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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.15057/25380
Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/25380

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Title
COMPARING COURNOT DUOPOLY AND MONOPOLY WITH ASYMMETRIC DIFFERENTIATED GOODS
Creator
Creator Name
CHANG, MING CHUNG CHANG, MING CHUNG
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
National Central University
Creator Name
LIN, YUN-CHIEH LIN, YUN-CHIEH
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
National I-Lan University
Creator Name
LIN, CHIU FEN LIN, CHIU FEN
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
National Central University
Key Word
Cournot duopoly
multi-product monopoly
output structure
horizontal merger
antitrust policy
JEL
L12
L13
L41
Abstract
This study compares a differentiated Cournot duopoly with a two-product monopoly by using the socially optimal solution as a reference point. Each solution is allowedto be either an interior or a corner solution. We establish that the ranking regarding each individual price is clear-cut and normal. In contrast, every one of the rankings regarding individual outputs and industry output can go either way. More importantly, the duopoly may be less welfare-efficient than the monopoly. For example, when demands are linear, lower welfare is achieved if the asymmetry between firms is strong enough. One reason is that when firms are asymmetric, the output structure in the duopoly is distorted with probability one, whereas the output structure in the monopoly is generally socially optimal.
Publisher
Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2012-12
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
departmental bulletin paper
Version Type
VoR
selfDOI
10.15057/25380
ISSN
0018-280x
NCID
AA00207547
Source Title
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
Volume Number
53
Issue Number
2
Page Start
177
Page End
200
Appears in Collections
Vol. 53, no. 2 (Dec. 2012)
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/25380