SESSION III

CHANGES IN MULTI-ETHNIC AND PLURI-LINGUISTIC SOCIETIES AND NATION STATES
CITIZENS, DENIZENS AND HELOTS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

ROBIN COHEN

Introduction

In a current period marked by immigration restrictions and increasingly tight definitions of nationality and citizenship, it is sometimes difficult to remember that the climate of decision-making in the immediate post-war period was far different in North America and most European countries.

In France, for example, the leading demographer at the influential Institut National d'études Demographiques, Sauvy, pronounced that France needed at the minimum to import 5,290,000 permanent immigrants to renew its labour force, restabilise the skewed demographic structure arising from war-time losses and reinforce its claims to Great Power status (Freeman 1979: 69).

Across the Channel, the budding Labour Party politician, James Callaghan (later to become Prime Minister), ignored the potentially xenophobic reactions of his working class supporters and proclaimed in the House of Commons:

We are living in an expansionist era. Surely, this is a Socialist government committed to a policy of full employment? In a few years' time we in this country will be faced with a shortage of labour, and not with a shortage of jobs. Our birth rate is not increasing in sufficient proportion to enable us to replace ourselves . . . . We are turning away from the shores of this country eligible and desirable young men who could be added to our strength and resources, as similar immigrants have done in the past . . . (cited Cohen 1988: 124).

In Germany, the post-war Constitutional provision for reunification allowed millions of East Germans to cross the frontier. These expellees and refugees, together with those from the former eastern territories of the Reich and demobilised soldiers, all unprotected by the weakened labour movement, 'provided ideal conditions for capitalist expansion, and were the essential cause of the economic miracle' (Castles et al. 1984: 25). With expansion, West Germany's demand for labour increased dramatically. Though a more cautious attitude prevailed on the question of according citizenship to 'foreign' newcomers, a massive guestworker programme from Turkey and elsewhere was initiated.

In the US, in addition to the strong continued demand for migrant labour (flowing especially from the neighbouring areas of Central America and the Caribbean), temporary
labour programmes, initiated to offset war-time shortages, were allowed to continue in the post-war period. For instance, the Bracero programme, designed to supply agricultural labourers to southwest agribusiness, commenced in 1942 with 4,203 recruits, peaked in 1957 with 450,422 labourers, and was only formally ended in 1965 (Samora and Simon 1977: 140).

Of all the major capitalist industrial powers, Japan was alone in not relying on the importation of large numbers of labourers to fuel its post-war economy. This was not because of some general rule of Japanese exceptionalism, but because, unlike in the other industrial powers, there was still a large indigenous rural population which could be detached from the land, and a significant proportion of women who could be enjoined to enter employment for the first time. For instance, the number of Japanese women ‘gainfully employed’ increased from 3 million in 1950 to 12 million in 1970 (Mandel 1978: 171).

The End of the Migrant Labour Boom

The authorised importation of labourers to the industrial economies mentioned above lasted roughly until the mid-seventies in Europe, when sharp restrictions were imposed. The US figures do not show similar absolute declines in legal immigration, but there were significant qualitative changes in the occupational and legal categories admitted—from immigrants to refugees and from agricultural and mass production workers to the professional, technical and independent proprietor categories (Keely and Elwell 1981: 192–3).

It is now no longer necessary to mount an elaborate argument listing the advantages conferred by the deployment of migrant labour by the host countries and employers in the post-war period, as there is now a remarkable unanimity of views between liberal (see Kindleberger 1967; Böhning 1972), marxist (see Castles and Kosack 1973; Castells 1979) and official accounts. Perhaps one, remarkably frank, paper prepared by the West German government for a conference on ‘The Future of Migration’ organized by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development in May 1986 is sufficient to make the point. The paper (cited Cross 1988) accepted that the German economy had gained considerable benefits with negligible costs, and continued:

Until far in the 1960s, the employment of foreigners helped to satisfy the rising demand for labour . . . at a time when the labour volume was getting scarcer and scarcer. . . . Their considerable flexibility in the economic cycle helped to offset negative employment effects in times of recession and to avoid inflationary shortages in times of upswing. The need for infrastructural facilities, integration assistance and social benefits which followed from the employment of foreigners was almost insignificant because of the short periods of stay of the individual foreigners and the low numbers of family members who entered in the course of family reunion.

If the benefits of migrant labour were so apparent, why did the import of labour throttle off so dramatically in the mid-1970s? On this question there is no final agreement, but a number of mutually-reinforcing explanations or contingent factors may be advanced. I will briefly discuss six factors, specified below in no particular order:
The Oil Crisis

There is an obvious co-incidence of dates in the early 1970s which may lead to a simple association between the dramatic increase in the price of oil and the end of the migrant labour boom. Certainly, the immediate wave of redundancies that followed in energy-intensive industries led to a political situation which would have made the importation of large numbers of ‘alien’ labourers untenable for most European governments. But, while the oil crisis can partly explain the timing of particular measures, any explanation of the end of labour migration must also be concerned with other deeper, underlying, factors.

The Rise of Racism and Xenophobia

One of the key variables, often underestimated by scholars (who often assumed the hegemony of ‘rational’ capital) and governments alike (who assumed their own hegemony), was the rise of a virulent indigenous working class xenophobia. This is not to argue, of course, that sentiments were only held amongst the working classes. But the opposite possibility, the belief that patterns of international class solidarity would obviate ethnic and racial allegiances, proved hopelessly idealistic.

In Britain, old protective practices, like closed shops and demarcation agreements, were used to freeze out migrant labour (Duffield 1988), while in France a municipal Communist Party bulldozed the hostels erected for migrant workers in response to the demands of its constituents.

In short, both capital and the state were unable to continue to employ migrant workers in oblivion of the countervailing racist sentiments such a policy provoked.

The Organisation of Migrant Workers

Much marxist theory, particularly of the ‘capital logic’ tendency, tends to depict migrants as hopeless chaff blown about by fierce economic storms—unable to respond organisationally to the market forces arraigned against them. This picture is partly correct at the earliest stages of migration, amongst those migrants with a particularly individualist ethic and in circumstances where it was difficult to effect a bond of alliance between co-religionists or those from a similar ethnic group.

Whatever the variation in activity across the different cases, there is no doubt that community associations, religious groups and political support groups were sufficiently and increasingly active—precisely at the time when issues such as repatriation, return migration immigration restrictions and deportations were proposed by politicians anxious to limit what were perceived as the socially divisive consequences of the untrammelled immigration period. Migrant groups were not sufficiently influential to prevent all these measures, but they were, on the whole, powerful enough to resist the pressures to mass repatriation and to press instead for the principle of family reunification to be recognised.

The Rise in the Cost of Reproduction

The increased assertiveness of migrants not only applied to matters of immigration policy and family reunion; immigrant associations became increasingly concerned with the full range of social and employment benefits. One should not fall into the racist trap of believing that immigrant families overclaim all benefits—the evidence indeed inclines to a contrary assertion (Rex & Tomlinson 1979: 62). However, given the demographic profile
and the special language needs of many migrant communities, increased costs arose in respect of child care, language training and education. Even if we assume only a broadly converging cost of reproduction between indigenous and migrant communities, the crucial advantage accruing to the host country and employer—a minimal or wholly displaced cost of reproduction—no longer obtained as migrant communities gradually reconstituted their family life and became permanent minorities.

Economic Restructuring

One way of understanding the economic restructuring of the last fifteen years is to argue in terms of new technology impelling a different industrial logic—away from mass production to small-batch production, away from labouring into independent proprietorship, away from manufacturing into services (Piore & Sabel 1984). The same processes also impelled a greater comparative advantage accruing to certain newly industrialising countries (for example, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), particularly in respect of low-bulk and high-value goods where the value added by the labour component was significant.

This is no place to explore the so-called ‘new international division of labour’ thesis in detail (I’ve developed a critique in Cohen 1988: 220–256). Suffice to say that many such theories are overly technologically determinist, and can easily confuse cause and consequence. Thus, it is at least as plausible to argue that increased levels of class composition and migrant organisation made mass production methods less attractive as to assume some exogenous new technology acted as an independent force. But whatever the exact reasons for the movement to independent proprietorship and small-batch and third world production, this development obviated the need to continue to employ factory hands imported from abroad.

The ‘Inefficiency’ of Unskilled Labour

In opening the paper, I alluded to a remarkable uniformity of opinion between official accounts and liberal and marxist writers on the benefits conferred by the use of migrant labour. The orthodoxy is, in my view, largely correct, but some dissent was recorded at an early date by Misham (1970).

His argument was alarmist and based on unlikely projections of large inflows of migrant labour leading to a rise in the labour-capital ratio and a consequent fall in production. While the broad thesis made unrealistic net migration assumptions, in some sectors, for example the textile industry, it is likely that working cheap migrant labour on a 24-hour shift pattern was used as a way of holding the line against low-cost Asian textiles, thereby avoiding the inevitable day when old machinery and tracks had to be discarded.

As Reaganomics and Thatcherism began to gain ground, and unemployment levels began to rise, the arguments that importing migrants were essentially an inefficient way of reducing industrial costs became more widely heard.

International Labour Flows since the Mid-Seventies

I have given an indicative, though not an exhaustive account of the explanations for the immigration restrictions of the mid-1970s. But incomplete as this picture is, it may
give the false impression that international labour migration has effectively ceased. In fact, it continues largely unabated—though with significant differences in the destination areas, and the kinds of migrants involved.

In Europe, the post 1970s migration is largely accounted for by family reunification, refugees and to a small degree, by illegal entrants. In the US, illegals account for a much greater proportion of post-1970s migrants. Agribusiness in the south, the sweated trades in the northeast and the service sector more generally continued to deploy imported labour, both legal and illegal. But there was also a clear movement away from employees destined for the mass occupations in the auto and steel industries, towards an acceptance of political refugees (Vietnamese, Cuban and East Europeans) and to those who could class themselves as entrepreneurs or proprietors (for example, the Koreans and Hong Kong Chinese).

Outside the US and Europe, labour migration, apparently of the more well-established kind, went to the Middle East and other oil-producing countries. But even in these areas important qualitative differences appear. These differences will emerge in my more detailed remarks below on migration flows to the oil-rich countries, illegal migrants, refugees and project-tied contract migrants.

Migration to the Oil-Rich Countries

While the quadrupling of oil prices deepened the climate of economic crisis and uncertainty in Europe and the US (and to a lesser extent, Japan), the same factor allowed for the massive expansion of infrastructural development programmes in the oil-rich countries.

What many oil-exporting countries in the Middle East lacked was labour-power—professional, skilled or manual. Migrant labour was recruited primarily from other Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan including Palestinians, Morocco, Oman and the two Yemens in declining numerical order) and from the Indian sub-continent (India and Pakistan). Other significant contingents to the Middle East came from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, Turkey, Korea, the Philippines and the Sudan. So great and so sudden was this migration that by 1975, migrant labour formed 98 per cent of the total labour force in the United Arab Emirates, 83 per cent in Qatar, 71 percent in Kuwait and 39 percent in Oman and Saudi Arabia (Ecevit 1981: 260). By 1980, the International Labour Office (ILO 1984: 102) cited a figure of 2,821,720 migrant workers in the oil-producing Middle Eastern countries. Although the overwhelming majority of the workers were of Muslim background, this link did not prove decisive in granting citizenship of the country of employment and many were either sent back to their countries of origin or remained without access to a new citizenship.

Other oil-rich countries, like Venezuela and Nigeria manifested similar inward shifts of population, though of proportionately lower size to those of the Middle East. As in France during the immediate post-war period, the Venezuela authorities, in particular the Council for Human Resources, determined on a pro-immigration stance. This encouraged a flow of about half a million undocumented migrants, the import of another half a million foreign workers between 1976–80 and a strong internal migration flow towards the capital, Caracas (Sassen-Koob 1979: 455–64).

Illegals

The restrictions on immigration in Europe and North America have also not strongly impeded the illegal, or as the ILO terms it, the ‘irregular’ flows of international migrants.
Within Europe, the illegal population is estimated to be about 10 per cent of the foreign population as a whole (OECD 1987: 55) and is characterised by Marie (1983) as follows:

Illegal migration has above all been a strategy adapted to a new institutional context . . . [offsetting] . . . the stringent restriction on the entry of low-skilled manpower by supplying workers willing to accept low-status jobs with poor working conditions and pay . . . [R]ecourse to illegal migrant workers may be interpreted as a movement towards replacing one category of foreigners by another contingent in a less secure position, with a view to more flexible management of the labour force.

The International Labour Office (ILO 1984: 113–4) argues forcibly that irregular migration should not be conceived as solely comprising those who cross the border fully intending to circumvent unequivocal immigration or employment law. Rather, 'irregular' migrants also include those who are permitted through administrative inefficiency or convenience to enter a country, with regularisation taking place later. Other sub-sets comprise those who enter countries (South America is cited) where few explicit immigration policies exist, or those who enter countries where laws provide contradictory signals to the intending migrant.

The latter is of particular salience in the case of the large numbers of 'undocumented' workers entering the US from Mexico. Whereas immigration law clearly states that it is illegal to enter the US outside the procedures established in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the agribusiness lobby forced through an amendment which permitted the employment of an undocumented worker. This led to the peculiar legalism of economic interest, which lasted until a recent change under the Reagan administration, namely that it was acceptable to employ an illegal, but not acceptable to be one.

The attempt by the ILO to widen the category of 'illegal' to cover the cases of other 'irregular' and 'undocumented' workers is a useful reminder to the authorities to avoid premature assumptions or unjustified stigmatisation. But it is undoubtedly the case that the illegal status attaching to irregular migrants of all kinds has generated a fearful, wary segment of the population—largely helpless in the face of ruthless landlords or exploitative employers, cut off from the protection of the police and courts, and excluded from the political life and social benefits of the society they now live in. As will be argued later, they form part of a 'helot' class.

**Refugees and Asylum-Seekers**

Who is a refugee? The legal definitions derive from the 1951 international Convention which defined refugees as 'persons who are outside their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion'. The 1951 Convention was drafted with the needs of the post-war displaced people of Europe firmly in mind. The modified 1967 Protocol sought to take account of events elsewhere in the world and was signed by nearly 100 countries.

Though the legal provisions appeared generous, in fact they still bore the mark of their original place of drafting. Moreover, European governments have been less than generous in applying the existing provisions to those demanding entry as a result of the mass displacements occurring in the third world. As a report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI 1986: 33) put it:

In the 1970s a new phenomenon emerged. Refugees from the crisis areas of Africa,
Asia and Latin America began to move in increasing numbers to the industrialised countries. . . . [T]he arrival of many refugees from geographically and culturally distant areas constituted an unprecedented challenge to the legal machinery and conscience of the receiving countries. The refugee problem, previously regarded as a factor in east-west relations, now had a north-south dimension added to it.

This analysis can be elaborated in three respects. First, the volume and effects of the refugee crises were amplified as they coincided with the reduction of aid and social investment programmes to the third world in response to nationalist and protectionist pressures in the industrialised countries. These pressures became politically effective precisely at the moment when many poor countries had their economic and environmental resources stretched to the limit. Increased energy costs, more expensive imports, political instability and lower commodity prices all placed a number of third world countries in a position where they were unable to respond effectively to the devastations wrought by famine, war and drought.

Second, the shift from a crisis of east-west relations to one defined in north-south terms can be vividly illustrated in the case of the US. Prior to 1980 when the US passed legislation paralleling the agreed international Conventions, the official US definition of a refugee referred, inter alia, to people 'fleeing Communist countries' or 'Communist-dominated countries'. The paradoxes and problem of US refugee admissions were highlighted in the summer of 1980, when two streams of refugees—the 'freedom flotilla' from Cuba and those escaping from the Duvalier regime—converged. President Carter was forced to endorse the 20-year old policy welcoming refugees from Communist regimes, even though many of the Cubans appeared to be less interested in the iniquities of Castro's regime than the opportunity for some quick pickings in Miami. At the same time the Immigration and Naturalisation Service had, increasingly implausibly, to hold the line maintaining that the Haitian boat people were economic and not political migrants, even though it was apparent that many were fleeing from the violence and depredations of the US-supported regime and its armed thugs, the Ton-Ton Macoutes. (For more on this period see Cohen 1988: 148–56; Bach et al. 1981–2).

Third, the volume of refugee migration, and potential migration, expanded to such an extent (the estimate is now 15 million refugees world-wide) that many states began to argue that refugees were in effect disguised economic migrants. Zucker and Zucker (1987: xiv) seek to contradict the commonly-held official view and to develop a clear distinction between the three categories, immigrant, refugee and illegal, in the following passage:

Refugees are neither immigrants nor illegal migrants, although, like immigrants, they have forsaken their homelands for new countries and, like illegal migrants, they may enter those new countries without permission. But a refugee is, in the end, unlike either. Both the immigrant and the illegal migrant are drawn to a country. The refugee is not drawn but driven; he seeks not to better his life but to rebuild it, to gain some part of what he has lost. The immigrant and the migrant are propelled by hope; for the refugee whatever hope there may be must arise from the ruins of tragedy. The refugee, unlike other migrants, has lost or been denied a basic human need—the legal and political protection of a government. Accompanying that loss has been the loss, as well, of culture, community, employment, shelter—all the elements that contribute to a sense of self-worth. Refugees, whatever their origins, are in need of protection.
However, such definitions depend greatly on liberal and humanist values being shared by politicians, policy-makers or immigration officials. The overall figures and the pattern of admissions do not indicate wide acceptance of such views.

In Europe, the number of refugees recognised under the 1951 and 1967 Conventions is very limited, though such individuals do gain the full protection of the host state and can be considered as holding equivalent rights to an indigenous citizen.

In the US, as Zucker and Zucker (1987) themselves show, refugee policy and asylum decisions are governed not by the recognition of need or the volume of applications, but on whether the country of origin is currently a recognised enemy of the US government. Between 1980–6, asylum was granted in 29,926 cases, but 76 percent of the cases came from just three countries—Iran, Poland and Nicaragua (ibid: 142–3). Admissions of refugees are regulated by quota and numbers exceed quotas only when an unexpected flow from a Communist country occurs and the Cold War drum can be beaten. Even then, the exasperation of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and many members of the public with the Cuban contingent was evident in the internment procedures effected and the lack of substantive help given in respect of settlement and employment. Many refugees or asylum-seekers remain unrecognised by the state authorities or are denied entry in the first place.

Project-Tied Contract Workers

Foreign contract workers can be of two major kinds. The first case is when an individual employment contract is drafted, often with an employee's existing multinational employer. Alternatively, a host government or employer will advertise for foreign workers in permitted categories and signs individual contracts with foreign employees. Such individually contracted workers, often known as 'expatriates', are likely to be in the skilled, managerial or professional category, to live in subsidised company housing, to have annual leave, child travel and education allowances, a pension arrangement and a generous salary. In short, expatriates provide a good example of privileged aliens—a group I include under the category 'denizens'.

The second case is much more interesting both because it is much less known and because it has the potential of being deployed on a wide scale by governments anxious to avoid the possibilities of settlement and ethnic group formation, seen even in the case of the guestworkers to West Germany. Instead of individual contracts being issued, block visas are provided to the project contractor, who is then held legally responsible for the behaviour of the labour force and its discharge outside the country of work. Of course, there are many historical examples of this type of labour recruitment, but it has become a much more popular mode in recent years. Source countries often include Eastern European countries anxious for the foreign exchange brought back by discharged workers. In 1982, for example, 11,335 Yugoslav, 6,914 Polish and 1,648 Hungarian project-tied workers were employed in West Germany (ILO 1984: 108).

But the masters of this trade seem to be concentrated in the Republic of Korea, whose

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1 The term 'denizens' is derived from Hammar (forthcoming). However, he uses it to refer to all alien residents. In origin, the term referred to an alien admitted to citizenship by royal letters patent by the English crown in the 16th century. I have reserved the term 'denizen' for the more privileged alien and used the term 'helots' to refer to those non-citizens whose rights are much less extensive.
construction companies have won extensive contracts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. (The value of such contracts was estimated as US$13,000 million in 1981.) According to the ILO (ibid: 112-3) in the case of the Korean contractors, 'virtually every aspect of the migrant workers' daily life is under the protection and control of their employers'. Work-camps are set up in remote spots, contact with the locals is minimal, workers are forbidden to form unions, health, accommodation and safety standards are poor, medical and recreational facilities equally impoverished and work-related deaths and injuries 'high and rising'. Workers so recruited are totally under the thumbs of their employers and the host government has no interest in offering protection or succour in the event of human rights abuses or high levels of exploitation.

What's in a Name: Citizens, Denizens and Helots

Immigrants, guestworkers, illegals, refugees, asylum-seekers, expatriates, settlers—do these labels signify anything of importance? My argument here turns on a belief that although there are considerable similarities between international migrants of all types, the modern state has sought to differentiate the various people under its sway by including some in the body politic and according them full civic and social rights and seeking to exclude others from entering this charmed circle.

The important role of citizenship as a means of integrating dissatisfied members of the lower orders and including them in the core society, was first explicitly recognised by Marshall (1950). For him, access to citizenship allowed everyone so favoured to be given some stake in the society at least, in respect of periodic elections, protection and access to some social benefits. With the rise of welfare and distributive states in the post-war world the social wage—unemployment benefits, social security, housing allowances, tax credits, pensions, subsidised health care—have become much more important symbolic and economic goods. By the same token, states have sought to restrict access to the social wage by the deployment of workers whose entitlements will be limited. The different statuses reflected in the categories immigrant, guestworker, etc. reflect the differential access held by such groups to the social wage and to the protection afforded by the agencies of law and order.

If we consider the various categories mentioned three broad categories appear—citizens whose rights are extensive, an intermediate group (the denizens) and a group which remains a subject population akin to the ancient helots who hewed wood and toiled for the Spartans without access to democratic rights, property or protection. A few remarks on each category will perhaps help to justify the trichotomy.

Citizens

This group appears as an increasingly privileged group. Many states have moved away from inclusive to exclusive definitions of citizenship, abandoning the principle of *jus soli* (citizenship by being born in a territory) to *jus sanguinis* (citizenship according to the parents' nationality). In the case of the European countries which once had empires (Belgium, France, Britain, Holland) binding guarantees of citizenship to colonial subjects have frequently been ignored or circumvented by subsequent legislation. While the Dutch on the whole respected the citizenship conferred on subjects of the Netherlands, the French main-
tained a recognition only for a small number of people in the départements (French Guyana, Reunion, Guadeloupe and Martinique). The British, for their part, in the Nationality Act of 1982 stripped away the rights of residents of the colony of Hong Kong (and a few other places) and created a new citizenship of ‘dependent territories’ which conferred no right to live or work in the U.K.

**Denizens**

I conceive this group as comprising privileged aliens often holding multiple citizenship, but not having the citizenship or the right to vote in the country of their residence or domicile. Hammar (forthcoming) has produced a remarkable calculation that resident non-citizens living and working in European countries include 180,000 in Belgium, 2,800,000 in France, 2,620,000 in West Germany, 400,000 in the Netherlands, 390,000 in Sweden and 700,000 in Switzerland. Many of these alien residents may be well-paid expatriates (see above) who are not particularly concerned with exercising the franchise and have compensating employment benefits—a group in short that can be seen as transcending the limits of the nation-state. However, the numbers involved in Hammar’s calculations suggest that many residents have been systematically excluded from citizenship and its accompanying rights without any compensating benefits deriving from their employment. These form part of the helot category.

**Helots**

I have used the category ‘helots’ in a somewhat more inclusive way in Cohen (1988). Here I refer more narrowly to people who have illegally entered the country, people who have overstayed the period granted on their entry visas, asylum-seekers who have not been recognised under the international Conventions, those who are working illegally, and those who have been granted only limited rights. A good example (cited Castles et al. 1984: 77) appears in a statement given to officials as to how to operate the 1965 West German Foreigners Law:

> Foreigners enjoy all basic rights, except the basic rights of freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, place of work and place of education and protection from extradition abroad.

Statements such as this reveal the powerful attempt to try to exclude, detain or deport foreigners who are regarded as disposable units of labour-power for whom the advantages of citizenship, the franchise and social welfare are denied.

Taking the three categories together allows a summary of the different status groups under each heading (Figure 1).

**Figure 1**

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<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Denizens</th>
<th>Helots</th>
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<td>Nationals by birth or naturalisation</td>
<td>Holders of one or more citizenships</td>
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<td>Established Immigrants</td>
<td>Recognised asylum-applicants</td>
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<td>Work-permit holders</td>
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<td>Expatriates</td>
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Conclusion

As Marshall (1950) argued, conferring citizenship is the key indicator of integration and acceptance within a nation state. This basic symbol of inclusion is signified by the right to elect periodically a new government. But the exercise of the vote has become of rather lesser significance than the other attendant benefits of citizenship—access to national insurance systems, unemployment benefits, housing support, health care and social security, etc. In addition to these undoubted advantages, citizens of the European nations within the European Community will soon have untrammeled rights to live, work, own property and travel within a wider Europe.

Helots and denizens are, by the same token, symbolically excluded and practically denied all the advantages just listed. In the case of the denizens, this may not be particularly burdensome—a denizen may be an employee of a multinational company with access to private medical insurance. But for a helot, the denial of citizenship is usually a traumatic and life-threatening decision. Given their vulnerability, the helots have become the key means for inducing labour flexibility and providing a target for nationalist and racist outrages.

Our trichotomy leads one to speculate that a new form of stratification has emerged which has little in origin to do with income, occupation, racial or ethnic background, gender, or a particular relationship to the means of production. Of course, there are likely to be coincidences between the different patterns of stratification. A helot is likely to be a third world migrant, a member of a stigmatised minority, with low income, holding an unskilled occupation and having limited access to housing, education and other social benefits. Similarly, a professionally-educated, urban, middle class, salary earner, who happens to be a foreigner, is likely to be a denizen.

Migration after the 1970s to a new country will not necessarily carry the optimistic possibilities characteristic of migrants at the turn of the century. Then the ‘huddled masses’, that time from Europe as well as from Asia, threw off their poverty and feudal bondage to enter the American dream as equal citizens. Equally it was perfectly possible for English and Irish convicts to become landowners and gentleman farmers in Australia. Nowadays, one’s legal or national status—whether, in my terms, a citizen, helot or denizen—will increasingly operate as indelible stigma, determining a set of life chances, access to the kind of employment or any employment and other signifiers of privilege and good fortune.
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