

Kleandridas in Exile: A Spartan in Thurii

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Of all the affairs in which Kleandridas – a military man and member, in all likelihood, of the Spartan elite –¹ was involved, the one that marked his rather tumultuous career – and is most frequently mentioned in the sources – is his role as king Pleistoanax’s military adviser in 446 BC, during the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians.

The year 446 was a difficult one for the Athenians, who faced two defections that exploded almost simultaneously: first the defection of the Euboeans and, immediately after, that of the Megarians. Pericles was in Euboea at the head of the Athenian forces; when he heard news of the Megarian revolt and the preparations of the Peloponnesians for an imminent incursion into Attica, he decided to return immediately.

According to Thucydides “...Pericles in haste brought his army back again from Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, ravaging the country; but without going further they returned home.”² Let us note that Thucydides makes reference to the unexpected withdrawal of the Peloponnesians in 446 three times³ without ever mentioning Kleandridas, though the author probably knew the circumstances of the adviser’s exile.⁴

It is in this strange and sudden departure that Kleandridas was involved according to Plutarch’s much discussed account. Nevertheless, Plutarch presents a different version of the event: he records⁵ that king Pleistoanax, due to his age (since he was probably under 30),⁶ was accompanied by a group of advisers. Kleandridas – the only adviser whose name is recorded in the sources – held an important position and was also a major influence on the king. Pericles, fully apprised of the situation, discreetly gauged the degree of Kleandridas’ probity

1 See S. Hodkinson (2009), *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta*, Swansea, p. 415; A. Powell (2010), ‘Divination, Royalty and Insecurity in Classical Sparta’ in A. Powell & S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Sparta: The Body Politic*, Swansea, p. 102 n. 50.

2 Thucydides 1. 114. 1-2 (Transl. by Charles Forster Smith, Loeb Classical Library); unless otherwise stated, all translations, in the present article, are taken from the Loeb editions.

3 Thuc. 1. 114. 1-2; 2. 21. 1; 5. 16. 3.

4 See *infra* n. 11.

5 Plutarch, *Pericles*, 22; Plutarch follows Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70 F 193). See also Diodorus 13. 106. 10; Diodorus calls Kleandridas “Klearchus”; see P. Green (2010), *Diodorus Siculus, The Persian Wars to the Fall of Athens: Books 11-14.34 (480-401 BCE)*, Austin, p. 263 n. 127.

6 See e.g., M. White (1964), “Some Agiad Dates: Pausanias and his Sons,” *JHS* 84, p. 140-152.

and, having quickly corrupted him with bribes, convinced him to withdraw the Peloponnesian troops.⁷

Modern scholars, deeming that the alleged bribery is not a convincing explanation of the unexpected retreat of the Peloponnesian army have suggested other possible interpretations. Thus, some scholars have argued that the alleged bribery of Kleandridas (and equally of Pleistoanax) provided the easiest and most expedient explanation for the hasty retreat of the Peloponnesian forces from Attica. Bribery was often suspected in instances of unexpected or unwarranted actions by prominent men. Indeed, when a leader fails to ensure victory or to take advantage of an opportunity, it is easy to infer that he was bribed.

Furthermore, it has been suggested that Pericles had offered to Kleandridas and probably to the Spartan king, something more important than money: Pericles may have proposed a peace treaty, which would actually be formally concluded two or three months later. As a consequence, it is likely that the main clauses of the so-called *Thirty Years Peace* had already been agreed upon before the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Attica and that the real bribery to the two Spartan leaders was the offer to surrender or discuss the surrender of Megara and other important cities which were under Athenian control. Indeed, it would not be groundless to maintain that Kleandridas' maneuvers – and also those of Pleistoanax – simply precipitated the course of events, exactly as Sparta – or at least a considerable number of her citizens – wished.⁸

Nonetheless, the Spartans were outraged by the sudden return of the army. Rumors of bribery naturally surfaced; besides, even if the accusations of corruption were groundless, withdrawal and inaction were considered tantamount to treason.

Hence, the two Spartan leaders received severe sentences: a huge fine was imposed on the king, the full amount of which he was unable to pay, and was consequently forced to take the road of exile.⁹ On the other hand, interestingly, the king's adviser was treated more severely than Pleistoanax: Kleandridas was condemned to death *in absentia*, and took refuge in southern Italy.¹⁰

7 The episode has been characterized as “novelistic”: A. J. Podlecki (1998), *Pericles and His Circle*, London, p. 73.

8 For bibliography and a more extensive discussion of the Peloponnesian withdrawal and the possible causes of it, see K. Mataranga's article “Cléandridas le Spartiate: un cas énigmatique” in *Conseillers et ambassadeurs dans l'Antiquité: compétences, modalités d'intervention et image*, ed. ISTA/DHA, 2016/2017 (forthcoming).

9 Pleistoanax remained some nineteen years in exile, having fled to neighboring Arcadia; see Thuc. 5. 16. 3: “...he had fled for refuge to Mt. Lycaeum, on account of his retreat from Attica, that was thought to be due to bribery and through fear of the Lacedaemonians had occupied at that time a house whereof the half was within the sanctuary of Zeus.”; on his exile see e.g., A. Powell (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 106, 128.

10 Plutarch, *Pericles* 22. 3: “When the army had withdrawn and had been disbanded to their several cities, the Lacedaemonians, in indignation, laid a heavy fine upon their king, the full amount of which he was unable to pay, and so betook himself out of Lacedaemon, while Cleandridas, who had gone into voluntary exile, was condemned to death.”

Plutarch's version, based on a non-thucydidean tradition, insists mainly on Kleandridas' corruption by Pericles and seems to be the most widely disseminated version. Kleandridas thus emerges as a corrupted person and this negative image survives through succeeding centuries despite the fact that he plays a distinguished role in the second period of his career, during his exile.

Kleandridas in Thurii

Kleandridas' activity in Thurii is rather fascinating not only because it draws a different picture of him than the one which became commonly known through Plutarch's narrative, but also because it sheds light on some aspects of the city's history.

Although Kleandridas seems to play a leading role in the military and political affairs of Thurii, on several occasions our knowledge is limited due the lack of related evidence. Kleandridas' presence in Thurii is first attested by Thucydides according to whom Kleandridas had earned full citizenship.¹¹ Strangely enough, the mere fact that Kleandridas had become a Thurian citizen is the only information Thucydides provides about Kleandridas.

In any case, many questions have been put forward concerning Kleandridas' 'western' career. To start with, the very choice of Thurii as a place of refuge raises issues and gives rise to conjectures. Apart from the broader question of why Kleandridas chose to head to the other side of the Ionian Sea, the choice of Thurii itself is an interesting matter for discussion.

The character of the city of Thurii was rather peculiar and its foundation has been closely linked with Athens¹² and especially with Pericles' policy, irrespective of its supposed imperialistic character.¹³ Thus, what was Kleandridas – a Spartan – doing in a city that was

11 Thuc. 6. 104. 2; see S. Hornblower (2008), "Greek Identity in Archaic and Classical Periods" in K. Zacharia (ed.), *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, Aldershot, p. 52-53 with notes; according to S. Hornblower (2012), "What Happened Later to the Families of Pindaric Patrons – and to Epinician Poetry?" (in P. Agócs, C. Carey, R. Rawles (eds.), *Reading the Victory Ode*, Cambridge), p. 100, Kleandridas "was a possessor of dual citizenship" of both Sparta and Thurii.

12 Diodorus gives us the fullest account of Thurii's foundation: 12. 9-1; the precise date of the last refoundation of Sybaris (c. 446/445), as well as the date of the new foundation of Thurii (c. 444/443), are uncertain. The foundation and character of the colony of Thurii has been a much discussed and controversial issue and the bibliography is rather rich; see e.g.: E. Greco (2014), "Sullo σχῆμα di Thurii: venti anni di ricerche con Silvana Luppino", *Annuario della Scuola Archeologica Italiana di Atene*, vol. XCCII, s. III, 14, p. 1-14; M. Bugno (1999), *Da Sibari a Thurii. La fine di un impero*, Naples, p. 112-134; A. J. Graham (1999²), *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*, Manchester, p. 35-39, 197-199; D. Kagan (1991), *Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy*, New York, p. 125-130; N. K. Rutter (1973), "Diodorus and the Foundation of Thurii", *Historia* XXII, p. 155-176; S. Accame (1955), "La fondazione di Turi", *Riv. Fil.* n.s. xxxiii, 164-174; V. Ehrenberg (1948), "The foundation of Thurii", *AJP* 69, p. 149-170.

13 For the *Panhellenic* character of Thurii and Athens' – especially Pericles' – political aims see e.g.: L. J. Samons (2016), *Pericles and the Conquest of History. A Political Biography*, Cambridge, p. 127-128 with notes; S. Hornblower (2002³), *The Greek World*, London & New York, p. 55; A. J. Podlecki (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 81 f.; D. Kagan (1969), *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, Ithaca & London, p. 156-169; see also supra n. 12. According to P. Cloché ("Périclès et la politique extérieure d'Athènes entre

claimed by the Athenians as their own colony? In actual fact, although many settlers came from various parts of the Greek world, the Peloponnese included, it seems that the Athenian element was quite strong and played an important role.¹⁴

Keeping in mind the general problem of the peculiarities of colonization in Italy,¹⁵ it could be assumed that Kleandridas chose to go to Thurii precisely because of the – much discussed – ‘panhellenic’ character of the new-founded, and rather unusual, colony. It has been also suggested that Thurii became a sort of shelter for “political exiles”.¹⁶ In addition, if the hypothesis that the settlers coming from the Peloponnese were limited to individuals opposed to Sparta¹⁷ is accepted, it can be assumed that Kleandridas would have been a leading figure among them.

Moreover, it has also been conjectured that Kleandridas was not merely an individual colonist from the Peloponnese who “went off in time to join in the founding of Thurii”,¹⁸ but that he may actually have been an *oikist* of the colony.¹⁹ Besides, in an effort to trace Kleandridas’ itinerary from Sparta to Thurii – though our sources remain silent – it has been proposed that Kleandridas arrived there through Athens,²⁰ this last conjecture is apparently

la paix de 446-445 et les préludes de la guerre du Péloponnèse”, *AC* 14/1, 1945), p. 99: “En somme, si la fondation de Thourioi n’est pas exclusivement l’oeuvre de Périclès, elle offre à coup sûr d’étroits rapports avec sa politique et sa personne.”

14 This is the claim the Athenians themselves would advance a decade later (434/433) at the outbreak of the civil strife between the pro-Athenian settlers and the part of the population that originated in the Peloponnese: see Diodorus, 12. 35. 2; see also *infra* n. 37. On the Athenian contribution to the colony and the Athenian proportion of the settlers see e.g., T. J. Figueira (2008), “Colonisation in the Classical Period” in G. R. Tsetschladze (ed.), *Greek colonization: an account of Greek colonies and other settlements overseas*, Vol. II, Leiden-Boston, p. 444-445 with notes; A. J. Graham (1999²), *op. cit.*, p. 35-36.

15 See e.g., K. Lomas (2001), “The *polis* in Italy: ethnicity, colonization, and citizenship in the Western Mediterranean” in R. Brock & S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens*, Oxford, p. 167-173.

16 See R. Meiggs (1975³), *The Athenian Empire*, p. 368; T. J. Figueira (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 444: “Thurii was a repository for pro-democrats and Atticisers of disparate background...” It does appear that, during the Peloponnesian war, the city of Thurii remained an asylum but mainly for politically discontented individuals from the Athenian League; see [Andocides], *Against Alcibiades*, 12: “That’s the reason why many men have left their own countries and become exiles, and have gone away to settle at Thurii.”

17 See e.g., P. Rhodes (2006), *A History of the Classical World, 478-323*, p. 69; G. De Sensi Sestito (1993), «Da Thurii a Copia» in *Atti XXXII Conv. Stud. M. Grecia*, Taranto - Sibari 1992, Taranto, p. 342.

18 G. Cawkwell (1975), “Thucydides’ judgment of Periclean strategy” in D. Kagan (ed.), *Studies in the Greek Historians*, Yale Classical Studies 24, Cambridge - London - New York, p. 63 n. 21.

19 See e.g.: S. Hornblower (2008), *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume III: Books 5. 25 - 8. 109, Oxford & New York, p. 534: “He may have actually been an *oikist* of Thourioi...”; see also F. Frisone (2008), “Tra reazione e integrazione: Thurii nel contesto magnogreco”, in *Atene e la Magna Grecia dall’età arcaica all’ellenismo – Atti del Quarantasettesimo convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia*, Taranto 2007, p. 250 n. 75; H. W. Horsnaes (2002), *The Cultural Development in North Western Lucania, c. 600-273 BC*, ARID 28, Roma, p. 124; E. Ciaceri (1940), *Storia della Magna Grecia*, vol. II, Genova – Roma – Napoli, p. 354. Contra: see e.g., H. T. Wade-Gery (1932), “Thucydides the Son of Melesias: A Study of Periclean Policy”, *JHS* 52/1, p. 225.

20 See e.g., E. Ciaceri (1940), *op. cit.*, p. 354-355; S. Berger (1990), “Revolution and Constitution in Thurii: Arist. Pol. 1307 a, b”, *Eranos* 88, p. 13: “He left Sparta in 446 and joined Pericles in Athens. Later, as Pericles organized the settlement of Thuri, he went westward.”

linked with the affair of Kleandridas' supposed corruption by Pericles. It seems intriguing to link Kleandridas' choice of Thurii, this rather mixed and colorful colony, as a place of refuge with his alleged bribery by Pericles, given that the latter was the initiator of the city's foundation. However, due to our lack of related details, Kleandridas' exact itinerary to Thurii is, at the very least, uncertain and any assumptions we wish to make could be potentially flawed.²¹

On the other hand, literary evidence on Kleandridas' military activities in Thurii is, comparatively, more eloquent. The exiled Spartan, who had been awarded Thurian citizenship, soon distinguished himself as a competent military leader.

Strabo (6. 1. 14) – following the testimony of Antiochus –²² reports that during the war between the famous Spartan colony of Taras and Thurii (at c. 444/443), in which Siris was at stake,²³ it was general Kleandridas the Spartan who led the troops of Thurii against the Tarentines: “According to Antiochus, when the Tarantini were at war with the Thurii and their general Cleandridas, an exile from Lacedaemon, for the possession of the territory of Siris, they made a compromise and peopled Siris jointly, although it was adjudged the colony of the Tarantini...”²⁴ Reading Strabo's text, a question arises whether the use of the term ‘strategos’ refers to a chief of the armed forces or whether it is actually a general, formally elected by the city.²⁵ We do not know if Kleandridas held office at Thurii; it does, however, appear that it wouldn't be necessary in order to command the troops.²⁶

At any rate, although Kleandridas' precise political status and official rank are somewhat vague, his skills as head of military operations were much praised by the city of Thurii and it seems that they reinforced the confidence of the citizens in his person. Kleandridas was ‘a man of war’ and, shortly after his arrival there, he undertook military action.²⁷ It is rather significant

21 See e.g., V. Ehrenberg (1948), *op. cit.*, p. 164 n. 69: “...If he had really gone to Athens, after being banished from Sparta, his guilt with regard to the charge of being bribed by Pericles in 446 would have been beyond doubt, and our tradition would have been much more definite about it. The *argumentum ex silentio* seems clearly to indicate that he did not go to Thurii by way of Athens...”

22 Antiochus, *FGrHist* 555 F11.

23 See T. Fischer – Hansen et al. (2004), “Sikelia”, in M. H. Hansen & T. H. Nielsen (eds.), *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, Oxford, p. 293-295.

24 See also Diodorus 12. 23. 2; 12. 36. 4; P. Green (2006), *Diodorus Siculus, Books 11-12.37.1. Greek History, 480-431 BC, the Alternative Version*, Austin, p. 210, n. 95.

25 For the signification of the term *strategos* see J. Boëldieu-Trevet (2007), *Commander dans le monde grec au Ve siècle avant notre ère*, Besançon, p. 28-29; Polyaeus, in his account of Kleandridas' stratagem against Terina (II, 10, 1), uses the term *ἄγων*. The full quote from Polyaeus is as follows: Κλεανδρίδας ὁ Λάκων ἐπὶ Τέρριναν ἄγων τὴν στρατιάν.

26 See e.g., R. J. A. Talbert (2007), *Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily: 344-317 B.C.*, Cambridge, p. 127 n. 2. Nothing proves, beyond reasonable doubt, the validity of the hypothesis that he held the office of “Councillor” of the city (Aristotle, *Politics*, 5. 7 [1307 b]: *οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι*); see V. Ehrenberg (1948), *op. cit.*, p. 168. On these *symbouloi* see e.g., T. Fischer – Hansen et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 306; S. Berger (1990), *op. cit.*, p. 13.

27 E. Ciaceri (1940), *op. cit.*, p. 354; According to F. Frisone (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 253, Kleandridas

that Kleandridas in succeeding centuries was remembered for his involvement in various expeditions on behalf of Thurii.

Kleandridas commanded Thurian forces and became famous for his stratagems: Polyaeus records a sufficient number of the stratagems that Kleandridas used in the war between Thurians and their enemies, the Terinaeans²⁸ and especially the Lucanians;²⁹ the successes of Thurii may plausibly be ascribed to his command. Frontinus also mentions – albeit in less detail – one of the stratagems used by Kleandridas during the war of the Thurians against the Lucanians.³⁰

In these campaigns he amply proved his exceptional military talents and his ability to make quick decisions; he knew how to seize the moment and take full advantage of every situation. He employed all forms of deception aiming to mislead, confuse and finally vanquish the enemy.

For instance, in a campaign against the Terinaeans, he overcomes the difficult position his army was in, first by boosting his soldiers' confidence and then by successfully sowing the seeds of suspicion in the enemy ranks that an act of betrayal was well underway, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the battlefield: "...Because the soldiers were discouraged, he urged them to take courage and led a herald through the army, ordering him to shout that any Terinaean who said the agreed password would be considered a friend. When the Terinaeans heard of the arrangement they suspected they had some traitors among themselves, and decided to depart as quickly as possible and guard the city. Deceived, they retreated..." (Polyaeus 2. 10. 1).³¹ Kleandridas reacts promptly and cleverly exploits the justified fear of betrayal and the knowledge that the enemy within is as dangerous as the enemy outside.³² This incident reminds us of Aineias the Tactician who, in his book on the defense of cities, highlights the danger of conspiracy and subversion.³³

Furthermore, during the wars of Thurii against the Lucanians, Kleandridas reveals his skills as a tactician, especially in the disposition of troops for battle. According to Polyaeus (2. 10. 4), Kleandridas, in order to mislead the enemies and force them to fight under

appears to have contributed significantly to the establishment, formation, and enhancement of the Thurian army.

28 See T. Fischer – Hansen et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 303-304.

29 For the Lucanians see e.g., J. W. Wonder (2014), "Lucanians and Southern Italy" in J. McInerney, *A Companion to Ethnicity in the Ancient Mediterranean*, Chichester, p. 514-554.

30 Frontinus, *Stratagems*, 2. 3. 12.

31 P. Krentz & E. L. Wheeler (eds. / trans.) (1994), *Polyaeus. Stratagems of War*, vol. I, Chicago, Illinois. See also Polyaeus 2. 10. 3: Kleandridas' stratagem against Tegea. Cf. also Herodotus 8. 22 and 9. 98. 2-4. On the use of military passwords (*sunthemata*) see e.g., F. Russell (1999), *Information gathering in classical Greece*. Ann Arbor, p. 182-185.

32 This case resembles – among others – the stratagem used in 415/414 by the Athenian generals in order to "intoxicate" the Syracusans by foisting false impressions upon them: Thucydides 6. 63–65.

33 Aineias the Tactician, *How to survive under siege* (Translated with Introduction and Commentary by D. Whitehead, Oxford 1990). On the prominent role of the fifth column in the strategy of war see e.g., L. Losada (1972), *The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War*, Leiden.

unfavorable conditions, he formed the phalanx in such a way as to conceal the size of his army causing the adversary to underestimate the deceiver's real strength. In this case he uses a well-known form of deceptive ruse intended to disguise real capabilities.³⁴

Kleandridas may be considered as an expert in warfare who knew to adapt rapidly his decision-making to new conditions, to make the best of changed circumstances and thereby attain victory. A good example of this quality of him is reported by Polyaeus (2. 10. 2): Kleandridas is suddenly confronted with the army of the Lucanians who, despite having been defeated by the Thurians, reappeared in the battlefield with a much larger force. Kleandridas quickly retreated to a narrow place making the enemy's numbers useless. Thus, placing himself in a strong position he creates an opportunity to defeat the enemy. That particular stratagem has been seen as bearing a resemblance to "Leonidas' feat at Thermopylae."³⁵

Apart from his success as a leader of the Thurian army, Kleandridas may also have exerted political influence on the city. Literary sources show that Thurii was quite soon affected by internal conflicts.³⁶ The existence of two rival factions, the "pro-Athenian" and the "anti-Athenian" (or "pro-Peloponnesian"), – especially since 434/433 – is solidly recorded.³⁷ *Staseis* (factional conflicts) also occurred during the Peloponnesian war and the Thurians attempted to balance between the two warring powers, occasionally even changing sides.³⁸ Nevertheless, after the disaster of the Sicilian expedition, Thurii openly supported Sparta.³⁹

Kleandridas' involvement in those *staseis* is considered by some scholars as plausible, even though it is not attested to in any of the extant sources. However, it has been disputed whether Kleandridas supported the pro-Laonian or the pro-Athenian faction in Thurii.

For example, it has been proposed that it was due to his successful generalship that the Peloponnesian influence in Thurii increased to the detriment of the pro-Athenians.⁴⁰

34 See E. L. Wheeler (2010), "Polyaeus: *Scriptor Militaris*" in K. Brodersen (ed.), *Polyaeus. New Studies*, Berlin, p. 23 with n. 66.

35 F. E. Ray Jr. (2009), *Land Battles in 5th Century B.C. Greece: A History and Analysis of 173 Engagements*, Jefferson, North Carolina, p. 143.

36 On the factional conflicts in Thurii, see e.g., S. Berger (1992), *Revolution and society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy*, *Historia. Einzelschriften* 71, p. 33-34. S. Berger (1990), *op. cit.*, p. 9-16; A. J. Graham (1992²), *op. cit.*, p. 198-199; D. Kagan (1969), *op. cit.*, 165 f.

37 Diodorus (12. 35) gives an account of the dispute in 434/433: the Thurians were split on the issue of which city was the *metropolis* and who was the *oikist*. The conflict ended when Delphi, upon being consulted by the Thurians, attributed the foundation of the city to Apollo. This outcome could be regarded as a blow at the supporters of Athens.

38 Thuc. 7. 33. 5-6; 35. 1; 57. 11; see A. W. Gomme et al. (1970), *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. IV, Books V 25–VII, Oxford, p. 413-414, 439.

39 See Thuc. 8. 35. 1; 61. 2; 84. 2; S. Berger (1990), *op. cit.*, 11f.

40 See e.g.: V. Ehrenberg (1948), *op. cit.*, p. 159: "...Apart from the Sicilian disaster it was through the great personality of the Spartan Cleandridas, who had soon become the military leader of Thurii, that the anti-Athenian party was eventually victorious"; see also: F. Frisone (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 249-250; R. Meiggs (1975³), *op. cit.*, p. 368; P. E. Arias (1964), "Rapporti e contrasti dalla fine del VI a. C. al dominio romano", in *Metropoli e colonie di Magna Grecia, Atti III Conv. Stud. M. Grecia*, Taranto

Furthermore, Kleandridas' influence has also been associated with the change of the Thurian constitution, from democracy to oligarchy,⁴¹ in spite of the fact that the subject of the Thurian constitution and its changes (*metabolai*) is a controversial matter.⁴²

From a diametrically opposed point of view, Kleandridas has been seen as a Spartan exile supported by Athens, a pro-Athenian, or if not a pro-Athenian, as someone who was not unfavourably disposed towards Athens⁴³ and had no apparent reason to "become once again a pro-Laconian".⁴⁴

It is evident that, given all these uncertainties, we cannot afford to be categorical on the character of his political involvement. After all, despite the fact that Kleandridas' participation in the political dissensions and constitutional change in Thurii remains uncertain, it is noteworthy that many scholars have tried to interpret the events marking the first twenty years of Thurii's existence by relating them to Kleandridas' activities in the city.

Anyhow, it seems certain that he played a significant role in the military life of Thurii. He may even have actually been ultimately revered *post mortem* as a hero, which constituted a primarily political act suggesting that he had been recognized as a benefactor of the city.⁴⁵ Indeed, some scholars assert that a *heroon* had been erected in his honor;⁴⁶ this monument, apparently reconstructed several times well into the Roman era, was built in order to remind Thurians of their city's former glory.⁴⁷

(1963), Napoli, p. 236 f.

41 See e.g., F. Frisone (2008), *op. cit.* 248f; on the subject of the constitutional changes in Thurii see: Aristotle, *Politics* 1307 a, b.

42 See E. W. Robinson (2011), *Democracy beyond Athens: popular government in the Greek classical age*, Cambridge, p. 119-122; E. Greco (2010), "Un ostrakon da Thurii", *ZPE* 173, p. 100 with notes.

43 See e.g., M. Bugno (1999), *op. cit.*, p. 132 note 57; G. De Sensi Sestito (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 342; A. Andrewes (1978), "The Opposition to Perikles", *JHS* 98, p. 8; N. K. Rutter (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 166.

44 S. Berger (1990), *op. cit.*, p. 14: "As to Cleandridas' position, one must bear in mind that he was an exile supported by Athens. Why should he become once again a pro-Laconian?..."

45 Regarding the view that Kleandridas "got oikist cult" at Thurii, see S. Hornblower (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 534-535. Hornblower (*op. cit.*, p. 518) deems it probable that Kleandridas in Sparta "was somehow rehabilitated, if only in memory" and that (*op. cit.*, p. 535), after the return of Pleistoanax from exile (at c. 426), "...the Spartans may well have been happy to revive their diplomatic and sentimental connection with Thourioi."

46 See P. Zancani Montuoro (1962), "Resti pertinenti all' edificio romano" in *La campagna archeologica del 1932 nella piana del Crati. I ritrovamenti al "Parco del Cavallo", Atti e memorie della società Magna Grecia* (1961) NS IV, p. 36-40; p. 40: «Cleandridaion»; contra M. Paoletti (1993), "Copia e il suo territorio in età romana: problemi di storia urbana, in *Sibari e la Sibaritide (Atti del XXXII Conv. St. Magna Grecia, Taranto 1992)*, Taranto, ISAMG, p. 413.

47 See P. Zancani Montuoro (1962), *op. cit.*, p. 38-39.

To conclude:

Dividing his career in two main periods – before and after his exile – we can observe that, during the first period, the literary tradition is hostile to Kleandridas and the infamy of bribery is affixed to him. On the other hand, during his self-imposed exile in the untypical colony of Thurii, Kleandridas' general picture is that of a skillful, agile, clever and efficient commander. Selected by the Thurians as their military leader, he proved his exceptional strategic talents – military deception included; indeed, deception in war formed part of Kleandridas' repertoire, as a necessary and even prudent activity for gaining a competitive advantage. Thus, Polyaeus quite plausibly attributes the following *dictum* to him: “When the lion's skin does not suffice, then it is necessary to sew on the skin of the fox”.⁴⁸

Furthermore, it has been suggested that Kleandridas inaugurated a military tactics school.⁴⁹ His stratagems came to be regarded as exemplary and it is significant that Polyaeus chose to incorporate them in his work.⁵⁰

Thus, Kleandridas ranks among other prominent *rusé*, crafty commanders of Antiquity and it is notable that in Byzantine military treatises some of his stratagems had been repeatedly classified in the same group as those of Themistocles, Agesilas and Alexander the Great.⁵¹

48 Polyaeus, *op. cit.*, 2. 10. 5; see G. Nenci & S. Cataldi, (1983), “Strumenti e procedure nei rapporti tra Greci e indigeni” in *Modes de contacts et processus de transformation dans les sociétés anciennes. Actes du colloque de Cortone* (24-30 mai 1981), Rome, p. 598 with n. 62. Plutarch attributes the same *dictum* to Lysander (*Lys.* 7. 4; see also [Plut.], *Apophthegmata Laconica*, *Lys.* 3 = *Moralia* 190 E).

49 G. De Sensi Sestito (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 354; p. 354 n. 98: “Che in una vera e propria scuola di tattica militare si traducesse l'operato di Cleandrida è dimostrato dall'atteggiamento didattico in cui il generale spartano è tratteggiato negli stratagemmi riportati da Polieno (II 10, 2 e 4) e da Frontino (II 3, 12)”.

50 This very selection should be examined in the wider context of Polyaeus' selection criteria; see e.g., E. L. Wheeler (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 23 f.

51 See e.g., J. A. de Foucault (1949), *Strategemata*, Paris, p. 81-82; P. Krentz & E. L. Wheeler (eds. / trans.) (1994), *op. cit.*, vol. II: *Excerpts of Polyaeus*, Chicago, p. 873-875.