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ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PRACTICAL WISDOM

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Aristotelian philosophy has been studied assiduously by scholars of the world for the last two thousand years. It seems that no Aristotelian stone has been left unturned and that nothing new can be said about the Stagirite in the sphere of philosophy and philology. But one can always expect to find a new angle, from which to study his outstanding works on philosophical problems. In any new undertaking, however, we should not follow the Scholastic formulae or the well-beaten path of Aristotelian study. What we are called upon to do today is to throw a new light on the incarnate system of Aristotelian philosophy evolved through following its development rather than on his pre-harmonized system.

This problem has been successfully dealt with by Prof. Werner Jaeger in his work, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin, 1923). A. E. Taylor was quite right when he said, "If any of us henceforth ventures to make assertions about Aristotle without having taken Mr. Jaeger's fascinating work into account, he will at least be speaking very terribly at his own peril." That development of Aristotelian philosophy seen in the studies effected on the Jaeger method has been followed and furthered largely by F. Solmsen and R. Walzer in both logical and ethical fields. I myself have traced by this same method the history of Aristotle's metaphysical and epistemological developments in my work, Aristotelian Studies (in Japanese, Tokyo, 1940). Again in another treatise, The Ethics of Aristotle (in Japanese, Tokyo, 1951), I have endeavoured to survey and analyse the development and structure of the practical wisdom (φρόνησις) of Aristotle which constitutes the most fundamental concept of all the intellectual virtues. This is an attempt to make an inquiry into the scientific character of his classical Ethics. In this article, I will give a short summary of the main conclusion I have reached in my recent work, dwelling on the relationship between practical wisdom and practical syllogism which to my way of thinking presents a very interesting problem in the study of Aristotle.

At first, I attempt to make clear two things; namely, the relationships enveloping the three works of ethics credited to Aristotle, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Great Ethics* and my point of view on each of them. Sir A. Grant, in his well-done study, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (3 ed., London, 1874), observes: "First, the *Nicomachean Ethics* are, as a whole, the genuine and original work of Aristotle himself, though some special parts of them are open to doubt. Second, the *Eudemian Ethics* are the work of Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, written either during his master's lifetime or shortly after his death: they are based entirely on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, being a re-writing of the system contained in the former treatise with some modifications and additions. Third, the *Great Ethics* are the compilation of some considerably later Peripatetic, who had before him the Ethics both of Aristotle and of Eudemus, and who gives a sort of abstract of the results of both, but on the whole follows Eudemus more closely than Aristotle."

This explanation seems coherent and well-substantiated. For students of Aristotle have regarded the *Nicomachean Ethics* as most fundamental in ideas and most original in style and tone. St. Thomas and many other commentators have done an extensive and intensive research work on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and given a scant attention to the *Eudemian* and the *Great Ethics*. The only exception to this interpretation is F. Schleiermacher, who in his *Über die ethischen Werke des Aristoteles* read at the Berlin Academy in 1817, asserted that Aristotle wrote the *Great Ethics* rather than the two other works which probably were brought out by some other philosophers on the basis of the Stagirite's book. He even went so far as to say that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was written later than the two others. But he arrived at such an arbitrary conclusion, as can be seen from his Plato-interpretation, chiefly because he had been engrossed in his attempt to build up a philosophical system which hindered him in a more natural developmental interpretation of the Ethics. Accordingly, the real *intentio Aristotelis* was lost in the process of his study. L. Spengel strongly refutes the theory of F. Schleiermacher in his *Über die unter Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften* (1841) after a comparative study of the three Ethics. According to him, only the *Nicomachean Ethics* is Aristotle's genuine work, the *Eudemian Ethics* is copy of it and the *Great Ethics* is a product of the *Eudemian*. In this respect, Spengel essentially concurs with Grant. It may be said therefore that the inter-

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interpretations of Spengel and Grant are regarded as the conclusion of the study in the Aristotelian Ethics in the 19th century.

Jaeger and other scholars, on the other hand, proved that the *Nicomachean* was Aristotle's genuine work of great importance, but that the *Great Ethics* was written by a Peripatetic who probably had been influenced by Dicaearchus and that the latter work was compiled with those extracts made from two other *Ethics* and used as text books for lectures. The *Great Ethics*, in spite of its name, is less valuable and bulky. H. v. Arnim has presented proof refuting this theory in a way that resembles Schleiermacher's point of view, but we cannot but feel that Jaeger's interpretation is more appropriate and substantial. Walzer in his exhaustive and persuasive work, *Magna Moralia und Aristotelische Ethik* (Berlin, 1929) agrees with Jaeger, thereby probably ending the controversy between Jaeger and Arnim. But what is important to us here is rather the position of the *Eudemian Ethics* in the philosophical development of Aristotle and its relation with the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

It is explicitly clear that the *Eudemian Ethics* basically agrees with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, although the former discourses in a different way and in a condensed form; it is more theological and Platonic than the latter. Since it is unthinkable that the author of the *Nicomachean Ethics* who was a more mature and deeper thinker than the author of the *Eudemian Ethics* would attempt to produce a crude and imperfect excerpt of his own original work, namely, the *Eudemian Ethics*, there is every reason to believe that Eudemus not only edited but wrote the latter himself as well.

But this interpretation is right only when it is assumed that Aristotle held only one ethical point of view embodied in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For this very reason, any system of thought that disagrees with the *Nicomachean Ethics* is considered un-Aristotelian and Eudemian. There can be no shadow of doubt that Aristotle's *Ethics* is Aristotelian. But this assertion too can be misleading, for as Kant could not build up his so-called critical philosophy at one bound, so Aristotle might not have been able to perfect his ethical system at a stroke. If we can suppose that in his earlier days, his metaphysical thinking followed a theological and Platonic pattern, can we not say the same thing about his ethical thought too? If this assumption is not un-Aristotelian, we see a new light in the interpretation of the *Eudemian Ethics*. In other words, this assumption concerning Aristotle's earlier and more Platonic work, the original *Metaphysics*, holds true with his original *Ethics*. Hence, this *Ethics* can be ascribed to the *Eudemian Ethics*.

The *Fundamentals of the History of Aristotle's Development* has resulted from Aristotelian studies carried on this light. The study began with P. v. d. Mühll, and was developed on the basis of his work by E. Kapp who carefully scrutinized the *Relation of the Eudemian Ethics to the Nicomachean*
Ethics. This problem has been, as mentioned above, successfully solved by Jaeger. He writes about it as follows:

"My own results, which partly agree with and partly go beyond those of my two predecessors, were reached along another path and without knowledge of their observations. Since their view, that the Eudemian Ethics is early and genuine, does not seem to have gained general acceptance, and since I hope to be able to make the matter clear once and for all, I will set out my own method here. It was a disadvantage of their work that it was not related to Aristotle's development as a whole. In particular, by confining their comparisons to the two great Ethics, they gave a handle for many objections, since they had no fixed point of temporal reference. Such an immovable criterion is to be found in Aristotle's ethics, which has never yet been seriously considered. By means of the fragments of the Protrepticus, including the newly recovered matter, it is possible to make a picture of the development of his ethics in three clearly separated stages: the late Platonic of the Protrepticus, the reformed Platonism of the Eudemian, and the late Aristotelianism of the Nicomachean. For us the most important form of the inquiry will be the question which of the two Ethics is to be regarded as the immediate product of the problems of the Protrepticus, and whether it is possible to demonstrate a continuous advance at all."

Having thus gained a true orientation of the disputed problem and accomplished a thorough investigation, Jaeger expressed his conviction that he has arrived at a satisfactory conclusion. As for us, we can, following this trustworthy assumption, clarify the very interesting development of the meaning of practical wisdom (φρόνησις) which is a most fundamental concept in the practical philosophy of Aristotle.

II

Aristotle's mission, σώζειν τὰ φανόμενα (to salve the phenomena) has, in my opinion, a double meaning, namely, to raise the commonplace to the scientific and to lower the transcendent to the empirical. To the Stagirite, the phenomenal does not contradict the noumenal or the immanent, the transcendent; rather they harmonize with each other, the transcendent being able to claim its existence only within the phenomenal. That is why he is sometimes associated with the hither side of Idealism and Realism or the middle-of-the-road between Rationalism and Empirism. This mode

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1 P. v. d. Muhl, De Aristotelis Ethicorum Eudemiorum Auctoritate (Göttingen, 1909); E. Kapp, Das Verhältnis der Eudemischen zur Nikomachischen Ethik (Berlin, 1912).

of thinking ascribed to Aristotle holds true also with the origins of almost all the *terminus technicus* that he introduced into the philosophical world. It may be said, for instance, that the concept of the *mean* (μεσοτητίς) which is fundamental to ethical virtue is a combination of two items: first, the worldly wisdom that lies within the Hellenic national spirit from the time of the Seven Sages or the ordinary way of thinking of the so-called *aurea mediocritas* which finds expression in such gnomes as ‘‘Excess is to be avoided’’ (μηδέν ἀγαθόν) or ‘‘Moderation is the best’’ (μέτρον ἄριστον); second, the exact scientific ethics of the *norm* (μέτρον) which runs through almost all the dialogues of Plato and especially the *Philebus*. Through such understanding, we can comprehend Aristotle’s famous definition of the *mean*: ‘‘in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.’’ As regards the term *phronesis* (prudentia, practical wisdom), we may say that it is still more clearly marked by the same tendency; here too it shows two sides, scientific and commonplace.

*Phronesis* was first used as a philosophical term in the days of Socrates. Needless to say, this term has been in use since the intellectual dawning of Hellas and even is to be found, for example, in the gnomes of the Seven Sages. But in those days *phronesis* meant worldly wisdom in actual life almost approximating *empeiria*. For Heraclitus says in one of his fragments: ‘‘Logos is common to all, but many people live as if they had a special *phronesis* of their own,’’ thereby bearing out the contention that there was virtually no distinction between *phronesis* and *episteme* or *gnosis*. Empedocles and Democritus often used this term in the sense of *aesthesis*. We can therefore say that *phronesis* represents in pre-Socratic philosophy an idea that embodies all that is human without a technical meaning of its own. But to Socrates, all virtues were nothing but *phronesis*, *logos* and *episteme*; out of this practical intellectualism grew ‘‘Knowledge is virtue’’ and ‘‘None do evil willingly, for those who know virtue, do it and only those who do not do vice.’’ Plato, his great disciple, used *phronesis* in the sense of *sophia* and *episteme* after the Socratic fashion, meaning both practical reason and theoretical reason. The *loci classici* of this typical use are shown in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*. This practical intellectualism, furthermore, is the keynote of the *Respublica*. As unquestionable proof of our interpretation stands the ultimate principle, *Idea of *

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6 Eth. Nic., II 6, 1107a 6—8 (For ease of reference, I have used the standard Oxford translation ed. by W. D. Ross, with some alterations.).
8 Ibid., Herakleitos B 2.
9 Ibid., Empedokles A 86. Demokritos A 112.
Good; it governs and evaluates not only all existence and cognition but all human conduct as well. All the subsequently-produced dialogues, especially the *Philebus*, which takes up the problem of *phronesis* as one of its main subjects, are not exceptions to this interpretation. What is to be noted here, however, is the fact that Plato therein is quite conscious of the *aporia* embodied in the transcendency of that Idea, indicating a compromising inclination toward reality. For, in reply to the question, “What is virtue?” Philebus gives *hedone* and Socrates answers *phronesis* that belongs to the same order of ethical merit as *nous*. These facts form the indispensable premise to the understanding of Aristotle’s ethical development.

We firmly believe that Aristotle was a most true descendant of Plato; neither was he a born anti-Platonist nor his humble adherent. Aristotle believed that he could not understand Plato thoroughly unless he surpassed his teacher. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is Aristotle’s stringent criticism on his teacher’s works that has distinguished him as the protagonist of true and ever-lasting Platonism. In the *Protrepticus* written when Aristotle was a member of the Academy, *phronesis* is spoken in Platonic style as well as in Platonic spirit. It links the *Protrepticus* immediately to the *Philebus*. For here it seeks to make *ethico more geometrico* and defines philosophy as the most exact science, strictly following the Platonic formulae of φρόνησις = ἐπιστήμη = νοῦς = σοφία. In other words, *phronesis* in those days meant reason, both theoretical and practical, as it did at the time of Socrates and Plato. Aristotle wrote the *Eudemian Ethics* in his days of travelling; it is original to the *Nicomachean Ethics* which he wrote when he was the head of Lyceum after he had reached maturity. The *Eudemian Ethics* is reflective and critical on Platonism although the author firmly believed in the latter. It is a product in a period of transition. (The three works critical of Platonism, namely, *On Ideas*, *On Philosophy* and the earliest *Metaphysics*, are believed to have been written about this time.) Although this original *Ethics* is as a whole deeply colored in the same transcendental ethos as the *Protrepticus* and presents *vita contemplativa* as ideal life, it does not refute the fact that virtue in everyday life must be humanistic and non-transcendent. Here the Metaphysics of morals is found compatible with the Ethics of humanistic good. We can therefore easily understand why *phronesis* have a dual character of the transcendental and the empirical, embodying theonomic and imperative reason, on the one hand, and practical prudence, on the other. But nothing is said here of the nature of *phronesis* as a moral *habitus*. The *Nicomachean Ethics* however gives this explanation.

We can characterize this classical *Ethics* as *ethica more empirico*, for it analyses and describes the phenomena of human virtues not by a transcendental but an empirical method. This Ethics may also be called a *Phenomenology of Ethical Consciousness*. Many a shade of meaning of
phronesis used in this Ethics are analysed by L. H. G. Greenwood as follows:

"The word phronesis is used in VI of the Nicomachean Ethics in four senses. The four senses are as follows: (a) In the narrowest of the four phronesis is merely said to lead to the knowledge by each man of what is good for himself as distinguished from other people. (b) Phronesis as distinguished from ἐνδοκλία is the ἀρετή that leads to the comprehending and retaining of practical truth as distinguished from the searching for it and finding it. (c) Phronesis as distinguished from εἴσοδη is the ἀρετή that leads to truth about πρακτὰ as distinguished from παρηγά (d) In the broadest of the four senses phronesis is the ἀρετή that leads to truth about all human action whether πράξεις or ποίησις."

But at another place, Greenwood gives another division from a different point of view. "The second division has to do with the sphere of action rather than with the kind of action; that namely into, πολιτική, συνοικία, φρόνησις περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἕνα — practical intellectual ἀρετή as it concerns the whole country, a single household, the individual thinker himself.”

But "the third division is more obscure than the second, and it is in a sense, at least for the purpose of the Ethics, more important. It is founded on differences of intellectual activity itself rather than on differences in the nature or sphere of the actions to which the activity leads. The third division includes the head ἐνδοκλία, ἑστική, ἀγείνεια, σώσεις, γνώμη, νοῦς πρακτῖκός: with a suggestion of phronesis in a narrow sense as opposed to all of these."

This analysis is very comprehensive and suggestive, but the mutual relationship between the three divisions is rather obscure; it seems to have completely ignored the historical development of phronesis. I would interpret the essential nature of phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics as follows: According to Aristotle’s definition, “phronesis is a time and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.” And since no one deliberates on or calculates things that are invariable or things that are beyond his reach, phronesis is the calculative virtue of variable things. It may be therefore contrasted with sophia which is a scientific virtue of invariable things. As quoted before, phronesis is divided into political, economic and individual wisdoms according to differences in the sphere of action. But what is more important to our present study is to make intelligible the relations between this habitus and its attributes which are roughly grouped into ἐνδοκλία, σώσεις and γνώμη.

Aristotle says, "It is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom (φρόνυμος) to be able to deliberate well (καλῶς) about what good

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12 Ibid., p. 60.
and expedient for himself, not in the same particular respect, but about what sort of things conduce to the good life in general."  

Since "excellently" (εὖ) and "well" (καλῶς) have the same meaning, it is quite natural that excellence in deliberation (μορφολογία) should be considered to be an essential attribute of phronimos, excellence in deliberation will be a correctness with regard to what conduces to the end, of which phronesis is a true apprehension. Then what will make a true apprehension of this possible? It cannot be anything other than understanding (ονονεία). For synesis is "the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters, with which phronesis is concerned," and is the fundamental function which makes both phronesis and episteme intellectual virtues. But synesis is not theoretical but practical because it is concerned with the correctness of judgement and not the truth of knowledge. Understanding (ονονεία) is used in the sense as the goodness of understanding (μορφολογία) for the same reason. At the same point, Aristotle says: "synesis is about the same objects as phronesis; but synesis and phronesis are not the same. For phronesis issues commands since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but synesis only judges." But we must not take these faculties for two species under the same genus. Synesis is, as above stated, one of the faculties of practical judgement pertaining to phronesis. Therefore, the more suitable term to express such a relation may be called judgement (γνώμη) which means "the right discrimination of the equitable (ἐπεξεργάζεσθαι)"; so far as gnome acts as right discrimination, it is synonymous with synesis, but so far as it is concerned with the equitable, it resembles euboulia closely. For equity is not an absolute but concrete justice, the equitable is just, but not the legally just, but a correction of legal just, and it corresponds to "the rightness with regard to the expedient-rightness in respect both of the end, the manner and the time." As long as gnome is the right discrimination of what ought to be done, it becomes sympathetic judgement (συνζγωμή) with deliberation and understanding. Here we may find sufficient reason to assert that a man of practical wisdom is excellent in deliberation and also a man of understanding has sympathetic judgement.

III

Now that the general character of Aristotle's phronesis has been analysed on the basis of explanations given in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, we can grasp the part to be played by that habitus in the practical

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syllogism as applied to express the logic of will and action. Strange to say, however, the philosopher who works out the laws of *Analytics*, theoretical syllogism, touches only on practical syllogism in the *Ethics* and *On the Soul*, as if it were a problem already sufficiently discussed. *On the Motion of Animals* which must be attributed to a student of the Aristotelian school rather than to the Stagirite himself as credited, discusses this point as follows:

"But how is it that thought is sometimes followed by action, sometimes not, sometimes by movement, sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of science. There the end is the truth seen (for when one conceives the two premises, one at once conceives and comprehends the conclusion), but here the two premises result in a conclusion which is an action...... for example, one conceives that every man ought to walk, one is a man oneself; straight way one walks; or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man; straight way one remains at rest. And one so acts in the two cases provided that there is nothing in the one case to compel or in the other to prevent. Again I ought to create a good, a house is a good; straight way I make a house. I need a covering, a coat is a covering; I need a coat. What I need I ought to make, I need a coat; I make a coat. And the conclusion I must make a coat is an action. And the action goes back to the beginning or first step. If there is to be a coat, one must first have B, and if B then A, so one gets A to begin with. Now that the action is the conclusion is clear. But the premises of action are of two kinds of the good and of the possible." 16

As Grant has pointed out, practical syllogism may be divided into two forms:

(1) Major Premise. Such and such an action is universally good.
Minor Premise. This will be an action of the kind.
Conclusion. Performance of the action.

(2) Major Premise. Such and such an end is desirable.
Minor Premise. This step will conduce to the end.
Conclusion. Taking of the step. 17

But these forms are really coincident with each other; as the good is always desirable and the end itself, the major premise may be said to contain the *logos of an end* which implies a general principle. As any particular act is an application of such a principle and the means necessary to the realisation of an end, the minor premise may be said to represent the *logos of the means* toward the attainment of such an end. Hence, the application of the minor premise (the means) to the major one (an end)

16 *De Motu Anim.*, VII 1, 701 a 7.
leads to the conclusion (performance of the action).

Now what kind of function does practical wisdom play in practical syllogism? Phronesis, as we have proved, is above all an excellent deliberation (ὀφθαλμία). Aristotle treats deliberation (βούλευσις) in the Nicomachean Ethics as follows: “We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained.”

It can be said therefore that phronesis, in respect to excellence in deliberation, expresses the logos of the means and belongs to the minor premise; such a faculty of phronesis is called cleverness (δινότης). For “it is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves and hit it.” Hence we call men of practical wisdom clever; practical wisdom cannot exist without this faculty.

But to get a right judgement in the minor premise, we must clearly understand the major premise. In other words, it is impossible to be practically wise without being good. For the major premise which regulates moral principles is understood only with the aid of virtue. We call that which expresses the logos of an end right reason (ὁρθός λόγος). But what is the relationship between practical wisdom and right reason?

“Now the right reason is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. All men, then seem somehow to divine this kind of state is virtue, viz., that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with (ἐκτά) the right reason but the state that implies that presence of (ἐκτά) right reason, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is a right reason about such matters.”

We can not however draw the conclusion from this much-disputed quotation, that right reason and practical wisdom are the same; we must rather assert that the former has the imperative (ἐπιταξικός) character of the major premise and the latter, the judging (χρεικής) character of the minor premise. Being unified by practical reason (ὡς πραξικός) which underlies functionally practical wisdom and right reason, these premises lead to the determination of will or the choice of purpose (προαίρεσις).

Thus we have arrived at the conclusion on Aristotle’s theory of practical wisdom. In the Protrepticus written in his academic period, practical wisdom was synonymous with theoretical, as it was with Socrates and

Plato; and the traditional formulae of \( \varphi \rho \nu \gamma \sigma \varsigma = \nu \omega \varsigma = \delta \rho \theta \varsigma \lambda \dot{\alpha} \varsigma \) was still preserved. But Aristotle in the *Eudemian Ethics* expressed his critical reflection on the trascendental method. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he made distinction between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom for the first time and showed the logical relation between practical wisdom and right reason in the formulae of practical syllogism. This problem offers us a great deal of lessons, but unfortunately the creator of classical logic failed to complete his theory on the logic of action.