances its ability to adapt. The premodern power elites disappear, either in the wake of lost wars and of revolutions or due to further modernizations which e.g. fascist regimes carry out. By that also the premodern elements in politics, socio-culture and psychological structure weaken and diminish. Nevertheless they retain strong and vital footholds. But robbed of their class base they are entirely functionalized for the modern power elites, i.e. for the capitalists, upper echelons of modern state bureaucracy, of modern military and conservative parties. The modern power elites make good use of premodern attitudes, symbols, masks and remaining traditions to complete and strengthen their domination. They save a good deal of direct costs which would rise from friction, conflict and violent suppression.

IV.

The specifically German form of heterogeneous modernity, in contrast to the Russian, Japanese etc. forms, is characterized by the facts that

(1) Germany had a very early start of modernization in the 16th century which unfortunately was soon stopped. But she stayed in close contact and exchange with the neighbouring modernization centers of West Europe. And she developed evolutionary innovations herself in the 18th and 19th centuries, when her modernization started again. Therefore, Germany did not feel modernization to come from outside, to be totally strange or alien like Russia felt or even more Japan.

Nevertheless also in Germany, as I already said, a strong antimodernist premodernism rose as early as in the second half of the 18th century. The old conservativism and romanticism originated all premodernist and fascist ideologies. Still in the 1960’s one could listen to German teachers discoursing on the contrast of German culture against Western civilization. The lack of modernity was considered the specific and approvable essence of Ger-
many, which must be preserved and defended against Western enlightenment. We know these litanies all too well from Tsarist Russia, from Japan, Spain, India etc.

Inspite of the vigorous premodernism the weak German modernism had brilliant champions: Lessing, Kant, Schiller, Heine, Börne, Feuerbach and the left Hegelians, later Max Weber. And it got brave allies in the 20th century: I mean the social democrats who mark the second difference of Germany from other heterogeneously modernized societies:

(2) As I have mentioned, German culture brought forth the greatest theories of aftermodernism, not only the theory of Marx and Engels but also, with different approaches, of Nietzsche, Freud, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Habermas. Among them Marxism has played the greatest role in the world in general as well as in Germany.

Socialist theory accompanied the German labour movement right from the beginning, and Marxism was officially adopted in the 1880’s. The German labour movement grew into the biggest, most powerful and best organized in the world, but their unions and their own political practice soon became, step by step since the turn of the century, pragmatic: reformist and revisionist, and even patriotic when the First World War broke out. Yet before this patriotic turn-about, the movement’s radical anticapitalist theory and revolutionary rhetoric as well as the continuing growth of the number of its voters over decades alarmed the power elites and increased the tendency of the bourgeoisie to submit to the pre- and half-modern power elites or to fuse with them. Thus, paradoxically, the strong social democracy aiming at aftermodern goals indirectly strengthened the forces of premodernism and the circle of heterogeneous modernity. Since the late 1890’s the power elites felt so endangered by the growing labour movement and its radical announcements of an imminent revolution that some planned a coup d’état, and a general agreement increased to heat up chauvinism and turn the internal discontent of the masses to external expansion, first by colonialism, later by war. Might and radicalism of the labour movement augmented the antagonisms in the German society and, tragically, indirectly added to the aggressive expansionism of the elites.

Since the turn of the century, however, the major part of the labour movement left socialism for social democratism, i.e. the third movement for modernization after liberalism and democratism. It is a movement to widen and complete the primary modernity. This change within the labour movement vastly strengthened the weak bourgeois modernity in Germany.

The combination of evolutionary progress and heterogeneous modernity made Germany, in spite of her unprotected center position in Europe, to a hegemonial great power vying with Britain, France and Russia. As a late-coming up-start she endangered the established order of the older great powers, especially of leading Britain, and entailed an alliance of these powers against her. Feeling encircled and in order to make use of her headstart in industry and armament before Russia would catch up Germany started the First World War. As the USA joined the Anti-German coalition in 1917, the balance of resources shifted even more to its disfavour. Germany lost the war in 1918 and went through her third revolution (after 1424/25 and 1848/49). This time the revolution was a success. The premodern power elites were partly dethroned, partly weakened. But the revolution unfortunately did not go far enough. The social democrats pursued a very maladroit policy which slowed the revolutionary drive and impetus. They were afraid that the communists who had left the party during the World War and formed their own party in 1918 would
take over. The social democrats managed, together with the bourgeois-modern forces, to establish the first German democracy, the so-called Weimar republic, which proved to be a rather shaky affair. The post-war crises lasted till 1923, radical leftist and extreme rightists staged rebellions, riots and tumults of all kind, and at last the weakened capitalists succeeded, in cooperation with state bureaucracies, in feeding a giant inflation that dampened the political radicals by direct economic plight.

From 1924 till 1929 Germany, again the second biggest industrial power, enjoyed a short period of prosperity. In those years Berlin became the cultural metropolis of Europe. It was the first democracy after several failed attempts, and it was not a mere bourgeois democracy but already social-democratized to a certain degree. Bismarck, the founder of the second empire, had started to build a welfare state (in order to lure the proletarians away from the revolutionary labour movement). The social democrats could realize more reforms in the revolution 1918/19.

Yet the Weimar Republic’s prosperity stood on hollow grounds:

— The defeat in the World War traumatized the national narcissism. And the international proscription of Germany by the victors, her longstanding exclusion from the League of Nations, the extremely heavy reparations and the invasion by France 1923 did not help to alleviate the trauma.
— Because of the war costs and reparations Germany was to a high degree dependent on US-American capital.
— Her modernity structure of heterogeneity still existed, and chauvinism was not appeased by the just mentioned facts but, on the contrary, sharply irritated. It nourished a strong chauvinistic party favouring monarchy and, later, the slowly but steadily growing Nazi party.
— From 1925/26 the communists had submitted to the guidance of the Soviet-controlled Comintern and thought fighting the social democrats their main task. They did not take the Nazi menace seriously and deepened the split in the labour movement.

In 1929 and the following years Germany was hit by the most severe economic crisis especially after the US-American credits were hastily withdrawn. The crisis hit all the capitalist world, it was, however, as facts demonstrate, without any doubt Germany who was suffering by far the most. In 1932 almost half of the labour force was unemployed and an additional fifth was put on short time work. In 1930 the establishment pushed out the co-opted social democrats and started a half authoritarian government. In 1932/33 it co-opted the hugely grown Nazi movement on which it pinned the hope that it would lure the masses away from the left and crush the communists and social democrats as well as the bourgeois democracy in order to help reestablish a more authoritarian regime.

The Nazi empire was an extremely reactionary and barbarian warfare state committing historic crimes. This all is well known to everybody so I need not comment on it. What is, however, mostly forgotten in the painting of that heinous regime, but was early pointed out by some famous sociologists such as R. Dahrendorf and T. Parsons, is the fact that the Nazis took not only all-out efforts to speed up modernization in technology and military but also kept a cool distance towards the old power elites. Their totalitarian mobilization of the masses destroyed or marginalized much of the old elites’ fabric. Especially in the Second World War the fascist mobilization of the so-called national community, the strong features of technocracy and of militarism tore down a great deal of the premodern establish-
The rest was done by war destruction and at last by the total defeat in 1945 and by the dismembering of the German territory and expulsion of Germans from the Eastern quarter of their land which was annexed by the Soviet Union and Poland as compensation for the Nazi aggression.

Central Germany became the new East Germany, and the Soviets established a communist state there by force. For some years they hoped that whole Germany would be reunited and then turned neutral. But the rapidly escalating Cold War made the USA afraid of a neutral Germany. She preferred the part of Germany which the Western Allies had occupied and which was the far larger part and also better equipped with industries and endowed with natural resources to become a separate state closely allied to the West. Founded in 1949, the West German Federal Republic, Germany's second bourgeois democracy, soon developed a prosperous economy aided by the USA and promoted by the Korean War boom, cheap qualified labour by immigration from the eastern parts, almost no reparations and low military costs, a currency kept undervalued over the years and the general reconstruction and backlog demand (conditions similar to those for the Japanese boom in the 50's). In the shadow of the Cold War after 1945 the Western Allies had soon watered down their purge of survived Nazi adherents from West Germany because the ex-Nazis' specialist knowledge, expert capacities and influence were needed for the quick setting in motion and reconstruction of West Germany. In addition, their chauvinistic anticommunism appeared to be a valuable ally to the West's anticommunism, if it was just changed from manifest chauvinism to a so-called occidental anticommunism which led the "Free World" against the Eastern powers of darkness and slavery. After the initial years of screening and sentencing the Western Allies handed the matter of denazification over to West German justice. But it busied itself with other things and dragged its feet on prosecution of Nazi crimes in the 50's.

Anyway, the second German democracy has been much firmer than the first, not only because it was carried along by a prospering economy, but also because Germany was soon integrated into NATO, EC etc. The disaster-bearing structure of heterogeneous modernity had been much weakened by Nazism, war and post-war events. The premodern power elites had vanished. But as the denazification was negligently carried out and prematurely given up, and as the Western allies far too early and too eagerly co-opted the West German power elites descending from the Nazi era for the Cold War-fare against communism, a good deal of that heterogeneous modernity survived, drove on the so-called economic miracle of West Germany and formed an essential part of its societal identity.

In the 60's deep change began. The West German economy plunged into the first grave post-war crisis, the state into financial plight, and the architect of the West German resurgence, the conservative chancellor Adenauer, had to resign. Also the West German foreign policy, the main goal of which was to compel the SU by German integration into the West to give way to reunification, proved to have failed, especially when the SU divided Berlin by the wall in 1961. The policy of confrontation against the East appeared too costly to more and more people. Younger and more democratic forces came up and launched large lawsuits against the Nazi criminals. The media covered the trials in detail over many years and constantly incited the "Aufarbeitung" of the past, i.e. the historical research and the moral discussion on the Nazi Reich by the population, especially by the younger Germans.

Also the opposition underwent some change. Since 1959 the social democrats dis-
carded the rest of the Marxist theory and of the socialist programme for ever and wheeled about to the course of an entirely social democratic reform capitalism. By this turn they gained the possibility of access to government. The communists had been condemned to insignificance by the voters and could, therefore, not occupy the position of radical mass opposition left by the social democrats. In the 50's at first writers and intellectuals moved in (or just stayed where they had been and did not follow the social democrats' moderation). Afterwards appeared the students' protest movement.

In the culture of the mid-sixties, as the great trials on the Nazi concentration camp criminals displayed the incredible Nazi atrocities to the public, conservativism and irrationalism decreased and were replaced by a general mood of absurdity and disgust, also of angry discontent with the established structures, and soon by a growing propensity to rebellion and provocation. Since 1967, like in other capitalist societies, the waves of the protest movement surged, at first among the students, in the 70's also among other groups. Until 1978 West Germany was stirred up by deep unrest. Vehement drives for more democracy were aiming beyond the narrow institutions of bourgeois formal democracy. This decade of what was often called a revolution of socio-culture saw the downfall of the remaining heterogeneity. The criticism inspired by the Frankfurt School of the authoritarianism deeply influenced many fields of socio-culture and effected the late completion of the modernity at least in West Germany.

In the first years the students' movement understood itself in terms of the Frankfurt Neomarxism. Later, many groups rehashed the orthodox party Marxism down to the Stalinist Diamat. After the naive expectations of an impending revolution had not been fulfilled, a great many students and young newcomers retreated to nonpolitical life reforms in the 70's and became the so-called Alternatives. But at the end of this wild decade the ecological current of the life reform movement returned to politics, and in the beginning of the 80's the environmentalists and fighters for extension of liberal-democratic rights (e.g. to women, foreigners) founded the Green Party. It was the fourth and fifth movement of modernization. The German ecology movement is, I guess, one of the strongest in the world, like the labour movement was in former times.

There are some deeper parallels. From the turn of the century till 1918 the aftermodernist socialism was being split into social democratism, the third movement of modernization, and into the further on aftermodernist communism. Likewise the aftermodernist protest movement of the 60's was split into Alternatives and Greens, the fourth and fifth movement of modernization (which yet carried also after- and premodernist elements with them) and into the further aftermodernist revivals of communist orthodoxy and terrorist anarchism. An even deeper similarity can be found in the effected modernization. The German bourgeoisie deserted its revolution in 1848/49 because of its weakness and its fear of the proletariat. Also its later attempts to take over political power from 1864 to 66 were only half-hearted. It was the revolution by the workers and soldiers in 1918 tamed by the social democrats which had to do the bourgeois task: to establish a bourgeois democracy (with some social democratic supplements). The social democrats' slowing of the revolution spared a big part of the heterogeneous structures. Also the upheaval from 1967 to 78 was originally oriented to aftermodernist ideas. They failed again, and in the end they caused the complete bourgeois modernization, the complete bourgeois democratization of West Germany, with social democratic, radical democratic and ecological supplements and
admixtures.

The deep changes since the 1960's are, looking at their core, nothing specific to Germany but happened and are happening in other metropolitan societies too, even in the early and homogeneously modernized societies of the West. What differs is the extent, degree of radicalism and some contents. In Germany the radicalism, the strength and the impact of these movements were a heritage of the old antimodernism of the pre- as well as of the aftermodernism. Seen socio-psychologically, the deep changes are not only a matter of value change but originally a change in the predominant social character caused by affluent consumerism which the present capitalism needs and by the change of family structure and modes of socialization which were introduced by this stage of capitalism and consumerism. The type of post-materialism that fosters democracy and protection of environment and the type of consumerist narcissism have been rising to predominance. This has been vastly researched and discussed in the pertinent social sciences since 1970.

The change is linked to the now attained level of capitalist accumulation and, therefore, cannot be avoided in advanced capitalist societies, as one can study in the example of Japan whose power elites for a long time struggled to keep these changes down. In the meanwhile, affluent consumerism has vanquished most bastions in Japan and is spreading without being much checked any longer (post-materialism, however, has yet nothing to celebrate). Present capitalism needs demand by affluent consumption, by conspicuous consumption and the like. Reversing this process, reversing the socio-cultural and political effects of the fourth and fifth modernization is, as long as capitalism is overaccumulated, very difficult and can be achieved only to a low degree—these were the experiences of the West German conservatives after they proclaimed the "turnabout of tendency" in the wake of the first oil crisis 1973/74 and tried to realize it after their takeover of government in 1982.

V.

This brings us to the present time. Let us recall to our mind the conditions for Germany's former great power and expansionism:

(1) evolutionary innovations in bureaucracy, military technology, and in religion, philosophy, arts and sciences. Further the aspects of heterogeneous modernity:

(2) a very high degree of narcissistic authoritarianism in the predominant socio-psychological types;

(3) premodern power elites and prevailing premodern structures in socio-culture and politics; a strong labour movement with aftermodernist goals;

(4) traditionally oriented and imperialist nationalism in the context of strong premodernism; besides strong aftermodernism and weak modernism.

Not to forget the external condition:

(5) the international system in the form of aggressive and unlimited imperialist competition which Germany joined as a late-coming up-start.

Today, all these conditions have vanished for ever or have been weakened.

(1) the evolutionary head starts have been caught up with, of course, after such a long time. The high level of instrumental rationality and efficiency in state administration, military, technology and economy is still striking. Similar things can be said about the
other fields of former evolutionary lead. In present German philosophy and macrotheory there are still (or again) some great figures which can be viewed as founders of new paradigms.

(2) the present degree of authoritarianism is estimated to be not significantly higher than in France or other West European societies as results of empirical research repeatedly have shown. But the authoritarians’ camp gets a considerable supply by the annexation of East Germany. In her population the degree of authoritarianism has certainly decreased since 1945 but because of lack of democracy and of any protest movement it is still much higher than in West Germany.

(3) The premodern power elites and social structures have perished as well as the aftermodernist labour movement. The latter’s present remainder in East Germany is doomed for speedy extinction.

(4) Similar things must be said of the theories and ideologies. In West Germany nationalism notoriously was weak for decades, especially among the younger generations. In the wake of reunification it has increased, but remains still within the usual limits existent in West and North European societies. Moreover, the predominant type of nationalism has, in the meanwhile, developed a modern orientation (i.e. the idea of a democratic contract nation with ethnic-cultural traditions) and has long abandoned the old imperialist goals.

Where have the famous German pre- and aftermodernism, the neoromanticism of all shades and Marxism, Freidianism etc., gone? Of course, they are still existing, esp. in academic niches and circles. A good deal also lives on in radical ecology. But except for the Habermas School which since the 80’s has turned to an ecologically enriched social democratism there are no great antimodernist theories at present. Perhaps powerful antimodernism will later resuscitate—some German intellectuals are hoping for it. But perhaps the great antimodernism has ended with the German heterogeneous modernity.

(5) The international system has modified its imperialist character, at first when competing with the Soviet state socialism and threatened by the atomic weapons developed in the Cold War. Another modification was later due to the relations with the Third World after the repercussions by the two World Wars had freed the colonies from the metropolitan countries. War as a form of conflict between metropolitan states has been cancelled for the time being for the following reasons:

—multilateral possession of atomic weapons which can render the earth uninhabitable makes a war too high a risk. The same is true to a lesser degree considering the so-called conventional arms that nowadays are so extremely effective that every aggressor risks too grave damage in his own country by the return strikes of the attacked;

—metropolitan societies have become so complex, differentiated and dependent on sensitive apparatuses, devices and organizations that already little interferences or troubles trigger the break-down of large sectors of society;

—many economic and political interests and socio-cultural interactions and internationally intertwined;

—the growing consumerism and post-materialism generate a pacifism that comprises all shades from ethics to consumer egoism. Who is still willing to sacrifice his life “at the alter of the fatherland” these days? Certainly not many people in Germany.

Metropolitan countries, therefore, do not apply military measures against each other
any longer, but still do against countries in the Third World where the risk of a dangerous back-lash is still low.

The imperialist competition has altered also in economy and politics, especially because of the just-mentioned international connections. However, this does not exclude conflicts between metropolitan countries, even not vehement conflicts. We must not fall for the pseudo-internationalist ideology of "globalization". Now as before, the nation states are existing. They do not have the full range of sovereignty any longer, but the major part of economy and, above all, the labour force continues to rely on national policy.

In those frames, especially in NATO and EC, Germany has been tied to international regimes and intertwined with her neighbouring countries for decades. She is no disturbing newcomer and has long accepted the international system of mutual checks and balances in Europe.

Under all those changed and modified conditions Germany is not at all likely to indulge in a brinkmanship and to take to expansionism again. Naturally, her power will grow in a Europe that shifts its axes back to their former position after the Yalta order fell down. Germany is situated in the center of Europe again. She will be a greater power than before 1990 after the West German capitalists will have digested East Germany within five or six years. But she will be a regional power, no global power again. She will be a power only together with Europe. Without or against Europe, I am glad to predict, a German great power is not possible any more. Also the German conservatives have understood this basic fact from the beginning of reunification.