DISASTER, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SOCIETY
No.7 March 2019
Learning from the 2011 Earthquake in Japan
災害・基盤・社会　東日本大震災から考える

Anti-Nuclear Social Movements

Study Group on Infrastructure and Society　/　「社会と基盤」研究会

Disaster, Infrastructure and Society
Learning from the 2011 Earthquake in Japan

災害・基盤・社会　東日本大震災から考える

No.7

Issued on March 2019
Published by Study Group on Infrastructure and Society（「社会と基盤」研究会）

Editorial Office:
Study Group on Infrastructure and Society (c/o Takashi Machimura)
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan
tel/fax: +81-(0)42-580-8642
e-mail: sgis@soc.hit-u.ac.jp
URL: http://sgis.soc.hit-u.ac.jp

DISASTER, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SOCIETY
No.7 March 2019
Learning from the 2011 Earthquake in Japan
災害・基盤・社会　東日本大震災から考える

contents

Anti-Nuclear Social Movements from the Perspective of Citizen Groups

Keiichi SATOH

Seven years have passed since the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. Though the swing-back to the nuclear energy is still expected, Japan has witnessed a wide change in energy policy. As of July 2018, nine power plants are working, 22 plants (including the six reactors at Fukushima) are to be decommissioned, and the remaining 27 plants are not operating.[1] The amount of renewable energy (including hydropower) accounted for 14.5% of the total energy generation in 2015, which indicates a 4.5% increase within a four-year period after the Fukushima accident (ISEP 2017: 74).

Although it is difficult to explain this rapid change through a small number of factors, one of the important aspects is the developed and persistent anti-nuclear public opinion among the citizens in Japan. In 2017, almost two-thirds of the population still supported the idea of decreasing the number of nuclear power plants. This stable public opinion since 2011 coincided with the upsurge of the anti-nuclear social movements, which contextualized the problem and strengthened the anti-nuclear sentiment among the citizens.

Nevertheless, there are still only a few studies about the anti-nuclear social movements after the Fukushima accident, as compared to the wide range of publications on the impact of the accident to society.

This does not necessarily mean there is a shortage of scholars who study the anti-antinuclear social movements. Quite the contrary, there were several important studies even before the Fukushima accident, such as the work by Koichi Hasegawa (2011; 2003) and Hiroshi Honda (2005), to name a few.

However, these scholars who had studied the anti-nuclear social movements even before the accident were rather pessimistic and skeptical on the impact of the social movements after the Fukushima accident. This skepticism is legitimate given their repeated experience of the ineffectiveness of anti-nuclear movements.

Not many environmental sociologists were involved in the studies on anti-nuclear social movements after the Fukushima accident—at least, not on a large scale. It is partly because most of them focused on the evacuees forced from the contaminated area by the radiation. For those who focused on evacuees, it was difficult to study the anti-nuclear social movements simultaneously because many of these evacuees or their relatives had worked in or had jobs related to power plants. Therefore, evacuees had an ambivalent attitude to the growing anti-social movements, especially to those which grew in the large cities (Yamamoto 2012; Kainuma 2012)

It was mostly "newcomers" to this topic who actively reported the social movements after the Fukushima accident. Among them, Yuko Hirabayashi (2013) conducted a survey among the participants in the demonstrations held three months after the

Keiichi SATOH, JSPS Oversee Research Fellow and Guest Researcher at the University of Konstanz, Germany.

Fukushima accident. Eiji Oguma (2013) edited the voice of the activists and published his own analysis of the process of the movement's progress (2013, 2016). He also produced a movie on the anti-nuclear movements (Oguma 2017). David Slater and his team (2014) conducted interviews with the people living in Tohoku region to reveal the micro-politics of the movements. Chigaya Kinoshita (2017), who attended demonstrations as "legal" (the role of negotiating with police and safely guiding the demonstration on the street), published his analysis of the process of anti-social movements from an insider point of view. Naoto Higuchi and his teams (Satoh et al. 2018) conducted a large-scale survey with the citizens in the metropolitan areas of Tokyo, asking about their experience of the movements. Anna Wiemann (2018) studied the organizational networks "e-shift", a social movement groups' coalition for nuclear phase-out and the promotion of renewable energy. Alexander Brown (2018) wrote a monograph on anti-nuclear protest in Tokyo based on his intensive fieldwork connecting the case with other global social movements.

Our research team "Study group on Infrastructure" (SGIS) can also be listed among the other newcomers. The main characteristic of our approach is that we focus particularly on the group or organization level, not the individual level. Even though, in contemporary social movements, many individual activists/activists are connected through the social network service and participate in the movement more "individually," we believe that the organizations still matter. Most of the demonstrations were still organized by organizations. People are sharing their information by creating groups. How were these groups formed? What kind of people participate in these organizations? How were social movements contextualized through these group dynamics? Moreover, people can sustain their activities through cooperation with other people, often through their members in the group. In short, organizations are the infrastructure for social movements.

In this special issue, we report our studies on the social movement organizations after the Fukushima accident.

The first paper provides the summary of our recently published book (Machimura & Satoh eds. 2016) based on our nationwide survey conducted in 2013.

The second paper provides a brief context to the ongoing nuclear power plant construction in Oma.

The third paper summarizes the interviews with the citizen activists in Hakodate through the lawsuit demanding a stop to the construction of the Oma power plant.

The fourth paper analyzes the evaluation of the anti-nuclear movements from the viewpoint of the groups which had long engaged in the anti-nuclear issues.

The fifth paper, Alexander Brown provides the summary of his aforementioned recently published book.

Last, but not least, SGIS conducted the second-round survey in February 2018 of citizen groups. This time we examined not only anti-nuclear groups, but also those engaged in the other issues, that is, peace issues and welfare issues. After the Fukushima accident the upsurge of social movements is now observable in these issues. (David Chiavacci and Julia Obinger (2018) describe this as a "new-protest cycle" in Japanese civil society). The focus of our second-round survey is therefore to reveal the connection of different social movements' organizations after the Fukushima accident. The original questionnaire and descriptive statistics of the responses are now available in the website of SIGIS (https://sgis.soc.hit-u.ac.jp/smos2018/). We will post regular updates to the analysis on the website for information.

Notes

1 “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plants” (nippon.com, published on July 19, 2018. https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00238/)

References

Brown, Alexander, 2018, *Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo: Power Struggles*, London: Routledge.

Chiavacci, David and Julia Obinger, 2018, “Towards a New Protest Cycle in Contemporary Japan?: The Resurgence of Social Movements and Confrontational Political Activism in Historical Perspective,” in David Chiavacci and Julia Obinger eds., *Social Movements and Political Activism in Contemporary Japan: Re-Emerging from Invisibility*, London: Routledge.

Hasegawa, Koichi, 2003, “Progress of the Environmental Movement,” Yazawa Shujiro ed., *Series Sociology 15: Social Movements*’ University of Tokyo Press,179-215.（＝長谷川公一, 2003,「環境運動の展開と深化」矢澤修次郎編,『講座社会学15　社会運動』東京大学出版会, 179-215.）

Hasegawa, Koichi, 2011, *A Choice for a Post-Nuclear Society: The Age of New Energy Revolution Revised Edition*, Sinyosha.（＝長谷川公一, 2011,『脱原子力社会の選択　増補版』新曜社.）

Hirabayashi, Yuko, 2013, “What Makes a Society Which Demonstrates: Activism and Media after 3/11,” Shigeyoshi Tanaka, Toshiyuki Masamura and Harutoshi Funabashi eds., *The Great East Japan Earthquake and Sociology: The Society which Beckoned the Disaster*, Mineruva Shobō, 163-195（＝平林祐子, 2013,「何が『デモのある社会』を作るのか――ポスト3.11のアクティビズムとメディア」田中重好・正村俊之・船橋晴俊編『東日本大震災と社会学――大災害を生み出した社会』ミネルヴァ書房, 163-195).

Honda, Hiroshi, 2005, *Anti-Nuclear Social Movements and Politics: Can Japan Change the Energy Policy?*, Hokkaido University Press.（＝本田宏, 2005,『脱原子力の運動と政治――日本のエネルギー政策の転換は可能か』北海道大学図書刊行会.）

ISEP, 2017, *White Paper on Renewable Energy 2016*, (Available online at http://www.isep.or.jp/jsr2016, updated on March 2017, checked on March 11, 2017.)（＝環境エネルギー政策研究所, 2017,『自然エネルギー白書2016』.）

Kainuma, Hiroshi, 2012, *Justice of Fukushima: A Battle against the Changelessness of Japan*: Gentosha.（＝開沼博, 2012,『フクシマの正義――「日本の変わらなさ」との闘い』幻冬舎.）

Kinoshita, Chigaya, 2017, *Political Science of Populism and ‘The Will of the People’*,: Otsuki Shoten.（＝木下ちがや, 2017,『ポピュリズムと「民意」の政治学』大月書店).

Oguma, Eiji, 2016, “A New Wave Against the Rock: New Social Movements in Japan Since the Fukushima Nuclear Meltdown,” Alexander Brown, trans., *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 14(13.2), (Retrieved February 25, 2019, http://apjjf.org/2016/13/Oguma.html).

Oguma, Eiji, 2013, *People Who Stop Nuclear Power Plant: From 3/11 to the Prime Minister’s Residence*, Bungeishunju（＝小熊英二, 2013,『原発を止める人々――3・11から官邸前まで』文藝春秋).

Oguma, Eiji, 2017, *Tell the Prime Minister (DVD enclosed)*, Shueisha International.（＝小熊英二, 2017,『首相官邸の前で〈DVD付き〉』集英社インターナショナル.）

Satoh, Keiichi, Shun Harada, Kikuko Nagayoshi, Minoru Matsutani, Naoto Higuchi, Hiroshi Ohata, 2018,“3.11 Go no Undō Sanka: Han/datsugempatsu Undō to Han-anpo Hosei Undō eno Sanka wo Chushin ni,” *Tokushima Daigaku Syakai Kagaku Kiyō* 32: 1-84.（＝佐藤圭一・原田峻・永吉希久子・松谷満・樋口直人・大畑裕嗣, 2018,「3.11後の運動参加――反・脱原発運動と反安保法制運動への参加を中心に」『徳島大学社会学研究』32: 1-84.）

Slater, David H., Rika Morioka, and Haruka Danzuka, 2014, “Micro-politics of Radiation,” *Critical Asian Studies*,46 (3): 485-508.

Yamamoto, Kaoruko, 2012,“Evacuee from Tomioka-Town: The Villagers mentioned alluded their discomfort with the anti-nuclear movements,”*Kinyobi*,20(28): 28-29.（＝山本薫子, 2012,「富岡町から避難して――町民が口にした脱原発運動への違和感」『週刊金曜日』20 (28): 28-29.

Wiemann, Anna, 2018, *Networks of Mobilization Processes: The Case of the Japanese Anti-Nuclear Movement after Fukushima*, München: Iudicium.

Special Issue
Anti-nuclear Social Movements

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI
JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

INTRODUCTION

"Even though Japan experienced a severe nuclear power plant accident in March 11 (3/11), 2011, nothing has changed. The Japanese government still sets nuclear energy as one of the basic national energy sources and keeps restarting nuclear reactors which were stopped after 3/11. People remain silent about the accident and don't try to make their voices heard." -----This is a typical reaction among people in Japan as well as outside of Japan, particularly among those who are critical of nuclear power. It is certainly true that Japan has not witnessed significant formal policy change on nuclear energy. At least, not as much as one might expect in a country that experienced such a severe accident.

However, this reaction grasps just part of the whole picture of Japan after 3/11. In fact, there has been considerable change in Japanese energy policy and in many aspects of civil society. Since 3/11, only three out of a total of 54 reactors (including the four broken Fukushima Daiichi reactors) have operated at any one time. This is because of changes to safety standards and because a number of district court rulings have prevented the resumption of certain

reactors. Since 3/11, public opinion polls consistently show that 60 percent of people are against nuclear energy (Iwai and Shishido 2015). There were demonstrations across Japan throughout 2011, some of which have continued up until now, five years after the accident. This includes the demonstrations held in front of the prime minister's office which attracted the largest number of participants of any anti-nuclear demonstrations held in Japan since 3/11 (Oguma 2016; Kinoshita 2017).

While it is too early to judge whether these seeds of change will eventually have a significant impact on the society, it is very important that we record the experiences of a civil society in motion. Moreover, it is very easy to judge that nothing has changed. From

Keiichi SATOH (JSPS Oversee Research Fellow and Guest researcher at University of Konstanz, Germany), Takashi MACHIMURA (Professor at Hitotsubashi University, Japan), Tomoyuki TATSUMI (Doctoral Student at Hitotsubashi University), JiYoung KIM (Assistant professor at University of Seoul, South Korea), Sunmee KIM (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Doshisha University, Japan), Uichi TAN (Doctoral Student at Hitotsubashi University), Hiroshi MURASE (Completed the doctoral program at Hitotsubashi University).

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

our perspective, however, this judgement benefits the powerful forces that would try to dismiss the changes that have taken place. In a time where history has not yet been determined, it is more important that we pay attention to whether there were people trying to effect change, than whether or not their attempts were successful (Satoh 2016a: 209).

A number of studies have recorded the changes in civil societies after 3/11. These include studies of demonstrations (Kinoshita 2017; Oguma 2016; Oguma 2013; Hirabayashi 2013) and shifts in public opinion (Iwai and Shishido 2015). But to our knowledge, none of the existing studies have tried to grasp the whole picture of citizen activism.

nation-wide, nor to cover the variety of their activities. This includes not only demonstrations, but other activities as well. We therefore conducted a nation-wide survey of various citizen groups which were active around nuclear and energy related issues after 3/11 in 2013 and published a book in 2016. Here we will report our findings very briefly. We refer interested readers who would like to know more to our original book in Japanese (Machimura and Satoh eds. 2016).

RESEARCH PROCESS

Data Collection

In this subsection, we briefly report how the data was collected. We sampled the target citizen groups from the following two sources:

- Newspaper articles in major nation-wide daily newspapers (Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun): We coded all the groups appearing in the articles published on March 12, 2011 and March 31, 2012 with the following paired keywords: "nuclear (原発 gempatsu) & citizen (市民 shimin)," "nuclear and groups (団体 dantai)," "energy (エネルギー) & citizen," and "energy & group."
- "The Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World" held in Yokohama on January 14, 2012: We coded all groups that participated in this event.

After coding, we located the approximately 1600 groups on the Internet. Out of them we could obtained the addresses of 904 citizen groups (779 groups coded from the newspaper articles, 93 groups coded from the conference and 32 groups coded from the both sources) and sent them a questionnaire in February and March 2013. The questionnaire covered various nuclear- and energy-related issues after 3/11. We distributed our questionnaire by post and received answers from 326 groups (response rate: 36.1%).

In addition to the survey, we conducted interviews with citizen groups and carried out participant-observation in order to gain further insights for the analysis.

Data Composition

The composition of the respondent groups was as follows:[1]

- Year established: 211 groups (66.2%) were established before 3/11 and 110 groups (33.7%) were established after 3/11.
- Legal Status: About half of the groups (57.7%) were private organizations with no legal status (任意団体 nin'i dantai). Another 15.3% had NPO status, and the remainder have a variety of legal statuses. Among those groups established after 3/11, 80.9% lacked any legal status.
- Location: Most groups had offices in Tokyo (62 groups, 19.0%), followed by Fukushima and Kyoto (26 groups, 8.0% respectively). Half of the respondent groups were located within the Tohoku and Kanto regions.

In the following section, we discuss the

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

Table 1 Background to the engagement of the groups

		Groups established		
		before 3/11	after 3/11	Total
	n=	209	105	314
A. Reasons on a personal level	Because we were victims of the earthquake or the nuclear accident	28.2%	30.5%	29.0%
	Because we had members who came from the earthquake or accident area	21.1%	20.0%	20.7%
	Other reasons	30.6%	34.3%	31.8%
B. Reasons on a local level	Because our local area is in the area struck by the earthqake and tsunami	12.9%	18.1%	14.6%
	Because our local area has a problem with radiation and debris	28.7%	41.9%	33.1%
	Because our local area has victims who have come from the disaster-stricken area	30.1%	35.2%	31.8%
	Other reasons	14.4%	19.0%	15.9%
C. Reasons on a Japanese society level	Because we believe there are problems in politics and corporate governance	51.2%	43.8%	48.7%
	Because we found that support for the disaster-stricken area is lacking	41.6%	41.0%	41.4%
	Because we found counter measures against the disaster and accidents to be insufficient	65.1%	73.3%	67.8%
	Other reasons	16.7%	19.0%	17.5%

Note: Multiple answers allowed

following questions based on this data.[2] (1) How the groups were established, (2) What issue they engaged with (3) How active were they in terms of advocacy and mobilization.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GROUPS

Background

In the previous section, we mentioned that almost one third of the respondent groups were established after 3/11. This suggests that many an enormous number of new groups were created just within two years after 3/11 (with our survey being conducted in 2013).

JiYoung Kim analyzed the background to the establishment of these groups (Table 1). On the one hand, some respondent groups had direct connections with the experience of the disaster, such as being victims of the earthquake or the nuclear accident (29.0%) or having members from the disaster-stricken area (20.7%). However, only such a direct experience could not account for the creation of such an enormous number of new groups, because only around 30% of the respondents at most checked these items. On the other hand, almost half of the groups were also driven by concerns about problems in politics or corporate governance.

Using the result shown in Table 1, Kim analyzed the combination of the reasoning for the establishment by each group (Table 2). For example, if one group checked any of the items in level A (personal level) and in level B, the group is sorted as type "A+B". The groups which were sorted into A (personal level), B (local level) or A+B account for only 4.8% in total (16 groups). Contrary to that, 73.0% (238 groups) also checked any items in level C (Japanese society level) in addition to the reasoning of A or B. This result suggests that not only the direct experience of the victimization but the awareness on

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

Table 2 The combination of the reasons for the engagement of the groups

	Total	before 3/11	after 3/11
n=	326	216	110
A	1.8%	2.3%	0.9%
B	1.2%	0.9%	1.8%
A+B	1.8%	2.3%	0.9%
C	16.3%	18.5%	11.8%
A+C	15.0%	16.7%	11.8%
B+C	12.3%	11.1%	14.5%
A+B+C	45.7%	40.7%	55.5%
none of A, B, or C	5.8%	7.4%	2.7%

Note: Multiple answers allowed
Source: Kim JiYoung (2016: 88)

the problem in politics or on the lack of the support played an important driving force for the people to start their civic engagement. Based on this result, Kim argues that 3/11 was no longer "somebody else's problem" for many people, but their own problem. But this sense of "my problem" was not only a result of direct experience, but also of self-identification with others who were suffering due to the disaster (JiYoung Kim 2016: 87-89).

In this connection, it is also meaningful to mention that the disaster stimulated the creation of many new networks. Asked about the previous connection for creating the groups, nearly two thirds (63.6%) of the 110 new groups answered that they were established by individuals without any previous connection. This shows that Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the importance of new social capital, because of the total 312 respondent groups, most (74.7%) still originated in existing groups in some ways, for example, some groups were created through the merger of existing groups (6.1%), some were established from existing groups (5.1%), and others were existing groups that just continued with their activities after the 3.11 (62.9%). In this regard, the expansion of citizen groups was rooted both in new connections as well as connections which existed before 3/11 (JiYoung Kim 2016: 91-92).

Social Impact

Once created, a group becomes a social entity that connects people and other groups. In his analysis, Keiichi Satoh focused on 70 groups established after 3/11 whose responses indicated they were created by individuals without any previous connection. The number of members of these groups varied: from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 5500 (mean of 317 and mode of 70). The total number of members of such groups accounted for 21,596 people. In addition, each group held events that brought together other people. In the questionnaire, groups were asked how many people came to their event in each period (Table 3). If we count up the average of each chosen category as an expected number of the participants,[3] averagely ca. 650 people (totally ca. 30,000) in the first half of 2011, ca. 800 people (totally ca. 45,000) in the second half of 2011, and ca. 500 people (totally ca. 30,000) in 2012 came to their events. From this simple estimate, we can see that even just 70 new groups have a large social impact (Satoh 2016b: 106-107).

Table 3 Number of participants at events held by newly established groups

n=70	1 to 9	10 to 49	50 to 99	100 to 299	300 to 900	1,000 to 4,999	more than 5,000	Did not hold events	NA	Total
First half of 2011 (2011.3.11-9.30)	0.0%	8.6%	5.7%	18.6%	20.0%	5.7%	1.4%	37.1%	2.9%	100.0%
Second half of 2011 (2011.10.1-2012.3.31)	0.0%	12.9%	14.3%	25.7%	11.4%	12.9%	2.9%	15.7%	4.3%	100.0%
2012 (2012.4.1-to the time of survey)	1.4%	17.1%	20.0%	30.0%	7.1%	11.4%	0.0%	10.0%	2.9%	100.0%

Note: The category "Did not hold events" includes the category "group did not exist at that time"
Source: Satoh (2016b: 106)

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

Nevertheless, in many cases they did not survive long. According to their answers to the questionnaire, only one third of the groups adopted an organizational form that was intended to enable the group to continue its activity as a group over a longer period (Table 4) (Satoh 2016b: 107). Accordingly, although the foundation of new groups can make an enormous impact on the creation of new social networks, only some of them are sustainable.

ISSUES

Six type of organizations

In the previous section, we saw that many citizen

Table 4 Organizational form of newly established groups

n=70

	Answer	Type	%
1	"A group where individuals and groups with various interests can connect without any specific goals"	Network	11.4%
2	"A group where individuals and groups come together to share information and negotiate in order to achieve specific goals"	Liaison committee	45.7%
3	"A group not only for sharing information or negotiation also but for running a one-time event or project"	Executive Committee	8.6%
4	"A group not only for running a one-time event or project, but maintaining it long-term"	Continual Activity Group	34.3%
	Total		100.0%

Source: Satoh (2016b: 107)

Table 5 Issues the groups engaged with (Multiple answer)

n=317

Cluster	Items in the questionnaire	
Anti-nuclear	Disseminating information about the nuclear accident	62.5%
	Decreasing or abolishing nuclear energy	49.2%
	Anti-nuclear and peace	40.4%
Energy-Shift	Promoting renewable energy	35.6%
	Energy-saving	26.5%
	Changing energy policy and the policy-process	31.9%
Evacuee and reconstruction support	Victim and Evacuee support	60.6%
	Support for reconstruction	39.7%
	Intermediate support and networking	34.1%
Health risk	Measuring radiation levels	37.5%
	Children's health, safety of school lunches	36.3%
	Food and water safety	32.8%
Countermeasure against the nuclear accident	Dispositon and acceptance of debris from the disaster stricken area	27.4%
	Compensation for damage caused by the accident	19.2%
	Countering harmful rumors	15.1%
	Supporting and providing information to workers in the nuclear p	10.1%
	Enhancing safety levels at the nuclear power plant	9.5%
	Decontamination	8.8%
	Other	20.8%

Note: Multiple answers allowded. Items are sorted based on the result of hierarchical cluster analysis

Source: Satoh (2016c: 47)

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

Table 6 Six types of organization based on activities they engaged with after 3/11

	Number of groups		Average Number of items in each Issue clusters						Established		
Group type	n	%	Anti-nuclear	Energy-Shift	Evacuee and reconstruction support	Health risk	Countermeasure against the nuclear accident	Features	before 3/11	after 3/11	Total
Anti-nuclear, single-issue type	45	14.2%	+	-	-	-	-	Focusing on anti-nuclear activities. Ex. Anti-nuclear groups	73.3%	26.7%	100.0%
Energy-shift, single-issue type	44	13.9%	-	+	-	-	-	Focusing on energy saving and the spread of renewable energies	68.2%	31.8%	100.0%
Evacuee and reconstruction support,	67	21.1%	-	-	+	-	-	Focusing on evacuee and reconstruciton support	54.7%	34.3%	100.0%
Health risk, multi-issue type	57	18.0%	+	-	+	++	+	Focusing on health risks caused by radiation, als taking part in evacuee and reconstruciton support as well as anti-nuclear issues.	42.1%	57.9%	100.0%
Anti-nuclear, multi-issue type	66	20.8%	++	+	+	-	+	Focusing on anti-nuclear issues, also taking part in energy-shift and evacuee and reconstruciton support	74.2%	25.8%	100.0%
Omnidirectional type	38	12.0%	++	++	++	++	++	Taking part in all the above mentioned issues	76.3%	23.7%	100.0%
Sum	31.7	100.0%							65.9%	34.1%	100.0%

Note: In the column of the average number of items, "++" means averagely two items were checked by the groups, "+" one item, "-" less than one item.

groups were active after 3/11. The next question is what kind of issues did they engage with? The accident forced people to face various kinds of problems. Table 5 shows the results of the answers by the groups to the question of which issues they engaged with (multiple choices were allowded). It turns out that the most checked items was "disseminating information about the nuclear accident" (62.5%), followed by "victim and evacuee support" (60.6%) and decreasing or abolishing energy (49.2%). Moreover, many group engaged with many issues simultaneously (on average six issues).

Based on a cluster analysis of these answers, Satoh identified six basic types of groups according to the patterns of issued they were engaged with (Table 6). It is notable that there are differences in the ratios among the group types with regard to the year in which they were established. Whereas most groups of the anti-nuclear and energy-shift type were established before 3/11, almost 60 percent of the health-risk type were established after 3/11. This suggests that the accident caused new types of groups to become active around energy-nuclear issues. It also means that the range of people's imagination about nuclear energy expanded and a wider range of people were motivated to become engaged in nuclear-related issues. This accounts for why so many citizen activities spread nationwide after 3/11 (Satoh 2016c: 50-54).

Spatial distribution of Six type of organizations

According to the analysis by Tomoyuki Tatsumi, there is a tendency for particular group types to occur in particular locations. Although Tokyo has the greatest density of citizen groups, regardless of group type, the distribution in the other areas differed based on group type. He identified three distinct distribution patterns:

- Nationwide: Both of types of "anti-nuclear" group (both single-issue and and multi-issue types) were located nationwide. Looking at the results in more detail, it was apparent that the "single-issue type" tended to be located in urban areas which are 50 to 150 km from the nearest nuclear reactor. On the other hand, multi-issue groups tend to be located closer to the nearest

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

reactor. In other words, whereas groups in urban areas tend to focus solely on the anti-nuclear issue, groups located near a nuclear power plant tend to engage in a wider variety of issues simultaneously.

- Concentrated in the area from Fukushima to Tokyo: The group types which engaged in disaster-related issues, that is, "evacuee and reconstruction support, single issue-type" and "Health risk, multi-issue type" concentrated in the area within 300 km of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant (which includes Tokyo). This is where the earthquake and tsunami struck and the risk of radiation was especially high. Interestingly, there was a concentration of "evacuee support type" groups in Kobe, suggesting that groups that supported evacuees following the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, also supported the Fukushima evacuees.
- Concentrated in Tokyo and Kansai: the remaining "Energy-shift" and "Omnidirectional type" groups were concentrated in the two largest urban areas of Tokyo and Kansai. Engaging in various issues as the "Omnidirectional type" groups did requires a large amount of resources, including expertise and finance. That is why most groups of this type were located in these two urban areas (Tatsumi 2016: 69-74).

Attitude toward nuclear power

In the previous subsection, we have seen that some groups engaged in activities in order to tackle the serious problems caused by the accident, such as evacuee support and health issues. We have also seen that other groups tried to avoid future problems by campaigning against nuclear energy. Though both of these activities are important, this difference in orientation often brought about disputes among the

Figure 1 Attitude toward the resumption of nuclear reactors by group type



Source: Tan (2016: 150)

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

groups. Uichi Tan's analysis illustrates the different attitudes toward nuclear power among the groups.

In the questionnaire, we asked the groups to indicate whether they had discussed the resumption of nuclear power plants suspended after 3/11 as a group. In some cases, they decided to take a stance as a group against resumption. In other cases, they did not discuss this issue, or deliberately chose not to adopt a stance on the issue as group, in order to focus on other issues. Figure 1 summarizes the answers by group type. More than 90 percent of both the "Anti-nuclear type" and the "Omnidirectional-type" groups adopted a stance against resumption as a group. On the other hand, a majority of the "Evacuee-support type" did not express any opinion as group against the resumption. This was because if they had expressed an opinion on the very controversial resumption problem, they would have difficulty in carrying out their main support activities.

It should also be borne in mind that residents in the contaminated area have a history living together with nuclear energy. Therefore, attitudes toward nuclear energy are highly contested among evacuees from the disaster-stricken area. In this connection, Figure 2 shows a clear tendency for groups that are located nearer to the Fukushima power plant the group to be less likely they to express an opinion against resumption. This tendency was sustained, even if we entered group type as a control variable in the logistic regression analysis. Accordingly, even if groups located in the disaster-stricken area face more direct catastrophes caused by the accident, the voices from these groups tend to be smaller as compared to the groups located far from Fukushima (Tan 2016: 146-154).

ADVOCACY AND MOBILIZATION

Creation of active advocacy groups after 3/11

After the 3/11, it became more common for Japanese civil society to engaged in politics than it had been

Figure 2 Attitudes toward the resumption of nuclear reactors by distance from the Fukushima Daiichi power plant



Source: Tan (2016: 153)

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

before. Demonstrations were held everywhere in Japan. The percentage of people who have signed a signature or contacted a politician has also increased (Satoh and Kim 2017).

Keiichi Satoh argues that groups established after 3/11 tend to be more active in their advocacy activity. In the questionnaire, we asked respondent groups to indicate all of the authorities they had targeted through advocacy activities such as submitting written opinions or entering into direct negotiations (Table 7). The percentage of groups which have already performed these advocacy activities before 3/11 did not change significantly before or after 3/11. In other words, most of the group which had not performed advocacy before 3/11 did not do so after 3/11, despite the accident. On the other hand, groups established after 3/11 tended to be more active in advocacy.[4] This suggests that after 3/11, many politically active groups were established, and this was the major, though not the exclusive, factor leading to the rise of various social movements after 3/11 (Satoh 2016: 43-45).

Resources and Mobilization

Often, the age of a group also correlates with the resources it has to support their activities. As Zald and McCarthy's (1987) resource mobilization theory suggests, older organizations tend to have more expertise, solid connections with their members and the knowledge to expand their resources. Hiroshi Murase tested this hypothesis against our data. The results, as clearly shown in Figure 3, confirmed that the older the groups is, the more annual budget they have in our data.

However, this does not necessarily suggest that the older groups are more active. If we look at the maximum number of participants at events held after 3/11, for example, there were no correlation between number of participants and the age of the groups (Figure 4). Murase concludes that the result is inconsistent with what would be expected in the original theory (Murase 2016: 186-189).

Mobilization and the Internet

Why was there no relation between the groups resources and their capacity to mobilize? One

Table 7 Advocacy activities before and after 3/11

"Our group performed advocacy activities such as submitting requests or conducting direct negotiations"

	Established Before 3/11		Established after 3/11
n=	211		108
	Before 3/11	After 3/11	After3/11
TO:			
Municipal governments	28.9%	31.8%	50.9%
Prefectural governments	24.6%	30.8%	43.5%
Ministry and central government	30.3%	35.5%	31.5%
Political parties and politicians	25.1%	30.8%	40.7%

Note: Multiple answers allowded

Source: Satoh(2016c: 44)

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

Figure 3 Year of establishment and annual budget



Source: Murase (2016: 187)

Figure 4 Year of establishment and maximum number of participants at events after



Source: Murase (2016: 187)

explanation seems to be the role of the internet, which, in terms of mobilization, can compensate for a relative shortage of financial resources. In this regard, Sunmee Kim's analysis is suggestive.

Sunmee Kim identified two types of groups in regard to their use of various internet tools such as Twitter and Facebook.[5] Almost 75 percent of the "non-active type" groups in terms of their use of internet tools were those which were established before 3/11, according to her classification (Table 8). In the non-active type, the majority of members were in their 50s, while those in the active type tended to be ten years younger. As compared to the non-active type, the active types were more active in circulating the information (80.3% of the active type hold the symposium and 60.6% of them collected

Table 8 Two types of groups in terms of internet-

n=	Active Groups 127		Non-Active Groups 178	
Established	Before 3/11	50.4%	Before 3/11	74.2%
	After 3/11	49.8%	After 3/11	25.8%
Age of majority of members	In their 40s	26.0%	In their 50s	29.8%
	In their 50s	22.8%	In their 60s	26.4%
	In their 60s	18.1%	In their 40s	10.7%
Location	Tokyo area (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama)	39.4%	Tokyo area (same as left)	18.5%
Frequency of use of SNS and Web	More than once a day	21.4%	More than once a day	4.9%
	Once every two to three days	22.3%	Once every two to three days	5.6%
	Once a week	20.4%	Once a week	21.8%
	Once a month	34.0%	Once a month	43.0%
Activity repertoire (Top five)	Symposiums and study sessions	80.3%	Symposiums and study sessions	73.0%
	Gathering and spreading the expertise	60.6%	Fundraising and material support	47.8%
	Advocacy	53.5%	Training sessions	44.4%
	Training sessions	52.8%	Participating in demonstrations	43.8%
	Participating in demonstrations	52.9%	Collecting signatures	41.0%

Source: Kim Sunmee (2016: 131)

and circulated the expert knowledge, whereas 73.0% and 47.8% of non-active type engaged with these activities, respectively).

Quite interestingly, the percentage of the groups which could organize an event that attracted more than 1,000 people was almost the same (Figure 5). This suggests that each type had an even chance of mobilizing people if they succeeded in activating their own mobilization channel properly (Kim Sunmee 2016: 130-136).

Figure 5 Percentage of groups able to attract more than 1000 people to their events by web user



Note: "2010" refers to 2010.1.1~2011.3.10, "First half of 2011" refers to 2011.3.11~2011.9.30, "Second half of 2011" refers to 2011.10.1~2012.3.31 and "2012" refers to 2012.4.1~time of survey, respectively. The number in brackets indicates the total number of groups (Active type, Non-Active type), which existed in each period.
Source: Kim Sunmee (2016: 135).

CLOSING REMARKS

In this paper, we have briefly introduced the results of our research on citizen groups engaged in nuclear- and energy-related issues after 3/11. Faced with the catastrophe caused by the triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, people took action based on their own understanding about what the society needs in this emergency. As is often discussed, civil society encompasses that part of society that belongs neither to the governmental nor to the market spheres. From this perspective, we can understand that civil society is the pool of the possibility of actions which have not chosen by the political and economic system. However, their possibilities in the 3/11 disaster embodied by the various citizen groups were not fully documented. Our research was one of many attempts to record concrete evidence about how people lived and what

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

people did in the face of the disaster (Satoh 2016a: 206-209).

It is still uncertain if the social movements after 3/11 will eventually lead to long-term change in Japanese society. If we recall the beginning of the 1970s, when environmental pollution was a serious problem, many citizen groups were also formed to tackle it. According to the environmental white paper in 1973, there were more than 1,420 citizen environmental groups. At that time, the Asahi Shimbun conducted a questionnaire survey of the growing number of citizen groups, including environmental groups, just like in our study.[6] We now know that these movements left a significant legacy in terms both of policy and of society in Japan. Just like the 1970s, we researchers should keep our eyes fixed on the changing society even though the results of these changes are not yet clear.

Notes

1 The questionnaire is available on our website (https://sgis.soc.hit-u.ac.jp/smosQE201305q.html).

2 In the following analysis, some questions have less than 326 respondents due to the "no answer".

3 For example, if a group answered "100 to 299 people", we counted it as "200 people" for adding up the numbers. The category "more than 5,000" was counted as 5,000.

4 These results correspond with the discourse among citizen groups after 3/11. After 3/11, many citizens expressed their regret for not being interested in the nuclear problem or not expressing their opinions about it publicly. Reflecting this, the need to engage in politics was widely discussed. it was during this time of public sentiment when the philosopher Kojin Karatani's statement in a speech at a demonstration in Shinjuku, Tokyo on *September 11, 2011* took attention among the citizens and widely shared. He stated, "some people doubt if demonstration can change the society. I think it can surely change the society, because through demonstration Japanese society becomes a society in which people demonstrate." For a critical analysis of this speech and the context behind it, see Brown (2014).

5 We asked respondent groups to indicate all of the internet items they used to distribute information and communication. In her analysis, she counted how many internet tools each group used and classified them as active if they used more than 2.27 items (the average number of items used by all groups), and non-active if they used less than 2.27 items. The items included in the questionnaire with their answers were as follows: Group homepage (77.7%), Group mailing-list and mail magazine (42.6%), Facebook (35.1%), Twitter (31.5%), Other group's website (26.9%), Website for video (20.0%), other SNS (4.3%), Other internet tools (4.3%) (n=305).

6 "Research on Growing and Diversifying Social Movements," Asahi Shimbun (Series of articles in the evening edition from *May 21-29, 1973*)(＝朝日新聞, 1973,「住民運動巨大化. 多様化の実態」(1973年5月21日～29日夕刊連載).

References

Brown, Alexander, 2014, "A Society in Which People Demonstrate: Karatani Kōjin and the Politics of the Anti-nuclear Movement," *Proceedings of the 18th Conference of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia*: 1-12. (http://japaninstitute.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/u6/23_Alexander_Brown-JSAA2013.pdf, checked on on *October 8, 2017*.)

Hirabayashi, Yuko, 2013, "What Makes a Society Which Demonstrates: Activism and Media after 3/11," Shigeyoshi Tanaka, Toshiyuki Masamura and Harutoshi Funabashi eds., *The Great East Japan Earthquake and Sociology*: The Society which Beckoned the Disaster, Mineruva Shobō, 163-195 (＝平林祐子, 2013,「何が『デモのある社会』を作るのか――ポスト3.11のアクティビズムとメディア」田中重好・正村俊之・船橋晴俊編『東日本大震災と社会学――大災害を生み出した社会』ミネルヴァ書房, pp. 163-195).

Iwai, Noriko and Shishido Kuniaki, 2015, "The Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident on People's Perception of Disaster Risks and Attitudes Toward Nuclear Energy Policy," Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 2(3): 172-195.

Kim, JiYoung, 2016, "Where Did the Activists Come From?: Causes and Processes of Group Foundation," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha, 85-99. (＝金知榮, 2016,「担い手はどこから現れたのか――活動のきっかけと団体結成過程」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 85-99).

Book "Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11": In a Nutshell

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE

Kim, Sunmee, 2016, "Use of Web-media: New Form of Culture and Participation through the Internet," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha,123 – 138 (＝金善美, 2016,「ウェブメディアの活用――インターネットが拓く新しい文化・参加のかたち」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 123-138).

Kinoshita, Chigaya, 2017, *Political Science of Populism and 'The Will of the People'*, Otsuki Shoten. (＝木下ちがや, 2017,『ポピュリズムと「民意」の政治学』大月書店).

Machimura, Takashi and Keiichi Satoh eds., 2016, *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha. (＝町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社).

Murase, Hiroshi, 2016, "Anti-nuclear Social Movements and Civil Society: Groups Established before and after 3/11," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha, 175-191 (＝村瀬博志, 2016,「脱原発運動と市民社会――震災前結成団体と震災後結成団体」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 175-191).

Oguma, Eiji, 2016, "A New Wave Against the Rock: New Social Movements in Japan Since the Fukushima Nuclear Meltdown," Alexander Brown, trans., *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 14(13.2), (Retrieved February 25, 2019, http://apjjf.org/2016/13/Oguma.html).

Oguma, Eiji, 2013, People *Who Stop Nuclear Power Plant: From 3/11 to the Prime Minister's Residence*, Bungei shunju (＝小熊英二, 2013,『原発を止める人々――3・11から官邸前まで』文藝春秋).

Satoh, Keiichi, 2016a, "Civil Society in the Age of Risk: What Can We Infer from the Spread of Citizen Activism and Anti-Nuclear Movements," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha, 201-222 (＝佐藤圭一, 2016,「リスク時代の市民社会――市民活動・脱原発運動の広がりは何を問いかけるのか」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 201-222).

Satoh, Keiichi, 2016b, "Five Phase in the Organizational Evolution of Citizen Groups," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha, 101-122 (＝佐藤圭一, 2016b,「市民活動団体の組織進化論」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 101-122).

Satoh, Keiichi, 2016c, "Citizen Activism on Nuclear- and Energy-related Issues: An Overview of the Activities and Six Type of Organisation," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11, Shinyōsha, 41-60 (＝佐藤圭一, 2016c,「原発・エネルギー問題に取り組む市民活動――活動の全体像と団体6類型」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 41-60).

Keiichi, Satoh, and Kim JiYoung, 2017, "Activism on Anti-Nuclear Issues by Young Mothers After 3/11 from a Quantitative Perspective," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (forthcoming).

Tan, Uichi, 2016, "Attitude toward the nuclear energy: Between the determination to "decide" and the strategy of "not to decide," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha, 139-158 (＝陳威志, 2016,「脱原発への態度――「決める」決断、「決めない」戦略」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 139-158).

Tatsumi, Tomoyuki, 2016, "Citizen Activism in Time and Space: Spatial Distribution and Temporal Transition," Takashi Machimura and Keiichi Satoh eds., *Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11*, Shinyōsha, 65-84 (＝辰巳智行, 2016,「市民活動の空間と時間――地理的分布と時間的推移」町村敬志・佐藤圭一編『脱原発をめざす市民活動――3・11社会運動の社会学』新曜社, 65-84).

Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy, 1987, *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.

What is the Oma Nuclear Power Plant?: Background of the Case Study

Keiichi SATOH

THE OMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

The Oma Nuclear Power Plant is a nuclear power plant currently being built in Oma, Aomori, with a capacity of 1,383 MW. It is owned by Electric Power Development Co., Ltd (J-Power), a formerly state-owned company that was privatized in 2004. The plant is planned to be the world's first reactor to use 100 % mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, a fuel made by combining plutonium and uranium (Gendai Jimbunsha Henshubu 2012: 141).

Figure 1 Location of the Oma Nuclear Power Plant



Note: Map by author.

BUILDING WITH MANY CHANGE OF THE PLAN

When the project was originally conceived, there was no intention to build a MOX reactor. In 1976, the Oma municipal assembly decided to invite the construction of a nuclear power plant in the town in order to promote economic development. The municipality had long been suffering from depopulation[1]. In 1978, the Oma municipal assembly formally asked J-Power, which already had relations with Oma connected with another submarine electric cable project, to build a new nuclear power plant. Originally, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) planned to make the Oma reactor the first Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor, a pressurized heavy water reactor design developed in Canada (Gendai Jimbunsha Henshubu 2012: 142). In 1979, however, AES decided to cancel the CANDU reactor project in Oma due to fears that the design would lead to inefficient electricity generation. Nevertheless, the municipal assembly continued to look for an alternative project. In 1984, the assembly decided again to invite the company to construct a new Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) (Nomura 2015: 38).

Oma is famous for its tuna fishery and until 1987, many residents were strongly against the construction of a nuclear power plant (Inazawa and Miura 2014: 76). However, after the Oma and Okoppe Fishery Cooperative Associations established a subcommittee within their respective associations, which implied that they would be ready to negotiate with J-Power, the anti-nuclear movement in Oma almost faded away. In 1994, the both union formally agreed to the construction in exchange for compensation money (Inazawa and Miura 2014: 83-91). Asako Kumagai (熊谷あさ子), a farmer who passed away in 2006,

Keiichi SATOH, JSPS Oversee Research Fellow and Guest Researcher at the University of Konstanz, Germany.

What is the Oma Nuclear Power Plant?: Background of the Case Study

Keiichi SATOH

was one of the very few residents who continued to oppose the project and did not sell her land, located within the planned construction site, to J-power (Nomura 2015: 49-77; Inazawa and Miura 2014: 102-115). Her house, named Asako House (あさこはうす), in which her daughter Atsuko Kumagai now lives, became a symbolic place for people opposed to the construction of the Oma plant.

In 1995, AES announced that it would construct a MOX reactor instead of a CANDU reactor. In 2008, construction finally started after repeated changes to the plan and a review by AES. In March 2011, when a large earthquake caused an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the construction at Oma was 37.6% complete (Kontani 2011: 34), with a 2014 target date for commercial operation (The Japan Times March 12, 2013).

TEMPORAL STOP OF THE BUILDING AFTER THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT

Following the accident at Fukushima, construction of the Oma plant virtually came to a stop. Meanwhile, concerns about the Oma nuclear power plant have grown, particularly among residents of the tourism and fishery city of Hakodate in Hokkaido, located 30 kilometers away from Oma, across the Tsugaru Strait. In April 2011, one month after the accident, Toshiki Kudo, who promised to support a freeze of the Oma plant construction, was elected as the new mayor of Hakodate (Kontani 2011: 36).

In September 2012, the DPJ government proposed a new energy plan, the Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment (革新的エネルギー・

Table 1: A Chronology of the Oma Nuclear Power Plant

Year	Month	Events
1976	6	Oma Municipal Assembly decided to invite nuclear power plant
1978		AEC asked Oma to build a CANDU reactor
1979	8	AEC canceled the CANDU reactor project
1984	12	Oma Municipal Assembly decided to invite ATR reactor project
1987	6	Oma and Okoppe Fishery Cooperate Associations decided to establish a subcommittee to negotiate with J-Power
1994	5	Oma and Okoppe FCAs agreed to the construction
1995	8	AES announced it would construct a MOX reactor
2006	5	Asako Kumagaya passed away (on 19)
2008	5	Construction started
2010	12	Citizen Group for the Oma Nucler Power Plant Trial sued the central government and J-Power (on 24)
2011	3	Construction stopped because of 3/11
	4	New Hakodate City Mayor Toshiki Kudo was elected
2012	9	Hakodate City assembly reached a unanimous decision calling for an unlimited freeze on construction (on 25)
	10	J-Power announced it would restart construction (on 1)
2014	4	Hakodate sues the central government and J-Power (on 14)

Note: This chronology was prepared by the author based on the original chronology by Nomura (2015: 266-274)

What is the Oma Nuclear Power Plant?: Background of the Case Study

Keiichi SATOH

環境戦略), which stated that Japan would not create any new nuclear power plants. However, the DPJ also announced on September 15 that they would accept the completion of nuclear power plant construction projects that were already underway. In response, on September 25 the Hakodate municipal assembly reached a unanimous decision calling for an unlimited freeze of the Oma plant's construction. However, J-Power announced that they have restarted the construction of the Oma plant as of October 1 (Kontani 2013: 44-47).

On April 14, 2014, Hakodate sued the central government and J-power in the Tokyo District Court, demanding the cancellation of the Oma construction. This is the first case in Japan in which a local government has sued the state over nuclear power plant construction (Kontani 2014: 82-83). In 2010, before Hakodate launched its suit, the members of the Citizen Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial (大間原発訴訟の会, see also Satoh's article in this volume), whose main staff live in Hakodate, also sued J-Power and the central government. As such, two cases against the Oma plant construction are being fought in the courts at the same time. Meanwhile, although J-Power restarted construction at Oma in 2012, they could not resume construction of the main part of the plant due to a delay caused by a review of the plant by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA, 原子力規制委員会). In ongoing this review, the NRA is checking the plant according to the new safety standard installed after 3/11. As of September 8, 2016, J-Power announced that they would postpone the construction of the main part and resume it once again in 2018 (Nikkei September 8, 2016).

Notes

1 The population in Oma town reached its peak of 7982 in 1960 and then decreased by 2.9% to 7753 in 1975 (Aomori Prefecture 2017). Although the ratio of the decrease is not large, it still marks a sharp contrast with the growth of the population in the nationwide, where the population grew by 19% (from 94,419,000 to 111,940,000) in the same period (The Statistics Bureau 2017).

References

Aomori Prefecture, 2017,"Information on Statistics," http://www6.pref.aomori.lg.jp/tokei/document_view.php?sheet_no=336, Retrieved on Retrieved on September 14, 2017.)（＝青森県, 2017,「統計情報のご案内」.）

Gendai Jimbunsha Henshubu, 2012, *How Should the Law Approach the Nuclear Power Plants: At the Forefront of the Nuclear Trials*, Gendaijinbun-Sha.（＝現代人文社編集部, 2012,『司法は原発とどう向き合うべきか――原発訴訟の最前線』現代人文社.）

Inazawa, Junko and Kyoko Miura, 2014, *Stop the Oma New Nuclear Power Plant: A Part of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle*, Otsuki Shoten.（＝稲沢潤子・三浦協子, 2014,『大間新原発を止めろ――核燃サイクルのための専用炉』大月書店.）

Kontani, Katsutaka, 2011,"Oma Nuclear Power Plant and Region of Hakodate and Donan,"*Hokkaido Economy*, 534: 34-36（＝紺谷克孝, 2011,「大間原発と函館・道南地域」『北海道経済』534:34-36）.

Kontani, Yoshitaka, 2013,"Growing Cooperation to Abolish the Nuclear Power Plants 3. Social Movements Demand the Cancellation of the Construction of the Oma Nuclear Power Plant,"*Assembly and Local Government*, 178: 44-48.（＝紺谷克孝, 2013,「原発ゼロ実現へ 広がる共同3 道南で大間原発建設ストップの熱いうねり(函館市)」『議会と自治体』178: 44-48.）

Kontani, Yoshitaka, 2014,"Hakodate City started the lawsuit to demand the cancel of the Oma Nuclear construction. The first local government nuclear power plants lawsuit,"*Assembly and Local Government*, 194: 82-86.（＝紺谷克孝, 2014,「大間原発建設中止求め、自治体初の原発裁判を提訴(函館市)」『議会と自治体』194: 82-86.）

Nikkei, 2016, "J-Power postpone the restart of the construction for two years due to the delay of the review," posted on Sept. 8. 2016 (http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFB07H4E_X00C16A9L01000/, Retrieved on January 22, 2017.)（＝『日本経済新聞』2016年9月8日付「Jパワー、大間原発の工事再開2年延期 審査長期化で」）.

What is the Oma Nuclear Power Plant?: Background of the Case Study

Keiichi SATOH

Nomura, Yasuko, 2015, *The Oma Nuclear Power Plant and Japan's Future*, Jurousha.(＝野村保子, 2015,『大間原発と日本の未来』寿郎社.)

The Japan Times, 2013, "Work resumes on Aomori's new Oma nuclear plant" posted on March12,2013, Retrieved on January 22, 2017. (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/12/national/work-resumes-on-aomoris-new-oma-nuclear-plant/#.WIR2svnhDic.)

The Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2017, "Population in Japan between 1920 and 2000". (http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?bid=000000090004&cycode=0, Retrieved on Retrieved on September 14, 2017.) (＝総務省統計局「我が国の推計人口(大正9年～平成12年)」.)

Key Organizations of the Post-Fukushima Accident Civil Society 4-2: Oma

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai

Keiichi SATOH

Outline of the research

Date: February 21, 2016

Place: Hakodate City, Hokkaido.

Interviewee: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial (大間原発訴訟の会)

Researchers: Keiichi SATOH, Keisuke MORI, Yosuke TATSUNO and Reeya KOMODA

INTRODUCTION

Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial (CGOL) (大間原発訴訟の会 Ōma Gempatsu Soshō no Kai) is a citizen plaintiff group that has gone to court to stop the construction of a MOX nuclear power plant in Oma, Aomori Prefecture. This group was initially organized by residents of Hokkaido and Aomori prefectures.

But after the Fukushima Daiichi power plant accident caused by the earthquake of March 11, 2011, its membership spread nationwide. As of 2016, there are almost 1,100 regular members who pay the annual membership fee of 3,000 yen. In addition to these regular members who are the plaintiffs in the case, there are also around 400 supporting members.

The administration of the groups is mainly undertaken by around 15 members living in Hakodate, a city located across the Tsugaru Strait from Oma.

In addition to supporting the legal case, the group also hold symposiums about the power plant and distribute handbills around the construction site once per year with their partner group "Landowner Group against the Oma Nuclear Power Plant" (大間原発に反対する地主の会 Ōma Gempatsu ni Hantaisuru Jinushi no Kai). Since the earthquake, they have also been participating in the monthly demonstration in Hakodate organized by local group "Good-Bye Oma Nuclear Power Plant Hakodate Working Committee" (バイバイ大間原発はこだてウォーク実行委員会 BaiBai Ōma Gempatsu Hakodate Walk Jikkō Iinkai).

We conducted an interview with the group's leader, Toshiko Takeda, and its secretary Tsukasa Nakamori at the Hakodate Community Design Center on February 21, 2016. The interview took around two hours. This report was written and edited based on this interview. When preparing the report, we asked some further questions via email and added some additional information.

Photo 1: Members gathering to participate in a demonstration held on the third Sunday of every month
Note: At the Hakodate Community Design Center, Hakodate, Hokkaido on February 21, 2016. Photo by author.

Keiichi SATOH, JSPS Oversee Research Fellow and Guest Researcher at the University of Konstanz, Germany.

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai"

Keiichi SATOH

HISTORY OF THE CGOL

The main members of the CGOL are retired men and women in their fifties and sixties, namely, baby boomers. Most of them have been engaged in anti-nuclear social movements since the 1980s.

Members of the group have been part of different groups, each of which was established to reflect local concerns over the progress of nuclear power plant construction in Oma. In 1986 they founded their first group, "Study Group on Nuclear Issues in Hakodate and Shimokita" (Study Group) (函館・「下北」から核を考える会 Hakodate Shimokita kara Kaku wo Kangaeru kai). This was a citizen-based study circle whose members tried to educate themselves about the nuclear problem in general.

In 1994, members of the Study Group founded "Donan Citizens Group to Stop the Oma Nuclear Power Plant" (Donan Group) （ストップ大間原発道南の会 Stop Ōma Gempatsu Dōnan no Kai) to oppose the Oma nuclear power plant (Donan refers to the southern part of Hokkaido).

Photo 2: Demonstration by COGL members in Hakodate. Many of them hold message boards illustrated with tuna and squid, a specialty product in Hakodate
Note: At the Hakodate Community Design Center, Hakodate, Hokkaido on February 21, 2016. Photo by author.

Finally, in 2008 they established CGOL in order to organize the plaintiff group. The members of these groups overlap, but not completely, because each participant has a different preference as to the extent of the activities they wish to engage in.

Establishment of the Study Group after the Chernobyl Accident

When the Chernobyl accident occurred in 1986, Nakamori, who was a high school social studies teacher at the time, had two children aged seven and three. Concerns for his children prompted him to want to learn more about the nuclear problem and he decided to establish the Study Group. He asked a university professor who led the local high school teachers' group for learning the teaching method of social studies to lead the group.

Already in 1987, the Study Group started organizing numerous visits to Oma, Mutsu and Rokkasho, where nuclear-related infrastructure is concentrated.

Takeda's engagement in various citizen groups started after she moved to Hakodate when she got married. Her first group was a citizens group for distributing organic vegetables. Takeda and Nakamori got to know each other through the Study Group.

As mentioned above, the core members of CGOL knew each other in their thirties and forties in the late 1980s and early 1990s and continued their anti-nuclear activities together.

Why have the younger generation not joined these groups in the meanwhile? Nakamori thinks that the main cause of this is the shortage of time caused by long working hours and low wages among the non-regular employee spreading among the young generation. Nakamori said, "I think the younger generation are very busy. Half of young people are in insecure work. They also don't go so often to pubs. They mainly spend their time at Karaoke instead. Our generation used to go to bars, pubs and cafes more often. Young people cannot spend as much money as we did. They also don't go out drinking with their boss."

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai"

Keiichi SATOH

The Study Group often visited the construction site of Oma nuclear power plant, which commenced following a formal invitation from the Oma municipal assembly in 1984. The group also supported on the construction site by raising funds and helping install a signboard.[1] The groups also supported a movement known as the "One Area Land Owners Group" (一坪地主の会 Hitotsubo Jinushi no Kai) in which anti-nuclear citizens become a small part of the land-owner in the construction area in order to prevent Electric Power Development Company (J-Power) from purchasing the site. Through these various activities, they developed networks with other activists in Aomori Prefecture.

Establishment of Donan Group in 1994

At an extraordinary general meeting in May 1994, the Oma and Okoppe Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FCA) agreed to a proposal to construct the plant and decided to accept the compensation money that was on offer. They later concluded an agreement with the J-Power that provided compensation to members of the cooperatives.[2]

This was the decisive decision for the building of the Oma nuclear power plant. In response, members of the Study Group founded the Donan Group in September 1994 with the aim of stopping the construction of the Oma plant. According to Takeda, the chief of the group, Chuichi Omachi, who was a lawyer, said at that time that they would need to be prepared for a court battle in the final phase.[3] In 1995, J-Power announced that the Oma plant would be the first reactor to be fueled solely by MOX fuel.

In December 1998, the then Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) held its first public hearing on the Oma plant. However, the Donan Group, located outside Oma town, was not recognized as a local group and was therefore not allowed to take part.

The Donan Group responded by suing the state in the Hakodate local court on February 4, 1999, demanding the right to participate in the public hearing.

Though the court rejected their claim, the NSC allowed them to participate in the second public hearing in 2005, as one of five representatives from Hakodate.[4] Takeda, who attended the public hearing, described it as follows: "No matter what we said, NSC just repeated that it was safe, with big clipboards. I thought to myself, this hearing is just a place for the NSC to advertise their agreement. This made me really disappointed because I expected J-Power, as a state-owned company, could think about more about the safety."

Establishment of CGOL in 2008

In December 2006, members of the Donan Group organized a new group, the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial Preparation Group (大間原発訴訟準備会 Ōma Gempatsu Sosho Junbi Kai) in order to prepare to sue in response to the announcement by the J-Power that they would start to construct the plant in August 2007.

In July 2007, the Chuetsu Offshore earthquake occurred in Niigata Prefecture. After this earthquake, new safety regulations in regard to the solidity of the ground were introduced. Group members hoped that this would change the decision about the construction.

Between November 2007 and February 2008, they collected a total of 64,222 signatures and submitted them along with other citizen groups and labor unions in Hokkaido and Aomori, demanding that the then NSC reject the construction.[5] However, on April 23, 2008, the NSC gave its approval. The next day, the preparation group formally changed its name to CGOL.

As mentioned above, CGOL has numerous members from the Donan Group and the Study Group, but the membership does not overlap

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai"

Keiichi SATOH

completely. There were also many members who did not want to take part in the legal action. Therefore, when CGOL holds an event such as symposium, the other two groups engage as supporting groups.

In July 2010, 168 CGOL members sued the government in court to cancel the approval for the plant construction, and sued J-Power to stop the construction and operation of the plant. They also demanded compensation from the defendants.[6] The first trial was held on December 24, 2010, and the second trial was planned for May 19, 2011. On March 11, 2011, when the judge and lawyers from both sides met to prepare for the second trial, the earthquake and subsequently the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident occurred.

Photo 3: Tsukasa Nakamori, standing at the Shiokubi Cape, the closest point to the Oma Nuclear Power Plant from Hakodate
Note: On February 22, 2016. Photo by author.

CHANGES AFTER 3/11

After the 3/11 accident, the circumstances surrounding the CGOL changed dramatically.

Before 3/11 only around ten people attended the study meeting. Takeda said, "Our activity was mostly regarded just as a social movement by a particular part of the citizens."

After 3/11, however, every time they hold a symposium, more than 200 people attended. Even in 2016, five years after the earthquake, around 100 people often attend their events. Members often receive cheers from residents and local neighborhood associations also started to take action against the Oma power plant.

"3/11 changed a lot of things. Many people started to think that there was no place to escape in Hakodate [, if a similar nuclear accident was to occur]", observes Takeda. Oma nuclear plant is now regarded as posing a real risk to citizens' daily life.

The membership of CGOL also spread. Before the 3/11 the plaintiff consists largely of citizens in Hakodate. Now, citizens from all over Hokkaido, and even from as far away as Kanagawa, Chiba and Tokyo in the Kanto Region joined. By 2016, there were more than 1,100 plaintiffs.[7]

Takeda express this expand, saying "we cannot identify now member's name and their face." The widening of the membership requires them to be more conscious about the way they present themselves to the public. As some people started to report the trial as "grassroots supporting group" (勝手連 Katteren), CGOL needed to make their own formal homepage and publish trial-related materials. Previously, they only had a blog written by one of the members voluntarily. The CGOL page now contains the phrase, "this homepage is the only one which publishes our formal information and opinions."

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

After 3/11, CGOL began networking with other citizen groups and other types of organizations. CGOL now has a relationship with members of Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) and neighborhood associations. Together with these groups CGOL once invited former Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi, who began campaigning against nuclear power after the 3/11, to the symposium. On that occasion, more

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai"

Keiichi SATOH

than 800 people came to listen to his speech.

Though CGOL's cooperation with these groups began after 3/11, both Takeda and Nakamori said that in Hakodate there was an atmosphere for networking among the different groups even before 3/11.

Takeda attributes this to Hakodate's merchant culture, saying "there is a history of cooperation in Hakodate, regardless of the political stances when citizen gather. Hakodate is a city of merchants, not militarists. The city has a bronze statue of Takadaya Kahei, [an Edo Era merchant] and there are four famous merchants who are known as the four heavenly 'kings'. They made Hakodate, including Hakodate park. As a merchant, I also understand the view of the merchants well."

The interviewees also noted that the fact that Hakodate does not receive any subsidy related to the plant makes it easier for people to cooperate against it.

As CGOL's membership grows and the organization strengthens its networking with other groups, the risks that the different political stances among the related people cause the dispute also grows.

In order to avoid this risk, Nakamori said, "I would like CGOL to remain a group for people who just want to stop the Oma nuclear power plant. I personally also attend the gathering on other issues such as TPP [Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement] or the security bills [introduced by the Abe government]. But I take care not to identify myself as a member of CGOL."

CGOL members also socialize with members of the Hakodate municipal assembly. When we visited them for this interview, it was the day of their monthly demonstration. At the beginning of the demonstration, two municipal councilors, one from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and one from the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) made speeches.

When CGOL holds an event, they invite all of the political parties in Hakodate to attend. Sometimes the political parties also invite CGOL members to their gatherings. Nakamori said, "if invited and asked to talk about the nuclear power plant, I will go regardless of which party issued the invitation".

Nevertheless, CGOL has stronger connections with councilors from the DPJ, the JCP and the Social Democratic Party. Nakamori said, "although I don't ask about party affiliation, I think we have very few members who support the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or the Komeito Party (KP)." Nakamori added that when they are invited, councilors from the LDP and KP do not come to CGOL's event, even though the two parties agree with the Hakodate City mayor's call for an indefinite freeze on the Oma plant's construction.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Up until 2012, there were around fifty lawsuits regarding the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant in Japan. Citizens opposing nuclear power won only two of these cases and even then the decisions were eventually reversed by the Supreme Court.

Kenichi Ido, who as judge ordered the stop of the operation in Shiga (志賀) No. 2 nuclear power plant in 2006, explains the reason following. "Among the judges there were strong sense of reliability toward the safety standard set by the State. Judges had little sense of the reality that an accident might occur." (Gendai Jinbunsha Henshubu 2012: 40).

Nevertheless, after 3/11 some changes can be seen among the judges.

On May 21, 2014, the Fukui local court ordered the cessation of operations at Oi (大飯 Ōi) No.3 and No. 4 power plant. The judgment noted that the plant

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai"

Keiichi SATOH

Table 1: Chronology of the Oma Nuclear Power Plant and CGOL

Year	Month	Events related to the Oma plant	Events Related to the Citizen Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial (CGOL)
1984	12	Oma Municipal Council formally invited the construction of an ATR reactor	
1986		Chernobyl accident occurred	Study Group on Nuclear Issues in Hakodate and Shimokita established
1994	5	Oma and Okoppe FCAs agreed to the construction	
	9		Donan Citizens Group to Stop the Oma Nuclear Power Plant (Donan Group) established
1995	8	AES announced the construction of a MOX reactor	
1998	12	NSC held the first public hearing	
1999	2		Donan Group sued the central government to demand the right to participate in the public hearing. (on 4.)
2005		NSC hold the second public hearing	
2006	5	Asako Kumagaya passed away (on 19).	
	12		Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial Preparation Group (Preparation Group) established
2007	7	Chuetsu Offshore earthquake occurred	
	11		The Preparation Group collect signatures until February 2008.
2008	4	The NSC approved the construction (on 23)	CGOL was found (on 24)
	5	The construction started	
2010	12		CGOL sued the central government and J-Power (on 24)
2011	3	The construction was stopped because of 3/11	
	4	New Hakodate Mayor Toshiki Kudo elected	
2012	9	Hakodate municipal council reached a unanimous decision to the call for an indefinite freeze on construction (on 25)	
2014	4	Hakodate City sued the central government and J-Power (on 14)	

Note: This chronology was constructed by the author based on the original chronology by Nomura (2015: 266-274).

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai"

Keiichi SATOH

operators cannot guarantee the absolute safety of the Oi plant (an appeal is now now pending in the Nagoya High Court). On March 9, 2016, the Otsu District Court issued a provisional disposition against the operation of Takahama (高浜) No. 3 and No. 4 plants. (This case is now pending in the Osaka high court.)

However, the situation is very fluid. For example, on April 6, 2016, the Osaka high court overruled an objection lodged by citizens who demanded for the stop of operating Sendai No. 1 and No. 2 plants.

We concluded our interview by asking Nakamori about his expectations regarding the outcome of the case. He answered, "we do this thinking that we absolutely can win. And we cannot say we will stop even if we lose. If we give up, we cannot save Hakodate. We want to save Hakodate and the whole Donan area. Moreover, we think this is a problem for the whole of Hokkaido and even for the whole Japan."

On March 19, 2018, the Hakodate District Court dismissed the lawsuit by CGOL. The Court ruled that there was no realistic possibility of a serious accident occurring, because at the moment the facility was undergoing screening by the Nuclear Regulation Authority to ensure it meets new safety standards imposed after the 2011. The court also judged that there is no serious defect in the new safety standards. The CGOL appealed to a higher court on March 28.

Further Information

Citizen Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial (大間原発訴訟の会)

http://oomagenpatsu-soshounokai.org/

Notes

1 For further information on the activities of the Study Group at that time, see also Inasawa and Miura (2014: 124).

2 For details about the acceptance by the FCAs, see also Nomura (2015: 46-48).

3 According to Nomura (2015: 98), around 300 Hakodate residents attended the public hearing.

4 See also Nomura (2015: 102-104).

5 According to Yasuko Nomura (2015: 106), this campaign for collecting signatures was also intended to prepare for the preparation for lodging an objection against the approval of the construction. According to Junko Inazawa and Kyoko Miura (2014: 130-131), there are roughly three ways to bring a case against a nuclear power plant to court: (1) a civil trial, (2) administrative legislation to invalidate the confirmation by administrative bodies, and (3) administrative litigation to lodge an objection based on the Administrative Appeal Act. In the first approach, a civil trial, anti-nuclear citizens bring electric companies to court demanding they cancel construction and stop the operation of their facilities. They can start this type of trial at any time. Plaintiffs can also start the second administrative litigation for the confirmation of the invalidation, but they need to prove serious illegality. For the last objection trial, the citizens need to submit the objection within sixty days after government approval has been granted. In case of the trial by CGOL, 4,541 objection signatures were submitted to the government in June 2008 (Gendai Jinbunsha Henshubu 2012: 144).

6 The first administrative litigation on the cancelation of the approval of the plant construction was later withdrawn (Gendai Jimbunsha Henshubu 2012: 144). The reason was that in this trial, the plaintiff and layers needed to travel to either the Aomori or Tokyo District Court, which have jurisdiction in this matter and this was too difficult for them. The remaining civil trial was lodged in the Hakodate local court, where most of the plaintiffs are located. (Inazawa and Miura 2014: 130-131).

7 The number of plaintiffs increased as follows: 168 members (July 2010), 376 (December 2011), 663 (April 2013), 786 (February 2014), 897 (September 2014), 1010 (April 2015), 1063 (September 2015), 1134 (November 2016). The reason for the increase in membership is also due to the CGOL's tactics. Normally, plaintiffs seeking a halt to the construction of the nuclear power plant need to pay 15,000 yen in lodgment fees. This is too large burden for individual citizens and therefore, the plaintiffs group failed to attract many members. Therefore, they combined their demand for 30,000 yen as compensation money into their lawsuit. If the plant starts to operate, the plaintiffs argue that it will pose health risks and keep them in fear of accidents. Because the amount of the compensation money is law, the lodgment fee in this case is just 1,000 yen per person. CGOL restricts the number of plaintiffs seeking a halt to construction and increases the same time the number of the plaintiffs seeking compensation. Through this combination, they hold down the total expense of the trial and make it possible for citizens to join the plaintiffs group (Inazawa and Miura 2014: 144; Gendai Jinbunsha Henshubu 2012: 151).

Saving Hakodate from the MOX Nuclear Power Plant Oma: Citizens Group for the Oma Nuclear Power Plant Trial "Oma Gempatsu Sosho no Kai"

Keiichi SATOH

References

Gendai Jimbunsha Henshubu, 2012, *How Should the Law Approach Nuclear Power: At the Forefront of the Nuclear Plant Trials*, Gendai Jimbunsha(＝現代人文社編集部, 2012,『司法は原発とどう向き合うべきか――原発訴訟の最前線』現代人文社).

Inazawa, Junko and Kyoko Miura, 2014, *Stop the New Oma Nuclear Power Plant: A Specialized Plant for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle*, Otsuki Shoten(＝稲沢潤子・三浦協子, 2014,『大間新原発を止めろ――核燃サイクルのための専用炉』大月書店).

Nomura, Yasuko, 2015, The Oma Nuclear Power Plant and Japan's Future, Jurousha(＝野村保子, 2015,『大間原発と日本の未来』寿郎社).

Special Issue
Anti-Nuclear Social Movements
Key Organizations of the Post-Fukushima Accident Civil Society 5: Tokyo

How Anti-Nuclear Organizations View the Present Status and Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in Post-3.11 Japan

Yosuke TATSUNO

INTRODUCTION

Though it seems to have lost the momentum it once had, activities by the anti-nuclear movement are still taking place throughout Japan. The organizations underpinning such activities are probably the citizen groups that have continuously operated since before the Great East Japan Earthquake in opposition to nuclear-power-related businesses. How do the organizations understand their current state of protests, especially after experiencing the spread of the large-scale protests in front of the office of the prime minister? By focusing on this question, I will examine the current state of the anti-nuclear movement as well as its future.

In this paper, I will use data obtained through interviews with members of multiple organizations that have led the anti-nuclear movement from the post-earthquake period to the present, focusing on what they think of the current state and future of the post-Great East Japan Earthquake anti-nuclear movement. In what follows, I will first describe the general development of the anti-nuclear movement. Then, after describing the interviews with the aforementioned organization members, I will conclude by presenting some points at issue related to the post-3.11 social changes that occurred through the anti-nuclear movement.

FROM THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN 2011 TO PROTESTS IN FRONT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

The nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, invigorated anti-nuclear movements throughout Japan. A review of the anti-nuclear movement of the past five years suggests there have been two trends.

The first is the fact that people who had not participated in social movements or citizen activities prior to the earthquake took part in this movement. For example, it has been noted that the number of people participating in the anti-nuclear movement for the first time increased thanks to a series of protests organized in Tokyo (e.g., Hirabayashi 2013). Certain circumstances must have led these first-timers to join in. A participant in the anti-nuclear demonstration organized in Shibuya on November 27, 2011, said, "I realized there is no place to express [opinions]" (November 27, 2011, interview with demonstration participants) and participated in the movement in search of places and spaces to express opinions on the situations and issues surrounding nuclear power generation. Or, as stated by Sono (2012: 122), "it makes no sense that the people become less interested when the situation is getting worse." People continued pleading for society to solve the nuclear power issue while keeping the conversation focused on nuclear power plants. In this way, immediately

Yosuke TATSUNO, Doctoral Student, Graduate School of Global Studies, Sophia University. JSPS Research Fellow (DC2).

How Anti-Nuclear Organizations View the Present Status and Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in Post-3.11 Japan

Yosuke TATSUNO

after the earthquake, the anti-nuclear movement had a space to protest against the social mood of self-restraint, or a space for expressing opinions and having discussions.

The second is the invigoration of citizen groups. For example, the Sayonara Nuclear Power Plants 10 Million People Action that has been held in Yoyogi Park on a regular basis since September 2011 is organized mainly by citizen groups such as the Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin), Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), and All Japan Anti-Nuclear Liaison Association. In short, the reason for the invigoration of these activities is the nuclear accident resulting from the earthquake. So, what changes do they want in Japanese society following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident? I would like to take the flyer of the Sayonara Nuclear Power Plants 10 Million People Action as an example. Here, while aiming to realize a sustainable society and resolve energy problems, they make the following three demands: The first is a demand for the abandonment of nuclear power plants and planned decommissioning; the second is a demand for the disposal of nuclear fuel facilities; and the third is a demand for a reflection/review of the current energy policy.

Considering each proposal, we can see how anti-nuclear advocate groups perceive the problem; they are dissatisfied with the fact that the political situation has not changed despite the earthquake. Based on such a case, it is likely that nuclear-power-generation-related citizen groups were growing discontent with the unchanging political situation even after the nuclear power plant accident and invigorated the movement in an attempt to seek change. As described, we saw objections to the mood of self-restraint and dissatisfaction with the political situation being expressed in the post-disaster citizen activities that attempted to keep the issue alive. And we can say that the anti-nuclear movement formed a large wave as a result of each group's and individual's concerns towards and awareness of the problem resonating.

In this way, the anti-nuclear movement, which was invigorated by various people and their awareness of the problem, later staged protests in front of the office of the prime minister, primarily led and organized by the Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes after March 2012. Unlike previous anti-nuclear movements organized around multiple issues, these activities were characterized by being organized around a single issue; that is, "protests specifically against the office of the prime minister rather than criticisms of nuclear power in general" (Noma, 2013: 72). In terms of this development, it has been noted that while it aimed to "go beyond all ideologies to create a mass movement against nuclear power generation" (Hattori, 2016: 60), "loose arguments to abandon nuclear power generation would have been swallowed by the enormous power of the pro-nuclear groups" (Ibid.). Noma (2016: 80) also explains that "they just pleaded to change the policy." Oguma et al. (2016: 39) argue that many participants in these protests felt "anger about 'being treated with contempt,' which came from political alienation."

As described, the post-2012 anti-nuclear movement focused on the political situation surrounding nuclear power plants after the earthquake and, naturally, the people who gathered were angry about these issues. As a result, we can say that the post-2011 anti-nuclear movement reached its peak when it established "in front of the office of the prime minister" as a space to express people's anger (Hattori, 2016: 59-61). Moreover, this space continues to be a central place for protests in Japan.

In this way, since the summer of 2012, the anti-nuclear movement that reached its peak seems to have lost the heat it had immediately after the disaster. The topics of protests in front of the office of the prime minister have shifted to bills related to state secrecy and national security. If we were to look

How Anti-Nuclear Organizations View the Present Status and Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in Post-3.11 Japan

Yosuke TATSUNO

only at protests in front of the prime minister's office, issues relating to nuclear power generation may seem to be losing attention amid the other social problems in Japan.

Yet, there are still many organizations continuously operating today. How do these organizations look back at the period between 2011 and 2012 and plan to use the lessons learned? Going forward, this type of reflection will be necessary in exploring trends in the anti-nuclear movement and people's awareness of the problem.

THE UNDERSTANDING OF ANTI-NUCLEAR ADVOCATE GROUPS BASED ON THEIR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

In what follows, I will describe, based on interviews with members of the various organizations involved in the anti-nuclear movement from 2011 to 2016, how each organization thinks about 1) how to understand the current state of the anti-nuclear movement and 2) future challenges for this movement. As for the organizations selected, I will discuss the CNIC and Gensuikin as central organizations involved in large-scale anti-nuclear events, such as the Sayonara Nuclear Power Plants 10 Million People Action described earlier and the Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World held in early 2012, and as organizations that began operating before the earthquake disaster and continue to operate today. In addition, I will discuss FoE Japan and elucidate a trend that can be seen in some of the new movements since the earthquake.

Understanding of the State of the Anti-Nuclear Movement from 2011 to 2016

The CNIC is an organization that collects, researches, and analyzes materials related to the dangers of nuclear power from the standpoint of citizens who are independent from the industry. It disseminates that information with the aim of realizing a society that does not rely on nuclear power.

Regarding past strategies of anti-nuclear campaigns, a member of the CNIC noted that the problem was that they did not have any discussion at the campaign or Diet level in terms of how to change nuclear power policy and how society would be after abandoning nuclear power. In other words, it can be said that they could not become a forum to reflect people's anti-nuclear awareness in a political setting where political parties with anti-nuclear power views became divided, and that made the discussions such as how to stop the nuclear power plants and how to build a post-nuclear society unclear on multiple levels.

This member also said that "mobilizing (individuals) is difficult unless it's based on a large strategy" (CNIC interview, September 8, 2016) and also mentioned "the manpower has declined as the number of individuals involved in the organization decreased, making the same pattern (of mobilization) as before difficult" (same as above).

In this way, it is suggested that one of the challenges for the anti-nuclear movement after 2012 was the fact that advocate groups could not create a political impetus for the movement.

On the other hand, the protests in front of the office of the prime minister strongly advocated turning the nuclear power problem into a political task. Was this a unique move? How was it understood by the organizations?

What a member of Gensuikin said about this understanding makes it clear. Founded in 1965, Gensuikin is one of the largest anti-nuclear, peace advocate groups in Japan. They undertake all kinds of campaigns to oppose nuclear, including the "peaceful use" of nuclear power, in addition to their original tasks such as opposing nuclear experiments,

How Anti-Nuclear Organizations View the Present Status and Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in Post-3.11 Japan

Yosuke TATSUNO

eliminating nuclear weapons, and aiding atomic bomb survivors.

The Gensuikin member explained that the campaign could not lay out a concrete path for solving the issue because its criticism of nuclear power was focused solely on the political situation. The member stated:

> "Neither the electric power company nor the government can be the first to say 'let's quit nuclear power generation.' …The industry is set up that way. It would be really nice to completely eliminate nuclear power generation right away, but just saying so does not make nuclear power generation go away. […] No one can paint the picture as to how to persuade the industry and make a soft landing. Who draws the overall picture?" (Gensuikin interview, September 15, 2016)

For example, my impression of the conference held in 2012 between Prime Minister Noda and the various organizations involved in the protest was that it was like a one-way dialogue in which the organizations only argued for the need to oppose nuclear power generation; the parties were expressing opinions at cross-purposes. Perhaps a path to explore each other's compromise is also necessary.

The CNIC also indicated that they had not done this kind of concrete problem solving. The CNIC member stated likewise, "No concrete vision for after the elimination of nuclear power generation was presented in the movement in Tokyo. We just raised our voice to oppose nuclear power generation" (CNIC interview, September 8, 2016) and said "Why is it a good idea to gather here to raise our voice?" (same as above)—i.e., identified a problem where there is no longer a point in coming together for the movement and holding a large rally or making statements. In this way, turning the problems into one single issue might have resulted in excluding proposals that considered the circumstances surrounding nuclear power generation. Furthermore, there is also a possibility that the state of the movement was one of the reasons why attention moved to other political issues unrelated to nuclear power generation.

Future Challenges as Perceived by Members of Anti-Nuclear Advocate Groups

Anti-nuclear advocate groups also showed some doubt about the "newness" of the movement and the danger of focusing only on that "newness." For example, a Gensuikin member used the anti-nuclear movement after the Chernobyl accident as an example and spoke as follows:

> "When a new movement emerged (like now) after the Chernobyl accident, they praised it as a new wave and gradually disregarded all old campaigns. Those people are not around anymore. Those who were disregarded for being "old wave" stuck around and kept at it steadily before and after 3.11. They might seem old-fashioned, but the groups always operate by thinking about the residents." (Gensuikin interview, September 15, 2016)

It is true that one of the factors that invigorated the movement after the earthquake was something considered as a new wave: participation at the individual level. However, we can say that these people are also the ones who rode a wave built on the movement created and maintained by the existing advocate groups. In other words, in order to unravel the modern anti-nuclear movement, it has to be regarded as an extension of the continuous anti-nuclear movement that began before the earthquake disaster. The effect of interactions between the existing advocate groups and newly participating individuals could become a point of discussion.

How Anti-Nuclear Organizations View the Present Status and Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in Post-3.11 Japan

Yosuke TATSUNO

Looking at the anti-nuclear movements of the past and present, the Saikado Soshi Zenkoku Network (National Network for Stopping the Restart of Nuclear Power Plants), which connects areas where nuclear power plants are located, can be named as an example we can use to think about the interaction between the existing advocacy organizations and individual newcomers.

According to the declaration at the inaugural rally held on November 10, 2012, this network was established on July 15 of the same year at a national networking meeting held by five organizations: Han Gempatsu Jichitai Giin/Shimin Renmei (Local Authority Representatives and Citizens' Federation for Anti-Nuclear), Saikadō Hantai! Zenkoku Akushon (Stop Resumption of Operation! National Action), Tentohiroba, Sutoppu Ōi Saikadō Genchi Akushon (Local Action for Stopping Reactivation of Ōi Nuclear Power Plant), and Tanpoposya, in order to stop the reactivation of nuclear power plants.

They acknowledged the need to connect with each other's power nationwide and united to strive to become a national organization (= movement) based on one goal: to realize a society without nuclear power.

For example, according to an interview with a CNIC member, organizations such as citizen groups, political organizations, and peace forums in each area are beginning to operate while cooperating with each other through this network.

Furthermore, the CNIC member indicated that this network has a positive impact on legal disputes in local courts. Legal disputes over nuclear power plants had been only a local movement in each location up until the earthquake; he said that the opportunity to share information had been rare and there had been no actions based on nationwide cooperation in the past.

In contrast, he indicated, today's legal disputes can be rolled out in cooperation with neighboring locations through the network, invigorating the contention in the courts. As described, it can be said that the anti-nuclear movement in recent years has shifted the stage of its main activities from inner-cities to the sites of nuclear power plants. Such a change cannot be picked up by an examination that focuses only on the newness of the movement. In other words, we can see that grasping the pulse of the organizations that have spread from urban areas to each nuclear power plant site through the network is difficult based on discussions that focus only on the protests in front of the prime minister's office.

How the New Anti-Nuclear Movement Operates

Finally, now that five years have passed since the earthquake, I would like to touch on one of the new movements that have emerged.

I will now talk about FoE Japan, the most active participant in the post-earthquake anti-nuclear movement.

FoE Japan is an international environmental NGO working on environmental problems on a global scale; it has been operating in Japan since 1980. "We will keep looking ahead of the times to challenge large trends that are creating environmental and social problems and take initiatives not for the sake of taking actions but to obtain results" is probably the part of their statement that draws the most attention.

We can see that this attitude probably became the driver for becoming deeply involved in the anti-nuclear movement after the earthquake. According to a member of this organization, now that five years have passed since the earthquake, they deemed it necessary to guarantee the rights of people who suffered from the earthquake and nuclear power plant problems and launched a cooperative center for evacuation. He said that behind these actions was the understanding that they must support people in difficult situations due to the problems with the right and policy to send people back after the earthquake.

How Anti-Nuclear Organizations View the Present Status and Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in Post-3.11 Japan

Yosuke TATSUNO

In other words, it seems they are beginning to reinterpret the issue by linking the anti-nuclear issue with issues such as human rights and poverty. That is, the major difference from the anti-nuclear movement that peaked between 2011 and 2012 is the fact that people are again beginning to understand that nuclear power generation is a broad issue, rather than merely a political one.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the challenges for the post-earthquake movement indicated by the existing anti-nuclear advocate groups—particularly the ones that participated in the protests in front of the office of the prime minister—included the problem that they could not put forward a clear vision for a society without nuclear power because they focused only on the immediate elimination of nuclear power as a political issue.

Also, the challenges included the experience the existing advocacy groups were accumulating while focusing on the newness in inner-cities, as well as the existence of networks that are difficult to see on the surface. For example, as a negative impact of turning the movement into a political issue, Yamamoto (2016) presents one interesting suggestion. He argues that interest in the nuclear power issue declined due to changes in people's interests as the political situation changed, as well as competition among multiple issues. In other words, we can see that merely shouting about stopping nuclear power generation and decommissioning reactors and not being able to present any concrete alternative led people to turn their attention to other social issues.

We can suppose that taking these circumstances into account led to practical activities such as launching an initiative to support victims widely linked to the nuclear power issue and preventing the reactivation of nuclear power plants.

We can say that the series of social movement waves following the earthquake—from the anti-nuclear movement to the anti-national security legislation demonstration—have succeeded in sending messages to society. That said, can we definitely say based on these facts that society changed after the earthquake, as indicated by previous studies? We can at least say that protests in front of the office of the prime minister and gatherings in urban areas have changed.

However, it can also be said that these changes came about based on "the connection to regional movements that have been continuing as a result of the efforts of people who have been active since long time ago" (CNIC interview, September 8, 2016). In other words, it may be that the social movements that were developing before the earthquake became apparent because of the earthquake. Social movement researchers need to continue to closely monitor the new trends in inner-city areas, the course of local history in each area, the changes in individual perception and feeling, and how these changes are likely to interact with each other.

Further Information

Citizens'Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) (原子力資料情報室)

http://www.cnic.jp

Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs(Gensuikin) (原水禁)

http://www.peace-forum.com/gensuikin/No Nukes Tokyo(Tanpoposya)(たんぽぽ舎)

https://www.tanpoposya.com/

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15J04114. The author would like to express

How Anti-Nuclear Organizations View the Present Status and Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in Post-3.11 Japan

Yosuke TATSUNO

my gratitude to the organizations that provided cooperation, instructors who provided guidance, and everyone on the research team.

References

Ohi, Akai, 2016, "For the Line that Connects Movements with the Government Administration: 'Cooperation' and 'Divergence' between Social Movements and the Democratic Administration,"*Contemporary Philosophy*, 44 (7): 84-104. (＝大井赤亥, 2016,「運動と政権を繋ぐ回路のために――社会運動と民主党政権との『連携』と『乖離』」『現代思想』44(7): 84-104).

Oguma, Eiji, Misao Redwolf, and Aki Okuda, 2016,"From 'in Front of the Office of Prime Minister' to 'in Front of the National Assembly',"*Contemporary Philosophy*,44 (7): 30-55.(＝小熊英二、ミサオ・レッドウルフ、奥田愛基, 2016,「〈官邸前〉から〈国会前〉へ」『現代思想』44(7): 30-55).

Kasai, Kiyoshi and Yasumichi Noma, 2016, *Post 3.11 Rebellion: Hangenren, Shibaki-tai, and SEALDs*, Shueisha.(＝笠井潔・野間易通, 2016,『3.11後の叛乱――反原連・しばき隊・SEALDs』集英社).

Komoda Reeya and Takashi Machimura, 2015, "Experience in Disaster and Experience in Movement: Reexamining the Changes in the Social Movement Landscape from an Overlaid Time Axis," Presentation at the 88th Annual Japan Sociological Society Conference, on September 19, 2015, at Waseda University.(＝菰田レエ也・町村敬志, 2015,「『災害の経験』と『運動の経験』」第88回日本社会学会報告, 2015年9月19日早稲田大学).

Sono, Ryota, 2011, Why I stood before TEPCO, San-ichi Publishing.(＝園良太, 2011,『ボクが東電前に立ったわけ』三一書房).

Noma, Yasumichi, 2013, *Friday Protest in Front of the Office of the Prime Minister: Demonstration Change the Politics, Kawade Shobo Shinsha Publishers.(＝野間易通, 2013,『金曜官邸前抗議――デモの声が政治を変える』河出書房新社).*

Hattori, Norimichi, 2016, "Keep the Fire and Warm the Place,"Contemporary Philosophy 44 (7): 56-65.(＝服部至道,「火を守り、場を温める」『現代思想』44(7): 56-65).

Hirabayashi Yuko, 2013, "What Creates a "Society with Demonstrations?: Post 3.11 Activism and Media," in Tanaka Shigeyoshi, Toshiyuki Masamura, and Harutoshi Funabashi eds., *The Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and Japanese Sociology: How a Country Brought Disaster Upon Itself*, *Minerva Shobo*,163-195.(＝平林祐子, 2013,「何が『デモのある社会』をつくるのか――ポスト3.11のアクティビズムとメディア」田中重好・舩橋晴俊・正村俊之編『東日本大震災と社会学―大災害を生み出した社会』ミネルヴァ書房: 163-195).

Yamamoto, Hidehiro, 2016, "The Course of Nuclear Power Phase-out and Consensus: The Process of Points at Issue and Interests Over Nuclear Power Generation," Tsujinaka, Yutaka ed., *Social Science as Studied from a Major Earthquake Vol. 1: Political Process and Policy*, Toyo Keizai, 245-268.(＝山本英弘, 2016,「脱原発と民意のゆくえ――原子力発電をめぐる争点関心のプロセス」辻中豊編『大震災に学ぶ社会科学第1巻　政治過程と政策』東洋経済新報社.)

Essay

Introducing Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo: Power Struggles

Alexander BROWN

BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

I am pleased to announce the publication of *Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo* (2018) as part of the Routledge/Asian Studies Association of Australia East Asian Series. This book documents the research I conducted into social movements in Tokyo during my PhD candidacy at the University of Wollongong between 2010 and 2015. During this time I was fortunate to spend eighteen months as a Japanese Government (Monbukagakusho) Research Scholar at Hitotsubashi University, where I undertook fieldwork for the project under the supervision of Professor Machimura Takashi and took part in the Study Group on Infrastructure and Society. I lived near the university in the Tokyo municipality of Kunitachi and visited protest sites all over the metropolis. I joined demonstrations and rallies, attended art exhibitions and film screenings and immersed myself in the world of anti-nuclear protest. These experiences are reflected in the detailed case study chapters within the book.

My motivation for writing *Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo* sprang from many years of experience as a participant in social movements in Australia, in particular in the alter-globalization and anti-war movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this period I was inspired by the work of autonomist Marxist writers such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004). While I found their ideas spoke to the experience of urban social movements in



Australia, I was dissatisfied with the lack of attention to East Asia in Hardt and Negri's work and in that of autonomist theorists more generally. During twelve months spent working as an English teacher in the Greater Tokyo Area between 2008 and 2009, I came into contact with diverse social movements such as the campaign against 'Nike-fication' of Miyashita Park in Shibuya and the Shirōto no Ran network, which organizes demonstrations around issues of urban poverty and alternative space in Kōenji. When I began the research for my PhD I decided to see if a close reading of autonomist theory in the Japanese context might yield new insights and facilitate a way out of the Euro-centrism that is implicit in autonomist theory. Autonomism developed out of the new social movements that emerged in response to the breakdown of the mass working class movement in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s and hence its key concerns incorporate the relationship between changing forms of the social organization of work in post-industrial societies the impact this has on

Alexander BROWN is a JSPS International Research Fellow at Japan Women's University and an Honorary Associate at University of Technology Sydney. His work has appeared in *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* and *Emotion, Space and Society*. Alexander's translation of Shimizu Hiromu's *Grassroots Globalization* will be published by Trans Pacific Press in early 2019.

Introducing Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo: Power Struggles

Alexander BROWN

social movement organization. This book explores some of these concerns, including how people organize themselves in struggle outside of formal party political structures and the relationship between social movements and the formally constituted power of the state.

'Precarity' Movements and Anti-nuclear Politics

I began the research project that led to *Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo* by looking not at nuclear issues but at urban social networks that combine alternative lifestyles with activist politics. The key concept in this early stage of the research was the notion of precarity, which has been used by activists in Japan (Amamiya 2007) who are engaged with the broader transnational conversation about the transformation of work that has accompanied deindustrialization (Standing 2011). The intervention of the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster in 2011 widened the scope of my research to take into account the anti-nuclear issues that emerged from the Fukushima disaster. As books appeared in both English (Allison 2013; Cassegård 2014) and Japanese (Watanabe 2012) detailing the rise of precarity movements in Japan I came to realize that my original contribution to this research area lay in exploring the intersection between so-called 'precarity' movements and anti-nuclear politics. One of the key concepts that emerges in the book is the notion of 'precarious life' and the way the threat of radioactive contamination in Japan after Fukushima intersected with the generalized anxiety caused by endemic precariousness to produce a widespread rejection of the special interest group politics symbolized by the 'nuclear village'. The nuclear village refers to a loose coalition of groups spanning government, political parties, private industry, the media and academia that had long promoted the use of nuclear energy in Japan. Drawing on Oguma Eiji's (2016) work on the anti-nuclear movement I came to understand the way opposition to nuclear power and the nuclear village had encapsulated a broad dissatisfaction with Japan's stagnant political and economic systems.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

Shirōto no Ran

The structure of the book reflects the development of my ideas as I expanded my research from the initial focus on precarity movements to incorporate anti-nuclear activism. After outlining some of the theoretical concerns and the background to the anti-nuclear movement in Chapter One, in Chapter Two I look at the first major demonstration against nuclear power that took place after Fukushima took place in Tokyo's Kōenji district in April 2011, one month after the disaster. Kōenji is a youth sub-cultural hub located close to downtown Tokyo which is known as a major center of artistic, musical and cultural life. The district is also home to activist network Shirōto no Ran (Amateur Revolt), whose creative and irreverent protest style developed in struggles against the growing inequality experienced by the urban poor following the recession of the 1990s. After the tragedy of the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster, a mood of 'self-restraint' (jishuku) prevailed in the capital. The festive demonstrations organized by the group helped to shift this mood, claiming a space where participants could express a wide spectrum of affective responses to the disaster. Shirōto no Ran's critiques of precarious work and of the inequities of neoliberal capitalism fed into their anti-nuclear activism after the Fukushima disaster, deepening the group's criticism of the energy-intensive consumer capitalism for which Tokyo has become a global symbol.

Introducing Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo: Power Struggles

Alexander BROWN

In the years prior to the Fukushima disaster, activists associated with Shirōto no Ran and similar networks had established bars, cafes and bookshops that constituted a loosely organized activist kaiwai or neighborhood. As I explain in Chapter Three, these places provided a space for anti-nuclear organizing and for cementing the relationships between activists that sustain political action over the long term. The neighborhood also generated a diverse print and electronic media that was produced in and distributed through these physical spaces and helped create a sense of community among activists, artists and the disenfranchised. These spaces emerged in the context of rising inequality and urban poverty after the collapse of the bubble economy. They enabled part-time, casual and freelance workers and alienated youth to seek refuge in the interstices of a city from which they often felt excluded. After Fukushima they provided a kind of asylum in the uncertain context of a radioactive city.

'Hiroba' as Place for Social Movements

While activist spaces were places of refuge after the disaster, activists did not simply disappear into them but sallied forth into the public streets, which they transformed into a theatre of protest. During two protests in Shinjuku in June and September of 2011, anti-nuclear activists occupied the east exit plaza of Shinjuku station and renamed it 'No Nukes Plaza'. As I discuss in Chapter Four, they deliberately invoked the pre-existing notion of a hiroba (plaza) in their efforts to redefine public spaces such as the consumer paradise of Shinjuku station as places for democratic practice and debate. No Nukes Plaza evoked a history of struggles for public space in Tokyo as Shinjuku station had long been a site of student and peace movement protest. The most famous example of this was the so-called 'folk guerrilla' movement of the late 1960s, when activists occupied the west exit hiroba on a weekly basis to hold political discussions and sing folk songs. Struggles to reclaim public space in turn raised questions about the limits of democratic participation imposed by the police and on the degree of internal heterogeneity activists themselves could accept.

The debates on democracy which occurred in and through the hiroba were not limited to the national space but were discursively linked with a global network of squares and public places where similar actions took place in 2011 and 2012 including the Occupy Wall Street camp in New York's Zuccotti Park and the Spanish 15-M Movement's occupation of public plazas in Barcelona and other cities. Nor were the demonstrations in Tokyo confined to large central actions in Shinjuku or Chiyoda wards. Residents of municipalities across the metropolis also organized local demonstrations. In Chapter Five I explore the anti-nuclear movement in Kunitachi in Tokyo's western Tama region, where demonstrators performed their opposition to nuclear power in colorful costume demonstrations that were themed according to seasonal festivals such as the bean-throwing festival Setsubun in February 2012 or Halloween in October. These seasonal themes naturalized the idea of demonstrating and aligned it with the normal rhythms of everyday life.

Beginning in March 2012, activists gathered outside the prime minister's residence in Tokyo's Nagatacho every Friday evening between six and eight o'clock to protest nuclear power. These weekly protests, which eventually grew to 100,000 and even 200,000 participants in 2012, are the focus of Chapter Six. By protesting outside the buildings which house the institutions of the government, the protests highlighted two different visions of politics: one centered on the formal representative democratic structures of the state and the other on grassroots participatory democracy. Their staging in

the government district revealed a tension between horizontal and vertical conceptions of politics and acknowledged the continuing importance of institutional politics in Japan today. Anti-nuclear protest transformed the order of public space in the city and reclaimed it as a place where citizens could participate in politics. Activists' diverse tactical interventions suggest a wider strategic vision of the city as a space for creative self-expression, sustainable livelihoods, strong communities and grassroots democracy.

Legacy of the Anti-Nuclear Social Movements

In Chapter Seven I try to make sense of the anti-nuclear movement as a whole and discuss its influence on subsequent struggles. For many anti-nuclear activists, the return of the pro-nuclear Liberal Democratic Party coalition under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in 2012 was a major disappointment. In reality, however, the change of government produced little real change in terms of nuclear policy. Neither major party was willing to make nuclear power into an electoral issue in 2012 and the successful LDP election campaign focused instead on economic concerns, thereby taking the political sting out of the nuclear issue. This is a strategy that has continued to serve the LDP well, particularly in the context of historically low levels of voter turnout. Despite the Abe government's publicly stated intention to proceed with reactor restarts once safety checks are complete, restarting Japan's nuclear fleet has proved to be extremely difficult. Many nuclear reactors failed the stress tests that were introduced by the Kan government after Fukushima. Others require extensive and expensive retrofitting and upgrading in order to meet the stricter safety standards that were adopted by the new Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). Where final approval has been obtained from the NRA, other delays such as objections from local political leaders or successful court challenges have further impeded the restart of the reactor fleet. At the time of writing in February 2019, only nine reactors have been restarted. This is compared with 54 that were operating before the 2011 disaster. Public opinion polls indicate that opposition to a return to nuclear power in Japan remains firm.

Since the election of the Abe government in December 2012, Abe's neo-nationalist and militarist agenda has generated many new protests in the streets of Tokyo. When the government moved to introduce a raft of security-related legislation in 2014, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets outside the National Diet. As the nuclear issue began to fall out of the news cycle and other issues took its place, a new common sense developed through the collective experiences of the anti-nuclear movement informed a new wave of protests. The experience of anti-nuclear protest rejuvenated civil society in Japan and schooled a generation of young people in street politics. These actions suggest that a new culture of protest, most clearly visible in these large-scale actions in the government district, has taken root in Japan since the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

Notes

An earlier version of this article was published in June 2018 in *Asian Currents*, the electronic news bulletin of the Asian Studies Association of Australia

References

Allison, Anne, 2013, *Precarious Japan*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Amamiya, Karin, 2007, *Precariat: The Uncertain Way of Life of a Generation of Digital Day Labourers*, Tokyo: Yōsensha. (＝雨宮処凛, 2007,『プレカリアート――デジタル日雇い世代の不安な生き方』洋泉社).

Cassegård, Carl, 2014, *Youth Movements, Trauma and Alternative Space in Contemporary Japan*, Leiden: Brill.

Introducing Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-Fukushima Tokyo: Power Struggles

Alexander BROWN

Hardt, Michael & Antonio Negri, 2004, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, New York: Penguin Books.

Oguma, Eiji, 2016, "A New Wave against the Rock: New Social Movements in Japan since the Fukushima Nuclear Meltdown," Alexander Brown, trans., *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 14(13.2), (https://apjjf.org/2016/13/Oguma.html,).

Standing, Guy, 2011, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class, London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Watanabe Futoshi, 2012,*Social Movements of Love and Humour: For Life in Late Capitalism*, Kyoto: Kitaōji Shobō.(＝渡邊太, 2012,『愛とユーモアの社会運動論――末期資本主義を生きるために』北大路書房).