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Abstract. Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and show that external norms can be made compatible with the methods underlying the rationalizability approach. This claim is substantiated by characterizing norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains due to Richter (1966; 1971) and Hansson (1968). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos.: D11, D71.
1 Introduction

In his Presidential Address to the Econometric Society, Sen (1993) constructed an argument which seems to go against a priori imposition of the requirement of internal consistency of choice such as the weak axiom of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1938; 1947; 1948), the strong axiom of revealed preference (Houthakker, 1950), Arrow’s axiom of choice consistency (Arrow, 1959), and Sen’s condition $\alpha$ (Sen, 1971), and investigated the logical implications of eschewing these internal choice consistency requirements. On the face of it, Sen’s argument may seem to go squarely against the theory of rationalizability due to Arrow (1959), Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), Sen (1971), Suzumura (1976a), and many others. This paper argues that there is in fact a way of constructing a bridge between Sen’s criticism against the requirement of internal consistency of choice and the traditional framework of rational choice. For the sake of pursuing this salvage activity, we introduce a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability, which helps us establish the peaceful co-existence of the rationalizability approach and Sen’s criticism against the requirement of internal consistency of choice.

The gist of our approach is simple and intuitive. In the presence of external norms, some alternatives, which are physically feasible, may not necessarily be choosable without violating the given norm. It should be clear that this additional constraint imposed by the prevailing norm should be taken into due consideration in defining the rationality, or the lack thereof, of observed choice behavior. The concept of norm-conditional rationalizability is nothing other than a modification of the traditional concept of rationalizability that takes into account additional restrictions imposed by the norm. Along with this modification, the standard revealed preference relations must be amended in an analogous manner. Once we implement these modifications, we establish the theory of norm-conditional rationalizability, which is a natural generalization of the traditional theory of rationalizability. Indeed, the novel theory of norm-conditional rationalizability boils down to the traditional theory of rationalizability in the absence of external norms.

More precisely, a norm can be expressed by specifying pairs of alternatives and feasible sets containing the requisite alternative such that the choice of the alternative from this set is prohibited by the norm under considerations. We will give specific examples in the next section when discussing Sen’s (1993) criticisms of internal choice consistency properties.

Apart from this introduction, this paper consists of six sections. In Section 2, we examine Sen’s criticism directed towards conditions expressing internal choice consistency
properties and motivate our concept of external norms and that of norm-conditional rationalizability. Section 3 is devoted to the formalization of the basic ingredients of our analysis. In Section 4, we state our main results. Section 5 discusses two alternative formulations of the concept of external norms and show that these alternative formulations are essentially equivalent to the formulation utilized in this paper. We will also make a few brief remarks on some earlier attempts to accommodate Sen’s (1993) criticism on the internal consistency of choice. Section 6 concludes with some remarks on related literature. Section 7 gathers all the proofs.

2 Sen’s Criticism of Internal Consistency of Choice

Let $C$ be the choice function that specifies, for any admissible non-empty set $S$ of feasible alternatives, a non-empty subset $C(S)$ of $S$, which is to be called the choice set of $S$. Then Sen (1993, p.500) poses the following question: “[C]an a set of choices really be seen as consistent or inconsistent on purely internal grounds without bringing in something external to choice, such as the underlying objectives or values that are pursued or acknowledged by choice?” To bring his point into clear relief, Sen invites us to examine the following two choices:

$$C(\{x, y\}) = \{x\} \text{ and } C(\{x, y, z\}) = \{y\}.$$

As Sen rightly points out, this pair of choices violates most of the standard choice consistency conditions including the weak and the strong axioms of revealed preference, Arrow’s axiom of choice consistency, and Sen’s condition $\alpha$. It is arguable and indeed Sen (1993, p.501) argues that this seeming inconsistency can be easily resolved if only we know more about the person’s choice situation: “Suppose the person faces a choice at a dinner table between having the last remaining apple in the fruit basket ($y$) and having nothing instead ($x$), forgoing the nice-looking apple. She decides to behave decently and picks nothing ($x$), rather than the one apple ($y$). If, instead, the basket had contained two apples, and she had encountered the choice between having nothing ($x$), having one nice apple ($y$) and having another nice one ($z$), she could reasonably enough choose one ($y$), without violating any rule of good behavior. The presence of another apple ($z$) makes one of the two apples decently choosable, but this combination of choices would violate the standard consistency conditions . . . even though there is nothing particularly ‘inconsistent’ in this pair of choices . . . .”

On the face of it, Sen’s argument to this effect may seem to go squarely against the
theory of rationalizability à la Arrow (1959), Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), Sen (1971), Suzumura (1976a) and many others, where the weak axiom of revealed preference is a necessary condition for rationalizability.

Recollect that the standard theory of rationalizability has an important point of bifurcation depending on the specification of choice domains. The classical theory of revealed preference due originally to Samuelson (1938; 1947; 1948; 1950) and Houthakker (1950) was concerned with the choice functions on the domains of competitive budgets, whereas the expansion of the choice functional theory beyond the narrow confinement of competitive consumers due to Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) had a constraint of its own, and presupposed that the domains were confined to the finite sets of alternatives. See, also, Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995), and Schwartz (1976) for further work along this line. It was Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1976a; 1977; 1983) who explored the general rationalizability theory without these domain constraints, thereby making the theory universally applicable to whatever choice contexts we may want to specify. Recent years have witnessed further development of the general theory of rationalizability in the tradition of Richter and Hansson without any external norm. See Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005; 2006) and Kim and Richter (1986), among others. It is this general theory of rationalizability that we modify so as to develop a new concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and build a bridge between rationalizability theory and Sen’s criticism. In essence, what emerges from this modification is the peaceful co-existence of a norm-conditional rationalizability theory and Sen’s elaborated criticism against internal consistency of choice.

How can we pursue this objective? Although Sen’s suggestion to the effect that the rationality, or its lack, of choice behavior cannot be judged only by means of the internal structure of choices made is well taken, we can modify the axioms of revealed preference theory in such a way as to provide an axiomatization of choices under external norms in terms of the modified revealed preference axioms.

As an auxiliary step, we introduce a model of choice where external norms are taken into consideration by specifying all pairs consisting of a feasible set and an element of this set with the interpretation that this element is prohibited from being chosen from this set by the relevant system of external norms. Norm-conditional rationalizability then requires the existence of a preference relation such that, for each feasible set in the domain of the choice function, the chosen elements are at least as good as all elements in the set except for those that are prohibited by the external norm. This approach is very general because no restrictions are imposed on how the system of external norms comes about—
any specification of a set of pairs as described above is possible. Needless to say, we do not by any means suggest that any arbitrary system of norms thus specified is desirable; clearly, what we advocate is a method to incorporate any norm into a model of choice without completely eschewing all notions of traditional rationality altogether. In fact, the traditional model of rational choice is included as a special case—the case that obtains if the set of prohibited pairs is empty.

As a matter of fact, the ‘do-not-choose-the-last-apple’ example is not the only one Sen (1993) uses to criticize internal choice consistency properties. A second example he uses to call into question the imposition of internal choice consistency conditions goes as follows. Suppose a decision-maker is offered a cup of tea at a distant acquaintance’s place, the feasible set thus consisting of the two alternatives ‘tea’ and ‘staying home.’ Suppose, further, that the person chooses ‘tea.’ Now suppose the acquaintance offers, in addition to tea, the option of having some cocaine at her or his place. It may very well be the case that, when faced with the new opportunity set consisting of the alternatives ‘tea,’ ‘cocaine’ and ‘staying home,’ the last option is selected. Again, the standard axioms of revealed preference are violated by this choice behavior. In the example, the opportunity set (the menu) itself conveys information about the consequences of these choices: if cocaine is offered in addition to tea, the decision-maker’s perception of the acquaintance may change and, as a consequence, he or she chooses not even to enter the acquaintance’s house. This is what Sen (1993, p.502) refers to as the epistemic value of a menu. The observation that opportunity sets may have epistemic value has been made before; for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957) argue that the existence or absence of certain menu items in a restaurant may influence a customer’s perception of the nature of the place and thereby allow ‘irrelevant’ alternatives to affect its choices; see Luce and Raiffa (1957, p.288) for a detailed discussion.

In the specific example described above, the behavior of the decision-maker can be explained if one is prepared to acknowledge that the objects of choice may not be the objects of preference. The possible choices that can appear on menus are ‘tea,’ ‘cocaine’ and ‘staying home.’ The consequences the decision-maker may care about, however, are more adequately described as ‘having tea at a place where cocaine is consumed’ (outcome a), ‘having tea at a place that is presumed to be cocaine-free’ (outcome b), ‘having cocaine’ (outcome c) and ‘staying home’ (outcome d). If the menu consists of the options ‘tea’ and ‘staying home’ only, both ‘having tea at a place where cocaine is consumed’ and ‘having tea at a place that is presumed to be cocaine-free’ are possible consequences of choosing ‘tea,’ whereas if the menu item ‘cocaine’ is added, this uncertainty disappears—‘having
tea at a place that is presumed to be cocaine-free’ ceases to be a possible consequence of accepting an invitation for tea.

Suppose the decision-maker’s (transitive) preferences are such that \( b \) is better than \( d \), \( d \) is better than \( a \) and \( a \) is better than \( c \). The choice of ‘tea’ from the opportunity set consisting of ‘tea’ and ‘staying home’ induces the set of possible consequences \( \{a, b\} \), whereas choosing ‘tea’ from the menu consisting of ‘tea,’ ‘cocaine’ and ‘staying home’ has but one possible consequence—ending up with \( a \) with certainty. If the set of possible outcomes \( \{a, b\} \) is, according to the decision rule under uncertainty the agent may employ, better than the singleton set of possible outcomes \( \{a\} \), the above-described choices can be explained in the context of preference optimization once the distinction between choice items and consequences is recognized and a preference relation on consequences is supplemented with a preference relation on sets of possible consequences under uncertainty. This criticism of Sen’s has been dealt with in Bossert (2001) and, thus, we do not discuss it any further and refer the reader to the original paper instead.

3 Preference Relations and Choice Functions

We are now ready to introduce our analytical framework and define the basic concepts of preference and choice that lie at the heart of the problem to be addressed here.

Let \( X \) be a universal non-empty set of alternatives and let \( R \subseteq X \times X \) be a (binary) relation on \( X \). The asymmetric factor \( P(R) \) of \( R \) is given by \( (x, y) \in P(R) \) if and only if \( (x, y) \in R \) and \( (y, x) \notin R \) for all \( x, y \in X \), and the symmetric factor \( I(R) \) of \( R \) is defined by \( (x, y) \in I(R) \) if and only if \( (x, y) \in R \) and \( (y, x) \in R \) for all \( x, y \in X \).

The transitive closure \( tc(R) \) of a relation \( R \) is defined by letting, for all \( x, y \in X \),

\[
(x, y) \in tc(R) \iff \text{there exist } K \in \mathbb{N} \text{ and } x^0, \ldots, x^K \in X \text{ such that } x = x^0 \text{ and } (x^{k-1}, x^k) \in R \text{ for all } k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \text{ and } x^K = y.
\]

For any binary relation \( R \), \( tc(R) \) is the smallest transitive superset of \( R \).

A relation \( R \subseteq X \times X \) is reflexive if, for all \( x \in X \),

\[
(x, x) \in R
\]

and \( R \) is complete if, for all \( x, y \in X \) such that \( x \neq y \),

\[
(x, y) \in R \text{ or } (y, x) \in R.
\]

5
$R$ is transitive if, for all $x, y, z \in X$,

\[
[(x, y) \in R \text{ and } (y, z) \in R] \Rightarrow (x, z) \in R.
\]

It is clear that $R$ is transitive if and only if $R = \text{tc}(R)$. A quasi-ordering is a reflexive and transitive relation and an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering.

$R$ is consistent if, for all $x, y \in X$,

\[
(x, y) \in \text{tc}(R) \Rightarrow (y, x) \not\in P(R).
\]

This notion of consistency is due to Suzumura (1976b) and it is equivalent to the requirement that any cycle must be such that all relations involved in this cycle are instances of indifference—strict preference cannot occur. To facilitate the understanding of this concept, we may define the consistent closure $\text{cc}(R)$ of $R$ as the smallest consistent superset of $R$. This is the concept coined by Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005), which may be written explicitly as follows. For all $x, y \in X$,

\[
(x, y) \in \text{cc}(R) \iff (x, y) \in R \text{ or } [(x, y) \in \text{tc}(R) \text{ and } (y, x) \not\in P(R)].
\]

Clearly, for any binary relation $R$, we have $R \subseteq \text{cc}(R) \subseteq \text{tc}(R)$ and $R$ is consistent if and only if $R = \text{cc}(R)$. It is easy to verify that consistency implies (but is not implied by) the well-known acyclicity axiom which rules out the existence of strict preference cycles (cycles composed entirely of instances of strict preference). Consistency and quasi-transitivity, which requires that $P(R)$ is transitive, are independent. Transitivity implies consistency but the reverse implication is not true in general. However, if $R$ is reflexive and complete, consistency and transitivity are equivalent.

A relation $R^*$ is an extension of $R$ if and only if $R \subseteq R^* \subseteq P(R) \subseteq P(R^*)$. If an extension $R^*$ of $R$ is an ordering, we refer to $R^*$ as an ordering extension of $R$. One of the most fundamental results on extensions of binary relations is due to Szpiłrajn (1930) who showed that any transitive and asymmetric relation has a transitive, asymmetric and complete extension. The result remains true if asymmetry is replaced with reflexivity, that is, any quasi-ordering has an ordering extension. Arrow (1951, p.64) stated this generalization of Szpiłrajn’s theorem without a proof and Hansson (1968) provided a proof on the basis of Szpiłrajn’s original theorem. While the property of being a quasi-ordering is sufficient for the existence of an ordering extension of a relation, this is not necessary. As shown by Suzumura (1976b), consistency is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an ordering extension; see Suzumura (1976b, pp.389–390).
A choice situation is described by a feasible set $S$ of alternatives, where $S$ is a non-empty subset of $X$. External norms such as those discussed in the introduction can be expressed by identifying feasible sets and alternatives that are not to be chosen from these feasible sets. For example, suppose there is a feasible set $S = \{x, y\}$, where $x$ stands for selecting nothing and $y$ stands for selecting (a single) apple. Now consider the feasible set $T = \{x, y, z\}$ where there are two (identical) apples $y$ and $z$ available. The external norm not to take the last apple can easily and intuitively be expressed by requiring that the choice of $y$ from $S$ is excluded, whereas the choice of $y$ (or $z$) from $T$ is perfectly acceptable. In general, norms of that nature can be expressed by identifying all pairs $(S, w)$, where $w \in S$, such that $w$ is not supposed to be chosen from the feasible set $S$. To that end, we use a set $\mathcal{N}$, to be interpreted as the set of all pairs $(S, w)$ of a feasible set $S$ and an element $w$ of $S$ such that the choice of $w$ from $S$ is prevented by the external norm under consideration.

More formally, suppose $\mathcal{X}$ is the power set of $X$ excluding the empty set. A choice function is a mapping $C: \Sigma \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ such that $C(S) \subseteq S \setminus \{z \in S \mid (S, z) \in \mathcal{N}\}$ for all $S \in \Sigma$, where $\Sigma \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ with $\Sigma \neq \emptyset$ is the domain of $C$. Let $C(\Sigma)$ denote the image of $\Sigma$ under $C$, that is, $C(\Sigma) = \cup_{S \in \Sigma} C(S)$. As is customary, we assume that $C(S)$ is non-empty for all sets $S$ in the domain of $C$. Thus, using Richter’s (1971) term, the choice function $C$ is assumed to be decisive. To ensure that this requirement does not conflict with the restrictions imposed by the norm $\mathcal{N}$, we require $\mathcal{N}$ to be such that, for all $S \in \Sigma$, there exists $x \in S$ satisfying $(S, x) \notin \mathcal{N}$. The set of all possible norms satisfying this restriction is denoted by $\mathcal{N}$.

Returning to Sen’s example involving the norm “do not choose the last available apple,” we can, for instance, define the universal set $X = \{x, y, z\}$, the domain $\Sigma = \{S, T\} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ with $S = \{x, y\}$ and $T = \{x, y, z\}$, and the external norm described by the set $\mathcal{N} = \{(S, y)\}$. Thus, the external norm requires that $y \notin C(S)$ but no restrictions are imposed on the choice $C(T)$ from the set $T$—that is, this external norm represents the requirement that the last available apple should not be chosen.

4 Norm-Conditional Rationalizability

The notion of rationality explored in this paper is conditional on a system of external norms $\mathcal{N} \in \mathcal{N}$ as introduced in the previous section. In contrast with the classical model of rational choice, an element $x$ that is chosen by a choice function $C$ from a feasible set $S \in \Sigma$ need not be considered at least as good as all elements of $S$ by a rationalizing
relation, but merely at least as good as all elements \( y \in S \) such that \((S, y) \notin \mathcal{N}\). That is, if the choice of \( y \) from \( S \) is already prohibited by the norm, there is no need that \( x \) dominates such an element \( y \) according to the rationalization. Needless to say, the chosen element \( x \) itself must be admissible in the presence of the prevailing system of external norms.

To make this concept of norm-conditional rationalizability precise, let a system of external norms \( \mathcal{N} \in \mathbb{N} \) and a feasible set \( S \in \Sigma \) be given. An \( \mathcal{N} \)-admissible set for \((\mathcal{N}, S)\), \( A_{\mathcal{N}}(S) \subseteq S \), is defined by letting, for all \( x \in S \),

\[
x \in A_{\mathcal{N}}(S) \iff (S, x) \notin \mathcal{N}.
\]

Note that, by assumption, \( A_{\mathcal{N}}(S) \neq \emptyset \) for all \( \mathcal{N} \in \mathbb{N} \) and for all \( S \in \Sigma \).

We say that a choice function \( C \) on \( \Sigma \) is \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizable if and only if there exists a binary relation \( R_{\mathcal{N}} \subseteq X \times X \) such that, for all \( S \in \Sigma \) and for all \( x \in S \),

\[
x \in C(S) \iff x \in A_{\mathcal{N}}(S) \text{ and } [(x, y) \in R_{\mathcal{N}} \text{ for all } y \in A_{\mathcal{N}}(S)].
\]

In this case, we say that \( R_{\mathcal{N}} \) \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizes \( C \), or \( R_{\mathcal{N}} \) is an \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalization of \( C \).

To facilitate our analysis of \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizability, a generalization of the notion of the direct revealed preference relation \( R_C \subseteq X \times X \) of a choice function \( C \) is of use. For all \( x, y \in X \),

\[
(x, y) \in R_C \iff \text{there exists } S \in \Sigma \text{ such that } [x \in C(S) \text{ and } y \in A_{\mathcal{N}}(S)].
\]

The (indirect) revealed preference relation of \( C \) is the transitive closure \( tc(R_C) \) of the direct revealed preference relation \( R_C \).

We consider three basic versions of norm-conditional rationalizability. The first is \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizability by itself, where an \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalization \( R_{\mathcal{N}} \) does not have to possess any additional property (such as reflexivity, completeness, consistency or transitivity). This notion of rationalizability is equivalent to \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizability by a reflexive relation (this is also true for the standard definition of rationalizability without external norms; see Richter, 1971). The second is \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizability by a consistent relation (again, reflexivity can be added and an equivalent condition is obtained; see Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura, 2005). Finally, we consider \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizability by a transitive relation which, again as in the classical case, turns out to be equivalent to \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizability by an ordering; see Richter (1966; 1971).

We are now ready to identify a necessary and sufficient condition for each one of these notions of \( \mathcal{N} \)-rationalizability of a choice function. To obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition for simple $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability (that is, $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by a binary relation $R^\mathcal{N}$ that does not have to possess any further property), we follow Richter (1971) by generalizing the relevant axiom in his approach in order to accommodate an externally imposed system of norms $\mathcal{N}$. This leads us to the following axiom.

\textbf{$\mathcal{N}$-conditional direct-revelation coherence:} For all $S \in \Sigma$ and for all $x \in A^\mathcal{N}(S)$,

$$[(x, y) \in R for all $y \in A^\mathcal{N}(S)] \Rightarrow x \in C(S).$$

Our first result establishes that this property is indeed necessary and sufficient for $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability.

\textbf{Theorem 1} Let $\mathcal{N} \in \mathbb{N}$ be a system of external norms and let $C$ be a choice function. $C$ is $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizable if and only if $C$ satisfies $\mathcal{N}$-conditional direct-revelation coherence.

As is the case for the traditional model of rational choice on general domains, it is straightforward to verify that $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by a reflexive relation is equivalent to $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability without any further properties of an $\mathcal{N}$-rationalization; this can be verified analogously to Richter (1971). However, adding completeness as a requirement leads to a stronger notion of $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability; see again Richer (1971).

Next, we examine $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by a consistent relation, which is equivalent to $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by a reflexive and consistent relation. As in the traditional case, adding completeness, however, leads to a stronger property, namely, one that is equivalent to $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by an ordering; see Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005) for an analogous observation in the traditional model.

The requisite necessary and sufficient condition is obtained from $\mathcal{N}$-conditional direct-revelation coherence by replacing $R_C$ with its consistent closure $\text{cc}(R_C)$.

\textbf{$\mathcal{N}$-conditional consistent-closure coherence:} For all $S \in \Sigma$ and for all $x \in A^\mathcal{N}(S)$,

$$[(x, y) \in \text{cc}(R_C) for all $y \in A^\mathcal{N}(S)] \Rightarrow x \in C(S).$$

We obtain

\textbf{Theorem 2} Let $\mathcal{N} \in \mathbb{N}$ be a system of external norms and let $C$ be a choice function. $C$ is $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizable by a consistent relation if and only if $C$ satisfies $\mathcal{N}$-conditional consistent-closure coherence.
Our final result establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by a transitive relation which is equivalent to $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by an ordering. We leave it to the reader to verify that the proof strategy employed by Richter (1966; 1971) in the traditional case generalizes in a straightforward manner to the norm-dependent model when establishing that transitive $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability is equivalent to $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizability by an ordering.

The requisite necessary and sufficient condition is obtained from $\mathcal{N}$-conditional direct-revelation coherence by replacing $R_C$ with its transitive closure $tc(R_C)$.

$\mathcal{N}$-conditional transitive-closure coherence: For all $S \in \Sigma$ and for all $x \in A^\mathcal{N}(S)$,

$$[(x, y) \in tc(R_C) \text{ for all } y \in A^\mathcal{N}(S)] \Rightarrow x \in C(S).$$

We obtain

**Theorem 3** Let $\mathcal{N} \in \mathbb{N}$ be a system of external norms and let $C$ be a choice function. $C$ is $\mathcal{N}$-rationalizable by a transitive relation if and only if $C$ satisfies $\mathcal{N}$-conditional transitive-closure coherence.

## 5 Alternative Formulations

Our model of norm-conditional choice may appear somewhat restrictive at first sight because it specifies pairs of a feasible set and a single object not to be chosen from that set. One might want to consider the following seeming generalization of this approach: instead of only including pairs of the form $(S, x)$ with $x \in S$ when defining a system of norms, one could include pairs such as $(S, S')$ with $S' \subseteq S$, thus postulating that the subset $S'$ should not be chosen from $S$. Contrary to first appearance, this does not really provide a more general model of norm-conditional rationalizability because, in order to formulate our notion of norm-conditional rationality, we require that a chosen element $x \in C(S)$ has to be at least as good as all feasible elements except those that are already excluded by the external norm according to a norm-conditional rationalization—that is, $x$ has to be at least as good as all $y \in S$ except for those $y \in S$ such that $(S, y) \in \mathcal{N}$. Allowing for pairs $(S, S')$ does not provide a more general notion of norm-conditional rationalizability because the subset of $S$, the elements of which have to be dominated by a chosen object, can be obtained in any arbitrary way from the subsets $S'$ such that $S'$ cannot be selected from $S$ according to the external norm. For simplicity of exposition, we work with the
simpler version of our model but note that this formulation does not involve any loss of
generality when it comes to the definition of norm-conditional rationality employed in this
paper.

An alternative formulation, based on a suggestion of one of the referees, is to use a

**norm-embodifying** relation \( R \subseteq (X \times X) \times (X \times X) \), where a pair \((x, S)\) with \(x \in S \subseteq X\) stands for the act of choosing \(x\) from a choice environment \(S\) given an underlying norm.

The statement \(((x, S), (y, T)) \in R\) can then be interpreted to mean that choosing \(x\) from
the admissible choice environment \(S\) is at least as good as choosing \(y\) from \(T\) in term of
conformity with the requisite external norm. This approach can then be used to define
notions of norm-conditional rationalizability that parallel ours.

Ours is not the first attempt to accommodate Sen’s (1993) criticism within a suitably
employ a non-standard notion of rationalizability that obeys the restriction imposed by
the external norm not to choose the *uniquely* greatest element according to some relation
but behaves as the traditional version of rationalizability when the set of greatest objects
contains at least two elements. Baigent and Gaertner (1996) define, for a feasible set
\(S \in X\) and for a relation \(R\) on \(X\), the set \(G^*(S, R)\) as

\[
G^*(S, R) = \begin{cases} 
G(S, R) & \text{if } |G(S, R)| = 1 \\
\emptyset & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

According to Baigent and Gaertner (1996, p.244), a choice function \(C\) is *non-standard rationalizable* if there exists a transitive relation \(R\) on \(X\) such that, for all \(S \in \Sigma\),

\[
C(S) = G(S \setminus G^*(S, R), R).
\]

The set of chosen elements is assumed to be non-empty implying that, implicitly, Baigent
and Gaertner (1996) do not include singleton sets in their domain. A choice function
that is rationalizable in the sense of (1) selects all second-greatest elements according to
a rationalizing relation if there is a unique greatest element; if there are several greatest
elements, \(C\) chooses *all* of these greatest elements. Baigent and Gaertner (1996, p.241)
state that they axiomatize the maxim “always choose the second largest except in those
cases where there are at least two pieces which are largest, being of equal size. In that
case, either may be chosen.” However, this informal maxim appears to be in conflict
with the formal definition and characterization provided by Baigent and Gaertner (1996,
p.243). According to (1), if there is no unique greatest element, *all* greatest elements are
chosen and not just one of them. Thus, there is a gap between their formal axiomatization
and the informal maxim, the axiomatization of the latter being left unaccomplished so far. Moreover, their model is restricted to a rather narrow class of choice problems. If, instead of having two apples in the feasible set, the decision-maker faces a fruit basket containing one apple and one orange, picking the second-greatest element according to some rationalizing relation no longer seems to represent reasonable behavior: the fact that I as the decision-maker prefer apples to oranges, say, does not mean other people have the same preferences and, as a consequence, norms of politeness and decency do not dictate the choice of the orange—what if everyone else at the table prefers oranges to apples?

Gaertner and Xu (1999a) discuss an alternative approach covering cases where external norms may lead to the choice of the median alternative(s) according to some antisymmetric relation on $X$. This approach is compared to the traditional rational choice setup and to the Baigent and Gaertner (1996) framework in the antisymmetric case in Gaertner and Xu (1997) and in a more general setting in Gaertner and Xu (1999b).

An alternative type of norm-constrained choice is characterized in Gaertner and Xu (2004). The choice functions analyzed in this contribution have a domain that contains the empty set in addition to all non-empty subsets of $X$ and, moreover, choice sets may be empty even if feasible sets are non-empty. The behavior Gaertner and Xu (2004) attempt to capture is the refusal to make a choice in response to the suppression of alternatives: if there is but a single alternative available, the decision-maker may choose the empty set as a means of expressing his or her displeasure with the suppression of other feasible alternatives. An example put forward by Sen (1997, p.755) and used by Gaertner and Xu (2004) as a motivation of their approach is that of a government that outlaws all newspapers but one that is owned by the government itself. They argue that if several papers are available, the government paper may well be the choice of a decision-maker, but the absence of any alternative sources leads the agent to boycott the single available news outlet.

Xu (2007) discusses some special cases of norm-conditional rationalizability, namely, a variant of the Baigent and Gaertner (1996) ‘never-choose-the-uniquely-largest’ rule, the median-based rule (see Gaertner and Xu, 1999a) and two versions of the ‘protest-based’ norm of Gaertner and Xu (2004). These special cases are obtained by ruling out the choice of unique best elements, elements better than the (bottom) median element, and non-empty choices in the case of single-valued feasible sets. See also Baigent (2007) for a summary and discussion of the relevant literature.
6 Conclusion

Instead of summarizing the main contents of this short paper, let us conclude with a remark on the literature with some relevance to the present paper.

It was Sen (1997) who made an important step towards the norm-conditional theory of rationalizability through the concept of self-imposed choice constraints, excluding the choice of some alternatives from permissible conducts. Let $M(S,R)$ denote the set of $R$-maximal elements in $S$ according to $R$, that is, the set of all elements of $S$ that are not strictly preferred by any other element in $S$. According to Sen’s (1997, p.769) scenario, “the person may first restrict the choice options . . . by taking a ‘permissible’ subset $K(S)$, reflecting self-imposed constraints, and then seek the maximal elements $M(K(S),R)$ in $K(S)$.” Despite an apparent family resemblance between Sen’s concept of self-imposed choice constraints and our concept of norm-conditionality, Sen did not go as far as to bridge the idea of norm-induced constraints and the theory of rationalizability as we did in this paper.

It is hoped that the present paper provides the missing link in the existing literature and shows that external norms can be made neatly compatible with a suitably modified revealed preference theory.

7 Proofs

We first provide three preliminary results. The following lemma states that the direct revealed preference relation $R_C$ must be respected by any $N$-rationalization $R^N$. This observation parallels that of Samuelson (1948; 1950) in the traditional framework; see also Richter (1971).

**Lemma 1** Let $N \in N$ be a system of external norms and let $C$ be a choice function. If $R^N$ is an $N$-rationalization of $C$, then $R_C \subseteq R^N$.

**Proof.** Suppose that $R^N$ is an $N$-rationalization of $C$ and $x,y \in X$ are such that $(x,y) \in R_C$. By definition of $R_C$, there exists $S \in \Sigma$ such that $x \in C(S)$ and $y \in A^N(S)$. Because $R^N$ is an $N$-rationalization of $C$, we obtain $(x,y) \in R^N$. Thus, $R_C \subseteq R^N$ must be true. ■

Analogously, any consistent $N$-rationalization $R^N$ must respect not only the direct revealed preference relation $R_C$ but also its consistent closure $cc(R_C)$.
Lemma 2 Let $N \in \mathbb{N}$ be a system of external norms and let $C$ be a choice function. If $R^N$ is a consistent $N$-rationalization of $C$, then $cc(R_C) \subseteq R^N$.

Proof. Suppose that $R^N$ is a consistent $N$-rationalization of $C$ and $x, y \in X$ are such that $(x, y) \in cc(R_C)$. By definition of the consistent closure of a binary relation, $(x, y) \in R_C$ or $[(x, y) \in tc(R_C)$ and $(y, x) \in R_C]$ must hold. If $(x, y) \in R_C$, $(x, y) \in R^N$ follows from Lemma 1. If $[(x, y) \in tc(R_C)$ and $(y, x) \in R_C]$, there exist $K \in \mathbb{N}$ and $x^0, \ldots, x^K \in X$ such that $x = x^0$, $(x^{k-1}, x^k) \in R_C$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and $x^K = y$. By Lemma 1, $(x^{k-1}, x^k) \in R^N$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and, thus, $(x, y) \in tc(R^N)$. Furthermore, $(y, x) \in R_C$ implies $(y, x) \in R^N$ by Lemma 1 again. If $(x, y) \notin R^N$, it follows that $(y, x) \in P(R^N)$ in view of $(y, x) \in R^N$. Because $(x, y) \in tc(R^N)$, this contradicts the consistency of $R^N$. Therefore, $(x, y) \in R^N$. Thus, $cc(R_C) \subseteq R^N$ must be true. ■

Finally, if transitivity is required as a property of an $N$-rationalization $R^N$, this relation must respect the transitive closure $tc(R_C)$ of $R_C$.

Lemma 3 Let $N \in \mathbb{N}$ be a system of external norms and let $C$ be a choice function. If $R^N$ is a transitive $N$-rationalization of $C$, then $tc(R_C) \subseteq R^N$.

Proof. Suppose that $R^N$ is a transitive $N$-rationalization of $C$ and $x, y \in X$ are such that $(x, y) \in tc(R_C)$. By definition of the transitive closure of a binary relation $R_C$, there exist $K \in \mathbb{N}$ and $x^0, \ldots, x^K \in X$ such that $x = x^0$, $(x^{k-1}, x^k) \in R_C$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and $x^K = y$. By Lemma 1, we obtain $x = x^0$, $(x^{k-1}, x^k) \in R^N$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and $x^K = y$. Repeated application of the transitivity of $R^N$ implies $(x, y) \in R^N$. Thus $tc(R_C) \subseteq R^N$ must hold. ■

Proof of Theorem 1. “Only if.” Suppose $R^N$ is an $N$-rationalization of $C$. Let $S \in \Sigma$ and $x \in A^N(S)$ be such that $(x, y) \in R_C$ for all $y \in A^N(S)$. By Lemma 1, $(x, y) \in R^N$ for all $y \in A^N(S)$, which implies $x \in C(S)$ because $R^N$ is an $N$-rationalization of $C$.

“If.” Suppose $C$ satisfies $N$-conditional direct-revelation coherence. We complete the proof by showing that $R^N = R_C$ is an $N$-rationalization of $C$. Let $S \in \Sigma$ and $x \in A^N(S)$.

Suppose first that $x \in C(S)$. By definition, it follows immediately that $(x, y) \in R_C = R^N$ for all $y \in A^N(S)$.

Conversely, suppose that $(x, y) \in R_C = R^N$ for all $y \in A^N(S)$. It follows that $N$-conditional direct-revelation coherence immediately implies $x \in C(S)$. Thus, $C$ is $N$-rationalizable by $R^N = R_C$. ■
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1. All that needs to be done is replace $R_C$ with $cc(R_C)$ and invoke Lemma 2 instead of Lemma 1. ■

Proof of Theorem 3. Again, the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1. All that needs to be done is replace $R_C$ with $tc(R_C)$ and invoke Lemma 3 instead of Lemma 1. ■

References


