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Nationalisms, Languages and Linguistic Minorities in Québec:
Comparing the Philosophy of René Lévesque and his Contemporaries

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Introduction

Québec nationalism might be thought of as an outdated topic. It was already more than 20 years ago that the last referendum was held, and separatism seems to have lost its momentum. But that is precisely the point. Québec nationalism is not about separatism, or at least, that is only one of the issues. Rather, it consists the basis of both Canadian and Québec political framework and still has an important role to play in this world aiming for coexistence. Thus, it is never too late to examine Québec nationalism, all the more so when one feels there still is an unexplored area.

Québec is a province within Canada comprising one sixth of the territory being the largest among ten provinces of the country (Figure 1). The province itself is 3.6 times larger than Japan. It currently has a population of over eight million, which makes it the second most populated province after neighbouring Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2016).

When we look at the population from the language perspective, 77.1 per cent of the population of Québec have French as their first language with which Riera (2016) categorized Québec as rather homogenous with a single language group of more than 75 per cent. Those who have English as their mother tongue comprise 7.5 per cent, indigenous languages 0.6 per cent and 12.6 per cent had none of the above languages as a mother tongue. Thus, although francophones compose the overwhelming majority of the population, the traditional anglophone population is smaller than the cultural minorities. In fact, 13.7 per cent of the population are first generation immigrants, Québec now accepting around 50,000 people annually; the number was 53,254 in 2016, of which 79.4 per cent had neither French nor English as their mother tongue.
(Gouvernement du Québec [Québec], 2018). Thus, as much as Québec still has a relatively homogenous francophone population, diversity is growing rapidly.

Research Question 1: Many Nationalisms

Although many intellectuals believed that the time of nationalist anxiety had ended with the defeat of fascism in the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations, nationalism continued to reign in many parts of the world (Balthazar, 1986). In fact, no other ideology nor movement has had equal strength to unite people since the French Revolution (Balthazar, 1986). Anderson agreed that the ‘end of the era of nationalism’ was not even close and that “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (2006, p.3). It is a powerful movement that continues today, as has recently been witnessed in Catalonia.

Many academics who have thought about nationalism seem to indicate that nationalism is a movement which seeks for a nation-state. Gellner, in his famous book Nations and Nationalism, defined nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (2006, p.1). Similarly, Brueilly argued that nationalism refers “to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” which is based on three basic assertions, one of which is that “the nation must be as independent as possible” (1993, p.2). Distinctions are sometimes made between state-led and state-seeking nationalism but still, the nation-state is implied as the motivation for nationalism.

However, is nationalism all about seeking or exercising power of the nation-state? In other words, for those minority nations within nation-states which exercise nationalism, do they all seek independence? In fact, few academics seem to acknowledge the many types of nationalism within minority nationalisms, and that not all nations seek independence. Anthony Smith recognized that “not all nationalisms have in practice opted for independent statehood” (1998, p.73) while Guibernau pointed out that not all nationalisms have secessionist aims (2011). However, further varieties of nationalisms are rarely explored to which Lluch made an excellent point that “the internal variation within national
movements has been under-investigated” (2014, p.10). He further pointed out that many scholars on secessionism “have generally failed to investigate the complex heterogeneity of political orientations within [italics added] national movements and their temporal evolution” (2014, p.3). Thus, on his dynamic work on investigating Québec and Catalan nationalism, Lluch focused on within-case variation and temporal evolution of national movements and stated that nationalisms led by parties within stateless nations “have different visions of sovereignty” (2014, p.264). Contrary to what is generally thought about minority nationalism, the internal variety does not limit itself to the simple dichotomy of pro-secession and anti-secession. Lluch pointed out that there are actually three main camps within minority nationalism, which consists of pro-independence, pro-autonomism and pro-federation camps, the latter two further divided to instrumental or teleological. Thus, he identified five visions of sovereignty in theory, three of which corresponding each to the respective political parties of Québec: independentist Parti Québécois (PQ); instrumental autonomist Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ); federalist Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) (2014).

Whereas Lluch’s interpretation of Québec nationalism was strictly along party lines, Balthazar (1986) identified two groups within the PQ, distinguishing between pure independentists and disillusioned federalists. The pure independentists comprise a vital part both inside and outside the PQ, who see independence or sovereignty as an end in itself or at least an essential means; the only objective of their political engagement. Borrowing Lluch’s terms, they can be considered as teleological independentists. They are also sometimes called orthodoxies (Fraser, 2001; Maclure, 2003) or hard-line nationalists (Levine, 1990). According to Balthazar, they are the ones who are usually perceived as synonymous to Québec nationalists but popular support for them had never been more than a minority within the population of Québec. The disillusioned federalists, on the other hand, see sovereignty as a means to affirm Québec identity and elevate the status of Québec within Canada (1986). Thus, they see sovereignty as an important option but their main goal is to achieve a better relationship with Canada.

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1 In 2012, the ADQ joined a new political party led by François Legault, the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ).
Hence, in Lluch’s term, they could be called instrumental sovereigntists.

Although in reality there seem to be several types of nationalist movements in Québec, Maclure pointed out that the Québec social imaginary has been limited to either melancholy nationalists or anti-nationalists, the former corresponding to Balthazar’s pure independentists and having taken a dominant place in Québec identity theories since the 1950s:

There exists in Quebec a whole discourse about the fragility, the precariousness, the tragic existence, the fatigue, the modesty, the philistinism, the mediocrity, the immaturity, and the indecision of the Québécois people. …By searching a little and by adopting a certain relationship to the past, one can indeed find in the genesis of Quebec society, as well as in its recent history, the fuel for a major depression – or more precisely, a cause of collective melancholia. (Maclure, 2003, p.19)

According to Maclure, melancholy nationalists postulate that certain traumatic events in Québec’s history, be it the British Conquest, the failures of referenda or the Constitution crisis, have been repressed and internalized within the collective unconscious of the Québécois. To emerge from its cultural depression, Québec must reconcile with its past by accepting and assuming a history scattered with failures and defeats. In other words, melancholy nationalists of each generation have been in search of normality, which they see as being embodied in some kind of national maturity which can only be achieved by independence (2003).

In viewing this complexity surrounding Québec nationalism, there seems to be several tasks that need to be done to better understand what Québec nationalism really is. First, it is necessary to redefine nationalism as more than simply state-led or state-seeking nationalism. In this thesis, the author takes the definition of nationalism from Balthazar as “a movement which consists of giving priority to national belonging and striving for a better recognition of the nation to which one belongs” (1986, p.19). He deliberately left the definition wide open to include political movements such as aspiration for total political sovereignty or limited autonomy as well as non-political movements seeking cultural identity. As for the definition of nation, he marked as follows:

A group of people who, beyond basic units such as family, clan, tribe, agree to live
together on a given territory, share a certain number of values, habits, memories and aspiration, speak the same language (most often) and are governed by a political organization. (1986, p.20)

Now, the mentioning of a political organization could be tricky where Balthazar himself admitted that there are some cases, especially when national identity is mostly based on culture, politics becomes less relevant. However, even in that situation, certain political aspects of the nation can be observed where, for example, religious organizations play the role of political structure (1986).

Second, if there are many nationalistic narratives, it seems more appropriate to concentrate on political individuals than looking at the phenomenon as a whole to avoid any generalization and to understand Québec nationalism properly. Martel and Pâquet (2010) stated that “politics, it cannot be stressed enough, is an affair of individuals before being a matter of ideas or abstract entities like the Law or the State” (p.277). Thus, the task of this thesis will be to identify nationalisms at the individual level to answer the following question: What do the nationalisms of Québec’s major political players look like? This will be the first research question of this thesis. By identifying several nationalisms, the point will be to prove that nationalism cannot easily be seen through a clear dichotomy of independence versus anti-independence.

In that sense, one thing ought to be mentioned before further discussion, concerning ethnic versus civic nationalisms. Although modern Québec nationalism is increasingly viewed as a civic one, the author does not wish to further discuss the dichotomy of these two nationalisms, not only because it is useless but also impossible. As Kymlicka stated, while ethnic nationalism is almost always equated with cultural nationalism, all nationalisms have in fact a cultural and historical component (2001). Furthermore, minority nationalisms are seen by many as ethnic whereas state nationalisms as civic, without any persuasive explanation (Kymlicka, 2001). Civic nationalism also gives the impression that it is good nationalism and the ethnic version bad, which has the strong potential to foster prejudice. Both nationalisms do not exist in their purest forms, which are only a matter of degree and difficult to measure. Since the concept itself is controversial, the author will refrain from using this dichotomy.
As much as Québec is known for its minority nationalist and sovereignty movement, recent academic works on Québec also deal with its struggle to accommodate minorities within the province. The debate on reasonable accommodation and interculturalism, a counter project to federal multiculturalism, dominated integration discussions, especially in the decades following the second referendum in 1995. The challenge of immigrant and ethnocultural minority integration is, of course, not specific to Québec. It has been of significant interest in recent years, a common topic in political debates as well as in academia in every Western democracy. Significant flows of migrants and the multiplicity of where they come from are especially of concern regarding demographic change. Other issues include illegal migration, refugees, social and economic alienation of migrants, and religious extremism (Joppke & Seidle, 2012).

Another recent phenomenon beginning in the last half of the 20th century, is the recognition of rights of indigenous peoples. Whereas many countries had sought assimilation and the later extinction of these people, the global process of decolonization and awareness of human rights extended to other various rights, including treaty rights, land claim, language rights or rights to self-government of the indigenous peoples (Kymlicka, 2003). The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was drafted between 1985 and 1993 by a UN Working Group and approved by the General Assembly in 2007, can be thought of as a major international accomplishment, establishing a universal framework in this area (Kymlicka, 2001; United Nations, 2017).

All three of these currents, minority nationalism, immigrant integration and self-determination of indigenous peoples, are the very challenges that Canada is facing. Kymlicka (2003) stated that the Canadian experience is unique, compared to other nation-states, since it is obliged to deal with all three of these silos (Kymlicka, 2007). Québec, a minority nation itself, is no exception which makes it even more unique relative to other parts of the world: the management of minorities (anglophone as a national minority, immigrants and indigenous peoples) within a minority nation. To this end, Maclure (2003) gives us an interesting perspective that contemporary Québec identity is going beyond the former.
dichotomy of the narratives of melancholy nationalism and anti-nationalism and in the direction of embracing both nationalism and pluralism. Normally thought of as incompatible phenomena, Québec is actually trying to practice both of these isms in its own way.

But then, several important questions arise. Was not Québec a nationalistic province that was seeking independence? Did not the PQ blame “money and the ethnic vote” for its referendum defeat in 1995? Is not nationalism exclusive in general? In other words, how was Québec able to pursue a course towards embracing both nationalism and pluralism? This is the second question the author will seek to answer in this thesis. Especially, it intends to focus on the balancing of nationalism and minority from a linguistic perspective, since language has been a central part of Québec nationalism, the French language defining the Québec identity in the first place. As Martel and Pâquet have stated, for several decades or even centuries, language has been the central issue of political life and public debates in Québec (2010). As Québec nationalism abandoned its traditional nationalist discourse based on religion, as we will see in subsequent chapters, language becomes all the more important as their source of identity. What is more, it is in fact language that plays a decisive and pragmatic role in modern Québec, acting as a focal point of inclusiveness and minority accommodation (Mackey, 2010).

Oaks and Warren (2007) have already observed Québec’s new approach to national identity including the three minorities, also from the language perspective. They argued that the model of intercultural citizenship honours a common identity built through dialogue with the use of French while still respecting pluralism. Importantly, however, they found that this effort to construct a sense of belonging was more challenging for the anglophone population than immigrants, and not relevant for many indigenous people since their primary identity remains their own language and culture. For younger immigrants, French has become more rooted through schools, but their attachment to Montréal rather than the province as a whole and bilingualism or multilingualism rather than French alone was observed.
Many other authors concentrate on one specific minority or two; in many cases allophones and anglophones. Carens (2000) defended the rather restrictive Québec language law from the view of “justice as evenhandedness” which provides immigrants equal opportunities in Québec. Conrick and Donovan (2010) indicated that this is precisely what the Québec government considers successful integration, namely the “acquisition of French by immigrants with knowledge of the French language being portrayed as the key that grants complete access to Quebec society” (p.342). At the same time, because of this strict and less open demand that is put upon immigrants, they also mentioned that it may be easier for immigrants to maintain their own languages outside Québec (Conrick & Donovan, 2010). This assumption was, however, contested by Turcotte (2006) who had concluded that among second-generation immigrants, those in Québec were more likely to have their parents’ mother tongue as their own first language.

As for anglophones, Bourhis (2008) admitted that language planning in Québec which favours French nonetheless guaranteed English schooling to all present and future Québec anglophones, including those immigrant children who were already in English schools by the time the Charter was adopted, and to their current and future siblings. However, many anglophones took the law negatively, since it threatened their traditional elite status, causing them to emigrate to other provinces. Studying statistical numbers, he concluded that the law caused a decrease of the anglophone population, which challenged the institutional vitality of the English-speaking communities in Québec. He suggested that maintaining and developing this vitality may have the effect of reducing emigration of young anglophones and in turn improve the future vitality of the demographic and institutional support fronts, which Québec francophones seem reluctant to act on (Bourhis, 2012). Green (1999) analysed the language policy of Québec from the domestic and international legal point of view of anglophones’ language minority rights. Most notably, it documented how the Québec Clause on the language of instruction, which limited English language instruction to students whose parents had received English

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2 Within the Canadian context, allophones are those whose first language is other than the two official languages or indigenous languages.
education in Québec, violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court concluded that the provision was unconstitutional. On the other hand, he also analysed the debate on commercial signs, where the Supreme Court acknowledged Québec’s distinct character and the importance of promoting French in the public sphere, permitting the government the predominant display of the French language.

Concerning the indigenous population, Patrick (2005) mentioned an important point that there is a stark asymmetry on how Canadian courts regard French minorities and indigenous peoples. Whereas the existence of French Canadian culture and language are taken for granted in Canada as a whole, indigenous cultures had to prove that their practices were “traditional”, having been practiced since before colonization by the Europeans. In this atmosphere of neglect, the Nunavik language of the Inuit in Arctic Québec was a rather successful case of indigenous language maintenance, which is expected to be one of the few languages in Canada to survive into the next century (Patrick, 2005). Oaks and Warren (2007) also mentioned that statistics show that language maintenance of indigenous languages are in better health in Québec than in the rest of Canada. Goulet (2016) documented how residential schools in Québec a) were very few compared to the rest of Canada in the first place and b) governed predominantly by Catholic oblates who resisted assimilation of indigenous children and insisted on the maintenance of their mother tongue, a very different approach compared to schools in the rest of Canada where the federal government was mostly in control. Nonetheless, Savard (2009) concluded that each indigenous group in Québec had different relations with the government depending on their geographical, economic, political and historical situations, especially in the context of natural resources, where those who were involved in the development of hydro-electricity were the only ones able to catch the careful attention of political leaders.

While previous literatures tended to focus on policy and government programs in general without

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3 Sponsored by the government, residential schools were religious boarding schools whose aim was to assimilate indigenous children into mainstream European culture. Many students are reported to have been physically and/or sexually abused and the negative effects still continue to have deep impact on the indigenous population as a whole. In 2008, the Canadian government apologized for its past wrong-doing, acknowledging the damage they have caused (Miller, 2018).
discussing the philosophy underlining each decision, the author intends to focus on individuals and their philosophy concerning the balancing of nationalism and minority management. As with the first assignment, the author will concentrate on several individuals and how they understood nationalism and minorities especially from the point of view of language.

Hypothesis

Until now, two main tasks have been outlined. One is to identify Québec nationalisms, especially at the individual level, for main political players. The second is to examine how Québec was able to pursue a course towards embracing both nationalism and pluralism. The hypothesis of this thesis centres strongly on one person, René Lévesque. A former journalist, an important Minister of the PLQ government and the Premier of Québec from 1976 to 1984 as a member of the PQ, Lévesque, as Premier, was who initiated the first independence referendum in 1980. However, different from his more hard-line colleagues, his nationalism did not seem to be a kind which pursued independence as an ultimate objective, Balthazar (1986) briefly mentioning Lévesque as one of the disillusioned federalists. Moreover, as a nationalist, a democrat and a defender of minority rights, the author intends to situate him as a pioneer of a modern Québec which strives for a new identity that embraces both nationalism and pluralism. Thus, the hypothesis is that Lévesque was the one who a) went beyond the dichotomy of melancholy nationalism and anti-nationalism and b) set the basis for and was able to act as a vehicle for Québec to pursue what Maclure claimed is a balancing of nationalism and pluralism. In addition to his determination to achieve rights as a minority within Canada, he did not forget that there were certain obligations as a majority within Québec to manage its own minorities. Importantly, he did not treat the three minorities in the same manner, having his own ideology behind each of their management. Thus, the most important task of this thesis will be to determine Lévesque’s ideology concerning Québec nationalism and each of the minorities within Québec.

Of course, one person alone cannot be regarded as having changed the political climate at that time. Kymlicka explained that there is a tradition in Canada to personalize political conflicts and that
this is misleading because it forces us to ignore the “deeper, structural causes at work” (2003, p.3). To give an example, Pierre Trudeau, the Prime Minister of Canada at the time, is considered a champion of multiculturalism but this does not give explanation to why the policy was also adopted in Australia (Kymlicka, 2003). Furthermore, Trudeau was, in fact, very ambivalent about the policy he proposed himself and did not even care about it afterwards (Kymlicka, 2007). Thus, we must clearly be very cautious in giving someone sole credit for altering a social and political situation.

Analysing from a Comparative Perspective

In this thesis, in order to avoid giving Lévesque sole credit for the changes in Québec and to paint as clear and unbiased a picture of him as possible, the author situates Lévesque on both diachronic and synchronic lines. On the diachronic line, the author starts by overviewing the history of Québec and the transformation of identity and nationalism and gives the foundation of the discussion. On synchronic lines, the author tries to situate Lévesque among other thinkers and politicians in the whole discussion of Québec identity, giving reference to readers how he was similar to or different from others at that time. Four people have been selected among his contemporaries as reference points based on the following criteria: a) born in Québec; b) preferably a politician who held important positions either in Canada or in Québec; c) was actively involved in language policy; and d) was active in the 1960s through 1980s. Preferably a politician because nations are basically led by political organizations, as defined by Balthazar, which consist of and further are led by politicians. The timeframe is limited since this was when Lévesque was active and also because Québec after 1960 is a very important turning point for the society as a whole, which definitely set the basis for contemporary Québec. In addition, by observing various characters, the author has the possibility to answer both research questions at the same time.

The first obvious choice was Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Lévesque’s official opponent acknowledged by everyone (Bergeron, 1985). As a former Prime Minister of Canada (1968-1979, 1980-1984), he enacted the Official Languages Act which made Canada institutionally bilingual. He was also the main
figure of the anti-nationalist camp defined by Maclure (2003), which makes the discussion even more interesting regarding his conception of nationalism.

The second person who was relatively easy to select was Camille Laurin, the Minister within Lévesque’s PQ government who was responsible for the famous Charter of the French Language. Laurin can be said to be a pure independentist or melancholy nationalist, though moderate compared to the other hard-liners. Still, it could not be denied that his primary objective was Québec independence.

Robert Bourassa could be an interesting choice. As a PLQ leader, he headed the Québec government as Premier twice from 1970 to 1976 and from 1985 to 1994. Compared to other characters, he was less of a man with philosophical ideas and principle but rather a pragmatic politician “driven more by calculation than conviction, more by opportunism than opportunity” (MacDonald, 2002, p.x). However, he checks all the criteria mentioned above and most importantly, it was during his tenure that Law 22 was enacted, the first law in Québec to recognize French as the official language. Although it was his Minister of Education who tabled the bill, Bourassa is said to have either written it with his Education Minister (Levine, 1990) or put in a lot of effort himself while the Education Minister and his team was writing it (Denis, 2006). Moreover, it may also help comparison to include someone less driven by ideology than the rest.

The last person to be on the list is André Laurendeau. He is the only one who did not assume a major political role, despite his brief involvement in Québec politics as a leader of Bloc Populaire⁴ in the 1940s. However, he was one of the co-chairs of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B & B Commission) of the federal government which recommended on various language issues and became the basis of the federal Official Languages Act. Moreover, Maclure identified Laurendeau as the forerunner of going beyond the dichotomy of melancholy nationalism and anti-nationalism, which cannot be ignored regarding the purpose of this thesis.

Mackey stressed that the visions and decisions of policy makers cannot be ignored because it is

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⁴ A political party in Québec from 1942 to 1947, founded by opponents of conscription during the Second World War. The party ran candidates in both federal and provincial levels, the latter of which was led by Laurendeau.
the people, with “their perception of the present and their vision of the future” (p.19), who made language policies, not the state. He included Trudeau and Lévesque on his short list of people on who Canadian language policies depend (2010). Similarly, Martel and Pâquet (2010) highlighted individual figures who emerged and strongly influenced the conceptions of linguistic issues over time, among them could be found André Laurendeau, Camille Laurin and Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Both of these authors, however, did not themselves analyse the individuals with whom the author intends to fill the gap. Especially, by comparing Lévesque with the four important people of Québec nationalist discourse, the author hopes to a) identify each’s conception of nationalism and minority and b) treat Lévesque as someone who chose his own path among many possible options, a path both similar and different to those chosen by others.

Lack of Study on Lévesque

Despite how much Lévesque is an important figure in Québec history, still ranking as the best Premier of Québec 20 years after his resignation and death (René Lévesque a été le meilleur premier ministre, 2006), works on him tend to focus on the same limited subjects. Writings on him mainly concern his nationalism, with Lachapelle (2008) highlighting five moments in Lévesque’s political career that defined his relationship to Quebec nationalism which Lévesque fully integrated into modernity. Beaulé (1992) pointed out that Lévesque’s vision of independence was by realism rather than by strategy and Johnson (1992) marked that Lévesque brought a progressive and liberal vision to nationalism. Others analysed Lévesque’s ambivalence towards independence (Bourgault, 1992; Fraser, 1992), noting that he was attacked by some hard-core nationalists in Québec for his failure to achieve independence (Vacante, 2011) who accused him of weakening Québec within Canada (Bisaillon, 2004).

Other works concern his charisma (Brouillet, 1992; L. Gagnon, 2008), his anti-violence (Brière, 1992) and his democratic politics (Provencher, 1974/1977; Laforest, 1992; McRoberts, 1992; Gagnon & Lévesque, 1992) for which he was very much liked even outside Québec (Fraser, 2001; Resnick, 2008; Poliquin, 2009; Vacante, 2011). While the above list may appear extensive, many of these references
are drawn from the same anthologies. Further limiting the audience and thus English understanding of Lévesque, the majority of these works exist only in the original French.

What is especially lacking in works on Lévesque are his relationships with the minorities. Although some authors have written separately on his attitude towards anglophones (Resnick, 2008), cultural community (Assimopoulos, 1992; Anctil, 2008), or the indigenous (Morin, 1992) or included some episodes in his biographies (Provencher, 1974/1977; Fraser, 2001; Godin, 1997, 2001, 2007; Poliquin, 2009), there is no comprehensive academic work on how he viewed minorities within Québec in relation to his conception of nationalism. Moreover, seen as a firm nationalist who advocated separatism, his initiative on minorities and their languages is not well known, especially his relation to indigenous peoples (Poliquin, 2009).

Academic writings on minorities in Québec, on the other hand, do not mention Lévesque as their defender. He is merely mentioned as the leader of the PQ that enacted the Charter of the French Language, a Québec nationalist or most of the time simply not mentioned. For example, although Lévesque’s initiative in the 1960s to grant Inuit language instruction at schools is clear, Patrick (2003), who wrote about language usage and policies in Arctic Québec, did not mention Lévesque’s endeavours on this front. Rather, she mentioned Lévesque, only once, as a nationalist Minister of Natural Resources in the PLQ government, running under the slogan of *maîtres chez nous* (masters in our own house) in the 1962 election and nationalizing electricity to symbolically gain independence from American and anglo-Canadian economic domination (Patrick, 2003). Thus with this thesis, the author tries to fill the void by regarding him both a nationalist and as a democrat who strongly defended minorities, since both elements are crucial to modern day Québec and his personality.

Another clear void that needs to be filled is his conception on language. There is almost no academic work on how he thought about language and what kind of language policy he wanted, with the exception of Araki (2015) who emphasized that Lévesque regarded not only collective but also individual rights to be crucial to the *Québécois* concerning their language. As the leader of the PQ, Lévesque is easily identified with the Charter of the French Language. But traces can be found
he was not very fond of language policies in the first place and also that he was not particularly fond of Laurin’s language law. This is a highly important matter which only the respective biographers (Fraser, 2001; Godin, 2001, 2007; Picard, 2003) and Laurin himself (1992) seemed to have taken into account.

Why are works on Lévesque, especially on minorities and language, so limited? Several assumptions can be made to this situation. First of all, as a significant political figure who is strongly related to the PQ, an influential party still to this day, any writing on him could have a significant political implication which the authors tend to avoid. In this sense, as a foreigner, the author feels free to express views on him or any other individuals without any political intention or inherent bias. Another assumption concerns Lévesque’s highly mythical character (Bisaillon, 2004; L. Gagnon, 2008). Because of this, anything written about him could be considered to be trying to a) create another myth or b) destroy the myth, either of which would be highly political. Political exploitation of Lévesque actually goes beyond party lines, as has been witnessed in the recent provincial election, further proof of his mythical character not only for the PQ but also for Québec society as a whole. Also, because anyone who cares to write about him is either a melancholy nationalist or an anti-nationalist, they do not really care about minorities and are not even interested in questions other than those regarding nationalism. It is important to note that he is generally disliked by both melancholy nationalists and anti-nationalists. For the former, Lévesque is the symbol of failure who was not really a separatist (Vacante, 2011) and for the latter, he is the charismatic nationalist leader who tried to break up the country. Another important point is that Lévesque himself was, as we shall see, not enthusiastic of legislating the language law despite his status as a Premier of the sovereigntist party which enacted the Charter of the French Language. This fact leaves us with very little material on Lévesque’s philosophy on language at the time although we can still explore what he actually thought through his previous discourses and biographies. With this thesis, the author tries to paint a broader picture and explore some lesser known aspects of such an important figure in the history of both Québec and Canada.
Methodology

Concerning Lévesque, the author will rely heavily on primary and secondary materials. Primary materials include his speeches both inside and outside the National Assembly, articles and interviews. Lévesque is known to have been one of the very few politicians to write his own speeches based on facts, details, and examples, and while sometimes used a basic structure someone else had prepared, invariably reworked the material (Fraser, 2001). He hardly ever had a whole speech prepared but rather spoke from notes (Fraser, 2001). As Lévesque was considered a very honest man (Provencher, 1974/1977; Poliquin, 2009; Vacante, 2011), the author would like to believe his quote on earnest speech and focus on his own words and consider them as reflecting his true thoughts. In addition to his memoirs (Lévesque, 1986) and books on political thinking (Lévesque, 1997, 1980), several books have been published which assembled his own arguments and words (Côté & Chaput, 1977; Lévesque, 1987; Lévesque & Casaubon, 1991; Maillard, 1997; Bédard & Gélinas, 2014, 2017). One book has been on an exclusive interview which was conducted by French media (Lévesque, 1978/1979). Concerning Lévesque’s involvement in indigenous affairs, the author has also referenced Québec governmental publications including *Rencontre*, a magazine for Québec’s Amerindian and Inuit population published three times a year from 1979. Concerning materials online, the website of the Québec National Assembly provides us with important scripts of debates, *Journal des débats*, both within the assembly and in commissions dating as far back as 1964. Additionally, Lévesque’s speeches and articles are available on the website of *Fondation René Lévesque* (2017) which has extensive lists on many of his materials.

Secondary materials include books and articles written about Lévesque, including his biographies (Provencher, 1974/1977; Godin, 1997, 2001, 2007; Fraser, 2001; Paulin, 2004; Poliquin, 2009), anthologies written exclusively on Lévesque (Bélanger & Lévesque, 1992; Stefanescu, 2008), books

5 “I've always made myself (I learned this as a journalist and I think it applies also in politics) a rule: not to say everything, because we can never say everything we think because that would make us kill each other, but at least never say the opposite of what I think” (quoted in Maillard, 1997, p.7).
concerning Lévesque’s government (Larocque, 2007; Panneton, 2017) and other simple articles, both academic and journalistic. Both French and English texts exist and the author tries to reference the original version, but in some cases the author will reference the translation. In all the cases where the French version appears in the bibliography, the translation is done by the author unless otherwise mentioned.

Naturally, the author will also be referencing both primary and secondary materials of other figures as well, which will be further mentioned in the bibliography list. Now, the difficult decision must be made whether a policy document or a governmental report should be considered to contain the author’s ideology. This is especially the case where several authors were involved or the author was reluctant to publish the document in the first place. Thus, in order to understand the philosophy of each figure and not the government, the author will reference those documents only if they are known to contain the basic ideas of each individual. This was especially the case of Laurendeau and his blue pages of the report of the B & B Commission\(^6\) or Laurin on his White Paper on language and cultural policies\(^7\).

**Definition**

Before we go on to describe what each chapter will contain, some terminologies need clarification. First, the most important concerning nationalism would be the distinction between *separatism*, *independence* and *sovereignty*. Many people seem to have their own definition with emotional feelings attached to each of them. While Lévesque admitted that the PQ intended to go for “political separation – but in a positive way” (1977/1991g, p.213), he nonetheless attached a negative nuance to the term *separatism* “which alludes to a brutal rupture” (1978/1979, p.72) and especially used in English “only

\(^6\) Among the six volumes which were published by the Commission, Laurendeau officially contributed only to the first book (1967), especially writing the general introduction also called the *blue pages* conventionally regarded as his political testament (Horton, 1992; Laforest, 1995b). He did not sign but contributed to preparing and writing Book II on education published in 1968 (Laforest, 1995b), before passing away suddenly in June 1968.

\(^7\) According to Picard, although it was written by one of Laurin’s teammate Fernand Dumont, Laurin examined each phrase and approved each affirmation. Thus, it contains Laurin’s every thought and philosophy of what he dreamed of a language policy (2003).
with the teeth clenched and to refuse any discussion” (1997, p.199). Concerning independence and sovereignty, Lévesque mentioned: “The difference is only in nuance. ‘Independence’ is more political. The term certainly covers the central part of our option, political sovereignty. In practice the two concepts meet. Having used the two words, my preference today is clearly for ‘sovereignty’” (1978/1979, p.73). Lévesque explained that the term sovereignty “does not create the illusion of non-dependence in a world .... nobody can deny that all countries now depend in a certain way on each other” (1969/1991a, p.110). Nevertheless, separatism seems to have been the widely used term until the 1960s, while sovereignty entered the political arena in the late 1960s with Lévesque’s manifesto on sovereignty-association. In this thesis, these terms will basically be employed to reflect this observation and the nuance that was outlined above by Lévesque.

Another word which needs clarification is the difference between a Bill (projet de loi) and a Law (loi). It seems clear that a Bill is the initial version of the Law which will be tabled, discussed, modified and enacted to become a Law. However, there is a tendency in English concerning Québec Laws to refer to them as Bills even after they are passed. Fraser mentioned that some francophone Quebeckers think that this “reflects a refusal to accept the fact that it is, in fact, the law, and not simply a bill, which is merely proposed legislation, not yet a law” especially concerning the Charter of the French Language, or Law 101, or still, Bill 101 (2006, p.138). Within this thesis, Bill will refer to the draft or tabled version and the Law to the actual enacted Law.

The term Quebeckers is used in the last paragraph which also needs mention. The French term Québécois is translated in English mostly either as Quebeckers or Quebecers. No distinction will be made between the two. Importantly, as we shall see, Québécois initially only referred to the former French Canadians but its definition widened to include anglophones and allophones through recent history. Who actually belong to the Québécois depended on each nationalist narrative, which will also be dealt within the thesis. In this thesis, Quebeckers or Quebecers does not only refer to francophones but also includes anglophones and/or allophones unless otherwise indicated, as in anglo-Quebecers or
francophone *Québécois*.

Concerning the political structure, Canada is a federal state led by the Prime Minister with each province headed by a Premier. While this distinction is clear in English, a Premier is also called a *premier ministre* in French, which creates confusion. In this thesis, the author will stick to the English usage unless it is a direct quote or designated in italics.

There is also the need to deal with the important definitions concerning minorities. First, *ethnic, cultural* or *ethnocultural* minorities refer to those who have neither French, English nor indigenous origins. Thus, they can be thought of as those who came to Québec relatively recently or their descendants. They do not have to be immigrants, who are limited to the first generation in the context of Canadian studies. Recent academic works prefer to use either cultural or ethnocultural as opposed to ethnic and the author will as well, unless it is a direct quote.

Second, the more complicated, is the terminology referring to indigenous peoples. In the Canadian context, *aboriginal* and *indigenous* had long been used as interchangeable terms, Canadian and Québec government policies preferring the former. However, recent usage is leaning towards the latter, due to the indigenous peoples’ own preference and also the international implication, including the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Joseph, 2016). Within the indigenous peoples, the Canadian federal government recognizes three groups with its Constitution, *First Nations, Inuit* and *Métis*. First Nations were formerly referred to as *Indians*, whose usage is still in the Constitution but obviously outdated. The Inuit were called *Eskimos* which is now perceived, as with Indian, as a highly discriminatory word. However, since these two terminologies still often appeared in the 1960s and 70s, the author has no choice but to include them but limited only to when it is a direct quote.

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8 The definition of the term Québécois has not been stable to which Fontaine (2010) contributed by illustrating how the government of Québec transformed the definitions of “we Quebecers” and “the other non-Quebecers” in the last several decades.

9 The Métis people are the descendants of both European and indigenous peoples, originating in the 1700s when French and Scottish fur traders married First Nations women, such as the Cree and Anishinabe (Ojibway). Their descendants formed a distinct culture, collective consciousness and nationhood especially in the Northwest (Canada, 2018).
Now, while the Canadian federal government recognizes three groups as indigenous peoples, the Québec government recognized eleven nations in the 1980s, recognition which is still in force. While both governments recognize the Inuit, the differences lie in that a) the Québec government does not recognize the Métis and b) the ten other nations would all have been grouped as First Nations in the federal context, but in the context of Québec, they are each seen as distinct nations. Thus, in the context of Québec, not only does the collective First Nations not exist, each nation is respected as its own nation, not mere groups.

Overview of Each Chapter

The first chapter deals with the theoretical framework of this thesis. The most important is the Theory of Survival which was proposed by Canadian author Margaret Atwood in 1972. It identified the four Basic Victim Positions (BVPs), supposing that Canada is (was) a collective victim (Atwood, 2012). As far as the author knows, this theory has never entered the academic sphere, let alone adapted in understanding Québec nationalism and Lévesque. However, this is a useful and innovative tool to better understand the historical transformation of Québec identity and how it leads to what is embraced in the current era of modern Québec. Both the diachronic and synchronic comparisons will be analysed with this theory.

The first chapter further contains the theory on modern Québec identity proposed by Maclure, exploring how Québec tries to go beyond the dichotomy of melancholy nationalism and anti-nationalism. It also deals briefly with interculturalism to suggest the lack of discussion on anglophone and indigenous minorities within the Québec context in recent years. The third and last section of the chapter introduces several frameworks concerning language policy in general, setting the basis that this thesis concerns status planning, introducing the principles of personality and territoriality and linguistic models of bilingualism, dualism, unilingualism and preferentialism to better understand the linguistic philosophy of each figure.

The second chapter will focus on the diachronic line of Québec identity and nationalism by
introducing the history of Québec. It will describe how Québec identity has transformed from *Canadiens, Canadiens français* to *Québécois*. In addition to mentioning the important historical events, the author will also pay attention to the language situation of the time, including legislation and minority languages. The author hopes to describe how language has become a significant factor for Québec identity and nationalism. It will be further analysed utilizing the BVPs introduced in the previous chapter.

The third chapter shifts the focus to the synchronic line and deals with different nationalisms of Laurendeau, Trudeau, Bourassa, Laurin and Lévesque. It also mentions Henri Bourassa and Lionel Groulx for their contributions for advancing nationalist narratives in Québec in the beginning of the 20th century. The purpose is to demonstrate that nationalist narratives contain certain similarities and differences to one another, not limited to independence versus anti-independence.

The fourth chapter deals with how each figure saw language in relation to their nationalisms discussed in chapter three. It is important to follow their conceptions on both French and English, since as much as French was both the reason and vehicle of Québec nationalism, how they perceived English reflects their degree of hostility and their inner motivation for nationalism.

Chapter five observes how each figure perceived cultural groups and minorities. Several policies are related to this subject including immigration, multiculturalism and cultural development in addition to language. They will be analysed less from the policy perspective but rather from the motivational and philosophical aspects of each figure.

The last chapter concerns the indigenous population. Traditionally, though both federal and provincial governments had reluctant views on them, mostly ignoring their existence or trying to assimilate them, the 1960s through the 1980s were a crucial turning point. Before the rise of the now popular phrase *nation-to-nation* relationship, it is interesting to find out how the sovereigntists who claimed their own nationalism perceived indigenous nations. This will be explored in this chapter.
Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework

The first chapter introduces our theoretical framework that will be useful in further discussion. First, it introduces the Theory of Survival to understand historical nationalist tendencies in Québec. Importantly, it presents the four Basic Victim Positions (BVPs) as models to recognize both a) historical nationalisms and b) different nationalists in a given time frame in subsequent chapters. Section two deals with what Position Four of the BVP means for Québec. Through the work of Maclure, the discussion pursues the possibility of Québec going beyond the dichotomy of anti- and melancholy nationalisms, clarifying what a pluralistic distinct society is. The last section concerns some of the technical frameworks on language, namely status planning, principles of personality and territoriality and linguistic models.

1.1. Québec and the Theory of Survival

Québec nationalism is often spoken of in accordance with the concept of survival. Bouchard mentioned that “until recent years, the history of French Canadians has ordinarily been told with a militant mode in the spirit of survival” (2000, p.61). Atwood (2012) agreed that survival had long been an overt subject in Québec politics, specifically expressed in the latter half of the 20th century as concern about the survival of the French language. It was the will and effort to survive as a nation that was at the core of this collective political movement. The belief was that should nothing be done, there was danger of not surviving. In this section, the author will explore the notion of survival in Québec, how its history can be understood through Atwood’s theory on survival and the BVPs.

1.1.1. Survival: The Terminology

Survival. The term sounds very desperate. Oxford dictionary gives us two meanings: 1) the state of continuing to live or exist, often despite difficulty or danger; 2) - (from sth) something that has continued to exist from an earlier time (2010). So it is not just preservation. The fact that Québec experienced difficulty under severe circumstances seems to make the word survival sound unusual and critical. After all, the verb survive consists of sur and vivre, a matter of life and death. At the same time,
though, it also gives us a hopeful impression with *sur*, that it could go above and beyond mere *living* and that it somehow could achieve something better than before. It has a dramatic implication which has attracted many theorists and nationalists, especially in Québec.

One of the reasons that this word survival was specifically used in Québec derived from the fact that Québec was seen as a nation in sickness, especially in the mid-20th century. *Cité libre*, an intellectual political journal of Québec published through the 1950s until 1966, whose mission was to provoke debate on the many problems and challenges facing Québec, was known to fall into an established rhetorical pattern concerning the poor health of the nation (Robert, 2011). Although its influence is often exaggerated (Balthazar, 1986), for a political journal with a circulation of fewer than 1,500 copies aimed at an intellectual elite audience, *Cité libre*’s mainstream impact was nonetheless considerable. Its editors and contributors carried its messages on television and radios, as well as daily papers in Québec, and thereby extended its reach and carried out new consciousness (Balthazar, 1986; Robert, 2011). Analysing articles in *Cité libre*, Robert pointed out that scarcely an issue was published without some reference to a social or political problem described in clinical terms and that this approach to medicalized political discourse implies that Québec was, at the least, suffering and, at the worst, fatally threatened by its various illnesses and diseases (2011).

This kind of conclusion put the journal in line with other discourse genres in Québec, such as history or literature that used medical tropes to give the impression that Québec was a pathological society, which indicated that the use of these metaphors as sign of an ailing Québec had a considerable precedent (Robert, 2011). Atwood also mentioned that Québec writers had also been addicted to Survivalism, in fact even more extreme in their attitude and its corollaries, compared to those in English Canada (2012).

However, the key here is that sickness is curable and survival is indeed possible. Robert further pointed out that troubling diagnoses were almost always framed as steps to a cure, not an end in and of themselves and the diagnosticians reserved the possibility for a cure that they, presumably, can supply if only given the power to do so (Robert, 2011). Therefore, the twofold nature of *Cité libre*’s
participation in Québec’s debates about nationhood was clearly represented in its use of medical discourse, which paradoxically posited the nation as being just as sick as it had ever been, but also in the process of recovery (Robert, 2011). This metaphor of sickness and the possibility of recovery is at the root of survival in Québec; it entails not only passivity but also subjectivity with a hopeful nuance for change.

1.1.2. Survival as a National Identity

One of the most distinguished and celebrated Canadian fiction authors, one who has won major prizes and international renown, Margaret Atwood published a book in 1972 called *Survival – A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature*, which was reprinted several times in recent years (2012). At the time of its writing, Atwood believed that Canada was in search for its national identity and the book sought to identify what Canadian characteristics were and find patterns that run through Canadian writings. Her book was welcomed by the public with mixed enthusiasm, reaching the best seller list at a time when Canadian literature itself was thought to be non-existent (Atwood, 2012).

According to Atwood, “every country or culture has a single unifying and informing symbol at its core”, functioning “like a system of beliefs … which holds the country together and helps the people in it to co-operate for common ends” (2012, p.25) which can be interpreted as national identity. For instance, the symbol for America is “The Frontier”, suggesting “a place that is new, where the old order can be discarded” (p.25), and holding “out a hope, never fulfilled but always promised”, that there indeed is a “perfect human society” (p.26). For England, it is “The Island”, “island-as-body, self-contained, a Body Politic, evolving organically with a hierarchical structure” (p.26).

Exploring many books written by Canadian authors, both English and French, she concluded that the principal symbol for Canada as a whole is “undoubtedly Survival, *La Survivance*”, the main idea of which is “hanging on, staying alive” (p.27). It is a multidimensional and flexible idea like The Frontier or The Island, meaning plain survival in the face of hostile elements and peoples or survival of a crisis or a disaster for early European explorers and settlers. For English Canada, it is rather a cultural survival
among large countries like Great Britain and especially the United States in modern age. Similarly for
French Canada, which is the main concern of this thesis, after the English took over it became cultural
survival as well, “hanging on as a people, retaining a religion and a language under an alien government”
(p.27) as we will see in the next chapter.

1.1.3. The Basic Victim Positions

Atwood supposed Canada as a colony to which the colonized are the collective victims. By colony,
she meant where “it is a place from which a profit is made, but not by the people who live there: the
major profit from a colony is made in the centre of the empire” (p.30). In this sense, Québec, or French
Canada, can also be seen as collective victims as a colony within Canada as an internal colony in which
Hechter stated that there exist hierarchical and segmental cultural divisions of labour (2017). Atwood
further stated that some attention should be paid to the Basic Victim Positions (BVPs) which are
adaptable to countries, minority groups and individuals (2012). The BVPs are thus four interrelated
positions which illustrate the types of victims and clarify their respective characteristics.

The first position is “to deny the fact that you are a victim”. This position is typically taken by
those who are in a situation little better than the others within that victim group. Since they are afraid
of losing their privileges, they refuse to recognize that they are victims pretending that certain obvious
facts do not exist. They even disparage the rest of the people in the group to explain their disadvantage.
If anger is felt, it is likely to be directed against those in the same victim group, especially those who
recognize their victimization. It is in this position where people do not realize that they are second-class
citizens but they actually are (Atwood, 2012, p.32).

The second position is “to acknowledge the fact that you are a victim, but to explain this as an
act of Fate, the Will of God, the dictates of Biology, the necessity decreed by History, or Economics, or
the Unconscious, or any other large general powerful idea.” Since it is not your own fault but the fault
of this unchangeable thing, one can neither be accused of the position nor be expected to take action. In
this position, the real source of oppression is not identified and because of the perceived cause being
vast, vague and uncontrollable, the victim perpetually overlooks altering their situation or even analysing how much could it be altered. If felt, anger is directed against both fellow-victims and oneself (Atwood, 2012, pp.32-33).

The third position is “to acknowledge the fact that you are a victim but to refuse to accept the assumption that the role is inevitable.” In this position, one can reject the role of victim and identify the objective cause for victimization and probably decide how much of the situation could be altered if you made the effort. Notably, this is not a static but a dynamic and crucial position, offering a possibility to either move on to the fourth position or to return to the second position “if you become locked into your anger and fail to change the situation.” Anger should rather be directed towards the real cause of oppression, the energy of that anger ideally conducted to constructive action to change the situation (Atwood, 2012, pp.33-34).

The fourth and last position is “to be a creative non-victim”. This is a position for non-victims or ex-victims who have moved on from Position Three due to the removal of external and/or the internal causes that were making them a victim. In this forth position, energy is directed towards all kinds of creative activity; no longer is it suppressed (Position One), spent for shifting of the cause or for being stuck to the role of the victim (Position Two), nor is it used for vibrant anger (Position Three). It is possible to accept one’s own experience as is, and rejecting the role of victim becomes unnecessary since the role is no longer a temptation. So, this position is for those who have survived, the survivors replacing victimhood with creativity and positive energy. New ideas and opportunities are created from within, gaining confidence and pride as a survivor (Atwood, 2012, p.34).

Laurendeau had made an interesting observation in 1962 concerning the attitudes of francophone citizens, especially in Montréal, which more or less reflects these positions described by Atwood:

One is to forget the problem, as much as you can, and live a day-to-day life. Another is to consider the French language and culture to be a real handicap in North America, and to decide that you will cut these roots within yourself and more radically in your children by sending them to English schools. Or you may decide to compromise and be content to survive as a small and rather poor minority. The
fourth attitude will be to consider French culture and language as an asset, and try to gain, for your group, better political, economical and social conditions of life – life, not survival (1962/1976h, p.228).

The first two attitudes seem to correspond to Position One of the BVP. They both try to forget that they are victims but they can do so because they are in a better situation than the others. Being content with survival exactly corresponds to Position Two, giving up with your life and accepting the minority position. The forth attitude is Position Three of the BVP, taking control and trying to do something about it. This was the Quiet Revolution for Québec, which will be explained in detail in the next chapter. Before that, however, the author will briefly explain in the next section what Position Four of the BVP means for Québec, referencing Maclure and his work on Québec Identity (2003). The author argues that modern Québec identity is (in search for) precisely what this fourth position represents. It tries to accept their history as nationalists but also tries to embrace pluralism and to form a creative society, which is condensed in the term *pluralistic distinct society* (Laforest, 1995a; Maclure, 2003, p.70).

## 1.2 Theory of Modern Québec Identity

### 1.2.1. Pluralistic Distinct Society: Beyond the Dichotomy

As has already been mentioned, Maclure described rather regrettably that there exists in Québec two dominant representations of identity, namely “the melancholy nationalist discourse, at times sorrowful and resigned, often vehement and seditious; and the anti-nationalist discourse, rationalist and cosmopolitan” (2003, p.11). These two discourses have tirelessly “gone head to head, ultimately coming to consider each other as both mutually limiting and exhaustive of Quebec political space” (p.12), creating the illusion that Québec identity representations are limited to either one or the other. “The Quebec social imaginary” is thus limited to two alternatives of identity representations (Maclure, 2003, p.119).

While melancholy nationalists see separatism as the necessary way to normality and maturity, cosmopolitan anti-nationalists abhor nationalism, seeing it as irrational and basically racist (Maclure, 2003). Thus, they both have attached a strict meaning to nationalism: For the former, nationalism means
independence; for the latter, nationalism simply cannot be accepted. In this sense, the former seems to be in Position Two of the BVP, while the latter is stuck in Position One. For the melancholy nationalists, the reason for their miserable and immature condition is because they are not politically independent. They had the chance to overcome their grievances twice with referendum, which could have been seen as Position Three, but independence was not achieved and thus they remain stuck in their second position. Their grievances are also explained generally by history, especially that of the British Conquest, of which French Canadians are always reminded. Their anger is directed towards those fellow victims who prevented them to become independent, which further enforces their misery. For the anti-nationalists, denying their victim position from the very beginning, they completely rejected the whole nationalist narrative. They denounce those that speak of nationalism, because they do not want to see themselves as victims and perhaps believe they are better off than those who do acknowledge their victim position. These two narratives are, however, not how the Québécois people in general feel. There is a more ambiguous version of nationalism which does not fall into these two extremes. Thus, there seems to exist a wide gap between the reality and theory of Québec identity narrative and Maclure tried to overcome this dichotomy.

Referencing Guy Laforest and Jocelyn Létourneau in addition to the forerunner André Laurendeau as examples who have cultivated a new and dynamic understandings of the Québécois identity, Maclure pointed out first and foremost that Québec nationalism cannot be totally denied. He acknowledged that “the nation remains vital for many as an intersubjective sphere, an agora, and an identity horizon” but at the same time, “being nationalists in the (very) broad, non-standard sense of the term … does not imply that this allegiance supplants all others, that the universal is perpetually sacrificed on the altar of the particular” (2003, p.135). Thus, he regarded the nation to be a fundamental identity referent (2003), refusing to yield to anti-nationalism.

But how do they go beyond melancholy orthodoxy? First, according to Maclure, both Laforest and Létourneau do not see maturity, an often used term among Québec nationalists, as something only to be achieved by independence. In this way, they refuse to see independence as the historical and
theoretical necessity and thus cut off ties with one of the melancholy nationalist dogmas. Similarly, because they do not associate political normality or modernity exclusively with independence, they do not see the ambivalence of being as a neurotic condition. Rather, they see ambivalence as functions of caution and intelligence which accepts dual affiliation of a primary identification with Québec and a profound attachment to Canada (2003).

Laforest and Létourneau further condemn melancholy nationalists’ tragic relation to the past. According to Laforest, the sovereignty project of Québec should only be justified on a breach of trust and an abuse of power, not on historical grievances (Maclure, 2003). Laforest challenged those orthodoxies, those who maintain that Québec never recovered from the trauma of French abandonment and the British Conquest, to overcome the melancholy narrative. This does not, however, mean to forget or give up one’s past. Rather, it encourages them to give up the role of the victim and to accept the realistic result of historical coexistence with the significant other, in places such as institutions and languages, which further means to accept Québec’s hybridity (Laforest, 1995a; Maclure, 2003).

Importantly, this new national identity tries to reconcile its past relations with minorities in Québec. Laforest especially considered it crucial to build a relationship of trust between the majority and the minority, particularly with anglophones and the indigenous (Laforest, 1995a). Here, Québec is being theorized as a nation respectful of the minority nations within, who contribute to the perpetual recreation of its distinctness in North America (Maclure, 2003). Bickerton (2011) agreed by observing of Québec nationalist thinkers and political party actors that they “have become more sensitive to and accommodative of the differential status and nationhood claims of Quebec’s indigenous peoples” since the 1990s, “opening towards a … plurinational concept of Québec” (p.159).

Moreover, this new Québec identity seeks the possibility of a plurality of allegiances (Maclure, 2003). In fact, as Maclure correctly pointed out, in an age of movement and diversity, plurality and hybridity of identity have come to be recognized as a general phenomenon, of which national identity can be an integral part but not necessarily predominant. Therefore, all identity or recognition politics grounded on assertions of homogeneity or cultural purity must be denounced (2003).
Similarly, cultural identity presents itself as a dynamic and evolving process (Maclure, 2003). As Taylor maintained that the “crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogical character” (Taylor, 1994, p.32), contemporary subjects maintain and flourish personal identity by developing interactions (Maclure, 2003). Thus, identity is repeatedly revised and sought after in the course of living. This was also true for Québec in the course of its history with evolving nationalism which was never stable, described intensely in the next chapter. It is a constant struggle, not at all static.

Therefore, while embracing Québec nationalism, which is itself unsolidified, Québec nonetheless contains plurality of national identities, including the indigenous, anglophone and even Canada. This is where Québec is or has been trying to reach, in the course of its struggle as a minority nation. It corresponds to Position Four of the BVP, where victimhood is removed and energy is directed towards creative activity. Although independence was not achieved, Québec was able to, or at least is trying to, survive with its strong nationalism on the one hand and the recognition of its plurality of nations on the other, all the while existing within Canada.

1.2.2. Beyond Interculturalism

The author must admit that she has referenced a somewhat old book – published in 2003 –, in the last section. This is because since the mid-2000s, the discussion of pluralism in Québec political and academic milieu has been largely taken over by the theory of interculturalism, which is an immigrant integration mechanism in Québec vis-à-vis federal multiculturalism. This is understandable, especially due to the rising immigrant population from non-European backgrounds with non-white population and various religions. In fact, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission whose report was published in 2008 was established to investigate cultural and religious conflict within Québec and brought attention to the concept of interculturalism.

However, basing the discussion on the last section, the theory of interculturalism is insufficient to grasp modern Québec as a whole on two bases. First, it only deals with ethnocultural diversity brought by recent immigration, thus ignores the whole issue on indigenous questions and anglophones.
Bouchard, a leading scholar on interculturalism, explained that the relationship between minorities and the cultural majority is at the basis of interculturalism. This latter can be also called the *founding culture* which Bouchard identified the following criteria:

- the symbolic heritage of a population that has occupied a space for a long time (several centuries or even several millennia); that has formed a territory or habitat (…) in which it recognizes itself; that has forged an identity and a collective imaginary expressed through language, traditions, ideals, and institutions; that has developed solidarity and a sense of belonging; and that shares a sense of continuity based in memory. (2015, pp.19-20)

In this sense, Bouchard pointed out that indigenous communities and the anglophone population of Québec can also possess the status of founding cultures and therefore cannot be considered to be a mere minority (2015).

Further, these two founding cultures do not have the same status either. According to Bouchard (2015), the English community can be qualified as national because of its long history, because of the rights that are recognized for it under the British North American Act of 1867 (reaffirmed in the Canadian Constitution of 1982), and because it is an extension in Quebec of a neighbouring majority nation. Accordingly, the Quebec anglophone minority enjoys rights that are not recognized for other minorities including school boards, separate education and health care systems, elements of bilingualism in civic life. (p.38)

This is supported also at the government level, where the Québec National Assembly officially recognized “a Québec English-speaking community that enjoys long-established rights” in 2000 (Québec, 2015, p.xi). Thus, for their distinct status and established rights different from cultural minorities, the anglophone community does not fall under the government interculturalism policy. Instead, for example, their linguistic rights are expressly protected under the Charter of the French Language, recognized clearly to be a different entity.

Similarly, indigenous peoples are also not included in the interculturalism policy, due to their nation-to-nation relationship with the Québec government and their refusal of being treated as a cultural
minority (Bouchard, 2015). As stated by the Government of Québec, their “specific history and identity and the recognition of Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal diversity issues differ from those related to ethnocultural diversity resulting from immigration” (2015, p.x). Their language rights are also enshrined in the Charter of the French Language, as will be further dealt with in the following chapters.

Thus, although Bouchard is rather ambivalent regarding the English-community where he sometimes includes anglo-Quebecers in ethnocultural minorities of Québec (2015), the two groups have distinctive status within the Québec society outside the scope of interculturalism. This treatment is actually in line with Kymlicka’s conception of the three silos within Canada where he stated that these silos exist vertically, disconnected from one another legally and administratively (2007). As with the case of interculturalism, he acknowledged that multiculturalism only concerns the relationship of the federal government with the cultural groups, where other silos have different frameworks such as the Indian Act in the case of First Nations and the Official Languages Act for the French Canadians (Kymlicka, 2007).

The second reason that interculturalism is not suited as the framework of this thesis or modern Québec identity is because at least some authors deny the nationalist narrative in interculturalism. Bouchard is actually the one who most denies any nationalist claim, implicit or otherwise, within the promotion of interculturalism (2016). However, other scholars indicated that Québec interculturalism “makes a moral and policy case for the recognition of relatively distinct substate nationalisms” (Meer, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, 2016, p.14) or that it is “unique in that it is embedded in a larger project for national affirmation” (Gagnon & Iacovino, 2016, p.129). Modood made an excellent point in mentioning that Bouchard’s conception of interculturalism is “not defined in terms of its aptness in contexts of minority nationhood” but rather “about integration in relation to a national state” (2016, pp.248-249). As nations or nation-states are the appropriate vehicle in the modern world to realize a liberal political order (Levey, 2016), Bouchard mentioned that “inscribing interculturalism within the nation-state is dictated by practical constraints” (2016, p.88). Thus, for Bouchard, Québec is already a nation-state to which nationalist claims are unnecessary and can be taken for granted.
Maclure seemed to regard Bouchard as one of the melancholy nationalists who denied dual allegiance and “chose to ignore the fact that a large majority of Quebecers identify strongly with Canada” (2003, p.83). Maclure continued:

In addition to asking francophones to sacrifice one of their communities of belonging, the solution proposed by Bouchard can hardly meet the legitimate expectations of Quebec anglophones or the First Nations. He cordially invites the latter to take part in building the Quebec society of tomorrow and in rewriting its historical memory, but he implies that they must resign themselves to giving up their primary national identification. In rejecting the “plurinational” conception, Bouchard offers Quebec’s national minorities an a priori unacceptable pact. (2003, p.83)

By acting as an independent state and rejecting dual identity, Bouchard is in line with the melancholy narrative which cannot be considered as going beyond the traditional dichotomy. Also considering that interculturalism does not include anglophones and the indigenous, is it not a comprehensive framework which can be applied to seeing the whole of Québec society.

1.3 Theoretical Framework on Language

1.3.1. Language Policy

This thesis concerns the field of language policy within which Spolsky (2009) identified three interconnected but individually describable elements: practice, beliefs and management. This thesis especially concerns the beliefs, which can also be called ideology (Spolsky, 2009), that are behind the actual management. Language management was defined by Spolsky as “the explicit and observable effort by someone or some group that has or claims authority over the participants in the domain to modify their practices or beliefs” (2009, p.4), the most obvious form of such control would be a law. As sub-categories, it further has three areas: status planning, corpus planning and acquisition planning. Among these perspectives, this thesis looks at each character’s beliefs on language in relation to nationalism from the status planning perspective, a process whereby elites identify a language as its official language to be employed in all the formal functions of its business (Wright, 2012). Corpus
planning, on the other hand, is an effort to change some aspects of a language such as the writing system, orthography or lexicon (Spolsky, 2009). Although both status and corpus planning have been argued to share the motivation or beliefs behind them (Fishman, 2006), this thesis does not deal with the latter, focusing on the status aspect of management.

Just as nationalism has long been seen from the perspective of the nation-state, Spolsky (2009) argued that studies concerning language policy or language planning/management have normally talked about the activities of the nation-state. However, he continued that various levels of governments each possess an obvious authority to rightfully exercise power, which is often “an attractive solution to problems of language status in a multilingual nation-state” (pp.144-145). This was the case of Québec, especially from the 1960s, where the provincial government exercised its power to manage the linguistic situation of the province. Importantly, however, Spolsky pointed out that Québec was a classic case where the linguistic problems followed rather than led the political issues, in which language played a mobilizing force rather than being a cause (2009). In this sense, there was clear political ideologies behind each efforts of language management in Québec which were never monolithic and need to be examined thoroughly.

1.3.2. Principles of Personality and Territoriality and Linguistic Models

According to Spolsky, when language is managed of its status, its functional allocation needs to be taken into account. That is to say that authorities need to decide on (a) national or official language(s) and in which functions the language will assume its duty. Normally, there are four functions that need consideration: a) internal use by the government for meetings of elected bodies and for civil servants in their bureaucratic activities; b) use by civil servants in their relations with citizens and others (including prescriptions for civil servant language use in international relations); c) prescribed use by government and non-government agencies and institutions, such as schools, news and entertainment media, business; and d) prescribed use by citizens in other cases (including for example Franco’s efforts to suppress Basque and Catalan) (2009, p.146).
Another category that needs to be considered is whether the language policy will be based on a personality or territorial principle of planning. The principle of personality gives all the languages official status for the whole territory within which individuals have the right to choose their preferred language in public life or dealing with the civil service, wherever they are (Costa, 2003). The territorial principle, on the other hand, gives only one language official status in a given territory, beyond which citizens must give up their linguistic rights even if the state gives official status to all languages (Costa, 2003). Whereas the personality principle favors geographically dispersed linguistic groups and attaches uniform rights and enables movement across a state, the territorial principle gives language groups the security by dominance in a certain region (McRoberts, 1997). Thus, the disadvantage regarding the survival of language will be that for the personality principle, *laissez-faire* and freedom of language selection works to the advantage of the language of dominant groups (Laponce, 1984/1987), while in the territorial principle a language group trades minority rights in one region for majority rights in another (McRoberts, 1997; Costa, 2003).

These two principles are rarely found in their pure forms (Riera, 2016), where Canadian and Québec language policies both adopt mixed forms of these principles. In Canada, language planning is based on the personality principle on the federal level, where both official languages have guaranteed rights throughout the state under the Canadian Constitution (McRae, 1998). However, considering the four functions presented by Spolsky, Canadian bilingualism of the two official languages is limited in its official roles. Although bilingualism is assumed in functions a) and b), it is not the case with c) except for Crown corporations and schools, and definitely not the case for d) where individual bilingualism is not pursued. Rather, the aim of the federal language law was to free Canadian citizens from the burden of becoming bilingual (Morris, 2010). Thus, the Canadian model of language policy is further translated into *institutional bilingualism*, where linguistic obligation is strictly limited for federal departments and agencies to serve the public in both languages (Morris, 2010; Gagnon, 2014).

At the same time, each province has linguistic policies which are accommodated, as long as they respect the official language minorities within the territory. Therefore, language planning in Québec is
based on the territorial principle (Coulombe, 2001), where French is dominant within the province. As Spolsky observed, “the territorial principle emerged as a potential solution to the problem produced by the multilingualism of most nation-states” (2009, p.173). It is an approach frequently assumed by governments in response to minority pressures for autonomy by giving the regional government authority for a defined territory and letting them develop its language policy (Spolsky, 2009). However, considering that Québec also offers many public services in English respecting minority rights, it cannot be considered to have implemented this principle in its strictest form (Carens, 2000; Gagnon, 2014). In this sense, although Québec language policy is sometimes seen to follow unilingualism, the author would like to specifically point out that it is not the case. As we will see, Law 101 might have had many aspects of unilingualism on functions a), b) and c) when it was first enacted but it has gone through dramatic modification over the years. It still declares that French alone is the official language and function a) to be in French but English is now also legally recognized in many aspects of functions b) and c). This approach of promoting French as the main language of the province while also frequently using and protecting English has been called functional bilingualism (Morris, 2010). French predominance is also frequently used but this only reflects the state of the language. In order to designate the belief behind it, the author personally would call this approach preferentialism, where many Québec nationalists preferred the dominance of French over English but also accommodated English having its own status.

Another important distinction that tends to be overlooked but needs to be pointed out is the difference between bilingualism and dualism. These two models are logical results considering two languages in the realm of the principles of personality and territoriality. When two languages exist based on the personality principle, this would inevitably result in bilingualism as we have seen above. But if they are based on the territorial principle, each territory will favour one language and thus become unilingual, and the result will be two segregated, unilingual territories. Seeing from this perspective, the result will be dualism, where two languages are territorially segregated. Some call this territorial bilingualism (Kymlicka, 2001, p.79) but dualism seems appropriate considering the dual nature of
nations from the Québec perspective. This is the case when Canada is considered not in federal terms but in provincial terms, where provinces, except for New Brunswick\textsuperscript{10}, almost exclusively use one language as the (de facto) official language. Of course, as was the case with Québec, they might employ preferentialism as opposed to mere unilingualism, especially in Ontario where francophone residents are still numerous compared to other provinces. Still, only in Québec is French the majority first official language spoken, as shown in Table 1, thus inevitably resulting in language segregation.

Although previous literatures mostly ignore Canadian dualism from the language policy perspective, generally contrasting the bilingual Canada and unilingual Québec, each based on either principle, this perspective has the important political and ideological implication of accommodating Québec within Canada. As we shall see, Québec nationalists have mostly claimed the dualistic nature of Canada, not the exclusivity of Québec. Furthermore, many moderate nationalists were in favour of French preferentialism, not of unilingualism for Québec itself. This new insight will hopefully help us better understand the nature of various attempts for language policy and the Québec nationalisms behind these initiatives.

\textsuperscript{10} With the New Brunswick Official Languages Act of 1969, the province became the sole officially bilingual province in Canada (Morris, 2010). This was further enshrined in the Canadian Constitution of 1982.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces and territories</th>
<th>French FOLS population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
<td>2,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>4,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>29,370</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>234,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>6,890,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>550,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>40,975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>14,435</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>79,840</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>64,325</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>1,635</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td>1,240</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nunavut</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada outside Québec</td>
<td>1,024,195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Population with French as their First Official Language Spoken (FOLS), provinces, territories, and Canada outside Québec, 2016

Note. Adapted from Statistics Canada, 2017, p.5. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product.
Chapter 2 History of Québec Nationalism and Identity

Identity and nationalism are not stable. As Maclure mentioned, they should not be regarded as a static monument but rather as a fluid narrative project. Since human beings are social animals who exist within complicated “webs of intersubjective relations”, identities are constantly interpreted in many different ways depending on the circumstances (2003, p.9). In this sense, it should not be surprising that Québec identity and nationalism have undergone dramatic transformations in the course of their history, moving on from the time of Canadien, Canadien français to Québécois (Balthazar, 1986). In fact, each generation in what was to become Québec has reintroduced this narrative of the nationalist debate as a (minority) nation, expressing their fears and resistance but stubbornly refusing to be assimilated to the English-speaking majority of North America (Fraser, 2001). Of course, since nationalism and therefore identity are modern inventions, we cannot clearly state that Québec had always possessed its own identity. In truth, nationalism did not appear in Québec before the first years of the 19th century (Balthazar, 1986). However, nationalism did not become a movement out of the blue. As Gellner stated, “nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically” (2006, p.54). Its foundations and elements were certainly set before the actual rise of nationalism, which can be found already in the 17th century (Balthazar, 1986).

This second chapter will focus on the diachronic line of Québec identity and nationalism, which will set the foundation for the succeeding discussion. The author goes through the history of Québec and describes how Québec identity has transformed. In addition to mentioning the important historical events, the author will also pay attention to the language situation of the time, including legislation and minority languages. The importance of language for Québec’s modern nationalism and identity will be made evident. This will be followed by a small observation using the Basic Victim Positions (BVPs) introduced in the last chapter.
2.1. Canadiens

2.1.1. During the French Regime (-1763)

In the late 15th century, Europeans commenced exploration of the oceans in search for the sea route to the wealth of China and India. As history proves, however, what they actually found was not in fact the Orient, but the New World, already inhabited by an indigenous population. A French explorer, Jacques Cartier, was one such explorer who found unexpected shores. He proposed to Francois I that he lead an expedition in search of the passage to Asia, which turned out to be three important voyages to the New World, respectively in 1534, 1535-36, and 1541-42. In 1534 he landed on the Gaspé Peninsula of today’s Québec claiming the French possession of the land, and during the second expedition he encountered two Iroquois villages, Stadacona, which were to become Québec city11, and Hochelaga, future Montréal, along the St. Lawrence River. Although it was a disappointment for the King not to have found the riches of the Far East and that settlement was not yet possible mainly because of the harsh weather, this was clearly the beginning of the French Fact in what was to become Québec (Bothwell, 2006).

Wars between Catholics and Protestants finally came to an end within France in 1589 with Henri IV converting to Catholicism to be accepted on the throne. The end of the conflict and Henri IV’s tolerant policies towards Protestants allowed French attention to turn to the New World. Samuel de Champlain, a mapmaker and navigator, sailed for the St. Lawrence in April 1608 with the solemn purpose to establish a permanent French settlement in northern North America. He arrived at the narrows of the river and constructed Québec city, building a fortified fur trading post, a habitation, and planting wheat and rye for he had assumed that the land was suitable for agriculture. Champlain died in 1635 without seeing his colony truly flourish, but his careful choice of what is now Québec city as the base and capital of New France is said to have served the colony well for the next century, affording a

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11 The capital of Québec will be further referred to as Québec city in order to avoid complication between the name of the province.
defensible fortress, a healthy if rugged climate and isolation from the English colonies to the south (Bothwell, 2006).

Although Protestantism was tolerated in France until 1685, the settlers in New France were required to be Catholics and the only clergies permitted in the colony after 1608 were Catholics. Therefore, the 3,000 settlers by 1663 were all Catholics: small, compared to other colonies in North America12, but stable, later flourishing as a firm Catholic colony. In addition, Louis XIV, grandson of the former converted King, believed in “one king, one law and one faith” and rescinded the protection of the Protestants, leading hundreds of thousands of Huguenots into exile in Protestant friendly countries, outnumbering the thin stream of faithful Catholics settling in the king’s overseas colonies, notably New France. Accordingly, over the 150 years of New France’s existence, no more than 10,000 immigrants arrived at the colony, almost all of them being French, directly from France, and Catholic (Bothwell, 2006; Kelly & Trebilcock, 2010). The population grew rapidly, however, as a result of a very high birth rate, reaching 70,000 by 1760 (Kelly & Trebilcock, 2010).

Language unity within the colony was more or less maintained as well. In 1539, François I had enacted the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts in France to make French the official language within its kingdom replacing Latin (Mackey, 2010). Martel and Pâquet stated that from then on, French gradually expanded its functions in France and was distributed throughout the kingdom, especially in the north of France from which 90 per cent of the colonists to New France arrived. Even if many still spoke a patois upon their arrival, factors such as territorial concentration, the proximity of colonial administration, interprovincial marriage and the important roles of mothers in children’s education, all contributed to the rapid decrease of regional languages to benefit the French language (2010).

Flourishing with fur trade at the beginning and agriculture after, the settler population increased and the small society of New France was distinct from very early on (Balthazar, 1986). In fact, New

12 There were already 50,000 English settlers in New England, 30,000 in Virginia, and 10,000 Dutch in New Netherland (Bothwell, 2006).
France was known as another name, *Canada*\(^{13}\), which grew to include all French land in what is now the American Midwest and as far south as Louisiana in the early 1700s (Government of Canada [Canada], 2016; Figure 2). Accordingly, they started to define themselves as *Canadiens* in order to differentiate themselves from their cousins in their home country, which was a colonial solidarity if not a national one (Balthazar, 1986). As McRoberts observed, *canadien* identity emerged quite spontaneously, gradually merging the various French regional identities brought by the colonists. This process was greatly fostered by isolation from metropolitan France and further accelerated by struggles for power and status between the *habitants* and Frenchmen who monopolized the positions of authority (1997). It was also forged by a different environmental conception of space and way of life, which was closer to that of the indigenous and nature, with a mentality of more independence than submission, more egalitarian than hierarchical (Mathieu, 2008). In other words, the *Canadiens* were not *Français* anymore (Balthazar, 1986).

However, according to McRoberts, it did not go as far as to produce a nationalist movement seeking autonomy from France. For one thing, they depended heavily on France’s economy and the absolutist character ruled the colony (1997). Nevertheless, their seigneurial regime was very different from that of France, with less tax being

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\(^{13}\) The name is said to come from the Huron-Iroquois word *kanata* which refers to village or settlement. Jacques Cartier started to use the word Canada as early as 1535, when two indigenous youths told him about the route to *kanata*, which they were actually referring to the village of Stadacona. Lacking another name, Canada was used to describe not only the village, but the entire area controlled by its chief, Donnacona. First official usage was in 1791 when the Province of Québec was divided into the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada (Canada, 2016).
charged and much less parasitic nobility and clergies (Balthazar, 1986). The social difference between
seigneurs and habitants was not wide as in France, the former being more like colonial land agents,
many coming more from the ranks of farmers than from French nobilities, and operating farms
themselves (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). Thus, the elements that caused the French Revolution were
almost non-existent in Canada. Hence, the *canadien* identity can be said to have come about in order to
distinguish themselves from France, remaining faithful to the sole religion, developing agriculture, but
identifying itself as a new generation.

As noted earlier, however, the people from France were not the first ones to arrive in this vast
territory. America was already inhabited by many indigenous tribes belonging to one of the three
linguistic families: Iroquois farmers of the banks of the St. Lawrence River; the Inuit of the arctic region;
or the Algonquin found everywhere else including the Cree, Naskapi, Montagnais, Algonquins,
Malecîte and Micmac (Delâge, 2008). Martel and Pâquet mentioned that this diversity and territorial
expansion were so immense that the French colonial authorities soon understood that it was almost
impossible to assimilate these people linguistically. Rather, francization was to be assumed culturally
through Catholicism, which itself did not see great success either. Still, the missionaries themselves
learned the indigenous languages and translated the missal, catechism and hymn books into these
languages (2010).

Indigenous peoples were crucial to the settlers from the beginning in terms of survival in this cold
and vast territory. They also comprised a critical part of the trading network, especially the Huron and
the Algonquins. However, wars were frequent among the indigenous peoples, especially between the
Huron and Algonquins on the one side and the Iroquois Confederacy on the other, which was one of the
reasons that immigration from France remained modest. Constant wars and epidemics brought by the
French devastated both sides, preventing them both from maintaining sizable populations and
dominance over their traditional territories. Thus, the Great Peace of Montreal of 1701 was concluded
between the French-indigenous alliance and the Iroquois, marking the end of their resistance towards
French expansion (Kelly & Trebilcock, 2010).
2.1.2. The Conquest (1763-1791)

From 1689 to 1815, for over 100 years, North America was constantly in the state of war, a reflection of the rivalries among the countries in Europe. The wars marked the rise of Great Britain and the decline of France’s ability to maintain its overseas colonies. In addition, they brought the unanticipated division of North America with the French settlers of Canada as part of the British Empire and almost all the British colonies no longer belonging to the Empire but claiming to be American (Bothwell, 2006).

As far as New France was concerned, the Seven Year’s War, or the French and Indian War considering their alliance, was the fatal conflict. Declared in May 1756, the war was fought in Europe mainly in Germany, between France, Austria, Spain and Russia on one side and Great Britain and Prussia on the other. In the New World, outnumbering and outgunning the French, the British landed on Louisbourg in 1758. The French surrendered immediately and marked the beginning of consistent British victories until the end of the war. The pivotal battle took place on the morning of September 13, 1759 on the Plains of Abraham in Québec city, remembered as a battle lasting only for 20 minutes ending in a decisive British victory. After Montréal surrendered in 1760, the war finally ended with the British sending the French troops back to France. With the Treaty of Paris in 1763, France lost all their colonies in North America except for two islands close to Newfoundland, sustaining the West Indies instead, and Great Britain gaining the entire continent east of the Mississippi (Bothwell, 2006).

The inhabitants of New France were treated mercifully, however, being able to choose whether or not to stay in the colony. Approximately 3,000 French men had already left New France during the war, but 70,000 stayed along the St. Lawrence, 99.7 per cent of them being francophones. It is not difficult to assume that the British were desperate to assimilate the population, wanting them to practice the Anglican religion and to speak their English language. In fact, with the Royal Proclamation in 1763, Canada became the Province of Québec, considerably limited in territory compared to before (Figure 3) and totally ruled by British law, Catholics being banned from holding government office (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). The only official language became English, and the only religion admitted was
Anglican. Since it was a province, not a colony, it would not have an assembly for the time being (Bothwell, 2006). In fact, it underlined that the government had the freedom only to adopt laws and statutes “as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England, and under such Regulations and Restrictions as are used in other Colonies” (Martel & Pâquet, 2010, p.37). The intentions were obvious: The Canadiens were to be assimilated or at least they would adapt to the law and values of the British Empire (Balthazar, 1986).

However, the rebellion and the War of Independence which was to break out in the southern colonies partly resulted in the Québec Act in 1774, which eventually served as protection of the Canadiens, by tolerating the Catholic religion and the French Civil Law. It assured the solid fidelity of nobles canadiens and the catholic clergies during the war in the following years (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). Thus, the British, who were afraid that their French subjects would ally with the Independence movement in the south, guaranteed religious and legal rights for the Canadiens instead, to maintain control over the province. As Balthazar (1986) stated, it was the Catholics of the former New France who actually sustained the British Empire in North America – the irony of history. For the Canadiens, their survival in British North America owed very much to this historical occurrence. It should be noted that although the Québec Act did not touch the issues of language directly, Mackey insisted that it was a fundamental document to understand the subsequent developments of language policy in Québec. Especially, it implied an ethnogenic treaty of the pact between peoples, accepting that French Canadians and their descendants were a distinct people due to their origins, religion and land (2010).
Thus, although the political and economic links between old and new France were broken, the cultural break was not clear where law and religion remained distinctly French (Bothwell, 2006). Consequently, the clergies became the sole authority for the Canadiens with the Conquest, their influence and control increasing drastically. During the French regime, the people of North America had been habituated to following the directions and management of two different authorities, one civil, represented by the Governor of the colony and one religious, namely the Bishop of Québec (Quinn, 1979). With the Conquest replacing the French colonial administration with English, upon which the population could not have been expected to look as a legitimate civil authority, it was natural that the Canadiens turned to the Church as the single organization that can provide them with effective guidance and leadership (Quinn, 1979). Thus, the Conquest can be said to have consolidated the power of the Catholic Church over the Canadiens.

The southern Revolution contributed to another important factor for the Canadiens, namely the arrival of the Loyalists. Loyalists were those who were in the southern British colonies but refused to join the American Revolution due to their economic interests, situations regarding the British government or other connections (Balthazar, 1986). More of them came from the middle colonies, New York and Pennsylvania, than from New England, no matter the class and across virtually all segments of society. But Anglicans and royal officials, especially in the northern colonies, were more likely to support the crown, as were religious and ethnic minorities and recent immigrants from the British Isles (Bothwell, 2006). Importantly, they were not conservatives who refused the liberal idea of the revolutionaries but rather believed that this liberal adventure follow within the framework of the British Empire (Balthazar, 1986). Some emigrated to Britain and the Caribbean, but a significant majority went to British North America, resulting in its first large inflow of English-speaking settlers and constituting the first major refugee movement (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010). In other words, not having been born in their mother country, they had become profoundly American and thus decided to remain on the continent, emigrating to Nova Scotia or Québec (Balthazar, 1986). A total of some 40,000 to 50,000 Loyalists headed north during and after the rebellion, of which 10,000 moved to Québec, primarily to
the western part of the province which later became Ontario (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010). Their mass immigration resulted in a population boost in the Province of Québec especially between 1778 and 1784, altering the province from a homogenous French Canadian society to one with a prosperous and vocal English minority14 (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980).

Where these Loyalists arrived, however, was not as British or American as they had imagined. Being accustomed to the culture of representative government, private property, Protestant religious establishments and British law (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010), Québec seemed to them to be too autocratic and antique, with the existence of a strong Catholic religion (Balthazar, 1986). Loyalists, with their identity both as loyal British subjects and as loyal Americans, and Canadiens thus represented two very different cultures and ideologies existing in Québec. The British authority was forced to react, which resulted in the Constitutional Act of 1791 (Balthazar, 1986).

2.1.3. Rebellion (1791-1840)

In 1791, the Province of Québec was divided into two Canadas by the Constitutional Act: the western Upper Canada, underpopulated and underdeveloped but significantly English-speaking and Loyalist; and the eastern Lower Canada where the Catholic religion was again tolerated and consisted overwhelmingly of French-speaking Canadiens15 (Bothwell, 2006; Figure 4). It is important, however, to note that Lower Canada was never entirely francophone. Québec city remained the residence of the British governor, the anglophone merchants continued to live in Québec city and especially Montréal which was soon to become the commercial centre of the colony, and the Eastern Townships and the Gaspésie was to be conceded to the Loyalists (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, the anglophone minorities of the future Québec existed already in this era in Lower Canada, British institutions of law and government being established for their benefit (Kelly & Trebilcock, 2010).

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14 High natural birth rate had doubled the population from 70,000 at the time of Conquest to approximately 140,000 by the mid-1780s (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010).
15 Their respective population is estimated from 12,000 (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010) to 20,000 (Bothwell, 2006) in Upper Canada and 156,000 (Bothwell, 2006) in Lower Canada.
The Act cannot be itself considered the cause for nationalism, but set the framework and the occasion (Balthazar, 1986). In addition to the executive council, two houses were created to produce legislation within the province: the non-elective Upper House and the elective Lower House (Balthazar, 1986). Although powers were very limited especially for the Lower House (Quinn, 1979), it was within this House where the friction between anglophones and francophones became obvious (Balthazar, 1986). For example, the use of French and English was accepted, but only the English version of the laws had official status (Martel & Pâquet, 2010).

The French language was timidly but officially recognized to serve as the language of oath for voters (art. 24) as well as of the members of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council (art. 29) (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). Thus, this distorted bilingualism did not treat the two languages equally, which manifested the inferior status of the French language and its peoples. Moreover, these political institutions were foreign to the francophone residents, which they could not regard as part of their own heritage and political culture (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). While they were able to use their electoral strength to gain a voice in the representative assembly, the assembly as a whole was mostly dominated by the executive, which, in turn, was still the preserve of anglo-Canadian minority of Lower Canada (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). With the minority anglophones aiming for support by the governor and the majority francophones represented by their elites, the divergence between these two groups certainly set the cause for further nationalism (Balthazar, 1986).
The divide between the two language groups was witnessed outside the governmental institutions as well. Although both the demography and the economy of Lower Canada in the 19th century was dominated by the establishment of a rural, farming population (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980), two very different ideologies manifested among the elites, especially in urban city centers. On the one hand, there were the anglophone merchants who were oriented towards commerce and acted on the basis of capitalist and liberalist ideologies (Balthazar, 1986). Prosperity led to the city of Montreal becoming the largest in British North America, and the founding of the English-language institutions of the Bank of Montreal in 1817 and McGill University in 1821, further cementing the language of economy in Lower Canada as undeniably English (Bothwell, 2006). On the other hand, there were the francophones who sought to defend stable society and fidelity towards the ancient institutions, represented especially by the Catholic clergies (Balthazar, 1986).

Beyond these two groups, a third group, a new middle class, was on the rise who were eager to fight the assimilationist Montréal merchants, a fight which forged in them a nationalist ideology (Monière, 2008). According to Balthazar, their intention was to assume leadership of the nation canadienne and to eventually replace the colonial government and especially those who exercised executive and legislative powers, most of them anglophones. This group had in fact replaced the old canadien nobility, which now consisted of certain attorneys, notaries, surveyors, doctors, small merchants and journalists, educated in classic seminaries: the middle class. Since their profession inevitably required them to deal with the population as a whole, they had no difficulty being elected to the Assembly within which their numbers gradually became significant. They formed the Parti canadien, and this became in 1826 the Parti patriote (1986).

The most notable to represent this middle class was Louis-Joseph Papineau, who became leader of the Parti canadien in 1815. Especially from 1822, when he strictly opposed the Montréal merchants’ intention to unite the two Canadas and further make English the only language of record for government in the province, he became an undisputed chef of his party. Thus, with the rising of a new social class,
an atmosphere of popular participation, parliamentary institution and press, nationalism started to develop in Lower Canada (Balthazar, 1986).

This nationalism seemed to be based on republicanism, as a representation of the national community in its territorial dimension, in a civic rather than an ethnic incarnation and strongly inspired by the American model (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). It was primarily based on political and economic claims, in other words to demand responsible government, the control by the deputies of public expenditure and public service appointments, and the development of an economy centered on agriculture (Monière, 2008). Their fight was not in the name of linguistic or culture preservation but rather in the name of democracy, refusing to define themselves ethnolinguistically and inviting Irish and Scottish members (Monière, 2008). However, it was profoundly rooted in traditionalism, religion being an important and essential ideology to protect, despite their liberal aspiration in the political sphere (Balthazar, 1986). Papineau was himself a seigneur and despite evolving from a liberal constitutionalist to a radical republican, admiring the French revolution of 1830 and American democracy, he expected his privilege as a seigneur to be respected (Bothwell, 2006). He also saw the Catholic Church as a bulwark of canadien identity, even though he personally did not believe in the religion (Bothwell, 2006). Thus, socially and also economically, these new middle class nationalists remained strictly conservative, as if to say that the rejection of the ancien régime, hierarchic structure and the Catholic tradition would eventually cause their loss of identity (Balthazar, 1986). In addition, Catholicism remained popular among many and the bishops were suspicious of any radical movement, which would decrease their authority within the society (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, the nationalism of the Canadiens was not able to detach itself from religion and conservatism.

The failed armed uprising of 1837 by Papineau resulted in an investigation by Lord Durham as governor general in 1838. His famous report was unquestionably of great significance to the evolution of British colonial policy (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980), especially by responding to the needs in Upper Canada to create a form of responsible government in the colony, that would be answerable to its citizen taxpayers rather than to a distant imperial authority (Bothwell, 2006). However, for the Canadiens, his
recommendations were a direct threat (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). During his stay, he had also found “two nations warring in the bosom of a single state” (quoted in Bothwell, 2006, p.184). There could be no political harmony nor economic development until the two nations became united, and that one must be English-speaking (Bothwell, 2006). In short, he suggested to combine the two Canadas granting each section equal representation, and to artificially minoritize the French population since the anglophones of Montréal and the Eastern Townships added to those of Upper Canada would result in permanent majority (Bothwell, 2006), i.e. assimilation.

2.2. Canadiens Français

2.2.1. Minoritization (1841-1867)

The Durham Report was realized with the Act of Union in 1841, reuniting the two Canadas and creating a new Province of Canada (Figure 5). This project was seen as a road to assimilation, uniting the House with equal representation from the former two Canadas although the population of the former Lower Canada outnumbered the other and no francophone was called upon to join the new executive (Balthazar, 1986). What was more, its article 41 established English as the exclusive official language which naturally caused a shock wave among the French-speaking population (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). This minoritization eventually brought transformation for the former Canadiens, defining themselves now as Canadiens.

16 While the population of Canada-East, former Lower Canada, was 650,000 in 1840 of which 150,000 were British, that of Canada-West, former Upper Canada, was only 450,000 (Monière, 2008).
17 In 1848, French was reestablished as language of use in the legislative assembly and the court (Martel & Pâquet, 2010).
français (Balthazar, 1986; Martel & Pâquet, 2010). This name itself shows the subordinate nature of their identity that the collective consciousness is occupied by the tutelary presence of another (Monière, 2008). In fact, the dynamic and liberal resistance to construct a French majority society and to achieve independence politically was transformed into a defensive strategy which internalized the demographic and political inferiority and shut itself up for the survival of language, religion and traditions (Monière, 2008). The state was no longer to be seen as the sole guarantor of their collective existence, that role would henceforth be given to the nation (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). Nation, in the traditional ideology, was essentially agrarian and the true manifestation of the French Canadian identity lay in the parish community (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). Proposed by the elite clergies, the Canadiens français were to form a Catholic and French nation, inspired by a providential mission to carry the torch of civilization and palms of the apostolate in North America against any forces which had the potential to destroy it (Quinn, 1979; Monière, 2008; Martel & Pâquet, 2010). Thus, for more than a century, they will preserve themselves as Canadiens français, surviving frugally and being protected by the Catholic Church, language becoming the guardian of their faith and guarantee of their nation (Martel & Pâquet, 2010).

Balthazar noted that in this period, nationalism did not manifest itself politically since the Canadiens français did not attempt to manage their social destiny by themselves. Thus, during the second half of the 19th century, nationalism concerned only the cultural sphere, which was founded on the past. Inevitably, the clergies became the real leaders of this nationalism of the Canadiens français. This religious authority, however, was not limited to culture but expanded in the social sphere as well, including education, social services such as hospitals, orphanages, and hospices, leisure and even some press (1986). Many of the social welfare facilities were governed by the Church, which in the other provinces had been state responsibility (Quinn, 1979). In fact, Roman Catholicism remained the major determinant of the way the Canadiens français think, their systems of values and way of life, up until 1960 (Quinn, 1979). Balthazar further mentioned that Catholic clergies refused any modern ideas such as the rationalism of the 18th century, French Revolution and liberalism. Thus, being Canadiens français meant first and foremost to be true to the faith of their ancestors, to maintain their familial and
parochial framework, to stay settled in their ancestral territory and to resist industrialization. In other words, their nationalism consisted of religion, non-politics, agriculture and territory (1986).

Concerning the indigenous population, their assimilation was thought to be the logical route. Martel and Pâquet importantly mentioned that the new political system and culture of the 1840s to 1850s replaced the former alliances between the indigenous with a legal regime based on the values of the conquering bourgeoisies, namely private ownership. Henceforth, in order to be emancipated and to gain full rights of belonging and participation in the new political community, they must abandon their traditional values and assimilate to civilization. As early as 1850, the Canadian authorities adopted laws, the spirit of which would carry through to the Indian Act of 1876. To gain emancipation, it conditioned that any adult males should have good moral conduct, be free from debt, and be able to read and write in the language of the state, English. In the meantime, while First Nations and Inuit retained their status as minors, they were confined to reserves to be gradually “civilized” and assimilated. What was more, the introduction of the infamous residential schools in 1883 greatly undermined their culture and enhanced their linguistic assimilation (2010). Spoken only by older people, the different Amerindian and Inuit languages went through difficult times. The first Indigenous language education programs on reserves will only start a century later in the 1980s (Martel & Pâquet, 2010), coming “after a century of almost total neglect” (Trudel, 1996, p.110).18

2.2.2. Québec within the Dominion (1867-1960)

The British North America Act (BNA Act) enacted in 1867, which marked the creation of the Dominion of Canada, offered a new political framework for the nationalism of the Canadiens français, offering them the possibility to become the majority within their own provincial government by re-

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18 Goulet revealed an interesting point that the operations of residential schools in Québec were significantly different from those in the rest of Canada. Due to the unique historical relationship with the indigenous peoples without treaties, lack of competition among the Churches as was the case in the west and the late introduction of compulsory education in Québec, residential schools were never many in Québec and their operation started very late (1930s and 40s) and ended relatively early, last one to be closed in 1980. Moreover, residential schools in Québec were mostly governed by oblates who resisted assimilation of indigenous children to white society and emphasized the importance of their own culture and first language (2016).
dividing the Province of Canada into the provinces of Québec and Ontario19 (Balthazar, 1986; Figure 6). Although their jurisdiction was limited and they were to be permanently relegated to a minority status at the federal level (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980), the federal characteristics suggested the maintenance of the civil code and the religious institution within this province of francophone majority (Balthazar, 1986).

It should be clearly noted here that this project of forming a new Confederation was not itself a manifestation of Canadian nationalism. Rather, the new nation was to be an essential part of the British Empire, English Canadians seeing it as the primary basis of their sense of nationality (McRoberts, 1997). Canadians relied on the British Empire for identity and support with the Union Jack flying proudly over Canadian land and portraits and statues of Queen Victoria being universal. For many, being part of this great entity meant identity, tradition and stability (Bothwell, 2006). Even John A. Macdonald, the first Canadian Prime Minister who promoted the national policy, identified first and foremost as a British subject and saw nationalism as a consolidation of British space within the North American continent (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, while francophones were attached to their distinctiveness as French-speaking people as Canadiens français, many anglophones were deeply connected to the British Empire.

Regarding language, Section 133 of the Act made both French and English the official languages of Canada, but only allowing parliamentary institutions and federal courts and that of Québec to be bilingual (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). This was achieved by the will of the Confederation to protect the interests of Québec’s anglophones, with no similar measures being taken to

19 The Dominion of Canada further included New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.
protect the francophone minorities in other provinces (McRoberts, 1997). Importantly, Section 93 of
the BNA Act attributed educational responsibility to the provinces, while protecting the rights of
minorities in Québec and Ontario to have their own school systems (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). In 1869,
Québec passed a law to provide Protestants of its province, mostly English, with full control over their
own school systems, which would function exclusively in English (Mackey, 2010). This measure
further extended to other institutions such as hospitals, colleges, social services and the press (Mackey,
2010). In this sense, Confederation dualism of French and English can be said to have persisted mainly
in Québec rather than in federal institutions (McRoberts, 1997).

Francophones never actually insisted on further devolution, due to what Balthazar (1986)
suspected as the absence of a strong political nationalism while the clergies favoured the new framework
of Confederation which helped them maintain their authority. The lack of political initiative was
reflected to their laissez-faire attitude concerning language, to which Martel and Pâquet agreed that
members of the assembly very rarely insisted that the federal and provincial governments have the right
to promote and protect the French language. In 1910, the Québec government intervened in the field of
language planning by adopting a law of only a few paragraphs, intended for the railway, telephone,
telegraph, electricity, transport and courier services, which encouraged them to offer services and to
publish their documentation in French. However, because government intervention was limited, and it
had not allocated administrative resources to force the enterprises to offer services in French, all the
unsatisfied clients could do was only to bring them to court. With their providential mission to establish
the French language and the Catholic faith in North America, Québec acted as a fortified castle,
protector of the French-American communities in New England or French Canadian communities in
other provinces. Still, preservation was their strategy rather than active involvement, and language was
for the most part subordinate to religion; the Catholic Church, rather than politics, acting as the primary
defender of the nation of Canadiens français (2010). Thus, non-political and religious characteristics
were reinforced and preserved with the new framework of Canada.
Although this traditional ideology began to see some contradictions within the society concerning industrialization and urbanization, nationalism of the Canadiens français was not seriously contested intellectually and remained mostly intact until 1960 (Balthazar, 1986). The PLQ government from 1920 to 1936 certainly accelerated industrialization by inducing and encouraging British, American and English-Canadian enterprises to exploit both the natural and human resources of the province (Quinn, 1979). McRoberts (1997) noted that by the 1930s, Québec had actually become a largely urban, industrial society. However, the Great Depression that hit Québec, much as it did in the other provinces and in other parts of the world in the early 30s, revitalized the nationalist sentiment which deepened antagonism towards the whole industrial system and the English-speaking people who dominated it (Quinn, 1979). Thus, a coalition of Conservatives and other nationalist groups and individuals founded a new political party, the Union National (UN), to counteract the PLQ government and to put forward social, economic and political reform programs espoused by the nationalists (Quinn, 1979). However, when the party won the provincial election in 1936 and Maurice Duplessis, a former conservative, assumed power, he abandoned many of the reform programs and transformed the party from a coalition to a unified force under his sole authoritarian leadership (Quinn, 1979). Thus, from 1936 to 1959 except for a few years in between, Québec was ruled under Duplessis, who had in fact a similar economic philosophy as the former Liberal (PLQ) government, based on the strong conviction of individual initiative and private enterprise with which governments should cooperate in every way (Quinn, 1979). Québec economy certainly expanded in this period helped by the Second World War and the post-war boom, but again, often colluding with American and anglophone capital, at the price of French Canadians and their control over their own economy (Quinn, 1979; McRoberts & Posgate, 1980; Balthazar, 1986).

Duplessis is often characterized as a nationalist, introducing the current Québec flag with the fleur de lys, for example, which recalls the banners of pre-revolutionary France and as a symbol indicates that Québec was indeed different from other Canadian provinces. More importantly, he insisted on defending provincial autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government in issues such as war
participation, social services and tax revenue (Quinn, 1979; McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). This vigorous defense of provincial autonomy was one of the important reasons why Québec’s francophone elites supported this government (McRoberts, 1997). Lluch agreed that although the PLQ was active in defending provincial interests after Confederation until the late 1920s, it had become more federalist with an actual alliance with the Liberal Party of Canada until 1964, whereas the UN was more autonomist and dependent on its nationalist allies within Québec (2014). However, Balthazar characterized Duplessis’ long reign less to nationalism and more to his political skills in the context of an exceptional economic prosperity. On the one hand, he defended the values of rural life, but on the other hand, he encouraged massive industrialization and urbanization, allowing Americans to exploit Québec’s natural resources (1986). Thus, despite his open attachment to French Canadian interests, Duplessis was clearly submissive to English-Canadian and American dominance of the Québec economy (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). In fact, the living standard of French Canadians in Québec, who represented 80 per cent of the population thanks to their high birthrate, was worse compared to anglophones and new comers. Average annual income was growing after the war from 655 dollars in 1946 to 1,455 dollars in 1961 (Durocher, 2008). However, in 1961, statistics shows the standard income of unilingual francophones was about half of anglophones, slightly higher than the indigenous population and Italians (Barbaud, 1998). Ethnic discrimination deeply affected Canadiens français, who were required to be bilingual to find a qualified job and get a promotion, which was not the case for unilingual anglophones (Durocher, 2008). In short, although they were the majority in number within Québec, their economic life and social status were clearly inferior.

One element needs to be considered which greatly helped transform the social conscious of the people of Québec: the media. Although radio services had entered Québec in the 1920s, many people turned their dials to American stations (CBC/Radio-Canada, 2018). In the early 1930s, there were only two radio stations in Montréal, one English and one bilingual, 80 per cent of Québec programs offered only in English in 1934 (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). More influential was the television service, which started in 1952, massively altering peoples’ daily lives. Television was able to avoid religious and
political authority in expressing ideas, often questioning the principles of traditional nationalism (Balthazar, 1986). The proportion of Québec households with television grew rapidly in the 1950s, from 9.7 per cent in 1953 to 38.6 per cent in 1955, 79.4 per cent in 1957 and 88.0 per cent in 1960, a percentage higher than for Canada as a whole (English, 2007). Communications intensified which brought people closer together and integrated the individuals to the wider social milieu (Balthazar, 1986).

Being a federal agency, Balthazar remarked that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in English or La Société Radio-Canada (SRC) in French had the mission to contribute to Canadian unity. However, since the French network was undeniably a Québec network, it had the effect of actually distancing the French Canadians in Québec from those in the rest of Canada. On the one hand, it brought the Canadiens français in Québec closer and accentuated their cultural allegiance; on the other hand, it integrated the French Canadians elsewhere to the anglophone society and accelerated their assimilation. Thus, for those in Québec, their communication became intense and facilitated their integration to a Québec society separate from wider Canada (1986).

Before proceeding to the next era, it is perhaps important to point out the immigration and indigenous situation of Québec before 1960. First, as was the practice of the time, subsequent Québec governments had largely abandoned their responsibility to manage immigration since 1867 (Anctil, 2010), which was a joint jurisdiction of both federal and provincial governments. Although Québec was largely seen as a homogenous society, it was a very different matter in Montréal, the commercial capital, which had a substantial anglophone population and invited many immigrants. According to Linteau, the proportion of the British population in Montréal decreased from 33.7 per cent in 1901 to 25.7 per cent in 1911 and further to 12.4 per cent in 1961. In 1911, the third largest group was a sizable Jewish community constituting 5.9 per cent of the people, which also decreased to 3.9 per cent in 1961. Immigration contributed to a growing Italian community, from 0.6 per cent in 1901 to 6.7 per cent in 1961, surpassing the Jewish community and becoming the third largest cultural group and a strong political force not only in the municipalities of Montréal and surrounding area but also in provincial
and federal politics (2000). Since there was almost no effort to direct immigrants to the francophone community and the economic appeal of the English language was greater, considering both the social standing within Québec and geographical situation of North America, immigrants to Montréal usually gravitated towards the English-speaking community (Anctil, 2010). However, Anctil noted that as long as their influx was limited, the Anglicization of immigrants was seen to have very little impact for the survival of French. Their declining birth rate among francophones and dramatic increase of new comers in the post-war period, greatly changed this conception, raising the fear among the French-speaking population towards the end of the 1950s (2010).

Concerning the indigenous population, an important territorial decision was made in this era which lasts until today. With the BNA Act of 1867 giving almost exclusive powers concerning indigenous issues to the federal government, the traditional attitude of the government of Québec towards them became basically one of indifference. In 1898 and 1912, however, the Parliament of Canada passed Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, which redefined the territory of Québec, expanding it massively to the north, including arctic regions²⁰ (Figures 7 and 8). With this law, Ottawa also gave certain obligations to the government of Québec to recognize the rights of the indigenous inhabitants.

²⁰ The northernmost Nunavik region had especially been called Nouveau-Québec or New Québec, comprising 37 per cent of the Québec territory.
(Frenette, 2013). The Québec government nonetheless sought to avoid any involvement in indigenous administrative affairs and their mining and hydro-electronic developments in the area, refusing to define their rights until the 1960s (Trudel, 1996; Savard, 2009).

2.3. Québécois

2.3.1. The Quiet Revolution (1960-)

The 1960s was a period of important political, social, economic and cultural demands internationally. Québec was no exception. With the television services contributing to opening people up to the world and to witnessing what is occurring in the other side of the planet, the people of Québec were gradually readying themselves for a new era. In the late 1950s, opposition to the UN was slowly growing, and the PLQ was undergoing substantial reforms within the party (Quinn, 1979). Suddenly in 1959 Duplessis died and his successor Paul Sauvé, who was the only person with sufficient support to replace Duplessis (Quinn, 1979), died as well after only a hundred days in office (Provencher, 1974/1977). In the provincial election of 1960, under Sauvé’s successor Antonio Barrette, the UN was defeated by a resurgent PLQ, whose leader, Jean Lesage, became Premier. This party change marked the beginning of the great reform, later to be called the Quiet Revolution by an English-Canadian newspaper journalist, an extensive transformation of Québec society.

What the Quiet Revolution brought was nothing short of absolute change to a province which, while already an advanced industrial society, still held many pre-industrial institutions, ideologies, and attitudes (Quinn, 1979). Thus, the Revolution was to amend this contradiction not only socially and economically but also politically. Socially, there was an anti-religious shift of values, which was a first for the francophones of Québec. From now on, the role in people’s lives long held by the clergy would instead be played by the provincial government elected by the people. This was an inevitable change in

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21 Sauvé, being much younger than Duplessis and coming from a very different background, could have changed the course of Quebec’s history. Sauvé’s slogan, Désormais (From now on), quickly became synonymous with change and was seen by many observers as the beginning of the Quiet Revolution (Provencher, 1974/1977). In fact, Laurendeau seemed to feel that the Quiet Revolution started with Sauvé (1962/1976h).
peoples’ minds: Rapid social mobilization and urbanization would not tolerate the religious authoritarianism exercised in the past (Balthazar, 1986). The most important reforms introduced by the Lesage government was in the education system, separating the Church from the system by creating the Ministry of Education and building public schools, diminishing drop-out rates and enabling the French population to receive education suited for modern society. Bothwell (2006) suggested that the logical end of the Quiet Revolution was in fact in 1997, when the school system was completely secularized by a constitutional amendment in that year.

Economically, PLQ government’s goal was to bring about greater participation and thereby control by the people of Québec themselves over the economic development of their own province. This was done by establishing public enterprises to develop natural resources and by assisting in strengthening small and medium-sized Québec-owned firms (Quinn, 1979). The former was realized by nationalizing Québec’s private power companies which were American capital, annexing them to the government’s existing Québec Hydro system and creating the all new French-speaking Hydro-Québec. The primary impact of this vast project was the creation of new opportunities for the French Canadians of Québec in managerial and technical positions, successfully converting the working language from English to French (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980).

Politically, there was a significant valuing of the state organizations (Balthazar, 1986). Abandoning traditional ideologies and valuing economic and social development, the state assumed a new significance as the primary agent (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). In fact, anti-statism had been a vital principle of French Canadian nationalist ideology, promoted by the Church in particular, claiming that politicians and the state, which were easily corrupted, were less effective in protecting and maintaining French Canada’s national survival than the Church (Horton, 1992). However, with the use of the expression État du Québec, provincial jurisdictions started to be intensely utilized to defend provincial or state rights and intervened actively in various sectors, such as culture, education, social affairs and economy (Balthazar, 1986). Importantly, for example, the Ministry of Immigration was formed in 1968 “to develop an active and independent presence in the immigration field”, sending
representatives to areas with a large number of French-speaking population to promote emigration to Québec (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010, p.365). The state was seen as a lever, a tool, or an instrument for collective emancipation (Balthazar, 1986) and it was presented as the sole institutional framework able to promote the well-being of French Canadians, both inside and outside Québec (Rocher, 2002). Thus, a democratically elected government was from then on an active player in many spheres of the society, facing both internal and external adversaries. Furthermore, in areas such as shared-cost programs, pension plan, taxation and international agreements and treaties, effective confrontation with the federal government became a reality, whereas Duplessis had merely opposed federal interventions without action (Quinn, 1979). Thus, the modernization of Québec had a significant impact on the relations between the two levels of governments, Québec willing to take control of its own power and acting more as an État national (Balthazar, 1986).

However, what was most revolutionary was in ideology, where there was profound and far-reaching change (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). Traditionalism was undeniably abandoned (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980; Balthazar, 1986) and the nationalists finally included the long-delayed liberalism in their discourse (McRoberts, 1997). Instead of ethnicity, which is a static and unchangeable element, nationalism was increasingly defined by culture or nation, a dynamic and lively notion, and by territory (Balthazar, 1986). The former was brought by Daniel Johnson, who won the provincial election of 1966 as head of the UN and who referred to the sociological dimension of the French definition of nation22 rather than ethnicity (Rocher, 2002). The division by territory was more explicit with the provincial border functioning as the boundary. Certainly, the link between French Canadians in Canada and Québec had persisted without interruption, especially since the formal establishment of Lower Canada in 1791 (McRoberts, 1997). Solidarity existed among the French Canadians in the whole of Canada until 1967. That relation changed considerably with the national affirmation of the Québécois narrowing the boundaries of the nation to Québec alone (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980; Bouchard & Olivier, 1992).

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22 Nation as a human community manifesting a historical, linguistic, religious, and economic unity animated by a common will to live (Rocher, 2002).
This shift to a territorial conception of nation, rather than ethnicity, was due to the new idea of a modern and secular society (McRoberts, 1997). Thus they were literally the Québécois, with the multifaceted term Canadiens français no longer being acceptable and falling into disuse (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). The Québécois were part of the État du Québec as proactive decision makers bringing change to Québec. As Marcel Rioux, a Québec sociologist described, the Quiet Revolution was “above all a reaffirmation of ourselves…. The Québécois became certain that they could change many things if they really wanted to” (quoted in McRoberts & Posgate, 1980, p.95). Thus, now the people recognized their competence as active citizens, rather than passive subjects guided by god.

Abandoning the traditional nationalist discourse which emphasized religion, language was now what they relied as their basis of identity. However, Québec had been a bilingual province for more than a hundred years, governments traditionally being laissez-faire on language matters and the choice of language resting with the individual rather than the collectivity (Bothwell, 2006). Under these circumstances, McRoberts mentioned two factors which caused successive Québec governments to act on language matters. First was the demographic consideration. Immigrants traditionally integrated to the anglophone population but this was traditionally countered by the high birth rate of francophones. However, by the late 1960s, Québec nationalists started to worry about the declining francophone population and estimated that its proportion would go below the historical level of 80 per cent. Second was concern for the status of the French language within the private sector of Québec economy, where English dominated, especially the managerial positions. This naturally affected a low francophone income which was observed by the B & B Commission and the new-middle class increasingly demanded government intervention to change the languages practice in the workplace (1997). Thus, all three parties, UN, PLQ and PQ, which held the government since 1960 ended up enacting language legislations.
The Saint-Léonard crisis\textsuperscript{23} was one of the driving forces for the UN government, which was in power since 1966, to act on language. The result, however, was the disappointing Law 63, \textit{Act to promote the French language in Quebec} in 1969. Despite the name of the act, the law supported parents’ free choice concerning their children’s language of instruction (Oakes & Warren, 2007), meaning that immigrant parents could still chose to send their children to English schools. It was, nevertheless, the very first law to mention the intention to make French the language of work and the priority language in public posting and to make teaching of “a working knowledge of the French language” compulsory in English schools (Paquette, 1996, p.332).

During the crisis, the government also called for the creation of an inquiry commission, later to be called the Gendron Commission, to examine the state of the French language in Québec (Gémard, 2008). The Commission delivered its report in 1973, the first substantial document establishing the foundations of a serious language policy in Québec (Gémard, 2008). It recommended a) to proclaim only French to be the official language of Québec while recognizing French and English as ‘national languages’, b) to make French the common language of Quebecers which can serve as a communication tool between Francophones and non-Francophones and c) to make French the internal communication language in the work world (Gémard, 2008). Although it did not touch directly on language of instruction, the Commission assumed that making French the language of work was the best way to lead immigrants to send their children to French schools (Gémard, 2008). Although anglophones reacted positively to the report, francophones criticized the report for its ambiguity and timidity (Levine, 1990). Eventually, Gendron himself admitted that it ignored the psychological factor that francophones felt threatened and that there was no choice but to modify Law 63 and oblige immigrant children to go to French schools (Levine, 1990). Laws 22 and 101 would be passed by subsequent governments, which will be discussed in detail in later chapters.

\textsuperscript{23} Seeing that bilingual classes, established in 1963, encouraged more than 85 per cent of the children of immigrants to proceed to English secondary schools in the area, school commissioners of the Saint-Léonard neighbourhood in suburban Montréal adopted a resolution requiring immigrants to send their children to French only primary schools which caused a wave of protests from anglophones throughout the province (Oakes & Warren, 2007).
With the identity of *Canadiens français* transforming to *Québécois* and a minority mentality changing to that of a majority, Balthazar pointed out that this brought significant challenge to the former majority within Québec, namely the anglophones, where they slowly gained consciousness of their minority status. At the time of the *canadiens français* identity, the anglophones were the ones who called themselves Canadians, simply suggesting that Canada was governed and controlled by the majority anglophones. With their privileged economic status and their absence of interest in Québec politics, at first the anglophones in Québec were not aware of the massive phenomenon of the Quiet Revolution. They did not take any declaration by the Québec government seriously, which they considered as simply more French Canadian rhetoric. Nevertheless, with the successive language laws (Law 63 in 1969, Law 22 in 1974 and then Law 101 in 1977), anglophones became aware of their minoritized status for the first time and of their necessity to integrate into the francophone majority, at least a little, as francophone minorities outside Québec had done (1986). Importantly, though, this integration of anglophones would have been difficult if not impossible if identity in Québec remained *Canadiens français*, with their ethnic nuance. Because now that their identity is territorial and cultural (Balthazar, 1986) rather than ethnic, it opened up the possibility of bringing anglophones as members of the *Québécois*.

Until the late 1960s, the federal government seemed to be willing to accommodate the new Québec by examining different and unconventional approaches. Throughout his tenure as Prime Minister, Lester Pearson (1963-1968) instinctively considered accommodation, rather than confrontation, to be the appropriate way of treating the Québec question. His willingness contributed to the creation of the B & B Commission in 1963 to understand and solve the problem of growing nationalism and separatism in Québec. However, this attitude was to change considerably when Trudeau assuming the role of Prime Minister in 1968. This change in attitude was made possible as Trudeau himself was a francophone from Québec and insisted that accommodation of Québec nationalism was not only unnecessary but also wrong and immoral. Passing the Official Languages Act in 1969, Trudeau’s vision of Canada, which will be further discussed in detail in the next chapter, was
shared by neither most francophones nor English Canada, but yet ultimately was to have a deep impact on Canadian politics (McRoberts, 1997).

2.3.2. The Sovereignty-Association Movement

As much as the Quiet Revolution brought major transformation, especially in the social sphere, the anglophone dominance of the Québec economy was not greatly reduced. In the reform of social institutions, especially in the case of education, the Québec government was able to seize full control either because it was already the provincial jurisdiction, or the government earned the right through negotiating with the federal government. This was certainly not the case with the economy and some initiatives by the Lesage government were hampered by competing federal undertakings (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). Another important point worth articulating is that Lesage himself was suspicious and cautious of too much transformation. New initiatives often originated with others who had had to fight hard to overcome his reservations, notable cases being René Lévesque with his plan for Hydro-Québec and Paul Gérin-Lajoie with his blueprint for the Ministry of Education, both of them closely tied to the new middle class and the new nationalist ideology. McRoberts and Posgate went as far as to mention that without the presence of these two individuals, “the accomplishments of the Lesage administration would have been much less substantial” (1980, p.104). Thus, while Lesage was able to gather liberal reformers and nationalists alike into his party, disagreement was inevitable with those who felt that the Quiet Revolution had not gone far enough, especially in constitutional matters, and those who felt it had gone too far in its reform (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980).

In 1967, when Lévesque’s resolution for a new political status for Québec, namely sovereignty-association, was rejected by the PLQ, which instead opted for a special status, he left the party to form the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA), which later in 1968 became the Parti Québécois (PQ) (Rocher, 2002). The PQ succeeded in forming a majority government in 1976, the first-ever pro-independence party that came to power in the history of Québec (Lluch, 2014). The promise of holding a referendum on sovereignty rather than announcing independence right after being elected to
government might have significantly helped the PQ to be elected. But the PQ’s promise to offer a good government, supported by many such as Claude Ryan of Le Devoir and every part of the province including English Montréal (English, 2010), seems to have had the greatest influence on voters. The PQ managed to deliver practically all their electoral promises, impressing even its federalist opponents with its competence and probity, columnists unanimously praising Lévesque’s overall performance, innovative reforms and responsible management (English, 2010).

The first referendum took place in 1980, just as it was promised in the election campaign in 1976 to hold it during the PQ’s first mandate. It questioned the matter of (political) sovereignty- (economic) association with the rest of Canada, whether the people would give the mandate to the Québec government to negotiate with the federal government. It should be emphasized that this program of sovereignty-association did not mean mere independence. Rather, it should be interpreted as a new form of federalism, especially in economic matters with the common Central Bank and certain numbers of institutions (Balthazar, 1986). This is why many federalists voted for the Yes side, who wished to raise the status of Québec within the Canadian Confederation and to proceed with matters that had stagnated for a long time (Balthazar, 1986).

The result, therefore, was devastating, precisely because this referendum was not for independence but for a new form of federalism. It meant to weaken the status of Québec more than before, degrading Québec to a simple province. Rocher mentioned the significance of the defeat in three levels:

At the symbolic level, nationalist rhetoric lost its credibility. At the political level, the federal government exploited the referendum result and at the same time discredited the Québec claims issued over the preceding twenty years in order to carry out this centralization plan. At the social level, the defeat of the Péquistes project translated into an important demobilization of the nationalists. Even though forty per cent of Quebeckers had voted oui, the result was a searing defeat for the nationalist cause. This caused serious damage to nationalist ideology and to the

24 This is called étapisme, a strategy to gradually proceed towards independence. It was suggested by one of Lévesque’s future ministers, Claude Morin (Fraser, 2001).
25 A commonly used term referring to members and supporters of the PQ.
intellectuals who were its principal spokespersons. The Québec intellectuals were thus silenced. (2002, pp.9-10)

One of the many reasons of this defeat was Trudeau, who had come back to politics as Prime Minister and leader of the federal Liberal party after a brief retirement, just in time for the referendum. Trudeau was an anti-nationalist, who never opted for Québec nationalism and simply believed in a united Canada. The two charismatic men, Lévesque and Trudeau, had significantly different characters with “the populist Lévesque and the patrician Trudeau; the crusading journalist, the engaged intellectual; the fiery nationalist, the passionate antinationalist; the charming roué, the disciplined actor; the crumpled suits and cigarette ash, the perfect cut with the rose in the lapel…” (English, 2010, pp.507-508). It was often said, even by Lévesque himself, that Lévesque was what the Québécois were and Trudeau what they hoped to be (Bothwell, 2006; English, 2010). Up until that point, however, the people of Québec never had to choose between these two great men, since Trudeau was in federal politics and Lévesque in provincial politics. Thus, they never had to directly compare Trudeau and Lévesque. In the referendum of 1980, however, where Trudeau actively supported the No side, the people had to make the impossible decision between the two (Balthazar, 1986). The people voted for the No side, however, because Trudeau had promised to renew the federal system in case of a No victory (English, 2010). This was to be betrayed.

2.3.3. The Decline of the Independence Movement

Following the referendum defeat, Québec nationalism was forced to take a different direction. This concurred with the politics at the federal level. Most poignantly for Québec was the (re)patriation of the Canadian Constitution26 and the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 without Québec’s consent. Not only was Québec excluded from negotiations at the last minute27, it was reduced in its powers to carry out the most crucial of its demands, namely the right to financial

26 Until then, the power to amend the constitution rested in Britain, which Trudeau aimed to bring back to Canada. This was seen by many as Trudeau’s Canadian nationalism.
27 This was called the Nuit des Longs Couteaux, or Night of the Long Knives, in Québec, as all parties reached an agreement behind Lévesque’s back.
compensation in case of opting out of federal programs (Lévesque, 1986). For Lévesque, “it was the procedure much more than the content that was intolerable” (Lévesque, 1986, p.332). It was a total win for Trudeau who left politics shortly after achieving his lifelong goal.

When the Progressive Conservative party took power in Ottawa in 1984 with an Irish-Québécois Brian Mulroney to assume the role of Prime Minister of Canada, he invited Québec to attend the Constitutional negotiations to finally include the province within the Canadian constitutional framework, which Lévesque accepted with his beau risque strategy, open as never before to federal-provincial conversations (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, the PQ relaxed its stance on independence, paving the way for a PLQ come-back in the 1985 provincial election.

Although the decline of nationalism was clear considering the constitutional strategy of the PLQ Bourassa administration of 1985 (Rocher, 2002), they followed the previous PQ’s nationalist stance in insisting that the current Constitution was unacceptable to the Québec government (Lluch, 2014). Furthermore, in the negotiation of the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord starting in 1987, the PLQ government proposed five conditions to bring Québec back into the Canadian Constitution, one of which was a recognition of Québec as a distinct society28, which caused a great controversy (Rocher, 2002; Lluch, 2014). According to McRoberts, this clause is not merely symbolic, but rather offers constitutional interpretation to the courts which would be consistent with “the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society” (1997, p.193; Lluch, 2014). Thus, nationalism was very much alive even without the PQ, seeking an autonomous position within the federal state of Canada.

The ultimate failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 was a great disappointment for Québec francophones (Lluch, 2014), many interpreting it as a rejection of Québec as a distinct community by English Canada (Rocher, 2002). The second round of negotiations, namely the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 fared no better. For many, it was a huge step backward from the previous Accord and the majority of Québécois voted No at the referendum of the Accord (Lluch, 2014).

28 The other conditions of the Accord clearly manifested Québec nationalism as well, they were: a Québec veto on future constitutional change; control of federal spending power; power over matters of immigration; and participation in the naming of Supreme Court justices coming from Québec.
The disappointment of the people of Québec at their failed opportunities to be included within Canada resulted in a brief revival of support for independence and the PQ, which had reaffirmed its sovereigntist vive in 1988 under Jacques Parizeau (Lluch, 2014). It won the provincial election in 1994, holding a second referendum on sovereignty in 1995. The Yes side was defeated again but only by a razor-thin margin. Despite the closeness of this vote, this was the last referendum held in Québec, independentist aspirations declining thereafter.

On the other hand, in 1993, after two failed constitutional negotiations, a new political party was established by a former PLQ member Jean Allaire, the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) (Lluch, 2014). As Guy Laforest, president of the ADQ from 2000 to 2004, stated, “the ADQ emerged after the failure of Lake Meech, and [Jean Allaire], Mario Dumont and his people, the nationalist wing of the PLQ who thought that the nationalist orientation of the PLQ was not sufficient” (quoted in Lluch 2014, p.84). The party principles included the following: priority of Québec above everything; respecting the citizen; promoting openness and solidarity among the Québécois, and so on (Lluch, 2014). From participating in the Yes side in the 1995 referendum and forming a coalition with the PQ, the ADQ came to recognize that the people of Québec did not hope for a major break with Canada nor a constitutional debate (Lluch, 2014). Going beyond the independence-federalist dichotomy, the party argued that Québec needed a strong autonomist voice and continued to be the carrier of autonomist nationalism within the province (Lluch, 2014). In 2012, the ADQ joined a new political party led by François Legault, the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ). Within its resolution, the CAQ (2015) clearly states its autonomist nationalism, “advocating an active role for the Québec government in Canadian intergovernmental relations” (p.5) while recognizing that “Québec is a nation endowed with a particular history, culture and territory” (p.8) and that it “has its own identity, and a common language in which we all take pride” (p.5). The CAQ won the Québec provincial election of October 2018 for the first time, even forming a majority government, and ending the long standing de facto two-party system of the PLQ and PQ.
2.4. Conclusion: Québec Historical Nationalisms and the Basic Victim Positions

Referring to the BVPs presented in the last chapter, some observations will be made here regarding the transformation of Québec nationalism and identity, combined with the analysis of nationalism by Balthazar (1986) who identified four models of nationalisms (modern, traditional, state-controlled and autonomist) in Québec through its history. Position One of the BVP was taken at the time of the *Canadien* with their ambivalent attitude towards the old regime. First, they were the majority within the colony, both during the French regime authorized by the French throne and after the British Conquest being protected by the Québec Act. They were able to remain as themselves despite of being governed by the English (Balthazar, 1986). Nevertheless, they were on the periphery, a colony, being taken advantage by the mother country. Surviving in harsh weather and refusing to see themselves as French people of France, they created a new identity that belonged only to them, denying that they were victims, referring to themselves as *Canadiens*. Thus, as Balthazar (1986) mentioned, there was no significant current in Canadian society in the 18th century that would question the values and structures of the old regime and they still had to wait for several decades to assert their grievances effectively. Nevertheless, it was the formation period of future nationalism with a strong attachment to the Catholic Church.

The second position was relevant for the *Canadiens français*, from the time of annexation of the two Canadas (1841) until the Quiet Revolution (1960). During this time of traditional nationalism, the former *Canadiens* were for the first time in a truly minority position (Balthazar, 1986). The people acknowledged that they were victims but they understood it as their destiny, as their clergies told them, that they now have a mission from god to preserve their own civilization in North America. With ever increasing power of the Church, this became the only valid explanation of their minoritized situation. It was understood as a negative force to protect the cultural heritage, not as a political affirmation (Balthazar, 1986), or as Quinn mentioned as “the defensive rather than the expansionist kind” (Quinn, 1979, p.27). This was not political, since the ideology of conservative-oriented Duplessis reflected a traditional and rural vision of Québec in which the survival of French Canadians was believed to be
only possible through a fierce attachment to their only real capital, namely language and religion (Rocher, 2002). Although they were highly urbanized in reality, the agrarian myth that industrialization and urbanization embodied alien values and could only weaken the French Canadian nation maintained its hold even upon nationalist intellectuals (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). Thus, the people were mainly to survive as French Canadians seeking refuge in an ethnic nationalism founded on traditional Catholic and rural values (Oaks & Warren, 2007).

Position Three reflects what Balthazar (1986) identified as modern nationalism, the movement of resistance towards the ancien-régime. Québec history experienced this position twice, one instance of which is quite obvious. The Quiet Revolution was the beginning of Position Three for the people of Québec where at last they have not only acknowledged their victim situation but also brought change by themselves. As Laurendeau noted in 1967, “…a culture emerges from the phase of ‘survival’ pure and simple and enters into a full acceptance of life with its risks and challenges. This is the adventure which is beginning in French-speaking Quebec” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxxvi). Naturally, it was also a response to international currents, where the logic of independence or independence struggles attracted much attention in Québec, especially that of Algeria (Bothwell, 2006). Anger was aimed towards oppression, creating such a huge energy that the people have finally gained majority status in their own province. Now as Québécois, socially, economically, politically and ideologically, they have transformed into a completely different nation. Since this period was marked by the intervention of the state, Balthazar also identified this period as state controlled nationalism in addition to modern nationalism, where the expression État du Québec started to be used (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, the role of the state, or the government of Québec, as an active player was crucial for modernizing and to attaining Position Three. The two referendums can be said to be the important high-points of Position Three since the failure of independence also had the danger of throwing Québec back to Position Two, enclosing itself within feelings of neglect and failure and making no further effort towards change.

The other time of Position Three in Québec history was more than a century before the Quiet Revolution, in the times of Canadiens with their rebellion, which Balthazar (1986) mentioned was a
modern nationalism as well. It concerns the period from 1791 to 1840 opposing the framework established by the Constitution Act of 1791. According to Balthazar, nationalism of the Canadiens can be considered a modern one for a couple of reasons. First, it was led by a new social class, which replaced the nobility of the ancien-régime. Influenced by European progressive thought, the leaders were essentially liberal who valued equality, sovereignty of the people and secularism. Second, it was political, in the sense that it directly attacked political power to form a new national sovereignty. Third, it occurred in a territorially defined area, that of Lower Canada. Lastly, this nationalism was not entirely based on ethnicity nor race; the leader of the rebellion, Papineau, was known to welcome those other than francophones (1986). All of these reached only half-way, which, due to its fragile base, usage of violence and the authority of the clergies, brought the total negation of these aspirations as a result (Balthazar, 1986), regressing to Position Two as Canadiens français. The ultimate reason for their failure was that they rejected profound change for fear of assimilation (Balthazar, 1986). This fear resulted in an ever strong dependence to the Catholic Church, which was believed to have been protecting the francophone population.

This strong rejection of change can be explained by the fact that the population as a whole had never really believed themselves a minority or never acknowledged their victimhood as in Position One, without any of the international perspective that would influence the Quiet Revolution. Although they were conquered by the English in 1763, they were able to live a stable life protected by the Québec Act. It was in fact only the élites who acknowledged the political minority situation they were forced to live in. In this situation, it is not surprising that the movement was limited to a small population, which was not able to become a full force as was the case in the Quiet Revolution. It is also worth mentioning that Papineau, who leaded the rebellion, was himself a clergy who could not have detached his movement from the Catholic Church. Thus, the fact that victimization was not recognized in the wider society and the movement was still deeply rooted in religion kept the people from aspiring for real change.
Chapter 3 Modern Québec (Anti) Nationalisms

The previous chapter showed how Québec nationalism has transformed over time by analysing the course of its history, thus focusing on the diachronic line interpreted through the Basic Victim Positions (BVPs). In this chapter, the author tries to describe and observe different Québec nationalisms within a given time frame, shifting our perspectives to the synchronic line, comparing Laurendeau, Trudeau, Bourassa, Laurin and Lévesque. Especially, the author will try to explain how each thought about the two nations theory and separatism. The purpose of the author is to demonstrate that while there is no monolithic nationalist narrative, neither can the various nationalisms be divided into discrete camps, with each sharing a number of similarities with the others. Before starting the discussion, however, the author will first introduce the ideological context of Henri Bourassa and Lionel Groulx and their conception of Canada and Québec since they seem to be at the basis of the whole discussion on Québec nationalism in the 20th century.

3.1. Ideological Context: Henri Bourassa (1868-1952) and Lionel Groulx (1878-1967)

Although the traditional French Canadian nationalism remained mostly intact until the start of the Quiet Revolution, it was nonetheless slowly contested in the beginning of the 20th century with the context of British imperialism, gradual rise of industrialization after the First World War and the Depression. Two notable figures were particularly influential: Henri Bourassa who inspired the movement during the first 20 years of the last century and Lionel Groulx for the next 20 years (Balthazar, 1986).

As a journalist and politician, having experienced both federal and provincial politics at the turn of the 20th century, Henri Bourassa was the founder of the influential nationalist paper Le Devoir. His nationalism comprised both Canadian and French Canadian nationalisms (Harvey, 2008; Martel & Pâquet, 2010), his first grand objective was to grant true independence of Canada vis-à-vis British imperialism (Balthazar, 1986; Pelletier-Baillargeon, 2008). Denouncing Canadian participation in British-led wars, Bourassa insisted that Canada must strive for complete autonomy in international
representation, defense and foreign trade, without breaking with British tradition and institutions (Balthazar, 1986). According to Bourassa, this independent Canada was based on *racial duality*. Francophones were thus equal partners for English Canada and French minorities in every province were to be respected for their linguistic, cultural and religious rights against the tyranny of the majority (Balthazar, 1986; Harvey, 2008). Jones (2008) explained that since the majority of English Canada tended to perceive Canada as first and foremost British and an English unilingual country, it was important for French Canada to advance their status by claiming the equality of the two races within Canada. This is why Bourassa rejected political sovereignty for Québec (Lluch, 2014) and rather sought provincial autonomy, not only to preserve the French and Catholic character of Québec but also to reaffirm Canadian independence (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, Canadian independence, cultural duality and provincial autonomy being his fundamental ideas, Bourassa was first and foremost a Canadian nationalist whose basis was equal partnership of the two peoples, his ideas later developing to the theory of two nations.

Bourassa’s view of French Canadians and their cultural nationalism was, however, conservative and religious (Balthazar, 1986). In his brochure *The Language, Guardian of the Faith*, Bourassa strictly linked language with the providential vocation of *Canadiens français* in American soil (S. Gagnon, 2008). What was more, despite the importance of his movement, he refused to found a politically structured party, opposing both party spirits and even the principle of popular sovereignty (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, it was in line with traditional nationalism of the pre-Quiet Revolution era with religious conviction and anti-statism, but his vision of dualism and autonomist nationalism remained the core view of many Francophones of Québec thereafter.

While Bourassa saw hope in Canadian confederation to expand the cause of French Canadians, Groulx, on the other hand, was more pessimistic. Although he had once held Bourassa’s belief that Confederation was a pact between two nations, he quickly dismissed this view on his move to Montréal realizing that English Canadians did not share this view (Senese, 1979). He saw Confederation as a failure and started to urge French Canadians to look to Québec, by 1928 describing himself as more
Québécois than Canadien français (Senese, 1979). Thus, his loyalty was towards the Québec nation and its ancestral territory, even dreaming of an independent Québec (Balthazar, 1986). As a priest, however, Groulx’s priority was always his faith, often repeating the slogan “catholic first and above all” (quoted in Senese, 1979, p.155). His nationalism was thus based on his will to preserve Catholicism within a secular and materialistic North America. Québec was, for him, the only place on the predominantly Protestant continent where Catholicism had the chance to experience a renaissance. As Senese mentioned, “for Groulx, the nation was vital as the efficacious instrument for the regeneration of Catholicism in Quebec” (1979, p.157). In other words, Groulx’s nationalism was typically traditional but saw Québec as its territorial and spiritual protector. As a historian, priest and essayist, co-founding the nationalist monthly journal L’Action française, later L’Action nationale, Groulx inspired many Québec historians and intellectuals following his ways of thinking.

3.2. Introducing the Five (Anti) Nationalists

3.2.1. André Laurendeau (1912-1968)

As a journalist who was deeply committed to Québec nationalism, André Laurendeau is known to have co-chaired the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B & B Commission), also known as Laurendeau-Dunton Commission from 1963 to 1968, commissioned by then-Prime Minister Lester Pearson. More importantly, however, he is credited with renewing the nationalist narrative of Québec by modernizing the whole discourse with secularism, statism and social-democratic values. As his biographer Horton (1992) mentioned, during his long career, Laurendeau was closely associated with both Bourassa and Groulx but gradually becoming known as the third nationalist luminary of the 20th century. Balthazar agreed that Laurendeau was “un artiste of nationalism”, who opened the door to a new Québec nationalism as a neo-nationalist (1990, p.169).

Growing up exposed to traditional and conservative French Canadian nationalism through his father, Laurendeau himself had become a conservative nationalist who was not able to conceive of a French Canadian who was not a Catholic (Horton, 1992). As a faithful student of Groulx, Laurendeau
had joined the *Jeune Canada* movement in the 1930s which supported separatism and some essence of fascist ideology and anti-Semitism (Fraser, 2006). Still, this is considered to have been an exceptional moment of his career (Horton, 1992), more or less reflecting the social atmosphere of the time. His views would be significantly altered after his studies in Paris.

After seeing its effects in Italy, Laurendeau denounced fascism in the late 1930s upon coming back from Europe, which estranged him from his fellow French Canadian nationalists (Fraser, 2006). Becoming aware of Québec’s “intellectual poverty” (Horton, 1992, p.51), he started the task of renewing nationalist principles (Monière, 1990; Bickerton, 2006) to link nationalism with liberal ideas and social concerns and to open French Canadian nationalism to outside influences (Horton, 1992; Bickerton, 2006). He replaced his father’s editorship of *L’Action nationale* and sought “to train minds, to lead public opinion … to be the conscience of the nationalist movement” (quoted in Laforest, 1995b, p.61). Campaigning passionately against conscription during the Second World War, he was elected as the *Bloc populaire* and sat as member of the Québec legislature from 1944 to 1948 (Fraser, 2006).

The nationalist, democrat and humanist Laurendeau significantly contributed to political life when he joined *Le Devoir* which was to become a forum for neo-nationalist thinking in the 1950s (Bickerton, 2006). Joining to adapt French Canadian nationalism to the current situation of post-war atmosphere, Laurendeau, together with director Gérard Filon, succeeded in giving it “a new identity as a nationalist voice seeking social reform and greater political democracy in Quebec” (Horton, 1992, p.141). *Le Devoir* thus would later come to be perceived as one of the most important forces for the Quiet Revolution, within which Laurendeau was solely responsible for its liberal-nationalist line (Horton, 1992). The main features of his arguments at the time included institutional modernization, improvements in the material life of the francophone working class, and the fight for provincial autonomy so that Québec could play a more aggressive role internally (Horton, 1992). Importantly, nationalism was linked to the socio-economic concern: “A cultural minority has to obtain … normal conditions of living, or it must disappear; because people will not accept indefinitely a basic inequality” (Laurendeau, 1962/1976h, p.230). What was emphasized was that the *État du Québec*, the term already
used by Laurendeau in 1940, must play a dynamic role for economic and social development of the French Canadians (Horton, 1992). This new path of state controlled nationalism, or neo-nationalism, was to become the source of inspiration of the PLQ’s policy proposals which were to lead the Quiet Revolution in the next decade. In fact, between 1960 and 1963, Laurendeau’s editorials were considered must-reads for anyone who intended to comprehend the significant changes that were occurring in Québec (Horton, 1992). Laurendeau was thus one of the most important figures in setting the tone for modernizing Québec.

3.2.2. Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1919-2000)

Prime Minister of Canada from 1968 to 1984 with a short hiatus from 1979 to 1980, Trudeau was a significant political player who represented anti-nationalism. Even after retiring from politics, he fought against Québec nationalism, not only against separatism but also against any special recognition for Québec. What distinguished him from many of his contemporaries who became Québec nationalists? McRoberts pointed out that Trudeau’s distinctiveness came from his unusual upbringing. His father being a francophone and his mother an anglophone, Trudeau acquired a degree of bilingualism that was rare not only in Canada but in any country, unable to identify exclusively with either English or French Canada (1997). John English, Trudeau’s biographer who had exclusive access to his personal writings, is skeptical of this view and insisted that despite of being proud of his English blood and adapting his mother’s maiden name Elliot as his middle name, his primary heritage was French and Catholic. English actually revealed that although Trudeau portrayed himself as an anti-nationalist from his youth in his memoirs, traces can be found of Trudeau becoming a strong Québec nationalist in his youth, influenced by the teachers at the classical Jesuit College he attended and the war. He associated with the supporters of Laurentie espousing an independent French Catholic state and was deeply involved with revolutionary activity, momentarily becoming a separatist and even violent (2007).

Trudeau’s hidden nationalist past can still be considered a part of the common phenomenon for
a young French Canadian living in Québec at that time, as with Laurendeau. However, Trudeau’s academic studies abroad seem to have had a great impact on him becoming an anti-nationalist. English noted that his time at Harvard, Paris and the London School of Economics during the mid-1940s made him abandon his collectivist, racist, corporatist and illiberal views. At Harvard, which was for him “an extraordinary window on the world” (quoted in p.124), he took an important lesson that “liberal democracies must prove that ‘efficiency’ is compatible with liberty” and that “democracy is not synonymous with capitalistic exploitation”, which was to become the origin of his later convictions that “politics in a democracy must be ‘functional’ and that romantic and unrealistic notions such as nationalism could be deeply damaging”. Trudeau did not become an American liberal democrat but Harvard greatly altered his political thinking, becoming increasingly cosmopolitan and making him aware of the importance of the rule of law and its embodiment in constitutions which could be used to protect minority rights. Nevertheless, he still maintained an antipathy as a Québec nationalist concerning the British impact on his people (English, 2007).

English further depicted Trudeau’s studies in London, where he furthered his intellectual zeal under Harold Laski, a controversial figure who defended the Soviet system for its attempt to create economic equality, which Laski believed was the basis of true democracy. He also encouraged Trudeau to study federalism as a means of balancing minority interests and an active central state as an actor that would achieve economic justice. Through these educations, Trudeau acquired a vast knowledge of contemporary political economy and his travels afterwards through Middle East and Asia made him familiar with international politics and suspicious of frontiers. As a result, his political views “had become more secular, liberal and egalitarian, and that co-existed with a renewed yet different Roman Catholic faith” and importantly, less interested in both nationalism and history, but more concerned with “‘effective’ and ‘rational’ approaches to politics” (English, 2007, p.196). Thus, starting as a banal

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29 When a Québec journalist in 1962 asked 97 Québec élites to identify writers or philosophers who had influenced them most, a majority of them chose French authors. However, Trudeau chose only one French author, René Descartes, and the list clearly reflected his education abroad while youth: Adam Smith, Cardinal Newman, Sigmund Freud and Harold Laski (Lesage, 1963; English, 2007).
French Canadian nationalist who even aspired for separatism, Trudeau’s view considerably changed through his time abroad, as had Laurendeau’s but very differently, towards rejection to any nationalist claim.

3.2.3. Robert Bourassa (1933-1996)

A former leader of PLQ and Premier of Québec, Robert Bourassa was the youngest to hold the latter position at 36 years of age, as well as one of the longest serving, holding it just shy of a total of fifteen years, from 1970 to 1976 and then again from 1985 to 1994. Both of his tenures were followed by the PQ and its referendum, which could be said to reflect the dissatisfaction of the Québec people towards Bourassa’s politics. Nevertheless, he did not yield to anti-nationalism, stubbornly disagreeing with Trudeau on numerous occasions and showing his side as a Québec nationalist. He also refused to join forces with Lévesque when the latter left the PLQ and went on to create his own movement and a party afterwards. What Bourassa valued the most was economy, believing that “economic success promotes the primacy of politics” (Bourassa, 1995, p.246).

Like Trudeau, Bourassa had also experienced a moment of exile by studying and working in the English environment. After studying law and being accepted to the Québec Bar in 1957, he studied political economics at Oxford and public finance and company law at Harvard (Denis, 2006). At Oxford, due to his desire to keep contact with the political reality and fascination towards the socialist leader Aneurin Bevan, he got involved in the Labour Party whose objectives and programs corresponded with Bourassa’s preoccupations concerning social justice (Denis, 2006). In fact, Bourassa’s federalism derived primarily from his admiration for Europe. He was an admirer of Jean Monnet, French political economist and one of the fathers of the European Union, which Bourassa considered “one of the great success of humanity integrating the European peoples” (Bourassa, 1995, p.60). “Already in the 1960s” he said, “I was influenced by European integration with everything that could mean for the future” (Bourassa, 1995, p.60). Towards the end of his time abroad, Québec was changing and Bourassa was deeply interested in the situation in his native province. But upon coming back, Ottawa was where he
was offered a job, as a fiscal adviser at the federal Ministry of Revenue and as a public finance lecturer at the University of Ottawa (Denis, 2006).

But unlike Trudeau, Bourassa never entered federal politics, opting for provincial. His origin as a “son of East of Montréal” (Bourassa, 1995, p.15) as a working class francophone might have had some important effect. His particular interest in Québec politics since the 1944 election also made him enter the political milieu at a young age even without the right to vote, giving a speech as a volunteer for the provincial liberals (Bourassa, 1995). But his decisive moment was when he was working in Ottawa, where his seriousness and competence earned him a chance to join the Quebec Taxation Review Committee, established by Premier Lesage of the PLQ, as a secretary for the president (Denis, 2006). For a man who lived several years outside Québec, the committee gave him an important opportunity to regain contact with those who were central figures for the Quiet Revolution and by touring the province to take seriously the reality of the financial problems of the Québec people (Denis, 2006). He ran for the election in 1966 as a member of the PLQ, won the election but the party was defeated by the UN. Bourassa thus started his political career in the opposition party as a finance critic (Bourassa, 1995).

3.2.4. Camille Laurin (1922-1999)

Foremost among the PQ independentists of Lévesque’s era, Camille Laurin, the architect of the Charter of the French Language, entered politics to achieve independence without compromise (Godin, 2007). According to Fraser, Laurin, being four months older than Lévesque, was the oldest member of the PQ. He was born in Charlemagne, close to the island of Montréal, where his father owned a small business, running from a restaurant to trucks. He could not afford to send his academically promising son to a classical college but found a benefactor who would pay for the boy’s education. He was a bright student who later decided to become a priest but after eight months of attending the Grand Séminaire de Montréal, he concluded that priesthood did not suit him for theology seemed too narrow and specialized. Rather, he was to become a doctor, another profession of help and love. After graduating from the Faculty of Medicine at the Université de Montréal and working as an administrative secretary
for a year in Geneva at *Entr’aide Mondiale*, he pursued his postgraduate work in psychiatry, first in
Boston and then in Paris (2001; Picard, 2003).

It was 1957 that he returned to Montréal, where he was hired at a small private hospital founded
in 1919 by two doctors (Fraser, 2001). It was “more of a rest home for members of the élite in difficulty”
which Laurin’s strong personality, extraordinary energy and a legendary capacity for work led him to
want “to transform this hospital … into a public hospital, for everyone, a research hospital” (quoted in
Fraser, 2001, p.93). But this Freudian psychiatrist’s clashes with the director became irreconcilable and
his contract was not renewed in May 1962, causing the entire team of psychiatrists to resign in solidarity
(Fraser, 2001). The incident became a public issue and the then-Lesage led government called for an
inquiry commission which led Laurin winning his job back and the hospital to undergo significant
reforms. This experience was to become a turning point for him. With all the élites against him, whether
religious, medical, and administrative, his sense of isolation from the academic institutions and the
Canadian medical organizations reinforced his idea that “there was a new order of things to be
established” (Fraser, 2001, p.94). Laurin would enter politics being elected in the 1970 election as one
of the seven PQ members and acting as parliamentary leader until 1973, his first defeat. He was
reelected in 1976 when the PQ took power, thus assuming the role of Minister of State for Cultural

3.2.5. *René Lévesque (1922-1987)*

Lévesque was one of the disillusioned federalists (Balthazar, 1986), despite his creation of the
first elected independentist political party in Québec. In fact, he had begun his political career as a
member of the PLQ after his remarkable career in journalism. The Radio-Canada strike, which will be
later explained and was a major turning point for Lévesque and other francophones, made him realize
the total indifference of the federal government towards matters in French Canada (Lévesque, 1986). It
contributed in his development as a nationalist and the change in his attitude was forged in the heat of
action, making him decide to go on to politics in 1960 (Fraser, 2001). He joined the PLQ since there
was no other realistic option and since he liked the PLQ program and particularly Georges-Emile Lapalme, a former party leader who was more committed than anyone to social justice (Provencher, 1974/1977). As a minister in the PLQ government, Lévesque became a central figure of the Quiet Revolution, one of his accomplishments being the nationalization of hydro-electricity, which he referred to as “a plan to decolonize the hydroelectric sector” (Lévesque, 1986, p.170). Côté emphasized that Lévesque did not proceed with this project for patriotism nor for nationalism but rather saw this occasion as a way to advance the apprenticeship of Québec engineers (1992). Thus, his career as a nationalist and politician can be said to have started from when he sought liberalization and modernization of the francophone population where nationalism was only a tool and means from the beginning to achieve a just and democratic Québec.

As with Trudeau, Lévesque was a total bilingual from his youth but in a completely different environment. He was raised in New Carlisle, a village in the Gaspé Peninsula (Gaspésie) of eastern Québec and one of few communities along the coastlines where English-speaking people had settled in the 18th and 19th century (Desbarats, 1976). It was thus a village of English-speaking middle-class inhabitants, a decision-making centre for the anglophone community in Gaspésie, four miles away from the French-speaking blue-collar village of Paspébiac. Although it was somewhat remote and provincial, the place where Lévesque grew up was thus a microcosm of Québec society at that time (Provencher, 1974/1977). His parents were both francophones, and his father was a lawyer who worked with an anglophone who, the Lévesques became convinced, was exploiting their father (Fraser, 2001). Lévesque also noticed that while Catholics were educated in their “one-room schoolhouse”, the Protestants had a high school which became a symbol for him (Provencher, 1974/1977, p.14). Lévesque recalled later on:

(The English) weren’t evil people: they simply treated the French Canadians the same way that the white Rhodesians treat their blacks. They don’t do them any deliberate harm, but they have all the money and therefore the nice homes and the good schools. … That fine English high school with its senior grades gave its graduates the opportunity to go on to McGill University. My own school, the one for French Canadians, with one teacher for four or five grades, led nowhere. It was
Thus, Lévesque was brought up with a firsthand awareness of how francophones were treated unjustly in an anglophone dominated society.

Within this environment, Lévesque grew up to be a natural bilingual. According to Desbarats, Lévesque’s parents had nothing against learning English and even thought it was one of the advantages to living in an anglophone village. However, Lévesque’s father noticed his son’s French was suffering and thus sent him to a French seminary in Gaspé. With ideas of French Canadian nationalism poured into him by the seminary’s Jesuits, this was where Lévesque “began discovering there was such a thing as French Canada” (Desbarats, 1976, pp.60-61). Unlike Laurendeau or even Trudeau, this did not lead him to espouse nationalism. But as Provencher observed, “beyond a doubt he was deeply influenced by the intellectual and political ferment that stirred Quebec during the 1930’s” (1974/1977, p.23).

3.2.6. Lévesque and Laurendeau

It should probably be noted that Lévesque, a former journalist, and Laurendeau, although ten years apart, were strongly connected through a very friendly and professional relationship. For one thing, they were the two most distinguished journalists of their time, Laurendeau for the writing press and Lévesque for the radio-televison (Pelletier, 1992). When the media was beginning to have significant influence, they both contributed greatly to opening up Québec to a wider world, Laurendeau trying to maintain an outward-looking nationalist perspective at L’Action nationale and further pushing his task at Le Devoir to write frequently on what is happening in the world and Canada’s role on these international events (Horton, 1992). From 1952, Laurendeau also hosted a television show, Pays et Merveilles, in which he interviewed guests and talked about history and culture of different countries (Horton, 1992). It aired until 1961 and made Laurendeau one of the most famous and respected television personalities in Québec (Horton, 1992).

As a former war-correspondent in the Second World War and Korean War, Lévesque became a journalist with CBC later hosting a solo television show as well, Point de Mire, which talked about the
world and made him a star as well. In the late 1950s, while many of his contemporaries were preoccupied with Québec politics, Lévesque was reaching out to the masses and explaining what was happening internationally. His style was simple but he had the capacity to make people believe that they were intelligent enough to understand the complexity of the world (Brouillet, 1992; Sylvestre, 1992) and that life was full of nuances contrary to the dominant ideologies that preached the “Believe or Die” (Sylvestre, 1992). Lévesque (1986) recalled:

Indeed, although Québécois had been presented as being turned in on themselves, and too systematically isolated by the regime and by their intelligentsia to care very much about the rest of the world, in fact they turned out to be as curious as raccoons, and not only open to others but singularly eager to put themselves in their skins. The only condition was that the ‘others’ be presented simply and as people like them, which, in effect, behind the mask of differences and inequalities, they are. (p.146)

Taking into account that his show was seen by virtually everyone in Québec and French Canada (Sylvestre, 1992), there was no question that he contributed to opening up people’s mind in two ways, exposing them to the outside world and also showing that they were capable of understanding it.

Lévesque and Laurendeau worked side by side throughout the Radio-Canada strike, exchanging ideas about the political significance of the crisis (Provencher, 1974/1977), Laurendeau even anticipating Lévesque’s advance into politics (Lévesque, 1986). Lévesque admired Laurendeau’s professionalism as a journalist to serve the public with the truth, admitting that “[Laurendeau] was the main and sometimes the only person I would willingly accept criticism from, even if it occasionally became quite biting”, Laurendeau being “quietly merciless in his observations” and “a man of profound convictions” (Lévesque, 1986, p.147). On the other hand, Lévesque was actually one of the people to whom Laurendeau consulted whether he should participate in the B & B Commission. Lévesque told him that he should not waste time in Ottawa, drawing up a long list of reasons against participating (Laurendeau, 1990). Still, they would meet occasionally during the 1960s, even after Lévesque assumed his political role, until Laurndeau’s death in 1968.
3.3. Similarities among (Anti) Nationalisms: Social-Democracy and Statism

While Québec (anti) nationalist narratives are far from monolithic, the five narratives which will be discussed diverging widely on many topics, there still exists some consensus and similarities. A core similarity was a commitment to two new elements: social-democracy and statism. Both of these stemmed from antagonism against Québec’s traditional conservative nationalism. Right-wing nationalism had been the norm of French Canadian nationalism in which anti-statism was the fundamental element of its ideology and was aggressively promoted by the Catholic Church (Horton, 1992). Thus, Laurendeau’s new nationalist narrative included these two elements to modernize French Canadian nationalism, overcoming the traditional right-wing type of nationalism and linking nationalism to a social-democracy in which the government of Québec – l’État du Québec – would play a leading role.

Of course, this conservatism was symbolized by Duplessis, who many of the intellectuals of this generation tried to counteract. Laurendeau continuously declared war against Duplessis in his newspaper in the 1950s and made him a living symbol of all the wrongs of Québec (Horton, 1992). Although he sometimes agreed with Duplessis on the necessity of protecting provincial autonomy, he denounced him by stating that “this is a régime which defended provincial autonomy to make Quebec the paradise for monopolies, the kingdom of low salaries, and the land of slums” (quoted in Fraser, 2001, p.7). Similarly, Trudeau and Laurin, old friends from their university years, worked together at the student paper Le Quartier Latin and later at Cité libre, sharing the same goals and fighting a common battle for liberty against dictatorship, cynicism, and political immorality in the Duplessis years (Fraser, 2006; English, 2007). Trudeau was, in fact, especially deeply grounded in the political life of Québec in the 1950s through debates on media and journalistic writings in newspapers (English, 2007). Thus, it was natural that these people will each advance to reform Québec when the time came.
3.3.1. Laurendeau: The Forerunner

As someone who received a classical education which prevented him from realizing the material and social aspects of the world around him, to the extent that he was completely unaware of the Depression (Horton, 1992), it was Laurendeau’s two-year experience in Paris from 1935 that totally transformed his views. He was influenced by the doctrine of personalism of the Catholic left which synthesized Catholicism and modernism (Laforest, 1995b), believing only the ideological left could uplift hope for the future (Horton, 1992). This enabled him to become one of the few nationalists of this time who could deal with Québec’s past and present, and future that contained deep changes ahead (Horton, 1992). As Horton observed, “the same André Laurendeau who in November 1932 had participated in a Jeune Canada meeting devoted solely to communist-bashing was now struggling to integrate Marx and Lenin into his thinking” (1992, p.53). Inevitably, the now left-leaning Laurendeau, who saw the poor as a target for social reform, would go on to condemn the conservative Catholicism of French Canadian nationalists (Horton, 1992).

According to Horton, Laurendeau owed a key new thought to Nicolas Berdyaev, a Russian émigré who was considered to be the most advanced social critic among the personalists. During a 1936 interview, Berdyaev preached to Laurendeau an important lesson; that a Christian did not have to accept harsh social realities as god’s punishment but rather that it was a responsibility for the Christian to change the material world to better serve the divine cause. This thought led Laurendeau to convert French Canadian nationalism from a passive one into a more active social force, denouncing old elitist arguments that “the misery of the masses was to be endured rather than changed” (Horton, 1992, p.58). As Laurendeau remarked, “socialism is oriented towards Progress … and justice. Nationalism glorifies tradition, culture and power. If that is the case, I am a socialist-nationalist” (quoted in Horton, 1992, p.66). Considering that Laurendeau would eventually completely lose his religious faith, there is no denying that this thought had a great impact on the process (1992). Thus, transforming into an active nationalist with a different interpretation of Catholicism and later completely abandoning religion, Laurendeau went on from Position Two to Three of the BVP.
Another turning point for Laurendeau was during his relatively brief political career in the 1940s. Although Laurendeau had been mainly a theoretical intellectual, this opportunity enabled him to meet people directly as a politician and learn their daily difficulties and concerns. As Horton pointed out, this led him to favour concrete proposals rather than high-sounding principles. Laurendeau finally started to see and face the social problems on the ground and admit that Québec had moved on from a rural to an urban-industrial province (1992).

At the same time, Horton described how Laurendeau was able to understand that the Church’s leadership role within the Québec society was ending, to be replaced by the state. Just as he was losing his own faith by realizing the deficiency of clerics who often preached unhelpful guidance from an old doctrine which no longer had any meaning to the people, he started to look towards the État du Québec for much needed initiative. He strongly advocated the creation of a Ministry of Education which would replace the traditional role of the Church and was the first to advocate the creation of a commission in 1960 to make recommendations for this immense restructuring. He was clearly abandoning the anti-statist position of traditional conservative nationalism and was now more in favour of the Québec government’s intervention in defending and enhancing the lives of French Canadians (1992). In so doing, although Laurendeau always used the term French Canadians, his conception was clearly becoming that of a Québécois. On the other hand, Laurendeau, being faithful to what French Canadian nationalism had preached, was skeptical of governmental institutions and their corruption (Horton, 1992). Horton mentioned that it was Laurendeau’s influential pen that played an important part in Québec growing from the most corrupt to the most democratic electoral environment in Canada (1992).

3.3.2. Trudeau, Bourassa and Laurin: The Followers

Trudeau seems to have also been influenced by Catholicism and thus embraced social-democracy as well, despite his complete faith in liberalism. Indeed, as a true son of Enlightenment, liberalism was the exact theory by which he came to perceive reality, driven by the ideals of individual liberty, autonomy, justice and equality (Maclure, 2003). It was a philosophy that respected both individual and
group rights, was based on the Enlightenment’s faith in reason, distrusted communitarian claims and deeply opposed nationalism (Bickerton, 2006). For Trudeau, liberalism was “the only philosophy for our time, because it does not apply to new problems the old doctrinaire solutions … because it knows that the past is less important than the future” (quoted in English, 2007, p.476). Trudeau’s conception of liberalism was, however, not exactly that of laissez-faire. Bickerton argued that he was not an American-style libertarian or John Locke/Adam Smith school of liberal. Rather, it was solidly in line with the Canadian tradition of individualism committed to social justice, derived from Catholic social doctrine. His intellectual writing and practice in politics both demonstrated his comfortability with state planning, skepticism for capitalism and commitment to redistribution (2006). He strongly believed that the state must interfere to defend liberty to ensure that the “strong and powerful don’t abuse their strength and power in order to take freedoms away from the little man” (quoted in English, 2010, p.293). Thus, as Bickerton argued, “what Trudeau calls the ‘Just Society’ involves state intervention that embodies the collectivist ethos which sets Canadians apart from their southern neighbours” (2006, p.136).

According to his biographer Denis, Robert Bourassa was also a man of social-democracy who liked to call himself a man of centre-left valuing economic stability, citing French politician Jean Jaurès that one cannot build socialism on poverty. He believed that he was contributing to promote social-democracy in Québec through various measures such as health insurance, the Office de la protection du consommateur, or family allowances, among others. In fact, his commitment to social-democracy was strong enough to make him wonder that with a gentrifying PQ, rather than along independentist and federalist, Québec politics should instead be based on the conservative and reformist axes (2006).

Social-democracy was also a part of Camille Laurin’s philosophy, which was well demonstrated during the crisis in the hospital. What was more, he considered the situation of the French language in Québec as a matter of social justice (Québec, 1977). It was the economic and cultural inequality that was at stake and especially that of francophone workers (Québec, 1977). He considered the language law to be the work of justice to strengthen the status of French (Laurin, 1977a). The time had come to
correct the wrongs within the society, and it was from this conviction that Laurin sought independence and joined politics in the first place.

3.3.3. Lévesque: Democracy above All

Lévesque, meanwhile, did not actively use the term social-democracy to describe his policies (Denis, 2008). McRoberts argued that the term does not precisely describe Lévesque considering his sometimes difficult relationship with the unionist movement. Rather, his reforms were better perceived as populist, always been driven by deep trust in the people and an equally deep distrust of organizations of all kinds, including the trade unions. They were based, however, on an almost unlimited confidence in liberal democracy which dominated his entire political career confirming Lévesque’s undisputed role as a reformer (1992). Lévesque himself admitted of being a social-democrat if it meant essentially two things: equality of opportunity and the definition of a new form of power (Maillard, 1997).

Above all, however, Lévesque was committed to a democracy which he believed should value the will of people more than anything else, explicitly constitutions (Lévesque, 1986), contrary to Trudeau who tried to define Canada in constitutional terms. Lévesque’s anglophone biographer Graham Fraser, who had considerable direct access to Lévesque, argued that “he had a stronger commitment to Quebec itself than to the ideal of independence” and that his achievement was “above all, a commitment to democracy” (Fraser, 2001, pp.xxviii, xxxi) which many of Lévesque’s later observers supported (Assimopoulos, 1992; Brouillet, 1992; Johnson, 1992; Laforest, 1992; McRoberts, 1992; L. Gagnon, 2008).

For one thing, he valued direct contact with people. During his campaign, he would meet thousands of people in small groups or in public meetings (Gagnon & Lévesque, 1992). Le Devoir called it the “kitchen meeting … a relatively unusual door-to-door campaign” in which he “visits what averages out to three homes every evening, and a small group gathers at each house to have an informal chat with him” (quoted in Provencher, 1974/1977, p.141). Gagnon and Lévesque observed that this long pilgrimage was the shortest way to gain power. Even as premier, despite his heavy responsibility, he
was present every Monday in his riding to listen to people talk about their problems (1992). It was natural for him to be close to the people, listening and sympathizing with them.

Although Lévesque did not believe that government should necessarily intervene, he thought it was responsible for correcting injustices since a healthy society is a society where at least all the people are treated respectfully (Maillard, 1997). At the same time, he was well aware what Laurendeau had feared, of government having too much power, in other words, of it being corrupt. In fact, one of Lévesque’s important objectives when he entered the field of politics was the democratization of political structures, a concern which lasted for 25 years of his political career (Gagnon & Lévesque, 1992).

The election-funding legislation was thus one of the most important to Lévesque, one that he cherished, which forbade corporate donations to political parties and permitted only voters to contribute, becoming the tightest funding legislation in the Western world (Fraser, 2001). In this sense, Lévesque achieved one of the things that Laurendeau had always wanted. As will be explained later, Lévesque wanted this law to become the first one that the PQ as a government would table, naming it Bill 1. His wish did not come true since Laurin’s language law would take that place. Nevertheless, it was one of Lévesque’s democratic reforms of which he will always be the proudest (Lévesque, 1986).

3.4. Turning Point: The Radio-Canada Strike

As much as Québec intellectuals had to face the conservative and corrupted government within its province that was symbolized by Duplessis, there was also another challenge that Québec had to contend with: the federal government in Ottawa. The producers’ strike at Radio-Canada from late-1958 to early-1959 is said to have focused intellectual anger not against Duplessis but against the federal government for the first time (Fraser, 2001). It was the turning point where Lévesque and many of his contemporaries turned into neo-nationalists, and the future anti-nationalists, including Pierre Elliot Trudeau, changed course as well (English, 2007). In this sense, the strike represented a consensus
between both neo- and anti-nationalists that Ottawa was not doing enough to accommodate French Canadians and yet it also marked the start of those two groups seeking change down very different paths.

It all started with the CBC management refusing to recognize the right of its producers at Radio-Canada to unionize because it considered producers to be managerial staff. Thus, the Montréal producers left their posts and went on strike, claiming recognition of their right to organize and of their association to be the producers’ negotiating agent with the CBC (Provencher, 1974/1977). The central problem was, however, the total indifference of the federal government, which had jurisdiction over the CBC Crown cooperation, making the strike a symbol not only of a new white-collar militancy, but of French Canadian nationalism and English Canadian insensitivity (Fraser, 2001). Even when negotiations broke down completely, Ottawa refused to listen and would not intervene. This led many, including Lévesque and Laurendeau, to believe that if the strike was in Toronto, the federal government and parliament would have reacted promptly but because it concerned French Canadians, Ottawa could not care less (Provencher, 1974/1977). The strikers organized a protest march in Ottawa and in Montréal which ultimately led the strike to end with the Crown cooperation signing an agreement with the union (Provencher, 1974/1977). Yet, Ottawa never intervened, then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker making it clear that his intention was to not interfere under any circumstances (Provencher, 1974/1977). The second-class treatment of the Canadiens français by Ottawa was clearer than ever. This event eventually was to be acknowledged as an important wake-up call for Québec nationalists, Laurendeau explaining the emergence of nationalism in Québec:

The man who is treated like a second-class citizen, like a colonial as opposed to a strong and inaccessible metropolis, like a nigger whose suffering stirs no sympathy in his all-powerful master: this man is either crushed and consents to a state of moral slavery, or, on the other hand, he rightfully demands the restoration of his shattered dignity. In any case, he feels wounded. A lot of us felt something like that. (quoted in Fraser, 2001, p.22-23)

As is clear with the Radio-Canada incident, anti-nationalists from Québec were not indifferent to the way French Canadians were treated by Ottawa. On the contrary, they understood that something had
to be done and this was precisely why they looked towards Ottawa, rather than Québec city, for much needed initiatives, since post-war Ottawa was heavily engaged in major new social and economic programs (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980). As Trudeau explained, “in order to prevent Quebec from getting obsessed with exercising all the power itself, there had to be some Quebeckers in Ottawa exercising some of the powers in a way that was acceptable and beneficial to French Quebeckers” (Trudeau, 1998f, pp.106-7). Entering federal politics as a member of the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) in 1965, Trudeau tried to offer an alternative to Québec nationalism, when the province was undergoing much desired change and many spheres becoming battlefields of political competence between the two levels of governments. Ottawa had to show that Canada was also a homeland for the francophones and that they could feel at home everywhere in the country (Balthazar, 1986). Holding strong resentment against the second-class treatment for French Canadians within the Canadian public service (English, 2007), language was especially a great concern for Trudeau who fought vigorously against Canadian English unilingualism (Maclure, 2003).

The neo-nationalists, on the other hand, looked towards Québec city as their nation’s capital for their own initiative. They also confronted the Duplessis regime but they did not renounce nationalism per se. They defended the linguistic and cultural rights of the Canadiens français and provincial autonomy, as well as workers’ rights, pluralism and openness to the world with their intention of secularization and modernization of their nationalism (Balthazar, 1986). Thus, while anti-nationalists went to Ottawa, neo-nationalists remained in Québec, foreshadowing the later battle between the two camps.

3.5. Two Nations Theory

The Radio-Canada strike being an important turning point, the new Québec nationalism gave rise to demands that the Canadian political order be adjusted to adapt better to the Canadian duality and the

30 Laurendeau notes in his diary that Trudeau sought “a position of strength from which he could counter-attack a René Lévesque” (1990, p.346).
centrality of Québec within it (McRoberts, 1997). Thus, what Québec nationalism from the 1960s generally aspired to become was a true partner of English Canada within Canada. What anti-nationalists and neo-nationalists fundamentally disagreed on was, of course, their conception on how this was to be achieved, especially due to the differences in their perceptions of nation and nationalism. Among neo-nationalists, however, disagreement also existed and it is the mission of this chapter to outline those differences. Since the two nations theory more or less inspired many of the neo-nationalists with varying interpretations, it seems appropriate to examine how each figure perceived this concept. But first, it seems important to highlight a man who opposed the concept of the two nations: Trudeau.

3.5.1. Trudeau: Constitutional Patriotism

Many young intellectuals in Québec who were able to travel to Europe after the war witnessed the ravages caused by fascism and started to distance themselves from any form of nationalism (Balthazar, 1986). Moreover, with the creation of the United Nations which inspired a world without borders, nationalism simply seemed to be outdated (Balthazar, 1986). While fighting systematic political corruption and the exploitation of the francophone workers in Québec, anti-nationalists never supported the idea that responsibility for the historical decline of the French Canadians lay with the English Canadians (Maclure, 2003), denying any form of national collectivity. This was also true for a liberalist Trudeau, for whom the individual was more important than any collectivity, rejecting the outright importance of the nation (McRoberts & Posgate, 1980).

Trudeau recognized the nation in both the political and the sociological sense. Nation in the political sense refers to “a particular country or to all the people – whatever their language or ethnicity – living within its boundaries”, for whom the state has the responsibility to govern. He preferred to call this “patriotism or the common good” rather than nationalism as some would (Trudeau, 1998e, p.94-95). In the sociological sense, a nation is “an ethnic, tribal or linguistic group” (Trudeau, 1998e, p.94-95). Trudeau did not denounce this aspect of nation and rather recognized its importance as “the guardian of certain very positive qualities: a cultural heritage, common traditions, a community
awareness, historical continuity, a set of mores; all of which … make individuals what they are” (Trudeau, 1962/1968b, p.177). But still, historical origins meant little to Trudeau, claiming that they “are less important than people generally think” (Trudeau, 1968c, p.31). He saw French Canadians as a mere linguistic community whose equal partnership with the English could be claimed “because each of these linguistic groups has the power to break the country”, not because of their historical origins (Trudeau, 1968c, p.31). It was the existing number of people that counted, not their historical importance as founding peoples of Canada.

Because he rejected that political and sociological nations coincide and rather argued in governing people as individuals (Trudeau, 1998e), he rejected the concept of two nations, stating that it was “dangerous in theory and groundless in fact” (Trudeau, 1968c, p.31). As Trudeau argued:

> It would be disastrous – at the very moment when French Canadians are at last awakening to the modern world and making their presence count in the country – their politicians were to be won over to anti-federalist policies. The consequence would be that French Canadians in Ottawa, Washington, and all capitals of the world would represent a country of five million inhabitants, and could expect to exert an influence in proportion to this population. (1968c, p.31)

His suggestion was for Québec to remain a part of the Canadian federation which groups two linguistic communities, where French Canadians can belong to a country of more than eighteen million peoples, with a very high standard of living and a degree of industrial maturity with which the most brilliant futures are promised (Trudeau, 1968c). His argument demonstrated that he saw this nation in political terms to imply the creation of a separate nation-state. For this reason, what the two nations theory meant for Trudeau was separatism that would easily break the Canadian federation he so highly regarded. In the same manner, Trudeau also rejected even giving Québec special status, which he supposed would inevitably lead to separation as well (English, 2007). Thus, he seemed to believe that any official recognition of Québec would eventually lead to a separation of Québec from the rest of Canada.

This does not mean, however, that Trudeau was too blind to see the distinctiveness of Québec. Trudeau insisted that it is obvious that Québec is a distinct society with its territorially defined borders,
its majority speaking French, and a particular set of laws, all of which are inarguable facts resulting in
the Canadian Constitution of 1867 and federalism which even “enabled and encouraged the
development in Quebec of a province that is a distinct society” (Trudeau, 1992, p.24). According to
him, Québec has become “an adult” with the Quiet Revolution and no favours or privileges were needed
for its peoples to face everyday challenges and to occupy their place within Canada or even the world
(Trudeau, 1996/1998a, p.161). It was even insulting for French Canadians in Québec to claim more
powers for their provincial government (Trudeau, 1987/1998g, p.161). At the same time, Trudeau
considered the other nine provinces to all be distinct in their own ways, while all still sharing a
considerable heritage. In this sense, Trudeau saw Québec as one of the ten distinct provinces, already
possessing executive, legislative and juridical powers, thus needing no further recognition through

For a theoretical and rational Trudeau, nationalism was a primitive movement fueled by irrational
emotionalism. Meaning intolerance, discrimination, and totalitarianism by nature (Trudeau,
1962/1968b), nationalism was for Trudeau an emotional appeal to preserve the integrity of the nation
and a theoretical aberration (Trudeau, 1965/1968a), feeding off the energy essential for modernizing
Québec (Maclure, 2003). It was to fade away in the course of history once it had become useless, just
as clannishness, tribalism and feudalism (Trudeau, 1965/1968a). Although he claimed to have
recognized that new Québec nationalism since the Quiet Revolution was not the same as Duplessis’s,
he saw it as a mistaken direction nonetheless of emphasizing maître chez nous when more practical
improvements were needed in the education and health systems (Trudeau, 1998f). He was even opposed
to the idea of nationalizing the hydro-electronic system in Québec during the Quiet Revolution,
Lévesque mentioning that “the word ‘nationalization’ was enough to make Trudeau’s hair stand on end,”
a reaction that was common among anglophones (1986, p.173).

Aside from his Official Languages Act which will be discussed in chapter four, one of his
strategies to settle Québec nationalism and promote national unity was with the Constitution, of which
Trudeau already had a clear vision upon entering politics. According to him, Canada did not need to
change federal-provincial jurisdictions, nor to recognize a special status of Québec. On the contrary, the Constitution must be accompanied by a Charter to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians, thereby preventing states or any other groups from restricting these rights (Trudeau, 1990).

Though enacted without Québec’s consent, the new Constitution and the Charter did in fact serve as a unifying symbol and homogenized policies across the country (Lluch, 2014). Therefore, it ultimately functioned to reduce the powers of the Québec government, directly affecting central Québec laws (McRoberts, 1997).

The Constitution Act of 1982, with which Trudeau (re)patriated the Canadian Constitution as a whole, was largely seen as Canadian nationalism by Québec nationalists (Lluch, 2014). But as a person who rejected nationalism for Québec, could have he been a Canadian nationalist? In fact, Trudeau was often observed forcing Quebecers to choose between two alternative allegiances: Québec or Canada (McRoberts, 1997), requiring citizens to directly relate to the Canadian state when it came to rights and responsibilities (Bickerton, 2006). Thus, Trudeau’s anti-nationalism can be considered to be an anti-Québec nationalism, which he tried to defeat with his own Canadian nationalism disguised in individualism. As Forbes put it, “the confusing difficulty Trudeau faced was the need to foster a certain nationalism in the very act of trying to overcome it” (2007, p.41).

On the other hand, there are some reasons to believe that he was a true anti-nationalist and a constitutional patriot. In Trudeau’s logic, nationalism had a mainly strategic legitimacy which would melt into a constitutional patriotism once Québec neo-nationalism/separatism failed (Maclure, 2003). Trudeau wrote:

"One way of offsetting the appeal of separatism is by investing tremendous amounts"

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31 **Patriation** is the widely utilized term to indicate the bringing of powers to amend the constitution to Canada from Britain.

32 According to Müller, “constitutional patriotism … designates the idea that political attachment ought to center on the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures of a liberal democratic constitution. Put differently, political allegiance is owed primarily neither to a national culture, as proponents of liberal nationalism have claimed, nor to ‘the worldwide community of human beings,’ as … cosmopolitanism has it. …Constitutional patriotism has experienced a major renaissance since the mid-1990s when observers … began to view it as a normatively attractive form of civic, non-national (or perhaps even post-national) attachment for increasingly multicultural societies” (2007, pp.1-2).
of time, energy, and money in nationalism, at the federal level. A national image must be created that will have such an appeal as to make any image of a separatist group unattractive... In short, the whole of the citizenry must be made to feel that it is only within the framework of the federal state that their language, culture, institutions, sacred traditions, and standard of living can be protected from external attack and internal strife. (Trudeau, 1965/1968a, p.193)

Trudeau’s instrumental nationalism was to result in a Canada that he described in his memoirs: “with the charter in place, we can now say that Canada is a society where all people are equal and where they share some fundamental values based upon freedom” (Trudeau, 1993, p.323). The Charter of Rights and Freedoms was therefore of great importance to Trudeau, which represented and embodied his vision of Canadian nationhood (Bickerton, 2006). Maclure pointed out that “Trudeau theorized a type of constitutional patriotism before the concept even existed” (2003, p.98) different from mere Canadian nationalism. In fact, his son, Justin Trudeau, the current Prime Minister of Canada seems to follow his father’s view. In 2015, shortly after his swearing-in as the new PM, he spoke to the New York Times that Canada was becoming “a new kind of state”. He explained:

> There is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada. There are shared values – openness, respect, compassion, willingness to work hard, to be there for each other, to search for equality and justice. Those qualities are what make us the first postnational [italics added] state. (quoted in Lawson, 2015, ¶45)

He further denied national identity which consists of religion, culture and even language since it poses a challenge to integrating people from various backgrounds effectively (Lawson, 2015). Thus, Pierre Trudeau’s idea of a constitutional patriotism seems to have been inherited by his son, which is not nationalism as the Québec nationalists had criticized.

### 3.5.2. Laurendeau: Equal Partnership and Special Status

Laurendeau was the heir of both Bourassa and Groulx. Committed to the belief that a constructive partnership could be established between the two nations through enlightened compromise, he clearly stood in line with Bourassa’s two nations theory (Horton, 1992). At the same time, as a strong Québec
nationalist who searched for a collective project for Québec, Laurendeau can well be considered to be in line with Groulx as well (Vallerand, 1990). Acknowledging first and foremost that the Québec nation exists and that Canada is both bilingual and bicultural (Maclure, 2003), the Canada that Laurendeau dreamed of was a country where francophones and anglophones were treated as equals and where Québec would play a particular role as the hub of French Canadians (Balthazar, 1990). Laurendeau’s conception of the two nations is well documented in the report of the B & B Commission. For one thing, the mandate of the Commission was

> to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership [italics added] between the two founding races [italics added], taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution. (B & B Commission, 1967, p. xxi)

Laforest pointed out that the mandate itself was a victory for Laurendeau, including the thesis that Canada was founded by two peoples, hence the spirit of duality (1995b). Martel and Pâquet similarly commented that Laurendeau was aware of the historical mission of this commission which sought to understand the present state of relations between the two founding people (2010). However, although the notion of two races must have been an important premise for Laurendeau, it is doubtful that he perceived history, represented by the term founding, as a decisive criterion. Of course, Laurendeau clearly admitted the undeniable importance of history:

> In our view the reference to the two “founding races” or “peoples who founded Confederation” is an allusion to the undisputed role played by Canadians of French and British origin in 1867, and long before Confederation. (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxii)

However, he rejected this narrow definition of the two peoples and rather included a wider view:

> As we understand our mandate, this equality should be the equal partnership not

The term race was also used by Henri Bourassa but does not have any significant meaning. As is explained in the report, “the word ‘race’ is used in an older meaning as referring to a national group, and carries no biological significance” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxii).
only of the two peoples which founded Confederation but also of each of their respective languages and cultures. What we are aiming for, then, is the equal partnership of all who speak either language and participate in either culture, \textit{whatever their ethnic origin} [italics added]. For us the principle of equal partnership takes priority over all historical and legal considerations, regardless of how interesting and important such considerations may be. (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxxix)

Thus, as he clearly stated, the historical meaning of the two peoples is insufficient and adds those who “speak either language and participate in either culture” at the very moment. This naturally included those who have different ancestral origins, because it does not matter where they come from. For Laurendeau, the important thing was that these two peoples or “two great, distinct cultures” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxxiii) included those from any origin and were treated equally within Canada. Thus, as Horton (1992) pointed out, the crucial term for Laurendeau was \textit{equality} within the mandate, which was what made him decide to participate in the Commission.

This does not mean, however, that Laurendeau thought little of history. Quite the contrary. According to Horton, Laurendeau had such a respect for the past and French Canada’s traditional culture beginning with the French language, that it earned him a reputation of being his generation’s most admired interpreter of the national culture of French Canada. It was with his deep historical consciousness that he was able to pursue a dual mission as a man of action and analysis which made him gain that status within Québec (1992).

What is important to be analysed here is that Laurendeau saw the two peoples or nations in cultural terms. For one thing, it was not a political effort. As Horton mentioned, the equal partnership to which Laurendeau aspired defined nationality in cultural terms rather than political and that as a cultural nationalist, he considered this Commission as his field of action, as opposed to many of his contemporaries who acted in the area of political nationalism, including Lévesque (1992). Second, the equality of people that Laurendeau sought was not that of individuals but of cultural groups. Laurendeau would never agree with Trudeau’s individual liberalism since equality of individuals can never be achieved without the equality of communities, stating clearly that “individual equality can fully exist
only if each community has, throughout the country, the means to progress within its culture and to express that culture” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xliv). For Laurendeau, Trudeau and his anti-nationalist colleagues were systematically underestimating the cultural factor (Horton, 1992).

However, it cannot be denied that Laurendeau’s cultural nationalism gradually acquired a political aspect. As we shall further see in the next section which deals with separatism, the Commission had the effect of turning Laurendeau into a stronger Québec nationalist. Indeed, Laurendeau might not have become a separatist during the Commission but he was convinced that more political powers were necessary for a new Québec that had been transforming with the Quiet Revolution. This conviction was so strong that he admitted in his diary that bilingualism for Canada had become a secondary matter:

> At the beginning of the inquiry, I would have been inclined to think of Canada as a whole as a bilingual country, within which Québec would be recognized of the special prerogatives. Today, it seems to me that the problem is reversed; special status for Québec is the first requirement: how can we integrate the new Québec, without stifling it, which has been manifesting itself since 1959? (Laurendeau, 1990, pp.147-8)

Recognizing “the main elements of a distinct French-speaking society in Quebec” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxxiii) in order to balance and achieve equal partnership, what Laurendeau envisaged was an “asymmetrical federalism that would recognize Quebec as a ‘distinct society’ and respect provincial prerogatives” (Maclure, 2003, p.69) with which the equality of the two founding peoples would able to become the mainspring of the Canadian federation. The phrase *distinct society* being later heavily used during the constitutional negotiations in the 1980s, the inclusion of it in an official document of the Royal Commission was a true breakthrough. Furthermore, Laurendeau believed that what the Commission was dealing with remained superficial without constitutional considerations and planned to write a complete volume on the issue (Lacoste, 1990). He hoped for “a new type of collaboration with the whole of Canada” (Laurendeau, 1962/1976h, p.233) to which he would contribute with the book. Although he did not live long enough to accomplish the task, we see that he did not remain a cultural nationalist but sought constitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of Québec.
Some, both within and outside the Commission, thought Laurendeau was going too far beyond the Commission’s mandate. Trudeau and others at Cité libre were among them and attacked Laurendeau and the Preliminary Report of the Commission published in 1965 which stated that Canada was going through the greatest crisis in its history (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). Although it was primarily the commission’s methods that concerned Trudeau, going beyond the traditional role of a Royal Commission to collect data and offer recommendations and becoming themselves the animateurs, he nonetheless criticized Laurendeau for becoming trapped within the nationalist discourse, especially due to his musings on the special status for Québec (Horton, 1992; English, 2007). The difference of Trudeau and Laurendeau is thus clear, the former neglecting any form of Québec nationalism and the latter leaning more towards constitutional recognition of Québec going beyond mere cultural nationalism.

3.5.3. Bourassa: Special Status and Cultural Sovereignty

Although Bourassa regarded that English Canada was not monolithic and each region or province had different voices (Bourassa, 1995) as with Trudeau, as a neo-nationalist, he was in line with Laurendeau, valuing the commission’s principle of equality between the two founding peoples (Denis, 2006). Defining himself first and foremost as a francophone before being a Québécois or Canadian (Bourassa, 1995), Bourassa, during his political career, always sought to establish Québec as a francophone state within the Canadian federation and North America (Bourassa, 1995). He regarded Canadian federalism as an effective formula as long as it was improved by taking inspiration from the European model. This improvement could, however, only occur if there were a strong Québec State, responsible for its majority francophones, of which economic development was the fundamental basis (Denis, 2006). Thus with other PLQ reformists, he gave rise to the idea that the future of Québec resided necessarily in a special status within Canada (Denis, 2006; Godin, 2007).

Writing an article in Le Devoir in 1967 entitled Québec’s Claims and the Problem of Sharing Fiscal Resources, he stated clearly that “Québec will choose a particular status, which complies with
its own characteristic traits, within a renewed Canadian federation” (quoted in Denis, 2006, p.30).

According to him, Québec had already taken some steps toward this path, opting out from several federal-provincial programs with fiscal compensation. Confirming that every political party in Québec agreed to push the state’s assertion further, he concluded:

Québec is demanding more than money, the power to direct its future. Increased financial resources would mean too little, without the means to change its taxation according to its socio-economic situation. (quoted in Denis, 2006, p.31)

Bourassa's nationalism was clear: He was not satisfied with the status-quo and sought political affirmation thus he cannot be credited only as a federalist just because he did not wish for separation.

In fact, when Bourassa became the new Premier in 1970, Trudeau hoped for cooperation. Trudeau stated:

I thought he was someone with whom we could make progress. He was a new man, a federalist, an economist with a clear mind, and a politician not particularly noted as a nationalist. (1993, p.230)

However, because their conception of federalism was fundamentally different, they did not get along, Bourassa rejecting many of Trudeau’s initiatives. Among others, there was the rejection of the Victoria Charter, a package of repatriation and propositions to amend the Constitution in 1971. Trudeau considered it an exceptional arrangement for Québec (1993) which Bourassa agreed to some degree. It recognized the right for veto, three Québec judges in the Supreme Court and linguistic rights for francophone minorities. But for Bourassa, it still fell short of what Québec had always insisted; that constitutional repatriation had to be accompanied by a renewed dividing of powers. Even with the proposed Charter, Québec was still colonized and Bourassa was determined to act as a premier ministre of Québec (1995).

Recognizing the cultural distinctiveness of Québec, Bourassa ultimately reached the notion of Québec's cultural sovereignty in economic federalism, which seemed to be the only realistic option for Quebeckers (Bourassa, 1973). First appearing in the end of 1972, cultural sovereignty was thus
As the only French-speaking government in America, Québec cannot, of course, abandon to others the responsibility to promote, with respect for the rights of the minority, the progress of the French language and culture shared by more than eighty per cent of its citizens and which constitute the dominant characteristic of the Québec personality within Canada. This fundamental requirement is the basis of the government's policy of cultural sovereignty and independence. (p.3)

Importantly, cultural sovereignty was not only aimed vis-à-vis Canada to express Québec’s distinctiveness but was also to solve the inner problem within Québec, which was the cultural insecurity widely felt by many Quebecers. Indeed, the government saw cultural security as a necessary condition for the development of Québec:

The cultural security of Quebeckers has become an essential condition for maintaining a healthy balance in the development of society and safeguarding the individual freedoms of the citizen. The cultural environment in which French-speaking Quebeckers operate in Québec, Canada and the North American continent imposes a particularly demanding responsibility on the Québec government. The search for cultural sovereignty becomes in this perspective a simple question of realism and logic. (Lieutenant-Gouverneur, 1974, p.1-2)

Because Bourassa considered that cultural insecurity was what was leading them to doubt the Canadian federal system (Denis, 2006) and driving people to vote for the PQ, he would repair it by injecting pride. If he was able to eliminate the fears from the Québécois with his solution, he knew that those who voted PQ would eventually rethink their political choice (Denis, 2006). In this sense, cultural sovereignty was for him a political calculation to defeat the PQ and make Québec a place where his social-democracy would be visible, or at least enable political parties in Québec to debate on right or left axes.

Successfully running the 1973 election on “cultural sovereignty with a profitable federalism” (Levine, 1990, p.98), cultural sovereignty was for Bourassa more than a slogan. It was also within this cadre that he proceeded with his language policy which will be discussed in the next chapter and immigration policy, obtaining important and specific powers concerning the selection of immigrants, and signed cultural agreements with francophone governments abroad (Bourassa, 1995). It was thus for
Bourassa an important condition to maintain the two nations theory.

The term distinct society was very much alive during the Constitutional negotiations of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bourassa had made a comeback with the PLQ sweeping victory in 1985 while Trudeau had been replaced by Progressive Conservative Brian Mulroney at the federal level, with whom Bourassa had a personal friendship (English, 2010). They were ready to make a deal to include Québec in the Constitution, thus drafting the Meech Lake Accord. Importantly, it recognized Québec as a distinct society, one of Bourassa’s conditions which he held dearly from his first years in politics. Trudeau, now an outsider, naturally opposed the agreement that “there could not be ‘two Canadas’ in the Constitution” (English, 2010, p.621). In the end the Accord failed and the following Charlottetown Accord, which also contained the distinct society clause, met the same fate. For Bourassa, however, cultural security was the real problem that had to be solved by the Québec government and not by the Canadian Constitution (Bourassa, 1995). In his sense, he was a true neo-nationalist who firmly believed in the initiatives of the Québec government as a nation within Canada. A federalist but also a nationalist, Bourassa would never yield and give up the special status for Québec. Or rather, he was a political opportunist who was sensitive to what the people desired.

3.5.4. Laurin: Cultural Development for Political Sovereignty

Greatly influenced by the Preliminary Report of the B & B Commission, Laurin was also in line with Laurendeau with his conception of the two nations. Laurin understood that the Canadian nation represented allegiance of anglophones both within and outside Québec, the federal government acting as their senior government whom the anglophone provincial governments obeyed. So was Québec constituting its own nation, clearly possessing all the elements to be one: a territory, a language, a culture, the institutions, a history and above all a will to live – *un vouloir vivre* – and a collective project (Laurin, 1977a).

Similar to Bourassa, what Laurin saw within this nation was insecurity. As a psychiatrist, Laurin diagnosed that the people was suffering:
I saw people resigned, sad, passive, discouraged. The healthy part of their personality was affected by a significant loss of self-confidence and the belief of being born for a small piece of bread forever. Our collective history prevented the development of happy individual behaviours. (quoted in Picard, 2003, p.186)

The people were absorbing an internal colonialism (Fraser, 2006) which further strengthened the threatening image of the powerful Other – the English – before whom the French Canadian felt powerless and thus even tried to imitate them. Laurin explained:

In front of the Englishman, who can represent for him a paternal substitute envied and dreaded, he can feel the full extent of his weakness, his poverty, his ineffectiveness and his denouement. He will then seek to identify with him, to learn his language, to adopt his conceptions, to copy his attitudes and his behaviour, in order to commune with his strength and not to expose himself to anger or retaliation which would mean for him the annihilation. (quoted in Picard, 2003, p.186)

Thus, what Laurin saw was an obvious inequality between the two nations, one wounded and even internalizing the other nation. Laurin thought that this pattern of minority behavior was created by the Conquest and had been reinforced by the authority of the Church and reproduced within family and schools by traditional nationalism (Picard, 2003). One of the important methods to break this pattern was through cultural development, again, in a similar vein to Bourassa.

Laurin is certainly known as the Father of the Charter of the French Language. However, according to Picard, his biographer, what he thought more important than language policy was the policy of cultural development. For Laurin, culture was not only different artistic modes of expression but was rather something that determined the totality of an individual. Laurin wanted to make an inventory of all the heritage and ways of life in Québec which was an anthropological conception of man and culture (2003).

Importantly, this project naturally had a political aspect against the federal government. According to the White Paper of Cultural Development (Québec, 1978), because “culture as a whole is a living environment” and “the existence as a whole is the product of culture” (p.9), all developments concerning human activity, be they economic, social and culture, including territory management, are
inseparable. In this sense, “there is nothing more necessary than a policy of integral collective development” (p.4). Naturally then, this collective development will have a political dimension, all the more because “Québec still suffers from under-development” in terms of marginalization and dependence (p.4). This was observable at the federal level, where its principle of multiculturalism led to cultural assimilation which further led Québec to provincialization. That was why Québec must act:

Québec must therefore get out of these ruts and gain access to an autonomy that is not only economic but also cultural and social. It must find its own model of development, its own mix of old and new cultural elements, through which it will recognize itself as being itself. (Québec, 1978, p.5)

There is thus a striking similarity of Bourassa and Laurin who both saw cultural sovereignty as a necessary step to be taken for the people of Québec. The difference was, of course, while Bourassa considered cultural sovereignty a cure in itself for cultural insecurity, Laurin saw it as a necessary path for further emancipation, i.e. independence. As Picard noted, it was for Laurin a necessary step forward towards political sovereignty recovering the Québec soul and re-appropriating the collective self (2003).

3.5.5. Lévesque: Sovereignty for Equal Partnership

As much as he had a reputation of being a separatist, Lévesque also saw Canada consisting of two nations but also of two majorities, English and French. Importantly, he perceived this nation in a political sense, the French one having a homeland in Québec. Declaring already in 1963 that “Canada was made up of two nations, not ten provinces” (Lévesque, 1978 /1979, p.19), he clearly stated his vision in his manifesto, Option Québec, in 1968: “Two nations in the same country, it also means that in reality there are two majorities, two ‘complete societies’ and very different, trying to get along within a common framework” (Lévesque, 1997, p.173). Rather than seeing this nation in a vague cultural manner, his vision was territorial, perceiving it as a concrete and physical existence. His famous first words of his manifesto stated:

We are Québécois. What this means first and foremost, … , is that we are attached to this one corner of the world where we can be fully ourselves, this Québec which,
we feel, is the only place where we can really be at home. (Lévesque, 1997, p.161)

Thus, promoting specifically the *Québécois* identity rather than the un-territorial *Canadiens français*, his nation was strictly in terms of Québec, separating itself from other French Canadians in the rest of Canada.

Nation, for Lévesque, meant “people who have a common history, a common language, a sort of common community” but most importantly, a “feeling of being an entity that wants to live together” (1975/1991f, p.137). This *vouloir-vivre collectif*, a collective will to live together, was a central element of Lévesque’s nationalism which he did not feel towards English Canada. In fact, Lévesque was never able to feel that he was a Canadian, feeling “like an Indian leaving his reserve each time I left Quebec” (1978/1979, p.19). Lévesque explained why he felt so lost in the rest of Canada:

> When you recognize and so often have been oozing between the lines the superiority complex of a deep-seated, majority-bred paternalism, that’s when you feel especially strongly the urge to be at last one day “maîtres chez nous”. (1986, p.38)

Knowing that English Canada did not have the desire to live collectively with French Canada and vice-versa, Canada as a whole did not constitute a nation as far as Lévesque was concerned. But because he saw English Canada as constructing its own nation which obviously had the same right to live as they did, he saw sovereignty for Québec as a realistic solution to the bitter relationship between the two nations. As Lévesque himself insisted, “this is not a question of destroying something that is already condemned, but of beginning, together, to build something realistic, noble and eminently fruitful” (1978/1979, p.162). Thus, sovereignty for Lévesque did not mean to break up a country but rather meant to start a new relationship with the rest of Canada.

> His ultimate desire was to be treated as equals by this other half. When asked what Québec wanted, Lévesque responded:

> The two founding peoples, the French Canadians and the English Canadians, could speak together on a one-to-one basis instead of in the majority-minority relationship which has always poisoned our political life. (1978/1979, p.75)
Equality of the two nations was his goal, to which his nationalism and the sovereignty movement could act as an important lever.

It should be clearly noted that he also considered the special status option for Québec. However, it meant for Lévesque “a closing door on any major extension of Quebec powers, since in the future decisions will have to be sanctioned first by Ottawa and … other provinces” (1986, p.260). It also meant that “Quebec wants more all the time – because more and more [Quebec] can do [its] job and nobody else is doing it the way [it] wants it to be done” which, if Québec gets what it wants, eventually “raises up a monster, a monster because Quebec will be half in and half out of federal structure” where Québec ministers will be in Ottawa serving more and more the other nine provinces but not Québec (1968/1991d, p.98). Sovereignty was thus for Lévesque a realistic and pragmatic solution for both accounts.

3.6. Separatism

It should be clear by now that although Québec nationalism is often spoken in accordance with independence, the central axis of Québec politics is not this extreme type of nationalism (Balthazar, 1986). Rather, starting as a modest movement of the right in 1957, the independence movement was nurtured within neo-nationalism in the 60s as a movement of the left (Balthazar, 1986). Separatism remained a minor force throughout the 1960s (McRoberts, 1997), and it was only with Lévesque in 1976 that it became an actual political option, which still only advocated sovereignty-association. In fact, many Québécois did not actually hope for complete sovereignty but rather were quite comfortable to express certain allegiance to the federal state (Balthazar, 1986). Still, it seems interesting and important to see why they supported or rejected separatism, to further illuminate the different nationalisms.

3.6.1. Trudeau: An Anti-Nationalist

For Trudeau, nationalism was synonymous to giving sovereignty to any nation in the sociological sense, which he denounced. For one thing, he denounced the idea of nation-states in the first place since “the idea has caused wars to become more and more total over the last two centuries” (Trudeau,
1962/1968b, p.157). But more importantly, he did not think that nations must necessarily be sovereign “because every national minority will find, at the very moment of liberation, a new minority within its bosom which in turn must be allowed the right to demand its freedom” (Trudeau, 1962/1968b, p.158).

Thus, he refused “to identify each of the minorities alive in Canada and to protect all the characteristics that made them different” which would not only be impossible but also balkanize Canada (Trudeau, 1990, p.389). If the ethnic principle of nationality were to be followed, there would probably be several thousands of countries, as there are ethnic groups. On the contrary, he believed that the modern states are necessarily pluralistic, whose citizenship is not based on their ethnicity, background or religion, but on their citizenship as individuals with equal rights and mutual tolerance (Trudeau, 1998e).

Because Trudeau saw nationalism as the pursuit of the good for a specific ethnicity, he was never able to abide the idea that nationalism and democracy could coexist. A democratic government “must pursue the good of all its citizens, without prejudice to ethnic origin. The democratic government, then, stands for and encourages good citizenship, never nationalism” (Trudeau, 1962/1968b, p.169). As Trudeau maintained, nationalism is contrary to reason and on which it is impossible to build an advanced society and a democratic politics (Bickerton, 2006, p.142). Thus, in his view, separatism will not solve the problem of Québec because a) there will still be minorities within and b) states based on ethnicity are essentially intolerant. Thus, it was necessary to build Québec “within Confederation, by running it properly, not just for French Canadians but for every citizen of Quebec” (Trudeau, 1998f, p.106).

One of his answers to separatism was federalism. He considered cooperation to be indispensable mentioning that “federal and provincial governments, far from seeking efficiency through complete independence in their spheres, will resort to agreement and understanding” (quoted in English, 2007, p.226). For Trudeau, Canadian federalism represents a more pressing, exciting, and enriching challenge than … separation because it offers to the Québécois, to the French Canadian, the opportunity, the historic chance to participate in the creation of a great political adventure of the
By the mid-1950, Trudeau was a diligent student of Canadian federalism, a defender of provincial rights and a social reformer, believing that the federal government had a crucial role to play especially in economic stability and growth and in promotion of equity among regions and peoples (English, 2007).

There seem to be three points that should be outlined concerning the source of disagreement between Trudeau and many of his contemporaries in Québec. First, McRoberts pointed out that Trudeau’s anti-nationalism and liberal individualism had no historical roots in Québec. Individualism had already been witnessed in federal politics, namely by Louis St. Laurent, a French Canadian Prime Minister from 1948 to 1957. Coming from a bilingual and bicultural background like Trudeau, he saw Canada in determinedly individualist terms, rejecting any notion of a dualist Canada composed of distinct collectivities (1997). However, it was not a thought that had grounds in Québec and any consensus to his unique vision would have had no grounds to nourish it. Second, despite his initial vision of federalism and decentralization, his actual experience once in government changed his views. With the oil crisis, the sudden shift of wealth to western Canada and the increasing demands from Québec, Trudeau repositioned himself as a centralist who believed that further devolution of powers was unnecessary (Bickerton, 2006; English, 2010). As Canada’s Prime Minister facing various issues, one could say that he had no choice but to pursue a bigger and more centralist government. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, because he gradually distanced himself from his youthful fascination with Québec nationalism by opening up to the world, he came to dismiss nationalism as a whole as an outdated, immature, racist and emotional rebellion against Canada. He had matured leaving (the old) Québec nationalism behind and he felt no sympathy towards any such irrational movement. This is the attitude that frustrated francophone Quebecers: Although he saw it as different from Duplessis’s version of nationalism, Trudeau’s conception on Québec nationalism had in fact changed very little since the time he framed his ideas in the 1940s and 1950s (Laforest, 1995b; Vacante, 2011). Therefore, he was not able to understand or accept the fact that Québec nationalism had also grown and transformed from a conservative one to a more mature conception of nationalism, more precisely, neo-nationalism.
3.6.2. Laurendeau: The U.S. as a Threat

As much as Laurendeau respected Trudeau’s intellect, the former never accepted the latter’s condemnation of the history of Québec as well as his rejection of any form of nationalism. Laurendeau considered that Trudeau “lacked a feel for the social” (Horton, 1992, p.190). With a growing separatism movement in Québec especially that of RIN\textsuperscript{34} during the 1960s, Laurendeau could not ignore the movement and dealt with separatism constantly in his journalistic writings to the point that he was accused of exaggerating the threat (Horton, 1992). Although the movement was quite small at the time, Laurendeau understood the potential for it to grow rapidly, especially in the context of the Quiet Revolution (Horton, 1992). He considered that separatism was driven in relation to French Canadian alienation from Canadian federalism and would become more serious as English Canada failed to understand and deal with it (Horton, 1992).

Thus within this context, it was no wonder that as much as the B & B Commission was on language and culture, it was asking a much more basic and fundamental question of whether the country wanted to stay together (Fraser, 2006). This was also true for Laurendeau who constantly fought against himself leaning towards separatism during the Commission. In March 1964 he wrote in his journal:

I remain a French Canadian nationalist who does not believe in separatism and who wonders how two nations can live within what kind of federation – two nations of which one is a dominator and the other the dominated but does not want to be anymore. (Laurendeau, 1990, p.96)

But shortly after in May, he could not deny

several times each week and even several times a day, real internal surges towards separatism. … the density, the depth of ignorance and the prejudices [of English Canada towards French Canada] are really immeasurable…it remains that these things are difficult to endure and to live through. (Laurendeau, 1990, p.174)

Laurendeau and his team toured the country to meet people all over Canada for their investigation, from

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Rassemblement pour l’Indépendance Nationale}, a group and later a political party which advocated Québec independence. Its leader, Pierre Bourgault, from 1964 was an electrifying orator who contributed to the group’s popularity. The party dissolved in 1968 to merge with the PQ.
provincial premiers and officials to local citizens. Much to his amazement, he encountered ignorance, indifference and hostility from English Canada towards French Canada. Provincial premiers seemed not to believe in the existence of a national crisis and if there was, they thought it should be managed by Québec and federal political leaders (Horton, 1992). The public meetings demonstrated a significant gap between the French and English language groups: the level of frustration for the former and the level of ignorance for the latter (Fraser, 2006). He felt himself becoming aggressive towards the immense social hypocrisy to the extent that he wrote in his journal that the English have the habit to dominate or that he was boiled with anger to hear Acadian children being assimilated and their integration was believed to be going well (Laurendeau, 1990). For most observers at that time, Canada simply consisted of a predominantly English-speaking culture with a substantial French minority in Québec that might or might not be given special treatments to appease the situation. The idea of two equal nations or cultures was thus only a dream and not taken seriously (Horton, 1992).

Facing this apathy, however, Laurendeau did not end up advocating separatism. But he understood it and was able to empathize with it (Fraser, 2006). Even before the Commission, he had understood that “separatist feelings are the direct result of Ottawa’s violations” (Laurendeau, 1955/1976d, p.218). He knew it was not an irrational surge and certainly was not mere emotionalism as Trudeau had stated. He felt he was in the opposite camp co-chairing the federal commission and against those to whom he felt “the most natural and spontaneous friendship … the clearest example of this being René Lévesque and the young” (Laurendeau, 1990, p.380). He was clearly torn.

Laurendeau mentioned several reasons for his not becoming a separatist. One of them was, as with Trudeau, that he did not believe that nations had to be sovereign thus opposing the universal right to self-determination, seeing it to be an “anarchical agitation” (Laurendeau, 1962/1976b, p.223). Seeing the case of Alsace, he understood that many disliked the French but they were not necessarily separatists but autonomists. Learning that political and cultural solidarity did not have to coincide, Laurendeau saw that cultural solidarity and autonomy seemed to be vital for survival of minorities (Horton, 1992). Another important reason seems to have been that separatism has the danger of defecting people from
“genuine work, towards illusive goals.” He continued:

Most separatists I meet show an increasing intolerance. The ideology hardens, isolates, and sometimes exhausts them. They come to the point of despising anything that is possible, putting off all real action to some future day, while wishing for the worst in the meantime. Their position remains intact; they distrust analysis; enchanted with their own emotions, they wallow in them. A single doubt is treason in their eyes. (Laurendeau, 1962/1976b, p.222-4)

Thus, he objected those who see separatism as an end in itself, blinding themselves from the real objective. His biographer, Horton, also pointed out that it was partly because of Laurendeau’s cautious personality that prevented him from embracing neither separatism nor federalism. He was rarely confident in his conclusions and was always concerned that there were other vital aspects that should be taken into account. Additionally, Horton thought that Laurendeau was not ready to abandon French minorities in the rest of Canada, as the separatists evidently were (1992).

Later commentators believe, however, that his hesitations came mostly from his resistance to the hegemony of the United States (Horton, 1992; Maclure, 2003). For one thing, Laurendeau seemed to care deeply what the United States thought and how might it react if Québec were to declare independence. He asked, “would the United States … put up with such a hullabaloo to their North?” (Laurendeau, 1955/1976d, p.215). But he was more worried of the significant economic, cultural and even demographic influence of the neighbouring country, against which English Canada could be a potential ally for French Canada. Thus, in order to resist together with English Canada, he rejected separatism. Already in 1936, during his stay in Paris, he addressed his concern that “the nearness of the United States is always a danger” but hopeful that “through England, Confederation partially offsets the neighbouring influence”, stating clearly that this perspective was introduced by André Siegfried, his professor in France (Laurendeau, 1962/1976g, p.213). Siegfried made him see Canada as a whole (Fraser, 2006) and made him realize that the United States was a bigger threat to French Canadian survival than English Canada (Horton, 1992). While he had had no interest whatsoever for English Canada and even Québec’s anglophone minority, Siegfried convinced Laurendeau that English Canada
could become an important ally against American economic and cultural domination (Horton, 1992). Long having admired Groulx over Bourassa, it was the latter’s version of nationalism which aimed for cooperation with English Canada that made more sense now (Horton, 1992). Laurendeau wrote later in 1962 that “I lost this dream [of separatism] the year after (1936) while studying in Paris” (1962/1976h, p.225).

In 1937 writing for *L’Action nationale*, Laurendeau referred the country to the south as a “threat”, to which he tried to counteract not by “shutting our doors” but by “opening them wide” calling for a “struggle on all fronts against the dogma of conformity” which was “to set up an original style of living …our own French-Canadian culture” (1937/1976e, p.53-55). In 1955, again contributing to the nationalist paper, he mentioned “the nearby presence of a large country to the south” as one of the problems of separatism and “the necessity of bringing the British colonies together so that they could exist next to the United States” (1955/1976d, p.215). In 1962, he expressed his view of the fragility of French Canadians, not within Canada but within the wider North America which would not change with Québec independence but would rather be subsequently linked to “annexationism” of Québec:

> Our real and current problems arise not from our being a third of Canada, but from the fact that we do not account for even a thirtieth part of North America. Attaining sovereignty would not alter our geographic or demographic situation; it would not essentially change our relations with the North American world. Or rather, … it would weaken us. (Laurendeau, 1962/1976b, p.222)

Thus, an alliance of Québec and English Canada was the only way to survival and to resist the major homogenization of the south (Maclure, 2003; Bickerton, 2006). He was thus more of an instrumental federalist than a Canadian who was trying to save Canada from breaking up. In this sense, he followed Henri Bourassa with his resistance to British imperialism. For this to happen, however, Canada had major fixing to do to include Québec within its federation (Maclure, 2003), something which he became well aware of resisting separatism during the Commission.
Bourassa was a federalist with no desire for a Québec separation from Canada, campaigning in the provincial election of 1970 as a party leader with a slogan *Non au séparatisme*, focusing rather on economy (Fraser, 2001). He did not believe in the slightest that political sovereignty as proposed by the PQ was a realistic concept. The *Québécois* were undeniably a part of a large group of North America and Canada which was perceived as a space of solidarity, though there was still considerable room for improvement. The world also seemed to be moving more and more towards a federative link and the monetary union of Québec and Canada which was often talked about by the PQ implied at least this federal link, to which elected representatives would participate and discuss monetary policy (Denis, 2006).

In fact, monetary concerns were the precise reason Bourassa rejected joining forces with Lévesque. As a young Member of the National Assembly, Bourassa was one of the members in the PLQ who was very close to Lévesque and saw him drifting towards sovereignty first hand. In fact, Lévesque finished writing his 35-page manifesto in Bourassa’s basement which called for sovereignty-association and they often discussed Lévesque’s statement and his position (Bourassa, 1995; Fraser, 2001). While Bourassa sincerely admired Lévesque’s talent, culture, knowledge on international problems, progressive ideas and his attitude as a *police d’assurance* against a gentrifying party (Bourassa, 1995), Lévesque respected the young Bourassa a great deal for his economic expertise (Fraser, 2001). Thus, Lévesque hoped for Bourassa’s support but Bourassa turned him down for several reasons but notably due to his economic plan (Bourassa, 1995), saying that political independence cannot go without monetary independence (Fraser, 2001).

Even if he could support an independent Québec, Bourassa saw that Québec having its own currency could place Québec rather in a total dependence towards the United States, making Québec an American protectorate (Bourassa, 1995). Supporting Bourassa’s perspective, Lévesque accepted the idea that Canadian currency would still be used in an independent Québec (Bourassa, 1995). But even if that was to be the case, it was not ideal since the management of the monetary union could give rise
to political clashes (Bourassa, 1995) and also signify an important restriction on Québec’s total independence (Denis, 2006). Thus, either way, Bourassa could not support independence.

Some saw Bourassa as highly opportunist and that his monetary argument was just an excuse. Bourassa presumably abandoned Lévesque because the option was rejected by the PLQ and its establishment and sovereignty only had little more than eight per cent of the popular support. Under these circumstances, Bourassa could not foresee that it would be possible one day to make a career as a sovereigntist (Fournier, 1992). Others, especially those who joined the two in discussions in 1967, stated that Bourassa had always made his disagreement clear and tried hard to keep Lévesque within the party and that the idea that he was to join Lévesque has been highly exaggerated (Fraser, 2001). Whatever the reason, Bourassa and Lévesque went their separate ways and history witnessed the emergence of a Lévesque and the first elected party in Québec history to advocate political sovereignty (and economic association).

3.6.4. Laurin: Independence as a Cure

Laurin’s belief in independence derived from seeing the people suffering. The pattern, however, was to be broken with a psychiatric method, a shock therapy, which would take the form of political independence (Picard, 2003). Laurin explained:

I examined the psychological dimensions of the vitality of our people. When we see defects, gaps, we must deal. For me, the cure could only be political by creating a strong, powerful state that corrects the negative effects of the Conquest. (quoted in Picard, 2003, p.186)

His mission was thus to liberate l’homme québécois (the Québécois man) of his defeated and depressed identity and to cure his fatigue of being himself and a francophone who speaks a devalued language in a massively anglophone continent (Godin, 2001). For him, the independentists were taking a step toward maturity contrary to the federalists who were emotionally regressive for refusing independence (Fraser, 2006): a melancholy nationalist narrative.

According to his biographer Picard, Laurin had already been interested in politics in the early
1960s when Canadian and Québec politics seemed to be evolving. He met with reformist intellectuals several times a year to discuss the situation of the country but there was not yet a question of independence; he was then a liberal federalist. Nevertheless, when Trudeau and the others went on to federal politics in 1965, Laurin was offered to run as well which he refused, without giving specific reasons. Laurin confessed many years later that he probably was already attracted to independence (2003).

In fact, Fraser noted that Laurin mentioned that it was in 1961 that he separated from his anti-nationalist friends including Trudeau (Fraser, 2001). The path chosen was very different to the extent that Laurin, after becoming Minister, referred to Trudeau as “the occupying force” and Québec as “an occupied country”, an allusion to France’s humiliation under the Nazi occupation during the Vichy regime (Fraser, 2006, p.80). That was how Laurin saw his old friend Trudeau and the victimization of Québec. Years later in 1992, Trudeau met with Laurin and asked what had changed his mind and made him a separatist. Laurin told him the Quiet Revolution had made him realize that federalism would not give Québec the necessary tools to modernize. Trudeau replied that the strong federal government would open Québec to the world while assuring modernization at home. Laurin then pointed to the fate of the francophones in other provinces where assimilation and decrease of their population were obvious (English, 2007). Thus, Laurin’s conviction as an independentist was firmly grounded on the deficiency of and his disbelief in federalism.

Laurin decided to join forces with Lévesque after seeing Lévesque and his friends leaving the PLQ in 1967 which strengthened Laurin’s conviction for independence and also later reading Lévesque’s manifesto for sovereignty-association to which he totally agreed (Picard, 2003). With the formation of the MSA in 1967 and the PQ the following year, he became openly involved. It was in fact Laurin who proposed the name of the party, *Parti québécois*, which was first rejected but eventually adopted less than a year later35 (Picard, 2003). He soon became a major figure and a serious intellectual

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35 Lévesque in fact wrote in his memoirs that he had preferred “a descriptive name such as ‘Parti Souverainiste’ or even PSA [Parti Souveraineté-Association]” finding the name *Parti Québécois* “rather presumptuous” (1986, p.234).
voice within the party (Fraser, 2001).

As much as Laurin and Lévesque respected each other, their friendship came to a bitter end after 16 years in 1984, disagreeing on the issue of sovereignty. On November 22, Laurin wrote a letter to Lévesque in which the former expressed his wish to resign. It was to object, with some of the others of the party, Lévesque’s recent beau risque strategy which put aside the sovereignty issue and rather sought to cooperate with the federal government, now that Trudeau was out of the picture. Laurin had no choice. He was an independentist who continued to believe in the necessity of Québec sovereignty which could not be compromised (Laurin, 2003).

3.6.5. Lévesque: Sovereignty-Association

It must be first noted that Lévesque did not enter politics as a separatist or sovereigntist. During the 1960s, however, Laurendeau observed his friend gradually aspiring towards separatism. Already in April 1964, when Laurendeau met with Lévesque, the former noted that Lévesque seemed to have “the guts of separatist” but he also “seemed to envisage the future in a confederation perspective” (Laurendeau, 1990, p.153). In June 1965, Lévesque was “very separatist”, seeming to have a precise long-term objective but to be a little lost when it came to the political means. He also noted that Lévesque’s thesis boiled down to associate states, where each of the two states would own sovereign jurisdiction which also included the armed forces having a sort of vague joint headquarters at the top (Laurendeau, 1990, p.331-2). Thus, as much as being very separatist, Lévesque’s conception of partnership between Canada and Québec was very much alive.

When he resigned as a PLQ member due to the rejection of his resolution concerning the future of Québec, many thought that his separatism finally surfaced (English, 2007). However, stronger than the nationalist message was his suggestion that he could achieve a great deal for Québec if he did not have to waste much energy on quarrelling about the federal-provincial relations (Fraser, 2001). Lévesque emphasized this point most in his manifesto:

Above all, ABOVE ALL – this must be said, and repeated, and shouted if need be
– this incredible squandering of energy which certainly is for us the most disastrous aspect of the present regime. (Lévesque, 1997, p.182)

“The systematic intransigence of the federal government” (Lévesque, 1986, p.152) had made Lévesque furious in many occasions over the last years, including the Radio-Canada incident, the sporadic distribution system, the battle over the pension plan36, and social affairs with which his proposal that they should be administered in Québec “bit the dust”37 (Lévesque, 1986, p.194). As Minister of Family and Welfare from 1965 to 1966, Lévesque had to confront the federal government which was increasingly becoming centralized and trying to achieve a welfare state. Thus, as Lévesque stated, “from the repeated failure of federal-provincial negotiations to the revelation of our striking new maturity, one could draw only one conclusion: …Quebec must become sovereign as soon as possible” (1986, p.224).

He believed that English Canada should also be suffering from the waste of energy and that they should also want to simplify, rationalize and centralize institutions as they like, especially those appearing to be obsolete for them (Lévesque, 1997). Québec sovereignty thus meant “a double emancipation” with which “the Anglo-Canadian majority would also at the same stroke be rid of constraints that our presence imposed upon it, would be free to reorganize its own institutions” (Lévesque, 1986, p.225). In fact, unlike some of the more radical separatists, Lévesque never exhibited any great anger towards English Canadians (Vacante, 2011) and simply thought independence was a rational and functional way for both to offer their people with what they truly need and to pursue their way of life as a separate nation.

36 Québec ended up creating its own with an investment bank Caisse de dépôt.
37 Béland and Lecours made an interesting point that “social policy presents mobilization and identity-building potential for sub-state nationalism” (2006, p.78) and that nationalists pursue their own social programs to demonstrate their distinctiveness and to control policy areas linked to identity building. Considering that they usually set up programs that are similar to the federal ones, the move is highly symbolic but it is important for nationalists to be seen as “more progressive, egalitarian and compassionate than the rest of Canada” (Béland & Lecours, 2006, p.93). Thus the question here was whether nationalism was a means to an end to achieve better government programs or an end in itself. Concerning pension plan, for example, although “the levels of the payroll tax and replacement rate are identical for both schemes” (Béland & Lecours, 2006, p.90), the important thing was that the money accumulated through the pension fund would be available for the Québec government to invest which was the key to build a modern economy autonomously (Bothwell, 2006). By the mid-1970s, state support for Francophone private enterprises was having a real impact to which Caisse de dépôt was playing an effective role (McRoberts & Postage, 1980). Thus, minority nationalism claiming for greater power in social security issues cannot be dismissed as being totally symbolic.
His plan was, however, not only sovereignty but sovereignty-association. By sovereignty, Lévesque meant an exclusive “power to make laws and levy taxes” and by association, the maintenance of the “Canadian economic space … with as few restrictions as possible on the traffic of products, capital and persons” (1978/1979, p.xi). Lévesque considered that in the last several decades of the 20th century, the classical notion of political independence would be out of date. It was not by strategy, but rather by realism, that he proposed to Quebecers sovereignty and economic association with other Canadians (Beaulé, 1992). As Lévesque explained, “we do not want to end, but rather to radically transform, our union with the rest of Canada, so that, in the future, our relations will be based on full and complete equality” (1978/1979, p.x). “This new relationship of two nations” he further clarified, “would be freely associated in a new adaptation of the current ‘common-market’ formula, making up an entity which could perhaps … be called a Canadian Union” (1986, p.226). Thus, his desire for equality was further expressed in his vision of sovereignty-association, fundamentally different from mere independence.

 Whereas for Laurin sovereignty was a necessary goal to be achieved, it was not the case for Lévesque. As has already been stated, the beau risque strategy demonstrated their fundamental differences. Lévesque’s francophone biographer Godin (2007) observed that it expressed Lévesque’s feeling of belonging to Canada especially now that there was a reasonable Prime Minister in Ottawa. As with Laurin, many interpreted Lévesque’s move as a betrayal and considered it as a mistaken move (Bourgault, 1992). However, it could also be considered that it confirmed Lévesque’s conviction that sovereignty is espoused only when the federal government was unnegotiable, clarifying his stance that sovereignty is not a necessity for aspiring Québec nationalism.

 Contrary to Trudeau, Lévesque believed that nationalism and democracy could coexist. For one thing, he was a nationalist only if it meant “fiercely for or against something or against a given situation. But never against someone. Nationalism that means racism or fascism makes me vomit” (Lévesque, 1986, p.202). In fact, he had undergone a life-changing experience as a war-correspondent during the Second World War, seeing the horror of the Dachau Concentration Camp and its first days of liberation.
Lachappelle (2008) argued that it was a determinant experience for him, above all because he witnessed the incapacity of the European countries to stop the rise of fascism and totalitarianism which he considered was a drift from ultra-nationalism. Lévesque feared greatly throughout his life of “an overflow of [independentist] feeling and a possible loss of control of the popular movement” (quoted in Lachappelle, 2008, p.194). As much as he abhorred violence, he refused any intellectual violence, seeing propaganda as violation of spirits; it was never a question for him of influencing the public opinion other than with truth (Côté, 1992). Thus for Lévesque, as long as nationalism was not linked to this horrible definition, it is not incompatible with progressive values, the better sharing of wealth, and especially the progress possible by the use of the State. As a reformist, open and internationalist, he was to demonstrate that national aspirations can mean better shared progress with a defense of rights and freedoms and of vigorous democratic construction (Johnson, 1992). In this sense, he was as much a democrat as he was a nationalist.

Considering that Laurendeau, and in part Bourassa, raised the threat of the US as one of their reasons for rejecting separatism, it seems necessary to note how Lévesque perceived the southern neighbour. In fact, Balthazar (1992) pointed out that Lévesque possessed a relatively rare sense of North Americanism from which his sovereignty-association also derived. For one thing, needless to say, there was never a question of separating Québec from the American continent (Godin, 2007). Obviously, “it won’t move geographically” even if gained political sovereignty (Lévesque, 1977/1991g, p.220). More importantly, however, it concerned Lévesque’s two important characteristics. The first was his pragmatism, understanding and admitting that “we are living in the era of the American culture” (Lévesque, 1978/1979, p.146). He was well aware that American economy and military could not be ignored (Lachapelle, 2008). Especially from the economic point of view, the country constituted a natural continuation and a bilateral commercial relationship that was necessary outside the scope of US-Canada relationship (Godin, 2007). Thus, the “simplistic anti-Americanism” was understandable but seemed childish considering its enormous influence (Lévesque, 1978/1979, p.146). This was in fact a similar attitude to Trudeau who never identified with simple anti-Americanism (English, 2007) and...
cherished functional politics.

The second was his respect for democracy, which the US acted as a model for their fundamental egalitarianism (Lévesque, 1978/1979). He admired Franklin Roosevelt of “his great communication skills”, humour, “the incomparable instinct that permitted this aristocrat to maintain for so long a coalition made up of minorities, blue-collar workers, and the poor” (Lévesque, 1986, p.123). He would always remain Lévesque’s great model for government, strategy and communication (Balthazar, 2008). To be sure, he condemned the American attitude towards the “Indians”, their continuous involvement in wars and high crime rate (Lévesque, 1986, p.126) as well as certain CIA activities (Lévesque, 1978/1979). However, as Balthazar mentioned, the America which Lévesque espoused spontaneously was the one defined by the currents represented by Franklin Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy or Martin Luther King, rather than that of Republicans such as Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George Bush (1992). As Lévesque mentioned, “it remains the most livable of all empires hitherto known, and one which has the possibility of becoming even more civilized, or at any rate much more so than many other powers” (1978/1979, p.146).

The United States never ceased to fascinate him, an admiration that lasted a life time (Lévesque, 1986), contrary to his fellow Québec nationalists who were more inspired by France whose influence and support for Québec sovereignty could certainly not be ignored (Balthazar, 2008). Lévesque felt at ease in the powerful country in the south and was transforming into what he himself called a Yankébéciais (Lévesque, 1986, p.125), even mentioning that one of his first moves after independence will be to appoint himself as an ambassador to Washington (Lisée, 1992). The hierarchical way in which Lévesque viewed Québec’s international relationship was thus as follows: first was Canada, consistent with the ideal of sovereignty-association; the United States would follow immediately; and then those with France and other European countries.

His way of looking at the world came from his basic trait as an internationalist. As Balthazar stated, “the person who designed Québec's largest nationalist project was first and foremost an internationalist” (1992, p.433), contrary to what is generally thought about nationalism being closed
and exclusive. Similar to those anti-nationalists who saw post-WWII Europe and expected a world without nation-states, Lévesque also came to regard that “the nation-state has had its day” at least “on two or three absolutely essential levels” (1986, p.117). He continued:

[The Nation-state] must give up part of its powers and resources to an authority that would be a Security Council for humanity at large. …to put an end to the massacre of innocents, to give children everywhere a minimum of equal opportunities, one cannot be anything but federalist … at least in world terms. (1986, p.117)

Thus, as an internationalist, he knew that nation-states would not solve all the problems and thus federalism was a useful framework to counteract the evils of the worlds. On the other hand, exactly because he was an internationalist, he also understood the universal will of self-determination and awakening of identities. Already in the late 1970s, he analysed:

Every people would like, as far as possible, to distinguish itself from others because, in the face of the more or less homogenizing current running through the world, which is accentuated by technical and economic factors, every identity feels a need to affirm its presence in order to avoid disappearing. One could very well adopt a minimal degree of federalism on a world scale, while remaining extremely nationalistic – nationalist in the sense of national sovereignty, and the affirmation of one’s identity. (Lévesque, 1978/1979, p.139)

Thus, his internationalism justified his nationalism but at the same time prevented him from regarding independence as separation from the rest of the world. This explains that he preferred the term sovereignty as opposed to separatism, secession or even independence (Lévesque, 1978/1979; 1969/1991a; 1977/1991g; 1997).

3.7. Conclusion: Québec (Anti) Nationalisms

For a small conclusion for this chapter, the author will now briefly outline the similarities and the differences of the (anti) nationalisms for the five characters who were introduced in this chapter, also using the BVPs of the theory of survival. What Laurendeau, Trudeau, Bourassa, Laurin and Lévesque all had in common was their belief in social-democracy and statism. Whether it derived from the
Catholic personalism or personal experiences, they were all reformists who wished to improve the situation of the little people. The role, however, was not to be assumed by the Catholic Church but rather by the government. Protesting against Duplessis and also the federal government, there was a widely held consensus that problems must be solved both inside and outside Québec through statism. We have seen that Lévesque’s commitment to (social-) democracy seems to be strong that even nationalism might have been secondary. In fact, one could argue that his position as a nationalist was a means to achieve a more democratic Québec. Nevertheless, it is clear that his stance valuing social-democracy was not rare but was even the norm of politicians at the time.

However, the main difference between Trudeau and the others was the former’s belief in anti-nationalism. Here, two interpretations are possible. On the one hand, Trudeau can be seen to have reached Position Four with his pioneering and creative conception of constitutional patriotism, overcoming victimhood by taking charge in Ottawa and including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the Canadian Constitution (Position Three). However, his ideas seem to remain highly theoretical, having failed to aspire the feeling of the masses. Rather, another interpretation could be that since Trudeau did not truly admit the victimized position of the French Canadians in Québec especially after assuming office in Ottawa, he has always remained a Position One figure. Minimizing the historical aspect of French Canadians and being a privileged bilingual, he denied any recognition of seeing himself and his peoples as victims. His anger was certainly directed towards those who recognized their victimhood as nationalists, Trudeau strictly denying to become one of them. Trudeau was certainly aware of the second-class treatment of francophones both within and outside Québec but did not act against it as a nationalist but rather as an individualist which failed to solve the problem, many later observers arguing that his politics were ultimately erroneous and damaging (English, 2010). He refused to regard Québec as a separate nation from English Canada, thus denying the two nations theory. Moreover, he too easily dismissed nationalism by regarding it as synonymous with separatism, which probably derived from his being too much theoretical, not being able to understand what ordinary people thought and wanted. He might have liberated himself from the traditional nationalist discourse as he
matured but could not lead the *Québécois* to their collective liberation, not truly being aware that individual liberalism works for the advantage of the majority to which Trudeau himself easily belonged.

On the other hand, the neo-nationalists of Québec all accepted the two nations theory. Bourassa, commonly referred to as a federalist, was no exception, who espoused the two nations theory insisting that Québec was a distinct society. He realized the cultural insecurity felt by many in Québec and sought cultural sovereignty to overcome this situation. Even if this was a political calculation to deteriorate support for the PQ, the point is that he realized the victimization and tried to do something about it. He battled against Ottawa if he had to, taking a strong stance especially against Trudeau. In this sense, he was in Position Three of the BVP fighting vigorously for Québec.

Laurin’s perception that the people of Québec were suffering was a more strongly held conviction compared to Bourassa, based on the familiar historical narrative of the Conquest. Laurin believed that it would only be solved by independence and this was the reason he entered politics in the first place. His conviction was so strong that it was non-negotiable, even when the wind was changing in Ottawa and some compromise could have been made. Considering that Laurin was trapped in the narrative of the necessity of independence, he degraded to Position Two, all the more so because independence was never achieved and he blamed others, especially Lévesque, who were more flexible with the idea of sovereignty. Laurin did actually cure the suffering francophones with his language law, which will be further explored in the next chapter. In this sense, he acted as a very important vehicle for perhaps lifting Québec from Position Two towards even Position Four. Laurin himself, however, followed the narrative of melancholy nationalism by emphasizing too much on victimization and independence.

Québec and neo-nationalists owe a lot to Laurendeau who himself was able to go on from Position Two to Three of the BVP. Growing up as a conservative nationalist, he was a typical French Canadian trapped in the providential narrative which explained their situation through religion and god’s will. In Paris, however, he was able to liberate himself from this position and to realize that things can change if one made the effort. This was the nature of neo-nationalism which he contributed in developing and distributing. Thus, the people of his generation were influenced by his narrative which was the major
part of the success of the Quiet Revolution. Laurendeau ended up, however, leaning further towards separatism during the B & B Commission. His cultural nationalism evolved to the will of constitutional recognition in the end, thus coming to embrace the distinct society narrative to achieve equal partnership.

For melancholy nationalists, Lévesque’s memory is tangled with a narrative of failure and he emerges both as the embodiment of Québec’s desire for greater political independence and as a constant reminder of the province’s failure to achieve it (Vacante, 2011). In this sense, Lévesque is forever trapped in the image of Position Two, never being able to fulfil his dreams of independence and playing the role of victim which is the destiny of a melancholic.

The author has shown, however, that independence was not Lévesque’s ultimate goal. While the lost maturity by the Conquest was only to be regained by independence according to Laurin, Lévesque was similar to the position of Laurendeau and Bourassa where sovereignty was simply a means. Certainly as with Laurin, Lévesque cherished the vouloir-vivre collectif of the Québec nation which he did not really feel towards English Canada. Nevertheless, what Lévesque tried to achieve through his nationalist discourse was to make English Canada realize that Québec was one of the two nations that comprised Canada. Indeed, witnessing Lévesque becoming a separatist, Laurendeau understood the importance of Lévesque in the context of total indifference of English Canada. Writing in his diary, he “came to conclude the absolute need for a René Lévesque … to worry, even dangerously, these communities [in the West] that are so closed in on themselves” and that “it is necessary, at times, to be able to speak from a position of strength” (Laurendeau, 1990, p.67). Thus, he recognized Lévesque’s impact already in the 1960s in achieving any kind of understanding of Québec in the rest of Canada (Fraser, 2006). In this sense, Lévesque’s strong voice was indeed necessary to make Québec visible within Canada.

What was more, his good will, honesty and determination were widely accepted even by those who never voted for him, or by those in English Canada who never had the chance to vote for him. In fact, Vacante explained that at the time of his death, many Canadians outside Québec expressed their sorrow which was surprising for a man who was thought to be trying to break up the country. His
evaluation in English Canada is thus very positive, embraced as a generally likeable and honest man who made Canada better and stronger with his democratic values. Especially compared to Trudeau, Lévesque remains an attractive figure for those who were uncomfortable with the former’s centralist agenda. Because Canada has been a country very much defined by its regions and many oppose the excessive exercise of power in Ottawa, Trudeau is seen by many as a radical who fundamentally threatened to undermine the country’s traditions while Lévesque emerges as a moderate force who sought to block the radical agenda that Trudeau tried to impose on the country. In this sense, Lévesque was the one who embodied the Canadian values of compromise, moderation, and regionalism and was increasingly seen as a Canadian nationalist, the English media praising him as a Canadian nation-builder (2011). Resnick (2008) agreed that compared to his pure independentist successors, Lévesque was the one who projected a better image outside Québec, appearing much moderate, decent, democratic and less demagogic and capable of playing the game of Canadian federalism.

Importantly, sovereignty was for Lévesque a pragmatic solution considering the complex relationship with the federal government and the energy consumed. In this sense, there were far less historical grievances or conviction for independence to achieve maturity that are generally espoused by melancholy nationalists for the reason for sovereignty. Lévesque’s nationalism was thus clearly beyond the dichotomy of melancholy nationalism à la Laurin or anti-nationalism à la Trudeau. Furthermore, unlike Lauréndeau, the United States was not a threat for Lévesque, which enabled him to aspire to a creative solution of sovereignty-association without fear. Considering that the failure of the first modern nationalism was based on lack of support from the mass and fear for assimilation, neo-nationalism à la Lauréndeau overcame the former but not the latter which the nationalism à la Lévesque revised without fear, even strongly politicizing the cultural sovereignty à la Bourassa so that Québec can be on equal terms with English Canada. Whether Lévesque was able to reach Position Four of the BVP now depends on whether he was able to achieve both nationalism and pluralism. This will be explored in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 Conceptions of Languages and Language Policies

In this chapter, the author concentrates the discussion on language and relates the argument in the previous chapter on various nationalisms to the respective linguistic discourses. Aside from French as the majority language of Québec, the importance lies in how each (anti) nationalist regarded English. As much as language policy and government white papers will be discussed in this chapter, the author tries to reveal more the philosophical side, that is, how and why each person pursued their policy as it turned out. Important distinctions will be made between bilingualism, dualism, preferentialism and unilingualism. But first, the respective language efforts pursued by each figure will be outlined.

4.1. Initiatives

4.1.1. Laurendeau: The B & B Commission

A neo-nationalist, Laurendeau tried to ally with the rest of Canada to defend itself from the U.S., encouraging French Canadian nationalists to reach out to English Canada (Horton, 1992). One of these efforts was his commitment to the B & B Commission from 1963 to 1968 since for Laurendeau, whether federalism was able to accommodate Québec depended on the development of a truly bilingual and bicultural Canada (Horton, 1992). In fact, Laurendeau was the one who called for its establishment in the first place in January 1962 in Le Devoir to find out what bilingualism meant:

After almost a century of Confederation, no one has a precise idea of what a completely bilingual state means in practical terms. …no one develops a distinct idea of what state bilingualism could and should be. (1962/1976a, p.250-1)

In his eyes, “the central government is, in Canada, an agent of assimilation” (Laurendeau, 1960/1976f, p.243) where francophone dignity was hardly considered. If Canada seriously wanted to value French Canadians, it was high time for them to come up with a solution. Thus, he proposed to set up a royal commission on bilingualism which would have three purposes: a) to find out what Canadians thought about it; b) to study examples abroad for their solutions; and c) to find out in detail the status of the two languages in the federal service (Laurendeau, 1962/1976a, p.251). Most importantly, the establishment
of a commission would mean to recognize the existing serious problem within Canada and to counter the rising separatist movement in Québec (Laurendeau, 1962/1976a), especially since Laurendeau had always believed that it was ignorance rather than malice that caused Confederation to fail (Horton, 1992). The recommendation was initially ignored by the Diefenbaker Conservative federal government but in December that same year, Pearson, then leader of the Liberal opposition seized the idea and incorporated it into his party policy (Horton, 1992). After Pearson won the election and became the new Prime Minister in 1963, he asked Laurendeau to serve the Commission as co-chair which Laurendeau accepted after much discussion with and criticism from his contemporaries (Horton, 1992).

Laurendeau’s central motivation to join the commission was his belief that it offered a commencement of processes whereby French Canadians could achieve both linguistic and cultural equality in Canada (Horton, 1992) as Laurendeau himself put it, “the Commission’s job comes down to studying and trying to resolve, in the basic area of language and culture, the problem of the friendly co-existence of the ‘two nations’” (1963/1976c, p.254-5). Thus, it represented his hope that French Canada could have its place in a Canada consisting of two nations and bilingualism and biculturalism would somehow contribute to the process.

4.1.2. Trudeau: The Federal Official Languages Act

As much as Trudeau criticized Laurendeau and the Preliminary Report of the Commission of going too far off its mandate and of reflecting the nationalist discourse, Trudeau, after entering federal politics, nonetheless found no reason to hamper their work (Horton, 1992). In fact, what Laurendeau and Trudeau had in common was their belief that greater bilingualism within the federal civil service and the government was necessary, for which the report would prepare the basis (Horton, 1992). Thus the most crucial remedy proposed by Trudeau to settle the Québec problem and to integrate its francophones was the law on Official Bilingualism, enacted in 1969 soon after Trudeau became Prime Minister. Still, his Official Languages Act was not ambitious; it served only to ensure that citizens could deal with the federal government in the official language of their choice and to create an institution at
the centre that could engage with anglophone and francophone Canadians equally (Fraser, 2006), in other words, institutional bilingualism (Trudeau, 1993).

Trudeau’s language policy only received mild approval among francophone media as a step forward for francophones and was rejected heavily by English Canadians once they learned that official bilingualism meant transformation of the working language in the federal government (English, 2010). Not only was their primary purpose of persuading Québec francophones to abandon their demands for constitutional recognition of Québec’s distinctiveness left unaccomplished, Trudeau’s language policy reduced national unity rather than strengthening it by discouraging English Canadians to further entertain Québec’s enduring demands (McRoberts, 1997). Thus, the rivalry between Ottawa and Québec was strengthened rather than weakened, Trudeau’s language policy failing to solve the Québec question. When Trudeau left politics for the second time, Lévesque noted “the ‘shipwrecked dream’ of a bilingual Canada, a generous dream in Trudeau’s centralizing perspective, but one that would only have been imposed in part, and by force, in Quebec alone” (1986, p.365). Ontario refusing official bilingualism and Manitoba capitulating over the linguistic rights of the francophone minority “clearly demonstrate the complete failure of Mr. Trudeau's dream ... except in Québec” (quoted in Godin, 2007, p.599).

Still, the Official Languages Law certainly facilitated francophones to become a part of the federal government where in the 1950s francophones formed less than 10 per cent of the Canadian public service and the language of work was mostly English (English, 2010). By the 1980s, the federal government was transformed into a bilingual institution and no federal political party would ever choose a unilingual leader (English, 2010). Cabinet ministers are expected to be bilingual as well, francophones becoming much more visible and assuming positions such as Finance, Trade, Commerce which were previously reserved only for anglophones (McRoberts, 1997). However, the federal institution in Ottawa was to maintain its primary English character, with a greatly increased number of francophones (McRoberts, 1997) and most importantly, it had little impact on the language situation in provinces, especially in Montréal, a hub of language issues (Levine, 1990).
Meanwhile in Québec, mainly campaigning on economy and promising to create 100,000 jobs (Denis, 2006), the PLQ was elected under Bourassa in 1970 and again in 1973. With an overwhelming majority government and the Gendron Commission having submitted its report, Bourassa had no choice but to act on the language question although he himself had been hesitant (Levine, 1990). Thus, Law 22, *Loi sur la langue officielle*, was enacted on July 31, 1974, with the aim to make “French obligatory without prohibiting other languages in the private sector” (Bourassa, 1995, p.143-4). With this law, Bourassa wrote later, Québec had become “a French state within a Canadian common market” (quoted in Denis, 2006, p.279). Additionally, while it made Québec the French state by reinforcing the collective rights of the francophone majority, it nonetheless respected the individual rights of the anglophone minority (Denis, 2006). It was to be a “very hard blow” for the PQ because it showed the people that there was no need to separate from Canada to live in a French environment in Québec (Denis, 2006, p.250). Indeed, it was the first law ever to recognize French as the only official language of Québec and was to serve as the cultural affirmation of the province. For Bourassa, it was a concrete measure of his cultural sovereignty with which cultural insecurity would be remedied.

In reality, the law satisfied no one. On the one hand, the francophones rejected the law for its major deficiency of making French the common language of Québec, believing that the law was indecisive and continued to recognize a certain institutional bilingualism condemned by the majority (Bothwell, 2006; Oakes & Warren, 2007; Gémar, 2008). On the other hand, the law had the effect of making anglophones feel as a minority for the first time in history, shifting the linguistic balance (Levine, 1990). Thus, for those anglophones who saw Montréal as bilingual, Law 22 was a major threat that shattered their majority psychology (Levine, 1990; Bothwell, 2006). In the end, Bourassa’s Law pushed even moderate francophones to vote for the PQ and anglophones to vote massively for the UN to punish Bourassa (Levine, 1990), giving the PQ momentum in the 1976 election (Gémar, 2008).
4.1.4. Laurin: Charter of the French Language

Lévesque’s idea of a language policy was very close to that of Law 22 of the PLQ (Lévesque, 1986). However, one thing that seriously bothered him about Law 22 was the criteria for those children who could go to English schools, which was to show a sufficient knowledge of that language through exams (Lévesque, 1986). Tests imposed on young children was unacceptable to Lévesque which was, according to him, “persecutory and sadistic” for the children (Godin, 2007, p.366). Thus, Lévesque fought the 1976 election campaign on two promises concerning language. One was to make Québec French as Ontario was English. The second was the abolition of language tests for children to enter English schools (Godin, 2001; Picard, 2003). Accordingly, shortly after the election victory in November 1976, Lévesque, now Premier, gave Laurin, Minister of Cultural Development, a very modest mandate to revise Law 22, referring especially to the language test38 (Picard, 2003).

However, with Laurin’s conviction, what was to become a modest amendment of Law 22 turned into an extensive masterpiece with the introduction of the White Paper (Godin, 2001). The Charter of the French Language was presented on April 27, 1977, almost a month after the White Paper, of which it faithfully followed the spirit (Levine, 1990; Godin, 2001; Picard, 2003). It was symbolically numbered Bill 1. It is generally thought that the number, 1, represented the importance of the language question for the PQ government (Oakes & Warren, 2007). However, as has already been mentioned, Lévesque wanted to give the symbolic number 1 to his Bill on party election-funds, to emphasize the democratic aspect of his government. The language Bill was thus to be given the number 2. Laurin pushed Robert Burns, parliamentary leader of the PQ who was responsible for legislations, to give the language bill the symbolic number 1, in part to avoid confusion between Bourassa’s Law 22 but mainly of his conviction of the historical importance of the Bill (Picard, 2003; Larocque, 2007). Either way, we see Laurin’s determination to give this law an important status, by even ignoring Lévesque’s will.

38 Lévesque was not exactly involved directly in the PQ language policy. He was the type of Premier who would entrust his ministers with their portfolio and let them take control and responsibility (Laurin, 1992; Fraser, 2001).
The Bill actually ended up becoming Bill 101, with several modifications\(^{39}\). It was enacted in August 26, 1977, to become the Charter of the French Language, less than a year after PQ had gained power.

Levine (1990) observed that Laurin’s initial plan of a radical language legislation (Bill 1) was soothed to a more moderate one (Law 101), extending the approach of Law 22 but some provisions even more liberal, especially concerning the language of instruction. Coleman held a similar view that Law 101 has in the end followed the path of Law 22, the difference being only clear in the field of local public institutions and language in schools (1981). Laurin’s biographer Picard, however, explained that Laurin’s principles remained intact, for him being “the greatest battle of his life” (2003, p.310). It was the treatment of English and thus anglophones that was strikingly different from Law 22, which represented Laurin’s conviction to battle the conqueror.

While nationalist associations and union groups strongly supported Laurin’s project, mainly four groups opposed. First were the cultural communities, especially that of Italians, concerning language of instruction (Picard, 2003). The new linguistic bible seemed less discriminatory at first compared to the language tests of Law 22 but the compulsory francization of future immigrants did not pass (Godin, 2001). Second was the anglophone community who was convinced that they would become extinct. Laurin understood their anger but thought that it would disappear gradually after full political and economic recovery of French-speaking Quebeckers was achieved (Picard, 2003). Third was the business community including both French and English who opposed the coercive francization programs for companies (Picard, 2003). The Board of Trade saw the White Paper as “the first step towards a form of totalitarian government” (Godin, 2001, p.189) and the Chamber of Commerce of Montreal wrote Lévesque to denounce the White Paper and asked to use his open-mindedness before tabling the bill (Picard, 2003). Critics were claiming that many companies would leave Québec and

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\(^{39}\) According to Picard, the maneuver did not have great importance in terms of substance, the essentials remaining the same especially on matter of official language, language of instruction and work. It was rather procedural, allowing the government to introduce all the amendments at once in the new bill that otherwise should have to be brought and debated one by one before the parliamentary committee (2003). Nonetheless, Laurin tabled a new Bill 101 in July with substantial modification, with 60 amendments, including 34 fundamental changes (Burns, 1977).
many jobs be lost, the head of the Royal Bank threatening to move the headquarters if French was imposed (Godin, 2001). “He is free to do it,” Laurin would fight back, “if he does not like the law” (Godin, 2001, p.190). Laurin was, however, disappointed and angry that francophone businessmen were against his project. He could not accept that they could slavishly adopt the perspective of the anglophone minority and it was in them that he saw the colonized attitude (Picard, 2003). And lastly and naturally, the Trudeau government opposed the law as well, still not even used to the idea that a sovereigntist party was in government. Trudeau thought that their language policy was narrow and backward which would constitute an ethnic society taking Québec back centuries before (Picard, 2003).

4.2. Language Ideology

4.2.1. Dualism and Bilingualism

4.2.1.1. Trudeau: Against Dualism

Although Trudeau had briefly been one of the conservative nationalists in his youth, he always rejected the popular nationalist cause of unilingualism concerning language. Instead, he followed the view of his father, a successful francophone businessman, that with the advantages it presented, majority of Canadiens were obliged to learn English which was perfectly reasonable for Trudeau as long as anglicisms were not introduced into French (English, 2007). Thus, for Trudeau, individual bilingualism had always been at his core from a very young age even while experiencing a moment of Québec nationalism and separatism.

Trudeau’s priority was to ensure that Canada as a whole was the home of French Canadians and if so, they had to be able to deal with the federal government in their own language and to send their children to French schools wherever in Canada (Trudeau, 1998f). Theoretically, Canada was already officially bilingual with the Section 133 of the BNA Act of 1867, with which both languages were to be used in federal Parliaments and Supreme Courts, important documents being published in both languages (McRoberts, 1997). However, other important federal operations were almost entirely in English, including cabinet meetings, federal bureaucracy, especially in the upper levels of the civil
service where francophones were under-represented, and military (McRoberts, 1997). In Trudeau’s words, “Ottawa in those days was very English” (1998b, p.135). Reflecting his personal experience of alienation when he worked in the Privy Council Office in Ottawa between 1949 and 1951 in an English-dominated environment, Trudeau was determined to change all that (McRoberts, 1997).

Often misunderstood by opponents of this law, not limited to Québec nationalists but including also those in Western Canada, the Official Languages Act certainly did not promote every Canadian becoming bilingual, just as the Commission had repeated numerous times. Trudeau marked that “the enemies of bilingualism propagated the myth that everyone in Canada would have to speak French” but “in fact, bilingualism only meant that the federal government had to serve Canadians in both official languages” (1998b, p.136). Thus, Trudeau clearly rejected his ambition of individual bilingualism for all Canadians.

This rejection is, however, questionable if we take into account his rejection of another concept, dualism. Trudeau stated in 1988 during the discussion on the Meech Lake Accord:

>Duality divides groups. We did not use the expression “French-speaking Canadians” and “English-speaking Canadians” in any of our constitutions. We used the concept of bilingualism. Bilingualism unites people; dualism divides them. Bilingualism means you can speak to the other; duality means you can live in one language and the rest of Canada will live in another language, and we will all be good friends, which is what Mr. Lévesque always wanted. You speak English, we will speak French, and we will be friends. (1988, p.2993)

Here, Trudeau clearly promoted individual bilingualism. If it was only the federal government that was required to be bilingual, institutional bilingualism as Trudeau had remarked, and normal citizens left untouched, does that not mean dualism in real life for Canadians? Here, Trudeau left this discussion unsettled, making people believe that he was in fact aiming for individual bilingualism which Trudeau regarded as neither difficult for an individual nor a threat for French.

4.2.1.2. Laurendeau and Laurin: Against Bilingualism

Interestingly enough, the two assumingly very different people promoting bilingualism
(Laurendeau) and unilingualism (Laurin) had similar conceptions of language that individual bilingualism is essentially a threat to French Canadians. Theorizing his concept of bilingualism, Laurendeau first distinguished between the elite and the mass. The elites are the ones who are capable of becoming a complete bilingual and of realizing what a national culture has to offer. The mass, on the other hand, cannot completely be bilingual and rarely has an attachment to their mother tongue. For them, languages are one of the tools to earn their living, not instruments of culture. Contrary to those who learn many languages, an average man will not make a lot of effort to learn a language with no practical value. Thus, when the mass sees bilingualism as practical, they will surely be bilingual, “but when everyone has become bilingual, bilingualism will have no more function” (Laurendeau, 1942/1976j, pp.236-237).

Further, Laurendeau distinguished between English and French Canadians with their attitude towards language. For him, the perspective of the former learning French was so unlikely that he even denied the need for examining this supposition. The thesis that all Canadians must be bilingual thus meant the total bilingualism for all French Canadians and making French Canadians to speak English (1942/1976j). In this sense, Trudeau’s promotion of individual bilingualism was strictly elitist and it was the French Canadian mass that were the most vulnerable. It was a serious threat to their existence and it was necessary to fight against it (Laurendeau, 1942/1976j).

In fact, from very early on, Laurendeau had opposed bilingualism for himself and for the society as a whole. For one thing, he grew up and lived in Outremont throughout his life except for some years in Paris, a francophone middle-class residential area in Montréal where it was the norm to speak French without being handicapped for not knowing English (Horton, 1992). Moreover, Laurendeau was greatly influenced by his conservative father who protected him from English exposure at an early age believing that learning two languages at once would harm his son’s intellectual development (Horton, 1992). Thus, Laurendeau himself refused to learn English, convinced that the French language and culture were superior to those of English and that the language played a crucial starting point for English Canada to assimilate French Canada (Horton, 1992). Additionally, his trips to Alsace and Belgium
during his time in Europe reminded him that bilingualism meant the undermining of the language of the minority and ultimately leading to the degradation of its culture to mere folklore (Horton, 1992). Thus, upon his return from Europe in 1937, he joined the *refrancisation* movement to condemn French Canadian supporters of bilingualism, like Trudeau, who considered it as the best way for material success (Horton, 1992), stating that “when all French Canadians have become bilingual…they will all speak English. …and French itself will soon be useless” (Laurendeau, 1942/1976j, p.237). Thus, while some of his contemporaries were learning English without much consideration, Laurendeau was not inclined to learn it until his late twenties and was unable to speak it confidently until he was forty (Horton, 1992).

At the same time, he had doubts about total unilingualism for Québec. He asked himself, “though in the more or less short term, bilingualism means the death of the nations, does not unilingualism mean death to all chance of success for the individual?” He certainly did not wish to build a wall surrounding the “reserve” of Québec or ban English within society (Laurendeau, 1942/1976j, p.238). But he was clearly caught between these two extremes of bilingualism and unilingualism, the former indicating the extinction of French and the latter lack of openness to the larger world or individual success.

Similarly, Laurin acknowledged the importance of individual bilingualism or multilingualism, for it contributed to the “important enrichment for the individual” which “cannot be considered to be a threat to the national language” (Laurin, 1977a, p.14). He mentioned that a modern education system should make its citizens foster their second or third language, recognizing that for many Québécois, English was a necessity (Laurin, 1977a). However, there should be three conditions to speak English: a) that the requirement to speak English at work is really justified by particular circumstances; b) that the learning of English is not imposed too early to the detriment of a basic training, cultural and technical, which must remain in any country the preoccupation of a fundamental humanism; and c) that the need for a second language does not contradict the need for a more fundamental belonging to the first culture (Laurin, 1977a). His wariness towards English is obvious, as well as his reservations about French and English bilingualism for every francophone Quebecers.
This is because, as with Laurendeau, Laurin essentially saw bilingualism as a threat to francophones. For Laurin, bilingualism inevitably expected the Québécois to know two languages, which also meant that knowing English was indispensable to earn a living in this country, in any post or any kind of work. Like in any colonial situations around the world, bilingualism represents a transitional period where the dominating society imposes their language to the dominated and the latter eventually loses the usefulness and the justification of its language (Laurin, 1977a). Thus, Laurendeau and Laurin shared the same logic of bilingualism having the major potential of degrading their French language.

What differentiated Laurendeau and Laurin was the former’s hope towards institutional bilingualism for Canada. Laurendeau stated in the blue pages that in a bilingual country, individuals are not necessarily bilingual but it is where “the principal public and private institutions must provide services in two languages to citizens, the vast majority of whom may very well be unilingual” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxviii). Consequently, what was crucial for the mandate of the Commission was not “the number of bilingual people” but “the position of each of the two languages in everyday life and of the opportunities actually offered to each of them” (p.xxviii). This did not, however, have to apply to the whole country. As he noted, “it will never be possible for the members of the two main cultural groups to enjoy advantages … throughout the country on an equal footing” (p.xlii). Rather, equality of the two linguistic groups meant “wherever similar conditions are found, similar services will be offered” (p.xliii). Thus, it meant that French minorities would be ensured of fair treatment by the federal institutions where their numbers warranted (Horton, 1992).

Concerning each province, this institutional bilingualism was, in fact, already applied to Québec’s provincial governmental institution under Section 133 of the BNA Act. Thus, the Commission further recommended two provincial governments, Ontario and New Brunswick, with their sizable francophone population, to adopt the Québec model (McRoberts, 1997). In this sense, Québec was recommended to remain officially and institutionally bilingual. However, Laurendeau, in the spirit of equality and further reciprocity, thought that if these two provinces had the right to refuse bilingualism,
Québec should have the right to declare French unilingualism (Fraser, 2006). To be true, Laurendeau concluded in his diary:

One is bilingual in North America if knowing two languages is necessary or really useful. … bilingualism becomes viable only where it is based on two unilingualisms; otherwise, bilingualism is a transitional situation ending up in unilingualism of the strongest and the largest. (1990, pp.339-340)

Thus, what Laurendeau ended up proposing was dualism, with two unilingualisms based on the two nations theory, with which he understood that separatism was based on the hyperconsciousness of the historical existence of this unilingual French mass (Laurendeau, 1990). In the end, New Brunswick was the only province to declare itself officially bilingual but only after Laurendeau’s death. If he were alive, he might have officially recommended Québec to become unilingual, seeing the refusal by Ontario, Québec’s true historical adversary.

Laurin, on the other hand, saw the bilingualism policy of the federal government as a dangerous lure that puts Quebecers at risk, providing them false security and preventing them from adopting measures that would ensure their true development (Québec, 1977). It was also unnecessary to make the whole of Canada bilingual, imposing on the residents of British Colombia or Ontario to know French when it is hardly used in their respective provinces (Laurin, 1977a). Seeing the contradiction concerning bilingualism advocated by those who supported Canadian bilingualism, Laurin made a valid point: “How can each have the freedom to speak one’s own language anywhere without the others knowing that language?” (1977a, p.32). Thus, Laurin considered bilingualism to be a highly unrealistic solution.

For Laurin, it was logical for Québec to pursue its own language policy to make French the common language of the province. In this way, at least in Québec, people were able to communicate with each other. Thus, in the end, Laurendeau and Laurin both advocated unilingualism for Québec thus dualism for Canada at the provincial level, i.e. the principle of territoriality. In fact, Fraser pointed out that Laurin’s conception of an officially unilingual Québec was inspired and encouraged by Laurendeau. Denying to join Trudeau and the others to engage in federal politics, Laurin had been drawn toward the

4.2.2. Language and Identity

4.2.2.1. French for Québec Identity

One of the important differences between Trudeau and the others was the latter’s emphasis on the significance of the first language towards culture and identity. For one thing, Laurendeau initially only recommended bilingualism to be investigated in the Commission, representing the importance he attached to language. This was soon accompanied by biculturalism proposed by the government side (Horton, 1992). Thus, it was stated in the Preliminary Report that

language is the most evident expression of culture, the one which most readily distinguishes cultural groups….In terms of our mandate, this statement means that the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism are inseparably linked. (quoted in Horton, 1992, p.213)

This spirit was subsequently followed by the blue pages (B & B Commission, 1967) written by Laurendeau that “language is in the first place an essential expression of a culture in the full sense of the word” (p.xxxiv). According to Laurendeau, “a given language as a means of communication and expression exists to permit the individual to communicate with others, and to express himself and make himself understood” (p.xliii). Within this context, the importance of a person’s first language was vital because even if one is a bilingual, the two languages cannot be considered to have the same significance. According to Laurendeau, individual bilingualism meant a person “know[s], more or less, two languages” (p.xxviii). However,

complete bilingualism – the equal command of two languages – is rare and perhaps impossible. Generally, the bilingual people … combine a knowledge of their mother tongue with a more or less extensive and active knowledge of the second language. (p.xxviii)

Thus, since pure individual bilingualism is a rare phenomenon, the importance of the first language can
never be overemphasized. “The problem of the first language must come first: it is vital; it is more
essential for the human being than questions about a second language” (p.xxviii). This conception
widely explains that even if many of the neo-nationalists were bilingual and even fluently so, the
importance of French cannot be underestimated.

The importance of French to Québec identity was clearly stated by Lévesque in his manifesto:

Being ourselves is essentially a matter of keeping and developing a personality that
has survived three and a half centuries. At the heart of this personality is the fact
that we speak French. Everything else depends on this one essential element and
follows from it or leads us infallibly back to it. (1986, p.222; 1997, p. 161)

Even for Lévesque, whose bilingualism and command of English was so high that he occasionally said
things more colourfully in English than the first time in French (Fraser, 2001), speaking French was his
fundamental being that could definitely be not ignored.

For Laurin, an independentist who was also a bilingual and felt perfectly at ease in both languages
(Laurin, 1977a), language was undoubtedly an indispensable part of one’s identity. As he stated,
“language is the very foundation of a people, through which they recognize themselves and are
recognized, rooted in their being and allows them to express their identity” (1977a, p.85). According to
him, it is not only practical but something “like food and air that we need for living. It is a basic and
fundamental condition of life in that it preserves the identity of individuals and communities” (1977a,
p.20-21).

Trudeau, on the other hand, did not deny the importance of language to culture. In fact, Trudeau
recognized that language has mainly two functions, one as a vehicle of communication and one as a
preservation of culture, but clearly stated that official recognition of language by the government should
only concern the former (Trudeau, 1972). Moreover, English and French were chosen as the official
languages of Canada for the single reason that those two languages were the languages used by the
overwhelming number of Canadians, not because they were the two founding races (Trudeau, 1972).
So according to Trudeau, if there were six million people in Canada whose first language was Ukrainian,
the language would forcebly be established as the official language (Trudeau, 1968c). In this way, Trudeau tried to cut ties with any official recognition of cultures within Canada. Indeed, his conception of language leaned heavily toward the instrumental one, seeing it as a tool. Thus for him, “bilingualism is a tool that doesn’t necessarily imply you’re of French or Anglo-Saxon culture” (Trudeau, 1998d, p.144). It was a very liberal conception of language, Trudeau stating that “anybody who really wants to learn a language can do so. But you can’t learn an entire culture” (1998d, p.144). Therefore, contrary to Laurendeau who initially only proposed bilingualism without biculturalism to the Commission because of the importance of language to one’s identity and culture, Trudeau officially only proposed bilingualism considering language as merely an instrument of communication.

Even Bourassa opposed Trudeau’s view on dissociating language and culture. Seeing Trudeau’s policy on multiculturalism as the very manifestation of the idea, Bourassa, as the Premier of Québec at the time, was the one who reacted against Trudeau’s fundamental ideal. Writing directly to Trudeau, Bourassa raised his concern that “the assertion [to dissociate culture and language] seems to me to be questionable to found a policy” (quoted in Denis, 2006, p.229). He also considered Québec to have the primary responsibility in its territory for the stability of the French language and culture in the North American context (Denis, 2006; Martel & Pâquet, 2010). Thus, acknowledging the importance of language for cultural sovereignty, Bourassa was also in line with the neo-nationalist narrative that French was an indispensable part of Québec identity.

4.2.2.2. Individual Rights

As has been already stated above, Trudeau did not deny “the importance of a linguistic community in the defense and advancement of the language spoken by its members” (1990, p.391) and did not deny the necessity of government support for language as cultural preservation (1971). In fact, language, as Trudeau remarked, becomes a contributor of Canadian diversity, richness and strength (Trudeau, 1972). These matters, however, would be settled by individual language rights of each person by the Constitution, which would protect the individual against tyranny of the state and majority
(Trudeau, 1990). As a liberal, he would “strengthen the sense of nationhood primarily by encouraging the growth of the national individual” (Trudeau, 1998e, p.9540). Thus, in Trudeau’s mind, the two functions of language are completely separated, one officially endorsed and the other without official status but enriching Canada in its own way, protected under individualism.

Importantly, Trudeau ignored many of the recommendations of the B & B commission which was incompatible with his notion of liberalism and individualism. Any idea related to the principle of territoriality was lost, since for Trudeau, only the personality principle was legitimate (McRoberts, 1997). He also did not implement certain measures such as balancing appointments on a linguistic basis, segregating workers according to first language (McRoberts, 1997), acknowledging the territorial distribution of francophones and anglophones (Martel & Pâquet, 2010). Rather, Trudeau relied heavily on language training to create and provide bilingual service, which was adopted by the former Pearson government and decisively criticized by the Commission (McRoberts, 1997). Trudeau sought to reduce language rights to individuals rather than groups and offer governmental services to individuals in either of the two official languages, wherever they were in the country with the principle of personality (Martel & Pâquet, 2010).

Among the neo-nationalists, Bourassa was the one who emphasized the most on individual rights. Bourassa’s cultural sovereignty, which adopted the collective conception of rights, was accompanied by the *Charte des droits et libertés de la personne* (Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms) enacted in June 1975. This Québec Charter was to respect the dignity of the human being and recognize the human rights and equality of all citizens in a democratic society, constituting the very foundation of freedom (Lieutenant-Gouverneur, 1974). It was to complement Bourassa’s cultural initiative by emphasizing rather the individual side of rights, even prevailing over other laws. Considering that Law 22, or the Official Language Act, was not a Charter, the Bourassa government can be said to have regarded individual rights more important than collective rights. Notably, the Charter of Human Rights and

40 Remarked at the Liberal International Colloquium in Ottawa, April 29, 1974.
Freedoms (2018) contained several provisions on language, which was to avoid discrimination based on language (art. 10), to assure to be informed in a language one understands when arrested or detained (art. 28) and to have linguistic assistance at a hearing in court (art. 36). Thus, Bourassa’s cultural sovereignty resulted in a moderate expression of collective rights of francophones.

Laurendeau did not consider that individual rights will solve the language issue. Even French, a great cultural and international language, “under certain sociological conditions, can wither away …” and be “forced to use another language in order to express itself the realities which make up a large part of its daily life” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xxxv). For Laurendeau, protecting individual rights was insufficient in order to avoid this unfortunate consequence. “Individual equality can fully exist only if each community has, throughout the country, the means to progress within its culture and to express that culture” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xliv), due to cultures as well as languages being “essentially collective phenomena” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xliii). As Horton stated, Laurendeau was not able to accept that linguistic and cultural issues could be solved with individual rights and without significant constitutional change (1992). Laurin agreed:

> The purely formal respect for individual rights risks being a means of protecting the privileges of a better-off minority, at the expense of a majority of citizens who cannot enjoy the same rights because they do not have the economic resources. In this sense, it is right to say that it is freedom that oppresses and the law that liberates. (1977a, p.90)

Thus, Laurin was to liberate his people with his Charter of the French Language. Laurin was actually the one who tried to override individual rights with his language law. Article 172 of Bill 1 implied, at least for some, that the Charter of the French Language prevailed over the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and restrained individual liberty41 (Levesque, 1977a; Picard, 2003). It was claimed by the president of the Commission of Personal Rights to be catastrophic and to be in need of a withdrawal (Picard, 2003). Laurin insisted otherwise but eventually gave in to deleting the article in the renewed

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41 Bill 1 article 172 read as follows: Section 52 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (1975, chapter 6) is amended by adding at the end, after the word “Charter”, the words “or unless it is of the Charter of the French Language in Québec”. 

Bill 101, thinking there were more important provisions to be discussed and realizing the Bill did not affect the other Charter thus no mention was required (Picard, 2003). In fact, it is said that Laurin finally gave in because of Lévesque’s express demand, the latter being sensitive to the president’s argument and considering the article to be irritating (Picard, 2003).

Lévesque himself also considered that individual rights were not enough to solve the basic problem of equality. Citing the example of French Canadians outside Québec being poor and easily assimilated, he denied that Trudeau’s method of spreading the French fact throughout Canada would solve the problem (1968/1991d). Rather, he considered that collective rights are necessary to enforce individual rights. As he stated:

> Collective rights, in essence, are general rights but whose exercise necessarily has the effect, if they are well understood and well applied, of promoting the effective exercise of the fundamental individual rights of each and every one of them, spreading the use for all citizens. (1978/1991b, p.243)

Thus, Lévesque considered collective rights and individual rights to be complementary (1978/1991b). In this sense, Lévesque gave importance to the equality of individuals, to which collective rights gives an important context, and did not necessarily give superiority to the latter. Rather, collective rights and even sovereignty were for Lévesque merely tools to further advance equality and democracy to treat all citizens as equals.

Araki has made a related observation that the difference between Trudeau and Lévesque was not the generally held view of individual versus collective rights, but rather how they perceived rights in the first place. While Trudeau believed that rights should be enshrined in constitutions, Lévesque held the view that rights are not static and would change over time, formed and reformed through dialogue, discussions and recognition (2015). Therefore, what Lévesque aspired to was to have this capacity for democratic formation of individual rights guaranteed within the context of collective rights, i.e. sovereignty.
4.3. Québec Language Policy

4.3.1. Intervention

4.3.1.1. Trudeau: Rejecting Protectionism

As much as all the characters shared a belief in state intervention, as we have seen in the last chapter, it was a different matter when it came to the crucial problem of language. Trudeau was especially critical of protectionism. According to Bickerton, although Trudeau did not deny state intervention on economic matters, he was more ambivalent and suspicious when it came to culture. While he recognized that modern capitalism and technology erode cultural distinctiveness and expanded policies to protect Canadian identity against American culture, he was extremely critical of certain forms of cultural protectionism, especially that of ethnic or linguistic for French in Québec (2006). Trudeau’s opposition to the Charter-kind of law stemmed from his two perspectives. First was that he saw it as a collective ideology, considering their laws as reactionary, limiting individual freedom in the name of the community and interpreting it through the community’s needs (Bickerton, 2006). He thought that Québec’s language protectionism was based on “a definition of the common good as a function of an ethnic group, rather than of all the people, regardless of characteristics” (Trudeau, 1962/1968b, p.169). Trudeau thought that it denies Québec’s social pluralism and consequently threatens the individual freedom and dignity vis-à-vis the elevated francophone community, with too much cultural protectionism leading into intolerance and subsequently a totalitarian denial of personal freedom for group dignity (Bickerton, 2006). For Trudeau, laws that give people choices and opportunities are good laws. In this sense, “laws that promote the use of French, the excellence of it, the teaching of it to immigrants, are good laws” but “forcing people to do something” was not (Trudeau, 1998b, pp.137-138). It is certainly “better to ensure personal freedom. (Or else you are a fascist)” (Trudeau, 1964/1968d, p.209). Thus, his refusal of protectionism in the field of language based on nationalism certainly came from his consideration that it is against human dignity and can evolve to intolerance. If the community is given priority over the individual, that is where fascism commences,
without true freedom.

The second concerned his belief in the French language itself. Since Québec language policy is obviously based on the conviction that the French language will lose ground in Québec without protection, Trudeau regarded it as an insult to francophones (Bickerton, 2006). As a libertarian who believed in competition, Trudeau had faith in the vitality of the French language and culture to strive against English under the sole condition that they are both constitutionally guaranteed equal in public life (Bickerton, 2006). As Trudeau stated, “a proud people will keep their language precisely because they’re proud of it” (1998b, p.138). As far as Trudeau was concerned, French was competitive enough to fight against English and refused to admit its weakness: “[the] survival of the French language … is already assured. French is spoken in Quebec by an ever increasing number of persons” (1968c, p.30).

4.3.1.2. Lévesque and Bourassa: Hesitation

Lévesque and Bourassa seem to have been very hesitant to act on language but with very different reasons. Although the Charter of the French Language is easily linked to Lévesque as the Premier of the PQ which enacted the law, he is known to have been very hesitant for intervention. As with Trudeau, it was a humiliation for Lévesque to have to legislate and use coercive measures to protect its language (Laurin, 1992) which Lévesque regarded as a proof that Québec was a “colonial society” (Godin, 2001, p.169). As with Trudeau, he was worried it would lead to intolerance (Johnson, 1992), especially of convincing his anglophone or allophone fellow citizens to adhere to francization by using coercive measures (Ancil, 2008). Again as with Trudeau, Lévesque preferred liberalism concerning language but with a different perspective. According to Lévesque, once Québec had become sovereign, its dynamism would lead to a natural francization (Provencher, 1974/1977; Laurin, 1992). As Lévesque stated in his memoirs:

One day, if we wanted it badly enough, French would be at home everywhere in Quebec and, as in any normal country, we could finally toss aside the crutches of legislation that have always seemed to me to be deeply humiliating. (1986, p.288)
Thus, Lévesque thought language would be one of the issues that sovereignty would solve by itself. For now, however, Lévesque understood the necessity to legislate, regarding that the need to legislate proved in itself the seriousness of the situation (Godin, 2007). As Lévesque mentioned, “for the time being, the prosthesis remained necessary” (1986, p.288). Thus, he agreed to intervene after acknowledging the victimization of francophones, contrary to Trudeau who denied it until the end.

Lévesque’s hesitation did not, of course, mean that he was indifferent towards language. Quite the contrary. Already as a minister in the PLQ Lesage government in the early 1960s before any language policy was in place for Québec, he continuously raised the need for state intervention on language concerning immigrant integration during debates in the Legislative Assembly of Québec. Lévesque mentioned the necessity of state participation to mitigate the superiority of English in the economic sector (1965), pointed out that any immigration law without language policy is weak (1968a) and reiterated the need to legislate (1968b). On the other hand, it was already a great humiliation for him to have to legislate on one’s language which was the same as one’s own existence and a proof that Québec was in a dead end (cul-de-sac) and was an inner colony of a country (Lévesque, 1968b). But according to Lévesque, lassais-faire was not an option anymore, considering the ever decreasing birth rate of francophones and the increasing anglicization of immigrants.

When the UN government finally tabled Bill 63, however, Lévesque was one of the few members within the Assembly who formed a small but vocal opposition fighting the details until the end (Picard, 2003). As Lévesque explained:

> Bill 63 was a notoriously clumsy text. While claiming to “promote” French, it offered everyone, immigrants included, free access to the school of their choice, in other words eliminating any defence against Anglicization. (1986, p.237)

Because it was the immigrants’ anglicization that had to be regulated, Bill 63 missed the point significantly. Lévesque thought there were at least three points to be tackled: a) to reverse the language situation to accord predominance to French without bullying the English minority; b) to make

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42 As of December 31, 1968, it has been called the National Assembly of Québec.
immigrants choose French schools for their children and free choice would come later when francophones were assured; but also c) to accept the fact that English will always reign in North America and absolute unilingualism was not realistic (Godín, 2001, p.168-171). Thus, Lévesque’s intervention a) preferred preferentialism rather than unilingualism, b) respected the anglophone minority and c) imposed French to immigrants but sought liberalism later on. Seeing Lévesque’s hesitance and the minimum requirement of intervention, Trudeau’s accusation of an intolerant ethnic nationalism does not seem to fit Lévesque’s views.

Recognizing the risks in acting on language, Bourassa (1995) noted that Law 63 had been the beginning of the fall of the then UN Premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand. Thus, Bourassa was also hesitant to legislate on language, which essentially derived from two reasons. One was his preference for liberalism, as with Trudeau and a little with Lévesque, Bourassa’s neo-classical assumptions made him wary of intervention especially in private enterprises (Levine, 1990). For the second reason, Bothwell (2006) remarked that the PLQ had a solid support from the English-speaking community which Bourassa could not ignore. Lévesque would even praise Bourassa for acting on language and showing courage, considering that the PLQ was the “English Party” (1986, p.265-266). Levine (1990) also portrayed Bourassa as a political opportunist who was hesitant to enact any language law and hoped that economic growth would soothe Québec nationalism and calm linguistic tensions that were arising.

Still, making French the only official language of Québec was for Bourassa “an essential objective to the historical plan” (1995, p.102) and language was also a personal concern of his from his youth through his adult years. For him, the symbolism of federalism, neo-federalism, quasi-federalism, and sovereignty-association was nothing but a technical problem. It was fundamentally more important that for the first time since the Conquest, French would be established as the only official language of the territory, seeing it as a chance to affirm the cultural sovereignty of Québec (Bourassa, 1995). As Denis stated, for Bourassa, the new status of French was “a fundamental element in ensuring Québec’s social stability” (2006, p.225).
As can be easily imagined, Laurin was the most eager to intervene. Whereas Lévesque envisaged a modest reform of Bourassa’s Law 22, Laurin was aiming for a very different solution for language:

I considered for myself a radical reform, a resumption of the ab ovo problem, in the light of our history, our French irredentism, our desire to maintain and develop our cultural identity, to repair the wounds and misdeeds of a long political, economic, social and psychological inferiority, to give back to our people pride, confidence and self-esteem. (Laurin, 1992, p.315)

Thus from the very beginning, he already knew what he wanted: a general, comprehensive and coercive language policy which would make French the language of the state, of work and of commerce (Godin, 2001). It certainly had the therapeutic aspect, very much related to his conception of independence and how it would be a way of shock therapy. For Laurin, the law was to lay the groundwork towards Québec independence, an act of liberation for the francophone and of defiance against the English North American majority (Godin, 2001; Fraser, 2006). It was a melancholy narrative to which Laurin planned to give a solution, radically different from Law 22.

In the White Paper, entitled La politique québécoise de la langue française, Laurin laid down four principles for state vigilance and intervention concerning his language policy: a) In Québec, the French language is not a simple way of expression but a medium of living; b) we must respect minorities, their languages, their cultures; c) it is important to learn languages other than French; d) the status of the French language in Québec is a question of social justice. Interestingly, there is no mention of English, despite the mention of minority. But probably the most significant remark in this White Paper was that “there will be no longer any question of a bilingual Québec” (p.35). This, it explained, stems from the critique of Law 22, which tried to francize Québec but at the same time maintain its institutional bilingualism. The new law was to correct this ambiguity and to construct a Québec that would be essentially French (Québec, 1977). In addition, one could say that this policy seemed to be quite liberal for a nationalist language policy with respect for minorities and encouraging people to learn other languages. It will become clear, however, that this was less about tolerance but rather about
reducing the power of English, treating it as just another minority as much as possible.

4.3.2. French as Primary Language of Work

One of the rare consensuses among all the characters on Québec language seems to have been to make French the primary language of work instead of English. We have already seen that Laurendeau ended up advocating, at least in his diary, unilingualism. Although his insistence on institutional unilingualism was not clear, what was apparent was his conviction that language of work in Québec should be French. Acknowledging the fact that young French Canadians were forced to learn the other language while that was not the case for English Canadians, he wrote in his diary that they “should either assimilate or change the situation by declaring French unilingualism in Québec” (Laurendeau, 1990, p.101).

Laurendeau’s French unilingualism was translated into preferentialism in Book III of the report of the B & B Commission, which dealt with the language of work. In fact, according to McRoberts, the status of French in the private sector of Québec was one of the most crucial points which the Commission faced. They were convinced that economic imbalances between anglophones and francophones must be redressed towards which direct governmental responsibility must be taken (1997). Laurendeau did not live long enough to see the actual publication of the book, but the principles were decided when he was still alive thus his spirit continued to live (Lacoste, 1990). The Commission recommended that “in the private sector in Quebec, governments and industry adopt the objective that French become the principal language of work at all levels” (B & B Commission, 1969, p.525). Although there were certainly opponents within the Commission who advocated equal rights on the two

43 The Commission further outlined the following principles to be accepted: a) that French be the principal language of work in the major work institutions of the province; b) that, consequently, the majority of work units in such firms that until now have used English as the principal language of work in middle and upper levels become French-language units; and that such firms designate all management and senior positions as posts that require bilingual incumbents; c) that the majority of smaller or specialized firms should use French as their language of work, but that there should be a place for firms where the language of work is English, as there should be a place anywhere in Canada for such firms where the language of work is French; and d) that the main language of work in activities related to operations outside the province remain the choice of the enterprise (B & B Commission, 1969, p.525-526).
languages no matter what, Laurendeau and the Commission as a whole were actually pioneers of recommending French preferentialism in the private sector, several years before Québec would legislate its own language policy. Thus, in the case of language of economy in Québec, the territorial principle was seen applying to the improvement of the province’s linguistic situation. Laurendeau was in fact so attached to the necessity of making French the language of work in Québec that he hoped that the related book would be the first one to be published. However, the research was not yet finished thus the Commission had to deposit Book I first. Laurendeau was depressed, mentioning that “[Book I] does nothing for Québec” (Morrison, 1990, p.217). As far as he was concerned, Laurendeau joined the federal Commission to serve Québec but he was unable to, at least he thought so.

Lévesque was among the first to pronounce this concern as a Minister in the PLQ government. As he stated in the debates:

As for the superiority of this language of economic work, that is English over French, …, it too can be partially mitigated and, in the long run, corrected profoundly and perhaps in a way that might be really radical compared to what we hope for. (1965, p.632)

The superiority of English in the work place continued to be the reality in the 1970s: “in large companies, we usually work in English and we cannot access senior positions, or even intermediate positions, without a perfect knowledge of this language” (Lévesque, 1972/1987a, p. 324). Thus, Lévesque defended the Charter of making French the main language of work on the day of its enactment, citing the argument of the B & B Commission:

The Commission argued that French should become the main language at work and that more Francophones should be able to work in French at the highest levels of business. It also argued that French must be the main language of Québec in a visible way. These are the main objectives. (1977, p.3445)

When Trudeau enacted the Official Languages Act, recommendations for elevating the status of French in Québec economy were completely ignored (McRoberts, 1997; English, 2010). Still, Trudeau remarked that Bourassa’s law on making French the only official langue in Québec (Law 22) “wouldn’t
have done so much damage” if it were about principal language or working language (Trudeau, 1998b, p.137). Thus, although he rejected the Commission’s view of seeing Québec as a French Canadian hub, he did not deny a little coerciveness regarding French as the working language in Québec.

Bourassa’s determination to make French the official language of Québec started with the effort to make French the “language of work”. He made it public during his opening address at the parliament that “…French must become the language of work…especially in the Montréal area” (Bourassa, 1970, p.7). He also began making concrete efforts among his immediate circle with all his Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Presidents of Parastatals44 (Denis, 2006). Further, he publicly stated that he will make French the language of work and usage in Québec and addressed internationally to the then French President the determination of the government of Québec to establish French as the language of work in Québec (Denis, 2006). Thus, his will was already clear shortly after his gaining power. Anglophones expressed their concern over how far Bourassa was willing to go with his language policy, but Bourassa had in fact clearly voiced the slogan “priority of French in Québec as a language of use and work” in the election of 1970 as well as his other slogan of 100,000 employment (Denis, 2006, p.225). We can assume that his insistence on language of work was influenced by Book III of the report of the B & B Commission which appeared in 1969.

Bill 22 was thus tabled on May 22, 1974, with the name Loi sur la langue officielle. Concerning the business sphere, coercive measures were preferred over persuasive measures with companies not applying francization programs subject to fines, withdrawals of licenses and permits, and possible denial of government contracts (Denis, 2006). In the end when the Law was passed, however, it only promoted French in the business sphere without compulsory measures and with much ambiguity (Levine, 1990; Oakes & Warren, 2007).

Levine documented that Bourassa had started to have private meetings with anglophone business leaders by the spring of 1973 to discuss the language issue. Bourassa explained to major executives of

44 With a document entitled “Administrative directive concerning the French language”, he gives five instructions including that the communication with Québec public bodies, Canadian and provincial government must be in French (Denis, 2006).
anglophone-controlled enterprises that he had no choice but to legislate on language, or else “he would be destroyed politically” (p.98). Although the executives showed some understanding and told him that they would accept some “crazy” initiatives to achieve greater results, they cautioned him that meddling with the language of economy would make businesses move their headquarters from Montréal and discourage investment, explicitly telling Bourassa that coercive francization was intolerable (1990, p.98). The final blow is said to have been a humiliating refusal by the multinational General Motors (Godin, 2001). Bourassa had no choice but to limit mandatory application of a francization program to those companies operating business with the government (Levine, 1990; Paquette, 1996). Consequently, it was only the business groups that were supporting the Law in the end, the only people with whom Bourassa had consulted and listened (Levine, 1990). Thus, Bourassa’s will was not reflected in his law, being unable to ignore the business community.

Laurin shared the nationalist concern of the time that immigrants were overwhelmingly integrating into the anglophone community, especially in Montréal which contained half of the Québec population, which had the impact of gradually diminishing the weight and influence of Québec francophones (Québec, 1977). As Laurin observed, this was because the power of assimilation of the dominant group is always stronger than that of the dominated group, with French representing small jobs and low income where francophones were the victims of the Conquest and economic and financial domination of English Canadian society (Québec, 1977). To counteract this situation, Laurin proposed to make Québec a truly French society by making French the language of work and letting francophones control their politics as well as their economy (Québec, 1977). The spontaneous integration of immigrants to the francophone community depended largely whether Québec society itself was francized, meaning that French had to become the language of work and business within Québec (Québec, 1977). This was, in fact, Laurin’s greatest concern. They had to control their economy where French would be used in the work place and as the everyday language for everyone (Picard, 2003).

Thus, with the Charter, francization was made mandatory in the work place for companies hiring more than 50 persons. The White Paper stated why the number was accorded to 50. First, two-thirds of
the working population were hired in these companies. Second, it was in these enterprises that access
to superior posts was difficult for francophones. Third, they have more financial and human resources
to adopt francization programs than did smaller companies. It further stated that smaller companies
were already francophone and the smallest businesses, which employed only non-francophones, were
obviously not imposed upon to abandon their languages; except when serving francophone clients
(Québec, 1977). Of course, this measure was to correct the historical injustice of income difference
between francophones and anglophones (Québec, 1977). It was also from the expectation that when
French became the true language of work and business, most immigrants will support the Francophone
community for their own benefit and interest (Québec, 1977). As Laurin stated, the Charter was
intended for the little people and their socio-economic improvement:

Our action will have a profoundly socio-economic impact… a decisive gesture for
the liberation and promotion of Québec workers. …it is first and foremost for the
workers, for the small farmers, for the housewives, for the consumers, for the
tenants and the small owners for all the little people in our country that we have
proposed this law; for them much more than for the bosses and the rich. (1977c,
p.3475)

4.3.3. Laurin versus Lévesque: Independent or Part of Canada

4.3.3.1. Conflicting Views

Excluding the language of work, language was one of the issues where the difference between
Laurin and Lévesque was most apparent. Laurin’s enthusiasm and determination was clearly felt at the
press conference on the day he made the White Paper public on April 1, 1977, expressing a deep pride
that he thought would be shared by the francophone majority, clearly announcing that the law was to
be made for them (Picard, 2003). He continued:

There will be no question of a bilingual Québec. The Québec that we want will be
essentially French in all acts of life: economy, work, public administration, signs,
and names of places. (quoted in Godin, 2001, p.187)

Lévesque, on the other hand, seemed to be very uncomfortable with Laurin’s whole project, starting
with the White Paper and Bill 1, saying that they were “unfortunately too rough and ready a remedy” (Lévesque, 1986, p.229) or on Law 101 itself that “there may be excesses in style and content” (Lévesque, 1977/1991g, p.217). In fact, the major difference was that while Laurin believed that the Charter was necessary to prepare the ground for independence by injecting some pride to the francophones, Lévesque did not want to cause a stir nor crisp the political climate before the referendum (Godin, 2001). Thus, while Laurin considered the language law as a necessary first step towards independence, Lévesque saw it as an obstacle with the potential to hinder Québec from gaining independence.

One could say, in fact, that the failure of independence was the consequence of the successful coercive language law which made Québec into an officially French-speaking society. Lévesque wondered whether the feeling of security in both linguistic and national terms contributed “in some sly way to weaken the referendum ‘oui’” (1986, p.315). As Fraser analysed, “rather than laying the groundwork, it has removed one of the major grievances that underlay the desire for sovereignty” (2006, p.93). In other words, the Charter had in fact a paradoxical effect on Québec nationalism by reassuring Québec francophones of their fear of linguistic assimilation, which constantly sustained nationalism in Québec in the first place (Rocher, 2002). It was a great irony that the sense of security created by the Charter for the francophone Québécois was one of the reasons that the independence movement lost its urgency (Fraser, 2006). For many neo-nationalists, Québec had to become a French-speaking society. This was fulfilled, not by independence but rather remaining within Confederation (Fraser, 2006). In fact, it was exactly what Bourassa had intended with his cultural sovereignty to reassure the people and demonstrate that Québec can be French without separating. It was ultimately Laurin who achieved this, unintentionally, with his separatist and coercive attitude.

The decisive difference between Laurin and Lévesque was translated into their respective attitudes towards each of the provisions of the law. Most importantly, while Laurin acted as if Québec was already independent, Lévesque insisted that Québec was still a part of Canada. As Picard observed, Laurin acted from the beginning as if Québec was already sovereign (2003). Godin documented, on the
other hand, how stunned Laurin was at Lévesque’s attachment to Canada when the latter said “we are still in the same country” when discussing the Charter (Godin, 2001, p.175). Lévesque is said to have publicly criticized the provisions of the White Paper of Laurin to have “made the present government act as if Québec were already separated and we had such a mandate from the people of Québec” (Lévesque, 1977a, p.2197). Even on the day of the Royal Assent of the Charter, Lévesque mentioned rather modestly that Québec still belonged to Canada until further notice (Lévesque, 1977).

On July 19, 1977, at the second reading of Bill 101, Laurin pronounced his famous speech reflecting on the tragedy of the French Canadian starting with the Conquest and how this Bill will represent hope to all people, giving them the necessary confidence to obtain political independence (Laurin, 1977b; Picard, 2003). Lévesque, with a symbolic gesture, left the room when Laurin started his speech and came back only after Laurin was finished. Laurin was hurt. Laurin knew that Lévesque did it on purpose as if he disapproved of what he was saying (Picard, 2003). The opposition members in the assembly had been very much aware of Lévesque’s reluctance towards the Charter in general, and the deep internal split within the caucus especially between Lévesque and Laurin (Levesque, 1977b). The PLQ also wanted to amend Law 22 under several principles: a) to maintain French as official language of Québec with primacy for French, b) to recognize the existence of anglophone cultural community and c) to send children to French schools with exception for anglophone children. They also criticized the Québec Clause and the dispositioning of Section 133 of the BNA Act (Levesque, 1977a). This position was strikingly similar to that of Lévesque, which all the more makes him closer to the federalists than independentists.

4.3.3.2. Language of Instruction: Québec Clause versus Canada Clause

Under these circumstances, one of the few terms of agreement between Lévesque and Laurin was the abolition of the language test imposed on children who wanted to go to English schools. But it raised a debate on the alternative criteria that Laurin introduced to replace the English test: If either one of the parents of the child received education in English within Québec, the child will also have that right
which was to be called the Québec Clause, different from Canada Clause which expanded the rights to parents receiving education in English within Canada. The former was supported, naturally, by Laurin. The Québec Clause meant that anglophones moving to Québec from another province must go to French schools. Here, Laurin’s attitude as if Québec were already sovereign becomes apparent. For Laurin, Québec has all the attributes of a real country and must become a society with a language and a face of its own and it was for the others to adapt, just as in any other country in the world (Godin, 2001). Certainly, it was far from what the unilingualists wanted, to abolish all English schools (Levine, 1990). Moreover, he did not intend to alienate Québec anglophones. Since Québec would be a society conducted in French, schools in Québec were to guarantee everyone to play an active role in the development of Québec. This was to apply also for anglophones in English schools, where French writing and speaking skills would be required to obtain their secondary school diploma. In this way, they will have the option to attend francophone colleges and universities if they wish to (Québec, 1977).

Nevertheless, with the Québec Clause, Laurin tried to recognize rights only for those anglophones within Québec, treating anglophones from outside Québec as the same as immigrants from other countries.

Lévesque, on the other hand, strongly supported the Canada Clause. As he stated clearly in his memoirs:

For my own part, I would have preferred ‘the Canada clause,’ which would have respected the constant flow of internal immigration by extending the right to English schooling to all Canadian children whose parents were authentic Anglophones. (1986, p.289)

Laurin himself was well aware that the Premier “would have preferred the word Canada to the word Québec” while being satisfied with the solution they had found to replace the language exams (Laurin, 1992, p.316). Lévesque cautioned that the government would have to soften its attitude towards English schools and reminded that there are about one million anglophone citizens in Québec whom the government must treat in a civilized way. He also warned that the government should not be an
aggressor against the minority (Picard, 2003).

One of the ministers then suggested *reciprocity*, to which Lévesque agreed. It would enable children from other provinces of Canada the right to attend English schools in Québec on the condition that the provincial government of origin had concluded an agreement with Québec to let its children go to French schools in that province. It also had a double advantage of helping francophones outside Québec and showing that the government was willing to become a partner for other provinces (Picard, 2003). Since education was already within provincial jurisdiction, this would enable provinces to exercise their sovereignty in this area with bilateral negotiations between Québec. This provision was included in Bill 101 as article 86 but consequently, no province signed an accord with Québec, Lévesque facing “a wall of indifference” (Lévesque, 1986, p.289) from the other Premiers, backed by Trudeau (Picard, 2003). Thus, the reciprocity article was never used in the end (Picard, 2003).

4.3.3.3. Language of Institution: Unilingualism versus Bilingualism

Another controversy concerned institutional unilingualism. Laurin was to ignore Section 133 of the BNA Act which imposed bilingualism for Québec and to ban English in the National Assembly and the courts. “It is necessary” wrote the White Paper, “that in diverse domains, the Québec state first gives the example of francization” (Québec, 1977, p.22). Thus, first the governmental functions were to set the tone for further francization for the society. Despite the advice of the lawyers of the executive council who warned against the unconstitutional nature of the measure, Laurin remained stubborn during the writing of the White Paper (Godin, 2001; Picard, 2003). According to Picard, Laurin himself admitted 20 years later that he was in fact very much aware of the unconstitutionality of his plan. Rather, that was very much his point. He expected the federal court to attack the Charter which would prove to the *Québécois* that they were a dominated people and affirm that only sovereignty would allow them to establish their own law in its entirely (2003). He wanted to make a point that French could *not* become the only language of Québec, as English was in the other provinces of this country, supposedly and falsely bilingual (Godin, 2001). Thus henceforth, laws and regulations would be adopted in French only
but with unofficial English translation of laws and regulations provided by the administration (Law 101 art. 10).

For Lévesque, Laurin’s proposal “was a pure and simple provocation, the politics of the worst” (Godin, 2001, p.177) and could not understand why they had to challenge the constitution (Fraser, 2001). Some in his cabinet were also leery of this move, suggesting waiting for the federal reaction (Godin, 2001). But in the end Lévesque “reluctantly consented” (Lévesque, 1986, p.289) for two reasons. First, because his fellow members insisted that this was a matter of protecting individual rights of francophones who could not understand English and thus could not follow the proceedings in courts after taking companies into the Québec tribunal (Fraser, 2001). Second, the government had to move quickly to abolish the language tests before the school year started in September which Lévesque had promised during the election (Godin, 2001). Thus, official unilingualism of French in the courts and legislature was to be established, ignoring the BNA Act of Canada.

4.3.3.4. Language on Commercial Signs: Unilingualism versus Preferentialism

The third clash was the provision on commercial signs which had symbolized English dominance in Québec. Already in 1830, Alexis de Tocqueville had remarked that all commercial signs were in English in Québec, of course in Montréal and Québec city but also in other exclusively francophone villages (Laurin, 1977a). According to Laurin, if Montréal was to become a great French city, English must be chased out of the scenery (Godin, 2001). Thus, public signage, both in the private and public sectors, would be in French only to give Québec back its French face (Québec, 1977). It was, according to Levine (1990), to get rid of the reminders of historical anglophone dominance, as many péquistes saw it.

Lévesque, on the other hand, was not really opposed to the bilingual signs provision of Law 22 which stated that outdoor signs should be at least in French. But the law seemed to have no influence since English only signs continued to exist especially of “those of some of the most arrogant big companies”, the government lacking any follow-up (Lévesque, 1986, p.266). Thus, Lévesque
reluctantly acknowledged that unilingualism had to be imposed. However, as Laurin mentioned, Lévesque found “the obligation of French unilingualism in terms of posting and publicity … excessive, insufficiently justified and suitable for accusing us of intolerance” (1992, p. 316). What bothered Lévesque most was the application of this law not only to big companies but also to small stores operating with very few people and with few financial resources (Godin, 2001). He was worried that his government was going to make trouble for the small English-speaking and allophone shopkeepers (Picard, 2003). Thus, he insisted on making exemptions for those employing fewer than five people (Fraser, 2001). This provision was included in Bill 101 where public signs were admitted to use another language of their choice accompanied by French which “must be given at least as prominent display as those in the other language”, for enterprises with four people or fewer including the owner. It was also admitted for cultural activities and selling ethnic products for cultural groups (Law 101 art. 60 and 61).

Despite these disagreements, when the Charter was finally adopted, Lévesque supported it. He defended the good faith of his government, affirmed that the anglophone minority in Québec would remain the most protected minority in Canada, and even begged the Quebeckers of any origin to give Law 101 a try for a few years (Picard, 2003).

4.3.3.5. Supreme Court Rulings

On the provisions where Lévesque disagreed with Laurin, namely the Québec Clause, the abolition of institutional bilingualism within the legislature and courts, and unilingual signs, the Canadian Supreme Court eventually declared all the contentious provisions unconstitutional. The first came in December 1979, declaring articles seven to thirteen unconstitutional for violating Section 133 of the BNA Act. It was a case brought in by an anglophone lawyer from Montréal, Peter Blaikie (Godin, 2007). Procedure-wise, the Québec government was thus obliged to adopt the official English version of all the judgements pronounced and laws enacted since September 1977, including, of course, Law 101 itself (Picard, 2003). Lévesque knew the unconstitutionality of the provisions and had disagreed with Laurin before, but he still criticized the Supreme Court judgement as being cruel and insulting,
and whose implications were worrisome for French Québec to remain in the federal system (Picard, 2003). There was thus “the imperative need to enter into a new agreement based on equality” (Godin, 2007). As the referendum was approaching, Lévesque thus used the occasion politically to stimulate his nationalist narrative. Thus, ideology-wise, Laurin was able to make a point as he had already predicted: Québec was confirmed of its status as an heir of the conquered of 1763, a marginalized and unequal status (Picard, 2003).

When the Canadian Constitution was patriated in 1982, it contained Section 23, which guaranteed access to minority language schools to those whose parents had received primary education in that language in Canada, in other words, the Canada Clause. Trudeau’s biographer noted that it was actually “cleverly drawn down from the educational provisions … proposed by Lévesque in 1977” (English, 2010, p.494). Thus, it was intentionally written in order to clash with Québec’s Charter and its Québec Clause. While Lévesque openly opposed Trudeau’s inclusion of the Canada Clause in the Canadian Constitution, Godin rightly explained that this did not mean that Lévesque opposed the Canada Clause itself. Rather, what he opposed was Trudeau’s intervention into provincial jurisdiction with his usual centralization, Lévesque trying to protect provincial sovereignty. Thus, Lévesque’s preference for the Canada Clause cannot be denied (2001). Fitting into Lévesque’s preference, even if it was a blow to his government and its Charter, the second Canadian Supreme Court decision against the Charter came in 1984, declaring Québec’s Québec Clause unconstitutional.

Concerning commercial signs, the Québec Court of Appeal ruled in December 1986 that while Law 101 could require signs to include French, prohibiting other languages was against the Canadian Constitution which guarantees linguistic equality and Québec’s own Charter of rights which assures freedom of expression (Levine, 1990). Two years later, on December 15, 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated the articles of the Charter of the French Language concerning the language of public display. While recognizing that Law 101 acted to protect and defend the French language in Québec, the Supreme Court nonetheless confirmed that the requirement to post in French only violated the fundamental freedom of expression and the right to equality. The judges thus annulled French
unilingualism in the public and commercial display and instead proposed the rule of predominance of French (Martel & Pâquet, 2010).

It is interesting to note that these Supreme Court decisions were exactly what Lévesque himself had insisted be changed in the Bill. It is logical when we think of Lévesque’s conception that Québec is still a part of Canada and that Québec’s sovereignty as a province must be exercised within this framework. What he also valued was the will of the people, recognizing that Québec was not yet given the mandate to act as an independent state. He was faithful to the fact that Québec was not yet independent and thus insisted on abiding by the Canadian Constitution and the reality that it represented.

4.3.3.6. Bourassa: Amendments

These three court decisions resulted in the amendment of the Charter by Laws 178 in 1988 and 86 in 1993, presented by Bourassa’s PLQ government. It should be noted that the former did not conform entirely to the ruling of the Supreme Court and rather invoked the notwithstanding clause contained in the Constitution. Concerning public signs, Law 178 read that while the Québec government allows the use of another language inside shops, provided that French is predominant as ruled by the court, it maintained French only signs outside the stores (art. 1). Bourassa stated that the government had three choices. It could have either abided by the judgement of the Supreme Court, maintained Law 101 or searched for a balance. Considering that French was not yet established as a principal common language, in other words that the linguistic reality did not yet reflect Law 101, the PLQ government decided to choose the middle way by following the ruling for the inside display and maintaining the status quo for those outside (1995). For his part, Bourassa concluded:

I did not have to base my action on short-term responses, but on the real objectives of Québec society, which were to consolidate the position of French in business and industry, as well as to make an effort to start reconciliation of the Charter of the French Language with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of Québec. In other

45 Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms permits Parliament or a provincial legislature to adopt legislation to override some sections of the Canadian Charter. Such declaration would expire after five years after which the government in question must re-enact a declaration.
words, it seemed premature and inappropriate to fully apply the judgment of the Supreme Court, as it could be a very abrupt shift from the situation that existed at that time. It was essential that the French character of the state of Québec, which has always been my goal, should not be weakened or perceived as such. (Bourassa, 1995, p.173)

It was essential for Bourassa that Québec stays, within the Canadian federation, a francophone state of North America to which establishment of French as the common priority language was crucial but thus far insufficient (1995).

Law 178 was followed subsequently by Law 86 in 1993 when the declaration to override the Constitution expired. It modified the Charter so as to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court, not only concerning public display but also language of instruction (Canada Clause) and language of the legislature among others. Especially with the latter, it replaced articles 7 to 13 of the Charter so as to comply with Section 133 of the BNA Act, article 73 to incorporate Canada Clause and article 58 to allow bilingual signs “provided that French is markedly predominant”.

Lévesque did not see the realization of this amendment since he had died in 1987, but it is not hard to imagine how he would have reacted to this whole process. As a disillusioned federalist and a democrat, he would not have opposed institutional bilingualism on the condition that French was predominant and always prevailed over English. As a nationalist, however, he would have strongly denied intervention of the Canadian Supreme Court, i.e. Canadian Constitution which was enforced behind his back by the federal government. Either way, Lévesque’s conception of language was closer to Bourassa and the PLQ than Laurin and his PQ. As Lévesque stated in his memoirs:

His proposed Bill [22] wasn’t so different from our own way of looking at things. Even in 1976 the résumé of our election platform followed the same general lines, though more insistently…. (1986, p.265-266)
4.3.4. English and the Anglophones

4.3.4.1. Bourassa: Bilingualism

While at first Bourassa was determined to make French the language of work, by 1974, he made public that French would become the official language of Québec and English be given a special status:

Québec's language policy will recognize the Francophone community's cultural rights and will ensure that every Quebecker will be respected of his language and his identity in all major areas of human activity. A law will proclaim “French, the official language of Québec”, unequivocally affirming the determination of all Quebeccers to preserve and develop the French language and culture, while also devoting the French personality of Québec within the Canadian confederation. The application of this proclamation of “French, the official language of Québec” and the place of the English language will be clearly defined. (Lieutenant-Gouverneur, 1974, p.2)

Thus, French would be claimed as official, meaning that it would be “the language of law, government, urban communities, municipal and school corporations and subsidized institutions” as well as conditions being determined in terms of language of instruction (Lieutenant-Gouverneur, 1974, p.2).

Importantly, English would also be given an appropriate status. French as official language started to be vigorously promoted by Bourassa in the context of cultural sovereignty, all the more so while Ottawa was going through uncertainty with Trudeau’s minority government elected in May 1974. Wherever he went, he reiterated that making French official was necessary, taking realistically into account the objective place and situation of the language not only in Québec, but also in Canada and North America (Denis, 2006).

Despite the boldness in the preamble, in the end, “there was a healthy dose of bilingualism” within the actually enacted Law 22 (Levine, 1990). For example, in local public administration, French and English bilingualism for official texts and documents was assured where at least 10 per cent of the persons administered were anglophones and for internal communication where majority of them were English-speaking (art. 9). Public signs were allowed to be bilingual with mandatory French but not specifically predominant (art. 35). Most importantly in the business sphere, as has already been stated,
it only promoted French without compulsory measures and meaningful enforcement mechanisms (Levine, 1990; Oakes & Warren, 2007).

However, the most controversial was language of education, where Bourassa actually did not admit bilingualism. Bourassa had decided to terminate free choice and those who wanted to attend English-schools were to be limited to students who had sufficient knowledge of that language which would be decided by tests (Levine, 1990). It enraged both language communities. The anglophones were furious for being deprived of their rights of free access to English schools to which Bourassa was completely unprepared, while francophones regarded the test as a sham seeing it as an excuse to maintain the status of English as another official language of instruction (Levine, 1990). For them, free choice still existing was intolerable. Consequently, although the law stated for the first time in Québec history that French was the official language, it still contained many bilingual factors. On the other hand, on the crucial issue on language of instruction, although it was not the intention of Bourassa to deprive their rights and send them to French schools, Law 22 was not able to grant anglophones’ rights.

4.3.4.2. Laurin: Hostility

As with Bourassa, Laurin also had a conflicted relationship with the anglophones. Picard described how Laurin tried to gain the understanding of the anglophones and allophones by touring the province and explaining their intentions at first. He explained that the new PQ government had decided to revise Law 22 from top to bottom and to assure the primacy of French while respecting the rights of all Quebecers. Although he told them that the language tests were to be abolished, he never described his intentions in detail. Rather, he listened to what they had to say, as the psychiatrist he was, generating sympathy between himself and the anglophones. But this feeling did not last long. When Laurin met with the president of Montreal Board of Trade, the latter faced him with arrogance, saying that the government was only elected and the real power was elsewhere, reminding him that people can easily leave Québec and take their capital with them. At this moment, Laurin understood very well that it was useless to deal with anglophones and it was better to proceed as if they did not exist (2003). Contrary
to Bourassa, Laurin did not give in and give up his conviction facing the dominator. Thus, Laurin’s version of language policy was to be very French, radical and coercive compared to Law 22 which had given certain status to English (Picard, 2003).

Laurin certainly admitted in the White Paper that English, in particular, would have an important place in Québec, not only since it is a medium of communication within North America but also since it is part of the Québec cultural heritage. “The government” he stated, “recognizes that in Québec, there exist an English population and culture” which “constitute an irreducible component in our society” (p.23). But their status posed questions that could not be ignored, considering that they controlled important decision-making powers that involved the French-speaking majority, a status which generated the wealth of the anglophones and the poverty of the francophones. Thus, he questioned the “vested rights – *droits acquis*” of the English language in Québec. According to the White Paper, the English language in Québec has no constitutional guarantee. It certainly acknowledged Section 133 of the BNA Act, but further invoked Section 92, paragraph 1 of the same Act which “authorizes the provinces to amend the internal constitution with the exception of the function of Lieutenant-Governor” (p.25). It insisted that at the Gendron Commission, Section 133 was interpreted as the internal constitution of the province and therefore can be modified by the National Assembly. Furthermore, concerning the language of instruction, Section 93 of the BNA Act guarantees confessional instruction, not that of language. Thus, according to Laurin’s logic, “no constitutional disposition protects instruction in the English language, even less of the existence of an anglophone school system” (Québec, 1977, p.22).

Laurin further explained that it would be easy to show that the British conquerors themselves never granted distinct rights to English-speaking Quebecers. On the contrary, the conquerors forced them to submit to the laws of the *pays français* where they had chosen to settle. It was therefore obvious that, in constitutional and legal terms, anglo-Quebecers did not have separate rights, as a community distinct from the people of Québec (Laurin, 1977a). Thus, according to Laurin, the anglophone community had no acquired rights within the territory of Québec. In fact, for Laurin, the indigenous
people, including the Inuit, were the only ones, in certain respects, to be considered as separate peoples of the Québec totality and therefore require special legal treatment. All the others are the heirs of immigrants of full rights and duties and therefore included within the legal-political and socio-cultural tradition common to all Quebecers (1977a).

Why, then, are the anglophone institutions maintained, especially that of education? The White Paper stated that not only had the government no objection for the anglophones to keep their language, way of living and culture, it regarded them as a given of the common history (Québec, 1977). Laurin further explained:

What the government recognizes is the historical existence of the Anglo-Québec community and the school system it has set itself. The government therefore recognizes the individual right of Anglo-Quebecers to attend a school system of which they are the heirs or they choose because they are now assimilated to their culture. Therefore, it is not the pan-Canadian, North American, British or universal English community as such … that the government recognizes but distinct rights of its own and only residents. (1977a, p.100)

Thus, Laurin admitted here that the anglo-Québécois indeed possessed distinct individual rights due to their historical existence, hence the insistence on the Québec Clause.

Nevertheless, Laurin tried as much as possible to degrade the English language in his White Paper. Emphasizing the importance of respect for one another, Laurin would provide a translated version of the laws and judgements. However, he did not specify that it will be in English. This was the same for addressing the state or organizations and receiving responses, teaching another language in schools and universities, or in catalogues and brochures of a company. He used the term another language – une autre langue – several times, making the impression that he degraded the status of English to that of other languages that have no historic roots in Québec (Québec, 1977). Thus, for example, while the Westmount neighbourhood would most likely publish their documents in French and in English, nothing would prevent Saint Léonard from using French and Italian (Laurin, 1977a). In fact, his willingness to see anglophones as just another minority is evident in the preamble of the Charter, where
no recognition of anglophones was made, assumingly included in *minorités ethniques*.

Laurin saw English as a threat not only because English is the language of North America but also because it is the language of the conqueror. He regarded anglophones in Québec as colonial minorities who were the heirs of the conquerors and only remained minorities in numbers. According to Laurin, colonial minorities tend to identify with the metropole rather than the new country and to assimilate all other minority ethnic groups. As a consequence, all the collective life in this given society is polarized between the numerical native majority and the attractive power of the colonial minority, creating aggression and tension. When a dominated nation gains independence, the colonial minority ceases to be colonial, but does not necessarily disappear as an ethnic minority (1977a). We sense the hostility of Laurin towards this group and understand that his attitude to see Québec as a presumed sovereign state made him treat the anglophones as an ethnocultural minority.

Laurin’s hostility was, however, limited, especially compared to those who insisted on absolute unilingualism and abolition of English institutions. Contrary to the criticism that the government was aiming at an eventual extinction of English schools and, consequently, of the anglophone collectivity, this was not at all the intention of the government (Laurin, 1977a). Laurin rightly pointed out the possible decline of the proportion of anglophones due to their emigration and decrease in immigration from other Canadian provinces or anglophone countries. But by retaining its entire network of educational, social and cultural institutions which were intact even by the most restrictive law on language, Laurin insisted that it was not the intention of the government to destroy the English language and culture. The anglophone culture in Québec would be difficult to be threatened within a larger context of Canada and North America where the dominant language and culture were indisputably English (1977a).

4.3.4.3. Lévesque: Test for Maturity

Levine pointed out that although Laurin’s view represented that of the majority within the PQ caucus, the party was not a monolithic force and Lévesque had always fought with hard-line
unilingualists especially concerning the anglophone minority (1990). Although Lévesque was a nationalist who wanted to “make Québec French as Ontario was English⁴⁶”, he was never a unilingualist who expected English to be swept away from Québec society. For him, it was certainly necessary to protect the fundamental rights of francophones concerning their “security and dignity in the field of language” but that had to be reconciled with “the rights that have been acquired for a long time by people who are our fellow citizens and who form a too important and too old a group” (Lévesque, 1969, p.3457). Needless to say, this other group was the anglo-Québécois and there needed to be a balance for the two groups both forming integral parts of Québec society.

In fact, raising the example of Belgium where the respective regions of Flanders and Wallonia each have only one language of instruction, Lévesque emphasized that Québec could have followed this precedent and made French the sole language of instruction. However, Québec did not pursue this measure and instead kept the English schools, choosing to respect the historical rights and roots of anglophones (1978/1991b). This was how strongly Lévesque felt for the English-speaking people of Québec and his perception that the English were the significant other within the context of the two nations of Canada.

Protecting anglophone rights was thus one of the most important principles for pursuing his sovereignty-association movement but was also one of the controversial themes among the PQ members. The first big debate occurred at the convention in 1968, when a paragraph in the preamble of the party program, which said that Quebecers “should make it a point of honour to show great respect for the rights of its important linguistic minority”, was deleted after a vote of 418 to 240 (Fraser, 2001 p.47). Considering anglophone minority as privileged with economic control, François Aquin, a radical and Lévesque’s fellow-independent member of parliament who had also quit the PLQ, called for further sanctions against the anglophones, including a special tax for companies seeking English signs or operating an English TV or radio station and a phasing out of state subsidy for English-language schools.

⁴⁶ This was in fact first pronounced by Daniel Johnson, the UN Premier from 1966 to 1968.
(Fraser, 2001). In Lévesque’s eyes, it was a proposition of “integral unilingualism whose point of departure would be the abolition of English schools” (Lévesque, 1986, p.229). Lévesque threatened to resign if this motion would pass and turned the tide, but he saw the MSA assembly leaning toward Aquin’s position (Lévesque, 1986; Fraser, 2001). It was a dangerous step to intolerance. As Lévesque stated in his memoirs:

> The maintenance, not of excessive privilege, but of basic school rights for Quebec Anglophones appeared to me to be a test of our maturity and also of our aptitude to maintain proper relations with the rest of North America. (1986, p.230)

Thus, Lévesque considered that their maturity was being tested by how they treated their anglophones. For him, maturity was not something that could be earned by gaining state sovereignty, as is often thought by melancholy nationalists, but rather something to be achieved in the course of sovereignty. The attitude towards anglophones, a very controversial existence considering their dominance in the economic sphere, was thus the way to show tolerance and Lévesque was determined to pursue his conviction.

Contrary to Laurin’s conception that English should be degraded, Lévesque maintained the importance of English within Québec. While Laurin imposed the acquisition of French in English schools but limited the learning of English to “certain Québec francophones” (Québec, 1977, p.28), Lévesque stated in 1973 the importance of those in French schools “to acquire a ‘perfect’ knowledge of English” and “in English schools as well as ours, the study of the language of the ‘other’ must become an indisputable priority” (1973/1987b, p.421) stating that “bilingualism or trilingualism on a personal level is ideal” (1975/1991f, p. 141). English remained a threat for Laurin who pushed for separation, while for Lévesque, it was the language of the significant other both inside and outside Québec, needless to say, the majority of North America from which Lévesque had no intention to separate.

His tolerance for English was publicly stated when he was granted the second mandate by the people of Québec at the election of 1981. He spoke English in front of 12,000 PQ supporters to thank those of anglophone and cultural communities who had “joined in the mainstream of Quebec support
which has given us this second mandate” (quoted in Fraser, 2001, p.277). The gesture came from finally achieving one of his most important goals: getting anglophones elected from his party. Among six anglophone candidates, two were now members of the National Assembly as PQ (Godin, 2007). Fraser noted that the gesture was unprecedented and made it possible to believe that “the PQ was moving to a new tolerance, a new openness” (2001, p.277).

In 1982, Lévesque took the responsibility of the Charter away from Laurin, now Minister of Education, except for the educational provisions, and gave it to Gérald Godin, a new Minister of Cultural Communities and Immigration, a former “left-wing journalist” and “both a visceral nationalist and an intuitive cosmopolitan” (Fraser, 2001, p.342). Laurin considered Godin to be “a liberal to the core”, feeling good to entrust the task to him (Picard, 2003, p.344). In fact, Godin had been the only PQ member to publicly express disagreement with Laurin’s White Paper, endorsing the Canada Clause and hoping that the law would be more flexible to the anglophone minority (Fraser, 2001), seeing the actual Charter as too inflexible on that front (Picard, 2003). Thus, this move of Lévesque assigning Godin to the language issue was intended to mitigate the anger felt by anglophones within the province, especially that of Alliance Quebec, an anglophone lobby group which had been founded just a few months before (Fraser, 2001). But this move was also possible because it was evident by that time that the Charter had generated a sense of linguistic assurance for the francophone community (Levine, 1990).

Godin is said to have made a crucial distinction between anglo-Quebecers and English as a North American cultural presence, a point that had rarely been made in Québec (Fraser, 2001). He admitted the threat to the French language from the technological revolution mainly supported by English but pointed out that the English-community in Québec had “very little to do with this assimilation, and it is not they that we should consider responsible, or their institutions” (quoted in Fraser, 2001, p.343; Levine, 1990). Lévesque made the same point in November 1982, when he responded to demands from Alliance Québec in Le Devoir. He noted:

It is important to distinguish between … the English-speaking community within a majority Francophone community and the pressure exerted on the latter by North
American culture, with the challenge that this constitutes for the maintenance and

Further, he stated the difficult task of both respecting “the aspiration of the minority to maintain and
express its own character” and assuming the “role of defender of the cultural rights of the majority”
(Lévesque, 1982/1991e, p.330). Hence, both Godin and Lévesque understood the need to see the
anglophone in Québec as a minority rather than a threat, especially since now the newly arriving
immigrants started to send their children to French schools, thanks to the Charter. As Lévesque stated,
“today’s anglophone community does not have to be blamed for the past situations or the decisions
made elsewhere” as long as they “accept … the principle of French primacy” (1982/1991e, p.330). Thus,
as long as they abide by the rule of preferentialism, anglophones were not to be blamed of their historical
role as the conqueror.

Godin thus sponsored the first major amendment to the Charter with Law 57 in 1983. Most
symbolically but also importantly, it recognized the institutions of the English-speaking community in
the preamble and separated them from the other minorités ethniques whereas formally, no distinction
was made among cultural minorities. Now, it reads as follows:

Whereas the National Assembly intends to pursue this objective in a spirit of
fairness and open-mindedness, respectful of the institutions of the English-speaking
community [italics added] of Québec, and respectful of the ethnic minorities, whose
valuable contribution to the development of Québec it readily acknowledges;

It was only the institutions that would be respected as anglophones, but still it was an important step
towards recognition. Moreover, since reciprocity on the language of instruction was refused by other
provinces, Godin went a step forward towards the Canada Clause, admitting English instruction for
children whose father or mother received elementary education in English elsewhere in Canada, where
French-language instruction services are considered to be comparable to those offered in English to
anglophone Quebecers (art. 20). This was immediately granted to New Brunswick (Fraser, 2001), the
only officially bilingual province. Other changes included permission to use another language in written
communication among two peoples in civil administration providing guaranteed French services (art.
exemption of French language tests for professionals with Québec secondary school certificate (art. 9) and outside bilingual signs for sale of foreign or ethnic products (art. 13). This amendment is regarded as the first victory on behalf of Alliance Québec (Oaks and Warren, 2007) but considering that Lévesque and Godin were both uncomfortable with the original Charter, the amendment was inevitable. In addition, after six years of the original Law 101, many improvements were visible, especially concerning the language of instruction.

There is no record of Lévesque speaking during the debate of Bill 57 and Lévesque is known to have grown more and more hostile to Alliance Quebec, stiffening his attitude after welcoming discussion at first (Fraser, 2001). To be sure, he was deeply wounded due to the constitution betrayal which led him to think for the first time of “administering to Anglo-Québécois some of the ‘school medicine’ our minorities were forced to swallow in the rest of Canada” (Lévesque, 1986, p.333). However, the fact that Lévesque assigned Godin to the task should at least signify his willingness to approach and satisfy the anglophone community, mitigating the wrongs and excesses caused by the original Charter.

4.4. Conclusion

One of the rare consensuses among all personalities was their agreement in making French the dominant language of work. Even Trudeau did not dissent, assumingly of his background as a labour lawyer. However, in other cases, differences among the five people were clearly beyond party lines, further demonstrating the importance of analysing their ideologies individually.

The major difference between Trudeau and Laurendeau was their view of Canada, the former seeing it in bilingual terms and the latter in duality. This was a fundamental difference, especially considering that bilingualism was a threat that could undermine French for both Laurendeau and Laurin. It was only in their respective solutions where the difference lay for these two anti-bilingualists, the former having hope for institutional bilingualism at the federal level but leaning more towards unilingualism for the province, as with Laurin.
With some varying degree, the neo-nationalists all agreed that individual rights were not adequate to solve the language problem, compared to Trudeau who saw it as the only way to ensure the cultural side of language. Importantly, however, collective rights were thought to be a tool to treat all citizens equally, thus an important and complementary mechanism to assure the validity of individual rights. Thus, Trudeau’s accusation that excessive demand for collective rights ends up in totalitarianism and fascism seems to greatly miss the point. Neo-nationalists also agreed that French was an indispensable part of Québec identity. Importantly, their own language competence was not the determining factor for their attachment to French. All admitting the importance of French as their cultural expression, the need to elevate the status of French in Québec was clear.

Under this consensus of the need to ensure collective rights, however, Lévesque seems to have been the most unwilling to legislate on language, compared to Laurin or even Bourassa. In fact, the ideology of these three figures are intermingled: Lévesque sought sovereignty thus wanted to avoid legislating since language problems would be solved by sovereignty and he did not want to stir the political climate; Laurin also sought sovereignty thus wanted to legislate since it was a necessary step towards independence; and Bourassa did not seek sovereignty thus wanted to reassure linguistic security by legislating. In the end, what Laurin consequently achieved was what Bourassa had wanted, namely to secure French in Québec and to avoid political independence.

We have also seen that Laurin and Lévesque were poles apart in their attitudes towards language, starting from how they saw the legislation. Laurin, who saw the Charter as a step towards independence, acted as if Québec was already independent and only proceeded with his language law on this premise. Laurin’s view clearly suggested a unilingual paradigm while reluctantly keeping the English institutions. Importantly, he tried to degrade English as much as possible to diminish their power, treating them as just another minorités ethniques.

Lévesque, on the other hand, believed that sovereignty would solve the language problem. Seeing the Charter as having prevented Québec from actual independence, he was nonetheless in accordance with the fact that the people of Québec has not yet voted for independence. Importantly, he saw
anglophone rights as acquired rights, which could not be modified. How to deal with them was one of the tests for maturity, an important process for Québec to be open and tolerant. In this sense, Lévesque’s insistence on French preferentialism included anglophones from the beginning, their existence and the importance of English being undeniable. It was thus, in fact, Lévesque who was willing to assume the role to act as a majority within the Québec nation to pursue its responsibility concerning the anglophone minority: one of the important conditions for Québec’s new identity, i.e. Position Four of the BVP.

Lastly, the interesting observation concerning the similarity between Lévesque and Trudeau should be mentioned, the two rivals seeming to disagree on everything. They both considered it humiliating to have to enact a language law concerning French, which signified their pride in the language. In the end, what differentiated them was Lévesque’s acceptance and Trudeau’s denial of the victimization of French which greatly contributed to their respective political behaviours.
Chapter 5 Cultural Communities

As an extension to the previous chapter, this chapter observes how each figure saw cultural groups and minorities in relation to their respective nationalisms and conceptions of language. Many policies are related to this subject including immigration, multiculturalism, cultural development as well as language, which will be analysed less from the policy perspective but rather from the motivational and philosophical aspects of each figure.

5.1 Initiatives

5.1.1. Laurendeau: Fighting Intolerance

Through his editorials in *Le Devoir*, Laurendeau had been expressing his views on immigration and integration as part of his neo-nationalism. Thus, already in 1951, seeing the federal government increase the number of new arrivals, Laurendeau called for French Canadians to transform their traditional attitude of “pure and simple refusal” facing immigration to “hospitality and sympathy” (quoted in Anctil, 1990, p.232). Capturing both the narrowness of certain ethnocentric prejudices and the emergence of new forms of national aspirations, what he called for were a) an increased number of Francophone immigrants to the country, b) for French Canadians to help immigrants with the process of adaptation and integration into French Québec, and c) for an increased effort by the provincial government (Anctil, 1990, p.233). And he warned, “an experience could be spoiled if we are not careful: it would leave unpleasant memories on both sides. We must immediately get clear ideas and act quickly” (quoted in Anctil, 1990, p.233). What was more, because he valued pluralism, Laurendeau despised the idea that sameness means strength, which manufactured a product dangerously reminding him of a “very classical type of Americans” (Laurendeau, 1960/1976f, p.245). Thus, he also insisted that new Canadians had to be encouraged to maintain their own culture, which would be a source of wealth for the country (Anctil, 1990).

On the other hand, he also saw immigration as a threat, having the potential to jeopardize Canadian identity:
the presence of millions of newcomers, who will surely speak English, but do not have the same cultural roots. The meaning of Canada is certainly less precise than it has been in the past, its future seems rather obscured, and the will to make it, at certain moments, appears as vacillating. (Laurendeau, 1962/1976h, p.232)

With people pouring in from elsewhere, he feared that being a Canadian would mean nothing, where any cultural recognition would be uprooted. He regretfully remarked that this might be inevitable for second or third generation of immigrants (Laurendeau, 1960/1976f). At the same time, he saw the potential to make English Canada reconsider their own Canadian identity to include French Canada. Laurendeau thus encouraged English Canada to be interested in itself which in return will mean, at least for the hopeful Laurendeau, that they would be interested in French Canada since they are an integral part of Canada (Laurendeau, 1962/1976h). Thus, Laurendeau seemed to view immigrants as one of the factors to make (English) Canada truly reflect on themselves and their identity, which would naturally lead them to include French Canada. This was a similar logic to how Henri Bourassa viewed the two nations, in which he encouraged Canadian nationalism so that French Canadians could flourish within.

However, it was not until his research with the B & B commission that Laurendeau became truly aware of the multicultural fact of English Canada, especially during his travels to the west in 1963-64 (Horton, 1992). In fact, he had been warned before joining the Commission that the cultural groups could be a major obstacle for the bicultural agenda, which Laurendeau did not take seriously enough due to his limited experience with the rest of Canada and his predominant preoccupation concerning his two nations ideal (Horton, 1992). However, in January 1964 in Saskatchewan, he noted in his diary that “a multiculturalism is an indisputable fact and must be taken into account” (Laurendeau, 1990, p.54).

But for him, French-English relations were the biggest problem and other relationships did not compare. After all, “ethnic groups” were relatively small in size compared to French Canadians in Québec:

[They] only compose 3 per cent of the total Canadian population, which was not at all the same thing as an organized society like the Québec society, with a large population, its institutions, and an old and specific history. (Laurendeau, 1990, p.55)

Thus, for Laurendeau, multiculturalism remained a minor concern, which is understandable given the
limited number of them in Québec and his concern for French Canadian nationalism.

A year and a half after this initial comment of awareness, Laurendeau was still not yet sure what to think of the cultural groups. But this time, he reflected on their language and culture:

There are nonetheless ethnic groups who want to preserve their original language and culture at least in their home, in their private meetings and at church. Should the provincial state help them achieve this, and by what measures? (Laurendeau, 1990, p.344-345)

He did not yet have a precise answer to this question but commented nonetheless: “in human relations, majorities can afford to be generous. They can do so because they are stronger – at least in a normal situation and politically” (Laurendeau, 1990, p.345). According to him, when the minority shows generosity, this is because they have a deep awareness of their own weakness. This is why French Canadians in Québec granted English schools to their minority. Thus, most importantly, Laurendeau concluded his entry as follows: “Civilization begins when the stronger voluntarily prevents itself from abusing its power; thus when the majority recognizes minority ‘rights’” (Laurendeau, 1990, p.344-345).

Thus, a majority has a duty towards their minority to be generous, which should be exercised in a civilized society.

This is therefore reflected in the blue pages, in which Laurendeau went back to his original conception of pluralism and set the tone of current Canadian discourse that diversity is an advantage for the country. Clearly differentiating the others from anglophones or francophones, Laurendeau defined the others as those who “remain attached to their original language and culture” whose “existence is definitely beneficial to the country” and they must be more readily accepted and willingly allowed “to preserve and enrich, if they so desire, the cultural values they prize” (B & B Commission, 1967, p. xxv). Although the mandate of the B & B Commission was mainly on the bilingual and bicultural problem of Canada, it nonetheless instructed to take into account “the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada” (B & B Commission, 1967, p. xxv). Thus, Book IV was dedicated to dealing with the other ethnic groups, which was published in 1970, two years
after Laurendeau’s death. The book did not explicitly promote multiculturalism but underlined the importance of taking into account the ethnocultural groups, proposing integration, not necessarily assimilation, of cultural groups to either French or English cultural domains (Morrison, 1990; Lapointe-Gagnon, 2018).

5.1.2. Trudeau: Multiculturalism

When multiculturalism within the bilingual framework was declared federal policy on October 8, 1971 by Trudeau at the House of Commons, it was clearly stated that “the government has accepted all those recommendations of the [B & B Commission] which are contained in Volume IV of its reports” (Trudeau, 1971, p.8545). At the same time, in a document entitled Federal Government’s Response to Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, it even stated that the government “wishes to go beyond the spirit of the Book IV to ensure that Canada’s cultural diversity continues” (Canada, 1971, p.8580). Thus, contrary to his language policy which went below the commission’s recommendations, the multiculturalism policy went beyond what had been suggested of integration in the framework of biculturalism.

Just as Trudeau was tackling Québec nationalism, there was another current which clamored for more awareness: immigrants and ethnocultural communities who sought recognition of their own cultural contributions and opposed the bicultural and bilingual framework (Gagnon & Iacovino, 2016). Lapointe-Gagnon (2018) documented a lively Ukrainian activism during consultation of the B & B Commission, which often stressed the incongruity of biculturalism, not understanding why the French language should enjoy a particular status. Some also say that multiculturalism policy was to earn votes and solidify support for the federal Liberals from the ethnic groups to compensate their declining popularity among traditional voters (Denis, 2006). Either way, there was a need to soothe these voices to which multiculturalism acted as a product of compromise, not necessarily a result of Canadian tolerance or Trudeau’s strong initiative.

Nevertheless, Trudeau’s view on the primacy of individual rights was obviously incorporated in
his policy. For one thing, he supported the fundamental discussions of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and believed that all people were equals in a liberal society, which led him to back a more open immigration policy (English, 2010). In addition, as a cosmopolitan, he thought that nation-states were obsolete in the first place (English, 2010). He expressed sadness in his memoirs “that places like Bosnia and Czechoslovakia, which were created … as multi-ethnic, pluralistic societies, are breaking up into little ethnic territories…” (Trudeau, 1993, pp.353-354). Trudeau saw a multinational society as a model of advanced societies with which Trudeau envisioned Canada where many cultures contributed to the richness and prosperity of the country (Trudeau, 1998d). A country’s true greatness was not in its military or economic power but in “the ability and desire to cohabit with persons of differing backgrounds, and to benefit from the opportunities which this offers” (Trudeau, 1998d, p.145).

What the government of Canada was able to do, with his multiculturalism, was to give choices to individuals. Trudeau declared:

> The individual freedom would be hampered if he were locked for life within a particular cultural compartment by the accident of birth or language. It is vital, therefore, that every Canadian, whatever his ethnic origin, be given a chance to learn at least one of the two languages in which his country conducts its official business and its politics. (1971, p.8545)

Importantly, language and culture would henceforth be dissociated, stressing the absence of majority cultures and Canada being defined as a single bilingual society where universal principles would apply (Gagnon & Iacovino, 2016). Trudeau continued:

> Although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian. (1971, p.8545)

This did not mean that Canadians were expected to be without culture. No official recognition did not mean no governmental support. Trudeau further announced:

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47 Remarked at the Ukrainian-Canadian Congress in Winnipeg, October 9, 1971.
The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for us all. (1971, p.8545)

Thus, what Trudeau offered was a choice, believing firmly in the individual’s right to choose, both of language and of culture. Especially on culture, Canada will henceforth have no official culture, meaning that immigrants were not expected to integrate to any majority culture. Because “anybody who really wants to learn a language can do so. But you can’t learn an entire culture” (Trudeau, 1998d, p.144). This is a very liberal and cosmopolitan ideal à la Trudeau, especially for those immigrants who had just arrived to Canada. They could choose to preserve their culture if they wanted, which the government fully supported, but they would not feel left out because there was no culture that they must adapt to.

5.1.3. Bourassa: Immigration Policy

Immigration policy itself was another domain of Bourassa’s cultural sovereignty where he considered Québec had the responsibility to protect its cultural identity (Bourassa, 1995). Since immigration is a joint jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments, yet despite the former’s paramountcy, as stated in Section 95 of the BNA Act48, Québec was already allowed to act on its own at least partially (Kelley & Trebilock, 2010). Thus, in July 1974, Bourassa’s government tabled Bill 46, to amend the already existing but very limited immigration law. Although this older law, enacted in 1968, had created the Department of Immigration and allowed it to develop programs of adaptation and integration of newcomers, there was a void in the areas of recruitment and selection. The new bill was to fill this gap by taking the necessary measures to inform, recruit, select and locate potential immigrants and temporary residents according to the demographic, economic and socio-cultural needs of the various regions of Québec (Bienvenue, 1974). A welcoming and dynamic policy, the new immigration

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48 It is stated: In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation … to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make Laws in relation … to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces; and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative … to Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada (Constitution Act, 1867).
bill envisaged the objectives of adequate information for candidates, the real power of selection and recruitment, and harmonious integration into Québec society (Denis, 2006).

With an objective to be admitted by Ottawa to control and to select the influx of immigrants to Québec by its own government, thus to ensure the spirit of Bill 46, Bourassa pushed Québec’s Immigration Minister Jean Bienvenue to negotiate with his federal counterpart. According to Denis, Bourassa expected to control immigration in two ways: a) through the cultural option, reducing the number of English-speaking immigrants; b) through the economic option, increasing the overall number of immigrants so that Québec would not be demographically stagnant compared to other provinces. As a Premier who valued economic growth more than anything else, Bourassa's objective was to seek a relentless balance between linguistic, economic, social and geographic factors, so that the government could determine its priorities according to the real needs of its citizens (2006). In October 1975, the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement was signed between the two governments49 (Kelley & Trebilock, 2010). Although the federal government was in complete control of the point system and of making the final decision for all applicants, it allowed Québec to perform a consultative role in the selection process reviewing and commenting on all immigration applications concerning Québec (Kostov, 2008). Kelley and Trebilock noted, however, that it did not contribute to increasing the number of immigrants to Québec. Still, Québec enhanced its role concerning immigration policy, even collaborating with the federal department by agreeing to exchange the information they each possessed on potential immigrants (2010).

With the PQ government signing the Cullen-Couture agreement in 1978 and advancing sovereignty of its immigration policy by establishing its own point system, the Bourassa government was back to power in 1985. During the Meech Lake Accord negotiations, it proposed a more comprehensive immigration policy suggesting settlement and reception services be solely rested under

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49 In 1971, the PLQ government had in fact already signed the Lang-Cloutier Agreement with the federal government. However, federal control remained strong preserving “all its powers in the various stages of the immigration process, giving the provincial government of Quebec only the role of immigration consultants” (Kostov, 2008, p.94).
Québec authority (Kostov, 2008). The Accord failed but both parties finally signed in 1991 the Canada-Québec Accord which was based on the Meech Lake proposal (Kostov, 2008). With this new Accord still in effect today, Québec gained exclusive powers in selecting immigrants which focus on French-language skills (Barker, 2015) even though the federal government has the final say on admission of all immigrants for security and health concerns (Banting, 2012). Concerning settlement services which focus on the pre-naturalization phase, Québec has exclusive responsibility since the agreement included provisions that the federal government withdraw from all settlement services and limit itself to providing financial transfer to the province (Banting, 2012). Naturalization, however, remained an exclusively federal domain, which immigrants can apply for after being in the country for three years with obligatory citizenship test including one of the official languages (Banting, 2012). It was thus due mainly to the initiative of Bourassa’s PLQ that Québec now has a special status on immigration policy with almost complete sovereignty.

5.1.4. Laurin, Lévesque and Laurendeau: The Québécois Pluralism

As the concept and policy of multiculturalism started to develop in Canada as an open integration policy, inclusion also started to take root in this era in Québec, with the developing of the Québécois identity. Laurin conceived that the Québec nation included all Québécois “whatever their ethnic origin or their mother tongue who chose to live in Québec” (1977a, p.144). While asserting the desire to live together – vouloir vivre commun –, he invited the minorities that also make up this people, to a new dynamism and to an initial phase of defining their own culture. Laurin explained:

While national culture is normally consistent with the ways of being, feeling and thinking of the majority of its population … it should not be concluded that the national culture belongs only to the majority; it is the common good of all the national population, including ethnic minorities. And it is fundamental for a society that is willing to continue to involve all elements of its population in the development of national culture and spread this culture. (1977a, p.142)

Where does this sense of tolerance come from? Fraser pointed out that Laurin and his team of the
Charter were devout Catholics but also very “committed to dialogue with non-Catholics” (2001, p.97). This sense of Catholicism was very similar to their conception of nationalism, with “a strong belief in a Québec that was almost mystically French and at the same time tolerant of non-French-speaking minorities” (Fraser, 2001, p.97). Their tolerance was also reflected in the White Paper of cultural development of 1978 entitled La politique québécoise du développement culturel. Laurin recognized that every culture is marked by its diversity including class, generation, regions and also minorities, even claiming that “there is no culture without a minority” (p.63). Laurin, denying the American model of melting pot which assimilates new immigrants, considered a society to be rich and balanced if it helped minorities conserve their cultural heritage (Québec, 1978).

Lévesque also repeatedly remarked that Québécois were people who lived in Québec and the name “links their linguistic, ethnic, cultural, religious, geographical and other diversities” (Lévesque, 1980/1991c, p.268). Already in 1965, he had the conception that immigrants were also Quebeckers:

The Government of Québec, its public administration, cannot, …, stay away from the difficulties that thousands, tens of thousands of Quebeckers may experience simply because that they are immigrants. The right to social justice and social equality is not limited to those who have been in Québec for five generations, or four, or three. It is supposed to apply … to all who live on the land, who pay taxes and who raise families. (Lévesque, 1965, p.633)

Considering that Lévesque’s primary mission was to territorialize their identity and cut ties with other French Canadians in the rest of Canada (LaSelva, 1993), he held it equally important to include immigrants and cultural minorities into the Québécois identity as well. In other words, while the French Canadian identity signified its exclusiveness with the reference of an ethnic identity, the Québécois identity enabled territorializing identity so as to include others equally.

This was actually in line with the pluraliste narrative to mark French dominance with a positive tone. According to Coleman, with the Quiet Revolution, francophone intellectuals and politicians in Québec started to redefine their society as pluraliste. It expressed the heterogeneity of the French Canadian society with individuals with different value systems and cultural orientation, contrary to what
they used to see it as homogeneous and monolithic. This paved the way to regard Québec as a single pluraliste society, with which policy makers could create a single set of institutions for all of Québec’s cultural communities, both francophone and non-francophone (1981).

Laurendeau was in fact “the first francophone intellectual to defend in the pages of a widely read newspaper the idea of a cultural convergence between old-stock Québécois and post-war immigrants” (Anctil, 1990, p.233). As we have seen, Laurendeau already empathized the importance of pluralism and insisted that immigrants should be able to maintain their culture (Anctil, 1990). His conception of pluralism came from his social Catholicism and personalism, reading from a young age and reaching “the concept of a pluralistic society as a necessity, since there are so many of us in the world” (Laurendeau, 1962/1976i, p.126). It was about respecting each other’s dignity, especially in a majority-minority relationship where a minority should put much effort into not being swallowed up and a majority should resist all attempts to swallow the minority. Laurendeau defined pluralism as follows:

Pluralism does not mean simply supporting neutrality, glorifying the middle of the road, or sitting on the fence! It means, essentially, recognizing the worth and dignity of other people, even when, in our opinion, they are in the wrong. (Laurendeau, 1962/1976i, p.127)

Thus, as with social-democracy, this important concept of pluralism seems to have derived, at least for Laurendeau, from Catholic personalism to respect one another’s dignity.

5.2. Trudeau and Laurin: (Not So) Hidden Agenda

As much as tolerance for ethnocultural minorities was empathized both in Canada and in Québec, it can also be considered a political tactic for both. There was a striking similarity between Trudeau and Laurin where they both used the cultural community to advance their fundamental thesis: Trudeau to denounce Québec nationalism and Laurin to degrade anglophones in Québec.

Trudeau tried to undermine Québec nationalist voices with his multiculturalism, considering them just another minority among many other cultures. It is considered by many that with multiculturalism, Trudeau officially rejected the theory of two nations and Québec’s status as a political community to
which outraged many Québec francophones (Carens, 1995; McRoberts, 1997; Bouchard, 2015). The outraged included Bourassa, as we have already seen, and he opposed Trudeau’s multiculturalism due to its inconsistency with the B & B Commission’s principle of equality between the two peoples (Denis, 2006). The French language was kept official only because of the relative population size, separating language and culture as has been already explained.

Trudeau’s attitude was very similar to Laurin, who encouraged other cultures to flourish but at the same time tried to degrade the anglophone population and English in Québec and treat them as just another minority. Before being amended in 1983, the preamble of the Charter stated as follows:

> Whereas the National Assembly intends to pursue this objective in a climate of fairness and open-mindedness towards ethnic minorities, whose valuable contribution to the development of Québec it readily acknowledges. (Law101, 1977, p.161)

Thus, while the importance of ethnic minorities was empathized, the English community was not mentioned, being thought to be included as one of the “ethnic minorities”. Additionally, as has already been mentioned, English was highly degraded in the White Paper and also in the subsequent Bill 1 and Law 101, the term *another language* being often used. By putting them in the same category as *minorités du Québec* as much as possible, Laurin’s efforts aiming to reduce the power of the English community becomes obvious.

It is doubtful whether either Trudeau or Laurin were actually interested in multiculturalism or pluralism where cultures of immigrants and cultural minorities could flourish. Kymlicka stated that Trudeau was never seriously interested in multiculturalism itself, proof being that his passion for French in Ottawa and linguistic minorities throughout Canada are in stark contrast to his legacy on the multicultural policy. While Trudeau devoted more than 10 pages to the former in his memoirs, the latter is completely ignored. Trudeau was, in fact, said to have been very ambivalent towards the policy and did not even care about it afterwards (Kymlicka, 2007). In the same vein, Laurin’s policy of cultural development largely left out any recommendations to develop cultures of cultural groups in the White
Paper, contrary to his intense devotion to stimulate French culture. In fact, Laurin’s degree of tolerance also needs to be treated cautiously. While the preamble of Bill 101 indicated that “a distinctive language of a predominantly (majoritairement) French-speaking people, the French language allows the people of Québec to express their identity”, Bill 1 had stated that “the French language has always been the language of the Québécois people and that it is the language that allows them to express their identity”. Fontaine pointed out that in Bill 1, two categories of people were proposed: a) the Québécois category, which referred to the “French-speaking Québec nation”, and b) the minorité category, which grouped together all “non-Québécois” (1992, p.323). Levine thus stressed that Bill 1 considered French as the language of the people of Québec, suggesting that non-francophones were not true Quebecers (1990). In this sense, it is questionable whether Laurin was truly willing to regard Québécois as including all those who lived in Québec, regardless of their first language.

5.3. Language: A Tool for Integration

5.3.1. French for Immigrants

Contrary to Trudeau who sought to give immigrants the choice to which language they would adopt in Canada, neo-nationalists agreed that the language could not be other than French in Québec. Bourassa saw Québec as composed of “a dominant French language and culture, an important minority of the English language and culture as well as the numerous minorities of other languages and cultures” (quoted in Martel & Pâquet, 2010, p.180). This was his grounds for rejecting Trudeau’s multiculturalism policy. His priority was “permanence of the French language and culture in the North American context” without discriminating against other cultures, to which the government of Québec had its primary responsibility (quoted in Martel & Pâquet, 2010, p.180). Naturally, then, immigrants and cultural groups were to acquire first and foremost French, not English. Thus under Law 22, those who had sufficient knowledge of English, including those from English-speaking regions around the world, were the only ones admitted to English schools. The others were to automatically go to French schools. This was naturally criticized by those immigrants whose mother tongue was not English but who expected their
children to receive education in that language, which was especially the case for the Montréal Italian community. Although understanding the general goal to build a French Québec, they denounced the provisions for not considering the acquired rights for those whose family members were already in English schools (Levine, 1990). Bourassa’s will to integrate immigrants to the francophone sphere cannot be denied.

Laurin, as with many other neo-nationalists, understood the colonized situation of Québec through the tendency of the cultural minorities adopting English. He defined ethnic minorities as those, in the course of history, who joined the already constituted nation not to modify its characteristics or structures but to live within it and share its destiny. In liberal nations, these minorities integrate into the national culture which does not prevent them from retaining their own cultural characteristics. In a dominated nation, however, the diverse ethnic minorities have the tendency to integrate into the culture of the colonial minority (Laurin, 1977a). This meant that in a dominated nation of Québec, cultural minorities were integrated into the anglophone colonial minority. This was observed in reality where not only were the cultural heritage of the neo-Québécois often expressed through the medium of English, but also their complaints were identical to the anglophone community’s, to the extent that it did not really concern their own problems. This internalization was, according to Laurin, proof how much the ethnocultural communities were integrated to the English community and this tendency must be annulled (Québec, 1978).

To counteract this situation, cultural minorities must accept that Québec fundamentally consists of a francophone culture:

The common good and the very interest of minorities demand that these various groups integrate into a predominantly francophone Québec community. But once this basic requirement is laid down and respected, the existence of vigorous and active minority groups can only be a gain for the whole. (Québec, 1978, p.63)

The French language was thus to play an important role of both francophone affirmation as Québécois and communication tool. Laurin stated:
Through this instrument of collective communication and social cohesion that will become the official language, all the ethnic groups … bring us the richness and variety of specific cultural contributions that they will have to maintain and develop. (Laurin, 1977c, p.3475)

Thus, French was to function as an instrument to bring people together. Functioning as the common language, French would enable the democratic participation of all Quebeckers in the economic and political life of Québec. To safeguard this, Laurin insisted that the state must ensure that this economic and political life be essentially realized through the language of the majority and ensure the best possible learning of this language for all Quebeckers without exception. Needless to say, however, to have a common language does not mean that everyone has to speak that language all the time (1977a). The Charter did not prevent anyone from using any language of their choice in the private domain. As Laurin stated, “the usefulness of a national language and a common culture … does not exclude the persistence of the use of ethnic languages and the maintenance of particular cultures” (Laurin, 1977a, p.142).

Considering that Lévesque started to claim the need for language policy in the context of immigration policy, his priority was mainly the francization of immigrants. For Lévesque, immigrants were threatening the demographic presence of francophones in Québec, as they had been overwhelmingly assimilated to the anglophone community. For this matter, the Charter was an important vehicle to send immigrant children to French schools, since he considered that “those who will most authentically become Quebeckers are still those of the second generation or those who arrive here at the age when we go to school” (Lévesque, 1965, p.635). Thus, Lévesque saw immigrants as part of the nation-building plan, expecting them to be Quebeckers through French.

As with language policy, Lévesque had continuously expressed the need for state intervention in immigration policy as well, especially in recruiting immigrants abroad and controlling immigrant selection, both of which were controlled by the federal government despite provinces also having jurisdiction in this area (1968a). He criticized federal immigration policy of its traditional racist selection criteria such as skin color, country of origin or religion but defended the positive discrimination “when it comes to protecting [the] cultural character” (1968a, p.3736). Thus, after the
PQ was elected, Lévesque openly stated that his government would value the language criteria compared to the racist ones, saying that “we will privilege those who can most easily adapt to our society – people from French-speaking or Latin countries” (Lévesque, 1977/1991g, p.217). Therefore, when the PQ government reached the Cullen-Couture agreement on immigration policy with the federal government in 1978, permitting the former to establish its own point system for independent immigrants, it provided 12 points for French and only 2 for English and 22 points for “personal qualities, motivation and knowledge of Quebec” (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010, p.387). As Lévesque stated at the time, “there is no self-respecting society that knows its best interests and has a self-identity that allows its immigration to be in the hand of others” (quoted in Kostov, 2008, p.98).

5.3.2. Lévesque and Laurendeau: Pluralism through Language

Lévesque also recognized, already in 1965, that immigrant parents would prefer their children to be educated as bilinguals if they had the chance. He even concluded that “a serious effort of action” is needed which “unequivocally posits the duality of Québec as it is, that is to say, at least minimum [French and English] bilingual and predominantly French” (Lévesque, 1965, p.636). Moreover, because everyone who lived in Québec was a Québécois who deserved the same rights, Lévesque believed that they all deserved to be respected to preserve their own language and religion, whatever their origin was (Anctil, 2008). Therefore, after becoming Premier, he assured that the PQ government had no intention of cutting financial support for private ethnic schools for Jewish, Greek, Armenian groups, later extending support to Muslim schools (Anctil, 2008). Believing a decade later that free choice of schools could come later for all children after the status of French was assured (Godin, 2001), Lévesque’s conception of francizing immigrants was not of making Québec French but rather of paving the ground for a bilingual or even multilingual Québec which would be predominantly French, i.e. the spirit of pluralism with preferentialism. He respected what immigrants wanted for their children in terms of language, which seemed to him realistic and logical as well.

Laurendeau also thought that immigrants in Québec should be integrated to the French Québec
Laurendeau’s significance, however, went beyond. It was Laurendeau who foresaw the potential of language to serve both Québécois nationalism and ethnic diversity, in other words pluralism. He marked an important conception that language can be chosen to learn and speak, contrary to ethnic background by birth, and that it should be a more important classification than ethnicity especially in a multi-ethnic country where all people are equal before the law (B & B Commission, 1967). Fraser evaluated this remark as a “prescient analysis, foreseeing both the emergence of multiculturalism, and a future in which immigrants would join French-speaking as well as English-speaking Canada” (Fraser, 2006, p.69). Thus, we observe two striking foresights in the report of the B & B Commission. One is the importance of language as a medium of cultural pluralism:

We do not mean that a language must protect a group by isolating it from the others. We believe that the members of a group, receiving through the natural medium of their language the new elements which are integrated into their culture, will have a greater chance to develop normally in harmony with that culture. (1967, p.xxxvi)

The other is that those without traditional French or English background to be part of the two nations theory with the medium of language and culture:

As we understand our mandate, this equality should be the equal partnership not only of the two peoples which founded Confederation but also of each of their respective languages and cultures. What we are aiming for, then, is the equal partnership of all who speak either language and participate in either culture, whatever their ethnic origin [italics added]. For us the principle of equal partnership takes priority over all historical and legal considerations, regardless of how interesting and important such considerations may be. (1967, p.xxxix)

Thus, language, for Laurendeau, was an important medium to depart from ethnic and historical conceptions of peoples, embracing pluralism.

5.4. Lévesque: Reaching Out

While many remained theoretical on the issue of immigration and cultural groups, Laurendeau and especially Lévesque actually reached out to them. Laurendeau, who had been taking a strong stand
against intolerance in *Le Devoir*, was one of the first French Canadians with Lévesque to be invited to the monthly gatherings of *Cercle juif de langue française* to speak (Horton, 1992; Anctil, 2017). But it was Lévesque who advanced personal ties with the cultural communities.

Indeed, Lévesque generally had a good relationship with the cultural communities. Assimopoulos explained that they admired Lévesque’s integrity and approved his social-democratic orientations, from which they benefited greatly. They recognized his modesty and were particularly impressed by his devotion to democracy. They were split, however, concerning the language orientations that the party advocated and remained fiercely opposed to Québec's sovereignty (1992). “Stop being a separatist and all Italians will vote for a man like you”, the Italian community would say (Micone, 1992, p.387).

As Assimopoulos (1992) observed, Lévesque’s first riding Montréal-Laurier, where he was elected three times as a member of the PLQ, was composed of a rather high proportion of immigrants. Being a democrat who cherished dialogue and spending his first terms in contact with several cultural groups within the riding, Lévesque became very sensitive to their daily problems. As Lévesque stated:

> I am also … in a constituency with a fairly large population, a fairly high proportion, composed of new Canadians, that is to say, Quebecer of fresh extraction. So I was brought to discuss, not just during the election period, quite often, and even to have studies done on this issue. (1965, p.628)

At the same time, Assimopoulos (1992) also noted that the socio-economic and cultural dynamism of cultural groups helped him to better understand, as early as the 1960s, the increased importance of immigration for the social, political and demographic future of Québec. As Gagnon and Lévesque observed:

> René Lévesque's vision of the Québec of tomorrow was reflected in the attitude he adopted in his riding towards neo-Quebecers and the poor. Lévesque wanted to build a country open to ethnic communities, without distinction between Quebecers, and more sensitive to injustices. He tried to lay the foundation for this new society starting with his riding. (1992, p.97)
Furthermore, Lévesque remained open and sensitive to international issues with his journalistic attitude and genuine passion, which led him to consider Québec's cultural communities as potential intermediaries between Québec and their countries of origin (Assimopoulos, 1992). The riding taught him a rather harsh reality as well that non-francophones overwhelmingly voted for the Liberals and were unsupportive of the sovereignty movement. Thus, he was defeated in two consecutive elections in 1970 and 1973, refusing to move to a safer riding (Lévesque, 1986). In the end though, pressured to be elected as party leader, he did move, with sadness, to a more francophone riding in 1976 (Balthazar, 1992). Nonetheless, he respected the political orientation of those of the cultural groups and always refused to blame the referendum failure on the ethnic vote, considering members of cultural communities also as full citizens of Québec (Assimopoulos, 1992). There was no question of pointing fingers to one’s fellow citizens.

His experience as a war correspondent witnessing the liberation of the concentration camp in Dachau not only made him suspicious of excessive nationalism but also made him reach out to the Jewish community in Montréal in 1960, before announcing his candidacy to the PLQ (Anctil, 2008). Anctil went as far as to mention that through constant connection and meeting with the leaders of the Jewish community, Lévesque conceived and formulated a coherent approach concerning minority rights in Québec during the 1960s. He frequently made the analogy of the State of Israel and Québec independence, admiring the state and revival of Hebrew. But he was not blind to the difficulties facing the Palestinians. As Anctil noted, Lévesque was also aware of the difficult similarities of the two cases, Québec and Israel, in deciding between the legitimate nationalistic impetus of a people and the long-term consequences of such a project on the minority populations (2008).

When the PQ was elected in 1976, there was no one in the party who had an existing relationship with the Jewish community – except, naturally, for Lévesque. Bernard Finestone, a leader of the Jewish community in Montréal, commented on Lévesque in 1985:

I like the man. He is a decent, honest, civilized and warm person who is prepared to put himself out where it is not in direct conflict with his political program:
independence first, the French fact second and minorities a close third. (quoted in Anctil, 2008, p.180)

Thus, his concern for minorities was genuine and well recognized. As Anctil concluded, although Lévesque obviously had very little influence during his lifetime on the electoral or referendum behaviour of those with ethnic background, he has kept the door open for dialogue with Montréal's cultural communities (2008).

As Poliquin observed, Lévesque basically wanted Québec to be very much like Trudeau’s ideal of Canada, dynamic and respectful of minorities (2009). Gagnon and Lévesque echoed this by stating that Lévesque wanted a Québec which was open to cultural communities, without distinction among Quebecers, and more sensitive to injustices (1992). Lévesque refused the American melting pot model which encouraged the disappearance of other cultures. However, he also rejected the Canadian mosaic or multiculturalism which treated any cultures equally. He was undeniably a nationalist who promoted primacy of French in Québec. As a consequence, the conception towards cultural minorities evolved towards a model of *rapprochement*, or even of *convergence*, according to which they obviously have the right to maintain and develop their own identity while at the same time enriching Québec culture (Assimopoulos, 1992). Thus, as Lévesque stated, “immigration is enriching for any country; yet we must not jeopardize our identity” (1977/1991g, p.217). It was about balancing the good in the society, with Québec nationalism always prevailing a little.

5.5. Conclusion

The basic difference between Trudeau and the neo-nationalists is the latter’s willingness and determination to make immigrants speak French rather than English. For them, freedom of choice could no longer be tolerated facing the diminishing francophone population and immigrants integrating to the anglophone community. Interestingly, immigration policy gained gradual sovereignty vis-à-vis the federal government mostly with the initiative of Bourassa, signing three accords in total. They emphasized the importance of both selection of immigrants and settlement services so that the Québec
government could receive immigrants who meet the needs and facilitate integration to the specific cultural environment. In between, the PQ government also signed an accord stressing the language criteria for future immigrants. In this sense, it could be said that Bourassa’s PLQ and Lévesque’s PQ had an overall consensus on immigration policy.

Language was the most important factor for welcoming immigrants to both Canada and Québec, with all the characters agreeing that its advantage is the fact that it could be learned. The instrumental aspect of language is highly valuable in this respect, contrary to culture which is difficult to acquire, at least according to Trudeau. The Québecois identity and its emphasis on territory enabled it to include those immigrants and cultural groups to become Québecois, or at least that was the task for both Laurin and especially Lévesque. French was thus highly regarded to become the common language of the Québecois to bring them together to a pluraliste society.

Laurendeau played a major role in this capacity as a neo-nationalist who called for more intervention in the immigration sphere and in service of pluralism so that immigrants could maintain their culture. He also recognized the importance of language and its potential to contribute to cultural pluralism and to allow those without a French or English background to still become part of the two nations theory. Still, his main focus was on French in Québec, viewing immigrants as a force to make English Canada reflect on their identity, which would lead them to reconsider their relationship with French Canada.

An interesting observation was that Trudeau and Laurin, two people who seem to have very few things in common, each had not dissimilar hidden agendas. As much as Trudeau used multiculturalism to diffuse the rising tension of Québec nationalism, so too was Laurin using cultural communities to degrade English and anglophones to just another ethnocultural minority. Their strategies were strikingly similar, trying to mitigate or even suppress the enemy by using the cultural communities. The only difference was that while Trudeau had no official culture to sell, Laurin had the French culture to promote.

At least some part of Laurendeau and Laurin’s generosity and tolerance towards the others came
from their Catholic faith. To the contrary, Lévesque’s life had no such spiritual devotion. It was always his own experience and his connection to people that shaped his views and determined his actions. The fact that he saw the concentration camp with his own eyes was more than enough to reject any racist excessive and totalitarian nationalism. It also made him reach out to the Jewish community even before becoming a politician, through which he learned how to interact with cultural minorities. Just as the anglophone population was for him a test of maturity, the cultural minorities were for him an integral part of his nationalism, in the sense that it kept him from pursuing an extreme type of nationalism. He knew he would not get many votes from them but it did not matter. Through constant dialogue, he “utilized” them to keep his senses and prove that his nationalism was fair and democratic. This was why he recognized the importance of bilingualism and even multilingualism for immigrants as early as 1965. He positively encouraged them to become one, with the condition of French predominance. Thus, French preferentialism continued to be the priority, to make immigrants integrate to the French side of Québec but at the same time to value pluralism as well.
Chapter 6 Indigenous Population

The final chapter analyses how each saw the indigenous peoples in their territory. Canada now emphasizes its relation to its first inhabitants as a nation-to-nation relationship. However, it was not always thought this way, the 1960s through the 1980s being a crucial turning point. Indigenous issues are mostly thought of as federal jurisdiction with provinces having less power to act. In this context, how the sovereigntists who claim their own nationalism perceived indigenous nations is an interesting question. This will be explored in this chapter.

6.1. Bourassa: Laissez-Faire and Indifference

6.1.1. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement

Faithful to the Canadian and Québec tradition, Bourassa was basically indifferent to indigenous matters, with the exception of his interest in the potential development of the James Bay area in northern Québec, an area inhabited by indigenous peoples. As an economist, Bourassa, before becoming a politician, already advocated that “the future of economic development of Québec involves the development of hydroelectric resources in James Bay” (Denis, 2006, p.123). In 1969, he expressed his beliefs as an opposition member at the Parliamentary Commission of Natural Resources that since the existing hydroelectric power station was not enough, the development of James Bay had to start at the latest in 1973 (Bourassa, 1969). It would also revive the stagnated economy by creating 100,000 jobs, favour industrialization of the south of the province and indeed open up a new territory with potential for all kinds of natural resources in the far north (Savard, 2009). The plan to manage the development of the region was thus included in the 1970 election promise which, with the PLQ’s comfortable victory, was to proceed rapidly (Denis, 2006). In July 1971, after a lengthy debate, Law 50 was adapted, creating la Société de développement de la Baie James (SDBJ) which would be responsible for the various phases of development (Denis, 2006). Its mandate was to develop natural resources of a territory of 350,000 square kilometers, which is roughly equivalent of two-thirds of France or almost the whole of Japan, situated between the 49th and the 55th parallel (Denis, 2006).
The indigenous people, especially the Cree and the Inuit, who lived in this immense territory were not consulted for the project (Savard, 2009). The government ignored them, just as they had done for a good part of Canadian history. However, encouraged by various pressure groups including those involved in the scientific and environmental fields, the indigenous communities, grouped under the Association of Indians in Québec, began to pressure the Québec government to recognize their rights. In May 1972, their initiative commenced within the legal field before the Superior Court of Québec (Savard, 2009). In November 1973, Judge Malouf ordered a stop of the work in James Bay, granting the indigenous peoples the interlocutory injunction which they had requested by invoking a 1912 law which, they said, granted them exclusive rights in this territory and rendered the law creating SDBJ unconstitutional (Denis, 2006). Hydro-Québec and SDBJ immediately appealed, thus the Malouf judgement was reversed a week later by the Québec Court of Appeal, the work at James Bay resuming (Denis, 2006; Savard, 2009). The indigenous side tried to bring their case to the Supreme Court of Canada which refused to intervene considering that the Québec Court of Appeal was pending their decision to have Law 50 declared unconstitutional (Denis, 2006).

Under these uncertain circumstances, the Bourassa government was quick to react. On November 25, only three days after the permission to resume the job by the Québec Court of Appeal, they presented 11 offers to the indigenous, which would eventually be the object of the final agreement (Denis, 2006). Hydro-Québec could not afford to delay the project timelines due to Québec's electricity demand and they needed to sooth the situation (Savard, 2009). The indigenous Association broke up in 1974, among which the three peoples most likely to be affected by the hydroelectric project ended up signing agreements with the Québec government: the Cree and Inuit signing the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) in 1975 and the Naskapi the Northeastern Quebec Agreement (NQA) in 1978 (Savard, 2009). They were the ones who succeeded in negotiating with the government while the other groups failed. Still, it is disputable whether the agreements were good for the three groups. They were required to drop the lawsuit and to relinquish their territorial rights in exchange for obtaining specific privileges, such as the right to hunt and fish and a financial compensation of 225 million dollars.
and participating in several organizations that protect the environment or the economic development of James Bay (Denis, 2006; Savard, 2009).

### 6.1.2. Oka Crisis

Another incident between the indigenous peoples in Québec took place while Bourassa was in power. The Oka Crisis was a 78-day logjam in the summer of 1990 between Mohawk protesters and the *Sûreté du Québec* (the Québec national police, SQ) near Oka, northwest of Montréal. The central issue was the plan to expand a golf course and develop condominiums on disputed land that included a Mohawk burial ground to which they protested peacefully by building barricades. Tensions became high, when the SQ made a raid on July 11, after the Québec Superior Court ordering the Mohawk to remove their barricade on June 29. The Mohawk considered the raid to be a provocation leading both sides to exchange gunfire during which a police officer was killed. The situation was only resolved after Bourassa asked Ottawa to send in the Canadian army. While the golf course expansion was cancelled, and the land purchased by the federal government, it has not yet been transferred to the Kanesatake community (MacDonald, 2002; Marshall, 2014).

Bourassa knew that this was not only a clash starting with the golf course but more of a historical conflict with the indigenous people. However, his concern was a more realistic one where the Mohawks had blockaded the Mercier Bridge leading to the island of Montréal. This forced thousands of commuters to drive extra hours each day just to get to work, which generated growing tensions (Bourassa, 1995). In fact, at one point, angry residents rioted near the bridge, “hurling invective at the Mohawks and rocks at the police” (MacDonald, 2002, p.325). Having considered calling the Canadian army for weeks, Bourassa finally made his decision in mid-August when the Mohawks blindsided the government delegation by staging the negotiation table on their side of the barricades surrounded by armed and masked Mohawk Warriors (MacDonald, 2002). Bourassa, very much in command, was determined to reopen the bridge by Labour Day weekend and it was, on September 5 (MacDonald, 2002). Bourassa was regarded as a hero. During the crisis, he had in fact been diagnosed with melanoma,
a deadly form of skin cancer, and urgent treatment was needed. But he refused to abandon his post during the crisis at significant personal risk which was to be known to the general public by the end of the year (MacDonald, 2002).

Bourassa said that the PLQ’s policy on indigenous questions is dialogue. This may have been true for the James Bay Agreement, despite the negotiations beginning after the indigenous protest. However, in the case of Oka, it was the Canadian army, not negotiation that led to end the crisis. As Claude Ryan, one of Bourassa’s ministers at the time, said, “He talks negotiations but behind the scenes he’s made arrangements for the army” (MacDonald, 2002). Surely he was recalling what had happened 20 years before – the October Crisis, where Bourassa asked Ottawa to intervene when a separatist terrorist group was radicalizing in 1970, in response to which Trudeau ended up enacting the War Measures Act50. Given the self-image and international reputation of Canada as a “peace-keeping” nation (Martin & Fortmann, 1995), many Canadians felt disbelief that their country “would go so far as to use military force over an extended period of time to suppress Native resistance within its own borders” (Patrick, 2003). “Overall” Bourassa continued nevertheless, “we have implemented a policy that has allowed for a significant reconciliation, except in some well-known cases. But as far as the territory is concerned, its integrity has never been negotiable” (Bourassa, 1995, p.208). Thus, concerning the indigenous peoples, it is clear that Bourassa did not have a fundamental philosophy on which he based his actions, although acknowledging the importance of the land without further explanation.

6.2. Integration, Assimilation or Self-Government

6.2.1. LaVerendrye: Integration and Cultural Preservation

The B & B Commission did not include “the question of the Indians and the Eskimos” (B & B Commission, 1967, p. xxvi). As Horton pointed out, the more critical issue for those in the 1960s was

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50 Enacted in 1914, the Act permits the federal government to legislate as it saw fit by order-in-council during a declared war emergency. During the October Crisis, the police arrested close to 500 individuals in Québec who might or might not have had connections to separatist agitation, using powers granted by the Act (Bothwell, 2006).
the measure and grounds on the inclusion of cultural groups (1992). Thus, no indigenous member participated in the commission, which caused much complaint during the committee hearings (English, 2007). This is not to say that the indigenous issue was ignored as a whole by the government. Lapointe-Gagnon pointed out that in the end of his mandate in 1968, Prime Minister Pearson consulted indigenous organizations and associations to see how the Indian Act could be amended. It was also in the agenda of the Commission in the summer of 1964 to meet with the indigenous as part of their country-wide consultation, two of the commissioners traveling through the north. Despite their initial interest in this cause, the two officials concluded that the First Nations and the Inuit would not be heard of as the voices of Canada, since the mandate did not include them in the first place, which no one seemed to have contested (Lapointe-Gagnon, 2018). This attitude was reflected to the report that the indigenous peoples did not belong to either the “founding races” or the “other ethnic groups” of the mandate and that simply it was not their job to investigate their rightful status (B & B Commission, 1967, p. xxvi).

There is one entry in Laurendeau’s diary during the Commission on an “Indian chief” whose language and people were neglected by the English Canadians when he was young. Laurendeau wrote that they were banned from speaking their own language even during recess time at school and physically punished when they uttered a single phrase in the indigenous language (Laurendeau, 1990, p.233). There is no proof how this single description affected Laurendeau’s thoughts on indigenous people. However, although the Commission did not deal with the indigenous peoples, Laurendeau nevertheless talked about their “integration”, not the “assimilation”, in the blue pages while acknowledging the complexity it raised. He wrote:

> The process of integration calls into question the very nature of the traditions and customs of native society. … the Commission considers it a duty to remind the proper authorities that everything possible must be done to help the native populations preserve their cultural heritage, which is an essential part of the patrimony of all Canadians. (B & B Commission, 1967, p. xxvi-xxvii)

On language, the commission advised the federal and provincial governments to cooperate and “take the necessary steps to assist the survival of the Eskimo language and the most common Indian dialects”
(B & B Commission, 1967, p. xxvii). It is easy to denounce this statement for being just a recommendation with no responsibility. However, it should be given credit that it departed from the traditional assimilationist approach and its difference from Trudeau.

6.2.2. Trudeau: Assimilation and Equal Treatment

Trudeau’s philosophy on nationalism and French Canadians indeed had a profound impact on indigenous issues, especially his rejection of special status for both groups (Weaver, 1981), also applying the conception of liberal individualism to the indigenous population. In fact, he went so far as to suggest the complete assimilation of the indigenous population, suggesting in 1969 that “they should eventually become Canadians as all other Canadians … and this is the only basis on which everyone in our society can develop as equals” (Trudeau, 1998c, p.8451). In so saying, Trudeau realized very well that “they risk losing certain of their traditions, certain aspects of their culture, and perhaps even certain of their basic rights” (Trudeau, 1998c, p.8452). But it was a risk they had to take in order to be treated as individual equals, which was one of the important elements of his Just Society.

This spirit was followed in the White Paper on Indian policy in 1969, presented by the then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Jean Chrétien. The Paper certainly emphasized the importance of developing indigenous cultures and preserving and enriching their identities and distinction regarding their languages as “unique and valuable assets” (p.12). However, they were not to be preserved as fossils but rather in the context of the modern world. The fundamental idea of the policy was to replace the role of dependence of the indigenous population by that of “equal status, opportunity and responsibility, a role they can share with all other Canadians” (p.2). Denying the two choices they seemed to have had, either continuing to live in reserves or being assimilated and losing their identity, the government proposed to offer them a third way: “a full roll in Canadian society and in the economy

51 Remarked at the Vancouver Liberal Association Dinner, August 8, 1969.
52 Ibid.
53 Weaver (1981) depicted how the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) strengthened its power to shape policy development under the Trudeau government and that it was where the actual power centre lay, not with the individual ministers who held the portfolios. Indigenous policy-making was clearly a good example of this process.
while retaining, strengthening and developing an Indian identity which preserves the good things of the past and helps Indian people to prosper and thrive” (p.12). Because of its weight on equality, the White Paper rejected any separate roads or services to their indigenous population, going as far as to suggest the termination of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to operate in the field of Indian affairs within five years (Canada, 1969).

Weaver stated clearly that the White Paper failed to offer realistic solutions to the problems the indigenous peoples were facing, due to how it was created and for whom. What the Paper largely responded to were the values of the political arena, not the problems experienced by the indigenous population. It corresponded to white liberal demands from the public, viewing indigenous peoples as “poor ‘aspiring whites’ who preferred what they did not have” (p.196) and ignoring the importance of their cultural systems. This was why the Paper lacked provisions related to concrete implementations of a wide range of social services (1981). The White Paper generated a firestorm among indigenous groups, regarding and rejecting it as the government’s attempt to assimilate them into the mainstream Canadian society (English, 2010). Trudeau and Chrétien were frustrated by this reaction but they ultimately abandoned the proposal two years later (English, 2010).

The discussion on the White Paper coincided the federal Official Languages Act. Not surprisingly, some indigenous spokespeople, especially those from the western provinces, argued that the indigenous peoples were the “original founding race and that their special rights were at least as valid as those of the French” (Weaver, 1981). However, historical origins meant very little to Trudeau, claiming them to be “less important than people generally think,” the proof of which “being that neither Eskimo nor Indian dialects have any kind of privileged position” (1968c, p.31). Trudeau does not seem to have thought of them as inferior; rather, as a pragmatist, he saw the number of people as the definitive factor. In fact, indigenous peoples comprised only one per cent of the total population, compared to French Canadians who had the political and demographic power to destroy Canada (Weaver, 1981). In this sense, the indigenous population was for Trudeau less likely to obtain serious recognition.

Trudeau’s attitude towards the indigenous derived from more than just his theoretical thinking;
he had actually seen what was happening in the north. In 1956, Trudeau had travelled through the Canadian North which made him understand the massiveness of the land, its severe demands and its unending rewards. It was for him a nationalist experience (English, 2007). He witnessed “the natives learning English from French priests, the missing maps, and the haunting reference to the residential school” which undoubtedly left a profound impact on Trudeau (English, 2007, p.329). 12 years later, he went to the Canadian Arctic, which was the first ever visit by a Prime Minister (English, 2010). Trudeau made a remark that the “Eskimos” were less “miserable” compared to a decade earlier but still the “‘North’ was far from an economic ‘takeoff’” (English, 2010, p.47). His experience, however, only led him to treat them as equals, without consideration for any group rights.

Based on Trudeau’s fundamental attitude as a liberal individualist, his intentions concerning his indigenous policy could be interpreted as his good will and conception of a Just Society, treating every Canadians equally. However, he did not understand that the indigenous considered their identity in the collective sense as tribes and nations which even impacted the concept of ownership, especially that of land (Plamondon, 2013). Trudeau, in fact, admitted in 1970 that the White Paper was flawed, mentioning that “I’m sure that we were very naive in some of the statements we made in the paper” and even “a bit too theoretical” (Trudeau, 1972, p.2154). He reflected that they “had perhaps the prejudices of small ‘l’ liberals … and that’s why we said, ‘Well, let’s abolish the Indian Act and make Indians citizens of Canada like everyone else’” (Trudeau, 1972, p.2155). Trudeau remained largely mute on the indigenous question thereafter, “not so much from lack of interest as because other items took priority”, according to his biographer (English, 2010, p.513).

6.2.3. Laurin: Self-Government and the Conquered

Laurin clearly stated that Québec and the indigenous constituted different peoples and nations. According to Laurin, the indigenous minorities – minorités autochtones – are the only ones who can, in

54 Remarked at the meeting with the Indian Association of Alberta and the National Indian Brotherhood in Ottawa, June 4, 1970.
55 Ibid.
certain respects, consider themselves to be distinct peoples of the Québec totality and therefore require special legal treatment (Laurin, 1977b). They are the historical extension of the society once established in the area concerned or descendants of the people that were once the majority in the territories where they still live (Laurin, 1977a). Interestingly, this category also includes Acadians in the Maritime provinces and French Canadians in Ontario and Manitoba (Laurin, 1977a). Thus, we see that Laurin understood that both the indigenous people and the French Canadians were the same conquered peoples, comprising a single category. Of course, the francophones in Québec do not comprise a numerical minority thus they are not exactly in this category as a minority. However, Laurin clearly saw the link between the francophones and indigenous in Québec. Laurin stated, “if Quebecers are becoming more and more aware of their own cultural identity, so too they are becoming more sensitive to the wrongs [the indigenous people] have suffered in the past” (Québec, 1979a, p.21). In Laurin’s mind, Québec nationalism was not only about the Québec nation but also raising awareness of the other nations within the same territory, those of the indigenous as victims.

In an independent Québec, he claimed, the paternalistic attitude which had been long exercised by the federal government would be abolished as soon as possible and be replaced with control given to the indigenous themselves. Recognizing the cultural diversity within the indigenous peoples, he asserted that the powers given to them should be given in the framework of regional entities based on linguistic and cultural identity. Moreover, in these regional jurisdictions, each region’s indigenous language must have a territorial language status equivalent to that of the official language. To avoid being paternalistic, Laurin did not forget to mention that the content must be negotiated among the people concerned. It is on an equality basis that the type of mutually beneficial relationships that would be established between the Québec majority and the first inhabitants of the Québec territory would have to be determined (1977a).

Laurin was thus sympathetic to the indigenous peoples which is also relevant to the White Paper of cultural development. Here, Laurin put forward some principles that must be taken into account. First, the indigenous population were to decide on their future for themselves. However, as the second
principle, while their autonomy would be respected, they would not be ignored by the government. As Québec citizens, the indigenous population must be able to count on the État du Québec for support. Third, in order to reconcile these first two principles, responsibility would be given to the indigenous peoples to invent institutions and strategies that are appropriate for their own development reflecting their deep originality with which they survive and flourish. The government would help, in the financial sense, this inventiveness, encouraging their originality (Québec, 1978).

As a sovereigntist, we sense his conception of the indigenous to be a parallel with that of Québec. Québec certainly wanted to decide on their own future (sovereignty), but also did not want to be ignored by Canada and expects support (association). Thus, Laurin’s nationalism and his reference to historical peoples as the conquered were important bases for his attitude towards the indigenous population and recognizing their right to self-government.

6.2.4. Lévesque: Self-Government and Nation

Lévesque also considered that the Québec nation is similar to the indigenous ones. Although he regarded the indigenous peoples as Québec citizens (Québec, 1979a), they were not a mere cultural minority whose ancestors were the first ones to arrive and live on this continent “which remained theirs even if history wanted them to share their use with others” (Lévesque, 1985a, p.4). However, his analogy is not so much of historical grievances as with Laurin, but rather of simply having a distinct identity in which language plays an important role. At the 1983 Constitutional Conference which will be later explained, Lévesque specifically made the analogy in terms of language and nation. Insisting on Québec’s position in the new Canadian Constitution, Lévesque articulated:

We would like the restoration of our rights and jurisdiction in the area of language. I understand our Inuit and Amerindian friends when they talk about the preservation of their culture and identity. These are concerns of ours too. Our rights and jurisdiction in the area of language, which were taken away, we would therefore like restored. …at a time when we are considering the recognition of rights in Constitution … of native peoples… in the same way, the specific existence or identity of another nation, as distinct as any other, whose homeland is Québec,
should have been and must be acknowledged. The Canada Bill has totally ignored our nation, as if it were a simple collection of individuals. …But we share the same concern: we want to protect our rights. (Québec, 1984, pp.11-12)

As stated, territory was another significant aspect of identity. Understanding that indigenous reserves were important tools for maintaining their identity and culture, he adopted a policy to create and expand their territories out of the public domain of Québec in 1982 (Morin, 1992), with certain limits:

Without a specific territory, where to find oneself at home and to develop, any culture is eventually threatened in the short or the long term. Aboriginal cultures are no exception to this universal law. …Of course, we cannot go very far. The integrity of our territory is fundamental, but it is not a question of letting 'ghettoizing' people uselessly or stupidly who are still entitled to the corners of land that belong to them. (Lévesque, 1985b, p.2495)

Thus, Lévesque understood the indigenous concerns of their land that identity flourishes in a given specific territory and Lévesque was determined to protect their rights on land – as long as it did not threaten the Québec totality. That is why in 1985 he recognized the 10 indigenous nations as nations, not merely as groups. After all, he was the one who claimed in 1967 the importance of territory:

We are Québécois. What this means first and foremost, … , is that we are attached to this one corner of the world where we can be fully ourselves, this Québec which, we feel, is the only place where we can really be at home. (Lévesque, 1997, p.161)

Lévesque described their relationship in terms of association to do a common job (Québec, 1979a). Lévesque, reminding what sovereignty-association sought was for Québec and Canada to work jointly in areas kept in common while preserving each sovereignty, explained his proposal to the indigenous people:

What we are proposing to [the indigenous people], from this stand point, is more or less a new version of an existing model … we can build a type of association that respects everyone’s identity and aspirations. Call it sovereignty, call it autonomy, call it what you like. (Québec, 1979b, p.5)

Thus, Lévesque was clearly seeing the similarity between the Canada-Québec relationship and the
Québec-Indigenous relationship of sovereignty and association.

6.2.5. Trudeau: Integration but Doubtful

LaSelva (1998) pointed out that Trudeau’s conceptions of the indigenous peoples described in the earlier White Paper were nowhere to be found in the Constitution of 1982. Rather, Section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act states that “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed”, repudiating the inadequate recognition of their rights and the paternalistic and assimilationist attitude. It does not support indigenous sovereignty but it assumes that Aboriginal governments will have autonomous decision-making powers in relation to matters of vital concern to the welfare of Aboriginal communities, as well as other powers sanctioned by negotiated settlements or arbitral decisions. (LaSelva, 1998, p.50)

Thus, having denied collective recognition for the indigenous population, Trudeau’s attitude was transformed.

To be sure, this Section concerning indigenous rights was not part of Trudeau’s original proposal for constitutional patriation in 1980, indigenous peoples not being consulted and there thus being very little reference to their rights. They were furious and concerned; mostly because they saw the draft Constitution to be another assimilationist policy similar to the White Paper of 1969, proposed by the same Trudeau government (First Nations Studies Program, 2009). Plamondon mentioned that Trudeau’s initial decision to strip indigenous rights was due to provincial demands (2013). English agreed that Alberta’s Premier Peter Lougheed strongly objected to the extension of indigenous rights and he was not the only one to do so (2010). Under these circumstances, for two years, the indigenous peoples demonstrated, campaigned and lobbied internationally, including the United Nations and the British Parliament, to have their title and rights recognized by the new Canadian Constitution, to which the Canadian government eventually agreed and included their rights in the constitution (First Nations Studies Program, 2009).
On what grounds did he include indigenous rights to the Constitution? Trudeau marked that the Constitution of 1982 recognized the collective rights of indigenous peoples, as well as many newer Canadians and women, since they were not defined by a specific territory nor were enjoying executive, legislative or juridical powers. Still, the Constitution only has the power to give individuals who belong “to these collectivities an additional guarantee of protection against any interpretation of the Charter whereby their rights could be overlooked” (1992, p.24). Thus for Trudeau, even though indigenous rights were enshrined in the Constitution as collective rights, it was only to supplement the existing individual rights which were given priority, rather than to recognize full collective rights. It should be noted that this notion is a very similar one expressed by Lévesque of the complementarity of collective and individual rights.

However, it is doubtful that Trudeau really believed in this thesis. Trudeau’s biographer English noted that Trudeau was always troubled by the meaning of collective rights both because of the implications it had for Québec and his own conception of the primacy of individual rights. He was also not quite sure what aboriginal rights meant (2010). Lévesque noted in his memoirs that Trudeau “defended the ‘national’ rights of the Inuit and the Indians with zeal” in 1984, mentioning further that “when it comes to the no less undeniable rights of the nation called French Québec he becomes completely blocked” (1986, p.365). Trudeau nonetheless always believed that individual rather than group rights should lead indigenous Canadians, clashing in 1991 with Ovide Mercredi, the Grand Chief of the Assembly of First Nations at the time (Plamondon, 2013). Mercredi accused Trudeau of his assimilationist approach to which Trudeau reminded him that what he wanted was integration. Mercredi further reminded him that it is easy for those in a dominant society to emphasize that individual rights should prevail and that for the indigenous peoples, to reject the prevalence of collective rights would be capitulating, allowing them to be dominated under the pretext of individual equality (Plamondon, 2013). Trudeau thus had reluctantly recognized indigenous rights in the Constitution, not whole spiritedly as Lévesque had thought. Again, as a liberal individualist, he saw Québec and the indigenous population largely in the same footing, the only and crucial reason that the latter was given constitutional
recognition was that it did not have legislative nor juridical institutions to protect themselves, contrary to Québec.

6.3. Language

6.3.1. Lévesque: First Initiative

With the PLQ government in power and its Quiet Revolution, Québec finally started to actively involve itself in the northern arctic region of Nouveau-Québec (New Québec) in the beginning of the 1960s. Creating the New Québec General Directorate in 1963 and concluding an agreement concerning the transfer of administrative responsibilities with the federal government in 1964, Québec started to offer administrative services within its jurisdiction to all the communities in New Québec (Trudel, 1996). Especially in the field of education, which is a strictly provincial domain, it created the New Québec school board in 1968 and opened its own schools where they attempted to teach through French, competing against the traditional English, while also allowing teaching in their own language, at least in their first years of primary school (Trudel, 1996). These initiatives were mostly conducted by Lévesque.

Lévesque’s strive for indigenous rights is very little known. Not only as a Premier but throughout his political career, he engaged actively with indigenous leaders and peoples. He listened and tried to understand what Québec could do for them. As a Québec nationalist, his attitude was not very surprising. He understood being a minority and the importance of being treated as a nation. Godin even pointed out that one of the decisive factors to have led Lévesque towards rejection of Canadian federalism was that of indigenous issues. Importantly, it was necessary to incorporate these people into Québec so that they could take control of themselves and no longer be the eternal wrecks of paternalistic services provided by whites, i.e. the federal government (2007).

Through his native Gaspésie which contained indigenous reserves and his assignment when a journalist to visit Canada from coast to coast to coast, Lévesque was aware of their miserable living conditions and was embarrassed that it was brought by well-intentioned white people (Godin, 2007). It
was when he became Minister of Natural Resources in the PLQ Lesage government that he was struck by real awareness and became actively involved, starting with the Inuit (Morin, 1992). For one thing, English presence was everywhere and federal hegemony was absolute in the North to create new English Canadians (Godin, 2007). Dismayed by this desire to assimilate, Lévesque also noted that the indigenous people were wary of everything that was French, francophones only seen as a “poor little boss” without power, even called Oui-Oui who serve the English (Godin, 2007, p.167). Recognizing the total neglect of successive Québec governments of the indigenous peoples and their total insensitivity towards their living conditions, Lévesque decided that it was high time for the government to take responsibility, drawing up a policy that would take into account their needs and interests (Morin, 1992). Because for Lévesque, only the future counted and Québec must occupy the land as quickly as possible and repair its negligence towards the Inuit population (Godin, 2007).

In 1963, Lévesque established a New Québec Branch within his Ministry to a) take over the administration of the territory, b) promote its development by involving the Inuit population and c) to develop education and health programs (Morin, 1992). Éric Gourdeau was entrusted this job with three basic objectives to pursue: a) absolute respect for the indigenous language and culture; b) the development of natural wealth; and c) the full association of the Inuit and Cree with the development of the territory (Godin, 2007). It was a de facto Ministry of the Interior whose early realization had been circulated by word of mouth to all indigenous people in Canada which gave Lévesque genuine respect (Johnson, 1992). Soon after, he proposed a first policy statement which focused primarily on human resources that a) the Inuit were the ones who will have to be in charge of their developing community and b) their language and culture need to be respected on which their fundamental values are based (Morin, 1992). Importantly, while the federal policy of the time prohibited the use of their own language, Inuktitut, in schools, Lévesque insisted that it must be considered a living language and recognized as language of instruction for the first years of schooling. He is noted to have stressed the importance of language in 1964 in Fort Chimo, now Kuujjuaq an Inuit community, as follows:
The Inuit should not lose their culture and language. They should be able to work in their own language and have positions in advanced fields such as medicine and education. The Inuit should take charge. Whites working in Inuit communities should speak Inuktitut, since they are here to serve the Inuit. All of this could happen with the help of the Government of Québec. (Qumaq, 2010, p.94)

Speaking their own language would further help them to engage with other Inuit in other regions and the world, especially with those in Greenland who already had their own publications and literary works (Morin, 1992). Thus, already in 1963, not only was his conception of self-determination and importance of language and culture to one’s identity relevant, but also his internationalism. When the school to educate children in Inuktitut was finally opened, Lévesque received a letter from a Briton, a Doctor of Education, who had spent several years in the North of Canada. She congratulated him on his choice and endeavour for indigenous language education, which she had unsuccessfully proposed to Ottawa more than 15 years ago (Godin, 2007). For Lévesque, “it (was) not so much a question of language as of pedagogy, it is for the sake of the children” (quoted in Godin, 2007, p.175). For a person who valued language for his own being, it was a natural choice for those Inuit children.

These principles announced in 1963 will henceforth be the basis for Lévesque and the PQ to pursue their indigenous policy. Upon discussing the JBNQA in the absence of Lévesque in the National Assembly in 1975, the PQ opposition made sure that the principles of 1963 were fully respected and that the Inuit representatives could speak in their own language during the Parliamentary Committee (Morin, 1992). The Charter of the French Language of 1977, despite largely seen as a law to advance the cause of the French majority, clearly stated in the preamble that it recognized the right of Amerindians and Inuit of Québec to maintain and develop their own language and culture. This also was a reminder of the principles announced in 1963 (Morin, 1992).

Since Lévesque did not want to patronize the North and become the second colonizer, he emphasized that the Inuit make their own decisions in many areas. One of the important choices they had to make was on acquisition of the second language, thus English or French. He stated in the parliamentary debate in 1964:
This choice … is precisely the thing that was completely denied to the Eskimos. We imposed them “manu militari” and unilingual English in a draconian manner. They were not consulted. …we would give them the choice from the beginning, probably the choice to complete in both languages. (Lévesque, 1964, p.4409)

When in 1965 two schools introduced the teaching of a second language, the parents of these schools opted for French (Godin, 2007). This was how Lévesque wanted to francize: a) not by force but by their own choice; and b) not assimilation but in addition to their own language. However, after 1967, his UN successor imposed French to eight new schools, violating Lévesque’s engagement to consult parents when choosing a second language (Godin, 2007). Seen as a betrayal, many parents abandoned Québec schools and inscribed their children to federal schools (Godin, 2007). In the years following the first incursion of Lévesque, the Inuit were no longer as pro-Québec as they had been. They had become, in the eyes of the sovereigntists, one of the federalists to defeat independence, still not speaking French, or very little, in the arctic part of Québec (Godin, 2007).

6.3.2. Bourassa: Following Lévesque’s Initiative

Lévesque’s initiative was incorporated in Bourassa’s Law 22. In Chapter V article 40 on the Language of Instruction, it was stated that “nevertheless, the School Board of New Québec may provide instruction to the Indians and Inuit in their own languages”. Education Minister Cloutier, who sponsored Law 22, explained that the practice of indigenous children in New Québec receiving instruction in their language had been established in recent years (1974). Thus, recognizing their right to education in their own language, the PLQ government officially acknowledged that at least the indigenous peoples in New Québec were to be under different regulations and were exempt from the French language obligations for education, following Lévesque’s policy.

The language provisions in both JBNQA (Québec, 1998b) and NQA (Canada, 1984) included language policies for each group in several areas, which extended well beyond Law 22. First, the language of communication within local and regional administrations were to be in accordance with Law 22. However, citizens may address themselves in their own languages, and the administration must
ensure that they can provide services or communicate with them in their own languages. Second, concerning education, it was entrusted to each indigenous school board and language of instruction was to be their own language, with a second language, preferably French, determined by the parents’ committee. They were also to choose their teachers with their own criteria, to select courses and materials appropriate for themselves and also to develop these courses and materials to maintain and convey their language and culture. Further, it also included provisions for their right to be informed when arrested or detained or to receive post-penal services in their own languages. Lastly, training at the Québec Police Institute was to be in both French and English but also in the native language where it was appropriate. Thus, the agreements compensated for what Law 22 left out on language of indigenous peoples. Trudel noted that the JBNQA made those involved in the agreement “fully integrated into the administrative framework of the government of Quebec”, but also enabled them to maneuver freely to preserve their culture, especially in the language domain (1996, p.108). Compared to Law 22, it is clear that the agreements gave more specific and concrete guidelines with which indigenous peoples can manage themselves, especially in education.

6.3.3. Laurin: Further Extension

The Charter not only maintained the provision of Law 22 but also extended the rights to other indigenous populations living within the territory of Québec (Québec, 1977), stating in article 87 that “nothing in this act prevents the use of an Amerindic language in providing instruction to the Amerinds”. Importantly, article 97 stated that “the Indian reserves are not subject to this act” which confirmed the territorial principle for the indigenous peoples outside the scope of the agreements.

In addition, for the Cree and the Inuit, the JBNQA was reiterated in article 88 that their own language was to be the language of instruction with an emphasis on French for those who wished to proceed to higher education within Québec. Nonetheless, they would also be consulted regarding French and English education. Their rights were further enshrined in the preamble:

Whereas the National Assembly of Québec recognizes the right of the Amerinds
and the Inuit of Québec, the first inhabitants of this land, to preserve and develop their original language and culture;

This line has not been amended to this day. However, this was not the case in Bill 1, the very first draft of the Bill, which did not make any distinction among the minorities, stating as follows: “the National Assembly intends to pursue this objective in a climate of justice and openness towards the minorities involved in the development of Québec”. The reason for the inclusion of indigenous people within the preamble of Law 101 is not clear but it acted as the guarantee that the government gave to the indigenous in the spirit of the JBNQA:

For our part, we intend to identify our common aspirations and concerns, our common problems, build bridges and work together to develop solutions that will ensure our common progress. … In the preamble, we have guaranteed [Québec autochthons] the respect and development of their language and culture of origin. We intend to scrupulously respect the commitments of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. (Laurin, 1977c, p.3475)

Thus, the overall continuity from Lévesque, Bourassa to Laurin can be observed, especially concerning the language of education. Although the Québec government was to collaborate with each of the indigenous peoples, respect for their choice of language of education and the primacy of their own language were thus the two main features reserved as their rights.

6.4. Lévesque: Reaching Out

6.4.1. The 1978 Convention and the 1983 Parliamentary Commission

Upon returning to politics as Premier in 1976, Lévesque took over the indigenous file as a direct responsibility of the Premier. He created in 1978 Secrétariat des activités gouvernementales en milieu amérindien et inuit (SAGMAI) within the Executive Council, whose function was to co-ordinate all governmental and parastatal interventions for the indigenous and to develop a comprehensive state policy in the Amerindian and Inuit milieu (Morin, 1992). Importantly, it functioned as a window for the indigenous people when they were not sure where they should turn to (Québec, 1979b). It proves how sincerely Lévesque thought about the indigenous issue and his determination to act. Determined to give
indigenous peoples exactly what the French majority of Québec needed, he provided them with institutions of self-governance concerning education, health and economic development, at a time when it was only a concept in the rest of Canada (Poliquin, 2009).

Because Lévesque saw that the indigenous were forming their own nation, he tried to build a fairer partnership. He also tried to break through the relative isolation of these reserves both physically and psychologically. This was first realized in December 1978, when the government organized a convention inviting 40 band leaders, involving almost all Amerindian bands, accompanied by 150 people representing the 45,000 indigenous Quebecers in Québec city, which is said to have been the first white-aboriginal summit since the signing of the Peace of the Braves in 1701 (Québec, 1979a; Morin, 1992; Godin, 2007; Québec, 2017). It was a three-day event and an occasion to allow all participants to reconnect with each other and to discuss the way forward for harmonious relationships (Morin, 1992). Speaking both in French and in English, Lévesque pronounced his intentions that it was
to make us better acquainted with each other. You will find out about our defects, about the things we do wrong and please tell us about them, especially when they affect your problems. We will find out your ideas if you will share them with us. We will find out about your aspirations and we will also try … to become more familiar with each other. We need a lot of that. We do not intend to push you in a direction you do not want to take, but we would like to know the direction you would like to take. If we can help, then we will be more aware of the way we should do it. (Québec, 1979a, p.16-7)

Recognizing the past errors and injustices of traditional white-aboriginal relations, Lévesque declared that they have an absolute right to their identity and the autonomy of their reserves and offered extended rights to these reserves equivalent to those of municipalities (Morin, 1992). This event also gave rise to the principles that would be laid down in 1983 and 1985, including quality social services at least equal to all Quebecers, placing vernacular languages in high school, reviewing of history textbooks and aiming at the widest possible autonomy for reserves including representation in the National Assembly (Morin, 1992). There were also discussions on tax exemption, development of a durable economy that was compatible with the environment and the territorial principles, to which some of the indigenous
protested that their rights should not be limited in reserves (Québec, 1979b).

Not only collectively but also bilaterally, Lévesque constantly met and discussed with various indigenous nations and representatives as much as possible after the convention. The referendum of Québec and the new Canadian Constitution were major topics that directly affected the indigenous peoples as well, to which Lévesque gave explanation and clarification and was also persuaded to act on behalf of the indigenous peoples as well. Especially from those who did not have official agreement with the government, he received claims on various topics extending from hunting and fishing rights to right to self-determination (Québec, 1980b).

In November 1983, 17 indigenous groups were invited to the Parliamentary Commission to set out their demands before the National Assembly (Québec, 2017) which was the first ever opportunity for all groups to be heard, with the exception of the Algonquins who instead presented a memoir (Morin, 1992). Morin mentioned that this occasion was set up by Lévesque himself, who believed that the time had come to institutionalize Québec-indigenous dialogue. He attended most of the sessions and listened attentively. He was open-minded even in the face of the most ambitious demands and harsh comments (1992). He reiterated in his closing remarks that sufficient political autonomy within Québec is needed to advance their territorial, socio-cultural and economic aspirations as “distinct nations with their own identity” and that former relations of the dominant groups and the dominated group should proceed on an equal footing (Lévesque, 1983). This clearly reflects his conception of Québec within Canada; Lévesque further pointed out that Québec was lucky to be able to understand what it feels like to be in a minority position (1983).

As a result of the Commission and request from the Inuit, Law 101 was amended in 1983 to include the Inuktitut language in article 87 concerning language of instruction. Although in practice the language had already been recognized as such, the Inuit nonetheless considered it should be stated in law (Godin, 1983). Therefore, it now states that “nothing in this Act prevents the use of an Amerindic language in providing instruction to the Amerinds, or of Inuktitut in providing instruction to the Inuit”.
6.4.2. Indigenous Matter above Québec Nationalism

Before the referendum, the indigenous people were naturally worried what would become of their status if Québec were to be independent. Lévesque promising that any information would be given in French, English and in their own languages, assured them that the related statutes and treaties would continue to be confirmed in an independent Québec with the guarantee of same rights (Québec, 1979b). Lévesque understood the anxiety felt by the indigenous people since they were under federal jurisdiction for so long, but reminded them that their relationship with Québec had undergone significant transformation in the past years with harmonization and normalization (Québec, 1980a).

Whatever the new status given to Québec, the Québec constitution will provide for the recognition and the protection of the rights and privileges already given to the Amerindians and Inuit by treaties, and legislation. That is a strict minimum; a minimum that will be guaranteed under Québec’s constitution. (Québec, 1980a, p.3)

After the referendum, Lévesque was put into a difficult position between the federal government and the indigenous people. When Trudeau patriated the Constitution in 1982 without Québec’s consent, the Lévesque government decided that they would no longer participate in federal-provincial conferences, including those on constitutional issues (Morin, 1992). However, a good part of indigenous issues had always been federal jurisdiction and Section 35 of the Constitution recognized and affirmed indigenous and treaty rights. Moreover, a First Minister’s Conference on indigenous rights was to be held in March 1983, and the indigenous people of Québec urged the Québec government to participate (Moirn, 1992). It was a real dilemma for Lévesque and his colleagues whether they should stick to their first announcement of abstention or give up for the sake of the indigenous peoples (Morin, 1992). In the end, the indigenous cause won in the mind of the government, Lévesque himself particularly being sensitive to the more vulnerable situation of the indigenous than Quebecers facing the federal government and its tendency to unilaterally decide on constitutional matters (Morin, 1992). The Québec government finally announced that while not recognizing the Constitution Act of 1982, they would be present at the federal-provincial conferences if only to give the floor to the Québec indigenous peoples.
In the First Ministers’ Conference on Aboriginal Issues, Lévesque himself headed the delegation of 17 indigenous representatives (Québec, 1983). In the opening address, he reminded those assembled of the difficult position Québec was in:

The one and only reason that we are here is out of respect for the native peoples, above all, obviously, those living in Québec. Their elected representatives strongly insisted that we be present, and out of solidarity with them, but at our own risk somewhat, we decided to come. …it seemed advisable for us to do our part to ensure that the native peoples would not be delivered the same treatment as that recently given to the French-speaking nation whose home and only homeland is Québec. (Québec, 1984, p.9)

Québec indigenous leaders were encouraged to speak directly to the constitutional forum, presented by Lévesque and other ministers (Morin, 1992). With no other provinces employing this method, it clearly represented the significance of the relationship between the indigenous and the Québec government (Morin, 1992). Lévesque, however, did not sign the final accord due to his position vis-à-vis the Constitution but promised that his government would attend any related conferences and meetings (Québec, 1984). He actually did attend the conference also in 1984 and 1985 until he retired from politics. The next Premier, Bourassa, did not attend himself but sent his Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs to represent him. This was Bourassa’s way of showing his protest against the unilateral repatriation of the Constitution (Bourassa, 1995).

6.4.3. Québec Initiative

Among the very few things that were agreed on through the conference of 1983, one was the indigenous women’s rights that Lévesque had deeply cared for, equality between indigenous women and men having been one of his major concerns. In reserves, women who were married to white men were not seen to have the same rights as others, neither were their children, which Lévesque saw as racist (Godin, 2007). The Supreme Court had, in fact, upheld this law in a court case in 1973, claiming that the government had the right to create special laws for the indigenous peoples by even violating the Bill of Rights (Price, 1979). Despite the reluctance of some chiefs (Morin, 1992), Lévesque
recognized this problem and eliminated this discriminatory practice of the government with his declaration in 1980 on Amerindian women (Québec, 1981). After the conference, it was incorporated to the Constitution in 1983 as Section 35 clause 4.

Another of Lévesque’s initiatives was officially recognizing the indigenous peoples as nations. In February 1983, before the March conference, the cabinet passed 15 principles which most importantly recognized

that the aboriginal peoples of Québec constitute distinct nations, entitled to their own culture, language, traditions and customs, as well as having the right to determine, by themselves, the development of their own identity. (Québec, 1998a, p.20)

This term, distinct nation derived from the report of the B & B Commission concerning the relationship of English and French Canadians, which Morin stated was not a coincidence but a deliberate choice by the government to reflect the sociological reality of indigenous communities (1992). The rights certainly did not include sovereignty which could affect the territorial integrity of Québec and thus are still within the framework of Québec legislation and community (Québec, 1998a). Still, within this framework they have the right to own and govern land, the right to have and control institutions related to culture, education, language, health, social services and economic development (Québec, 1998a).

On March 20, 1985, a historical resolution was adopted at the end of Lévesque’s political career. This resolution marked the evolution of what had started as the policy statement of 1963, incorporating important additional directions and details (Morin, 1992), officially recognizing the 15 principles laid out in 1983 (Trudel, 1996). It also included that first, contrary to the federal perception of indigenous peoples as Indian, Inuit and Métis, the resolution recognized 10 groups existing as nations, recognizing their diversity56. Second, following the 1983 Parliamentary Commission which had been seen as beneficial by all parties, the resolution announced this forum to be held on a regular basis. It was also

56 This included the Abenaki, Algonquin, Attikamek, Cree, Huron, Micmac, Mohawk, Montagnais, Naskapi and Inuit nations. In 1989, an eleventh nation was additionally recognized, the Malecite nation (Québec, 1998a).
clearly stated that the exercise of the right to self-government within Québec was guaranteed (Morin, 1992; Québec, 1998a). In a speech the day before, Lévesque also reiterated that in addition to their collective recognition, “each and every one of these full citizens has a minimum right to the same services as the whole population” (Lévesque, 1985b, p.2494). Thus, individual rights of the indigenous peoples were also guaranteed. He also suggested that the term *band* be replaced by the term *community* which “is simply more inclusive than the previous one, is also more respectful of the diversity of indigenous nations and is more appropriate, particularly when addressing Inuit” (Lévesque, 1985b, p.2497).

Lévesque took pride with Québec’s relationship with the indigenous peoples:

> As far as I know, Québec is the only place in Canada where respect for rights goes as far as granting privileges, such as public schools in the language of the minority, which does not exist in any other province. (quoted in Godin, 2007, p.180)

He strived to maintain this attitude and thus stated in his memoirs that “as far as native peoples are concerned, we don’t have to take a back seat to anyone”, quoting John Price saying that “almost without exception, comparisons show that Indian people live better in Québec than anywhere else in Canada” (Lévesque, 1986, pp.365-366). In fact, Price mentioned that among others in Canada, the indigenous in Québec had the highest average incomes and the lowest rates of “murder, suicide, arrests and convictions for indictable offences” (Price, 1979, p.215). This, according to Price, was due to the historical and traditional policies of greater integration between the French and the indigenous, compared to the British who were more racially prejudiced and convinced of the biological inferiority of the indigenous peoples. Thus in many cases, the policies of the French resulted in more interracial marriage with the indigenous and more humane treatment of their society than the British (1979).

Lévesque agreed, remarking that Québec history in general was about opening up, especially towards the indigenous. Admitting that while there were certain times of friction, he noted that there had always existed a relatively harmonious co-existence with the first owners of the land, and the fact that nearly half of francophone Quebecers have indigenous blood all the more signifies the mixing of
the two peoples, which was relatively rare in the North American context (1978/1979). It was also about respecting the minorities, as he had mentioned in 1964 that “whether it is respect for the linguistic or cultural or religious traditions of minorities, that is Québec” (Lévesque, 1964, p.4409). Thus, according to Lévesque, there is a general rule as a minority nation:

People who think as ever about their own collective identity and their rights and aspirations cannot continue to ignore those who, right next to them, have been dispossessed without management of all this. (1972/1987c, p.329)

Morin stressed the personal contribution of Lévesque in this domain of indigenous rights. According to him, the sources of Lévesque’s thinking and political direction derived from his temperament, human experience and tireless reflection on the indigenous question. He was generally sensitive to inequalities, whether it was between minorities and the majority or between the disadvantaged and the well-off (1992). Johnson agreed and stated that it was Lévesque’s awareness of the injustices and the situations of the systems that marginalized the indigenous which led him to actively support them (1992). Morin continued that Lévesque’s personal and professional experience as a war correspondent and journalist made him understand the evolution in the contemporary world towards the freedom of the peoples and the rights of the person. His international insight was in line with the development in international forums but largely ahead of opinions heard in Québec or even North America (1992). In 1960, the right of self-determination to all peoples was granted to colonial countries by resolution 1514 and in 1962, “the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources” was to be respected by resolution 1803 (United Nations, 2018). Most importantly, searching for the difficult balance between the aspirations of the francophone majority and those of the indigenous nations, Lévesque understood that there are certain attitudes beyond rights that should be pursued, those of accepting differences and respecting one another (Morin, 1992). Thus, as much as Québec was traditionally sensitive towards the indigenous cause, Lévesque’s personal influence cannot be denied.
6.5. Conclusion

Because of Trudeau’s deep conviction in liberalism, his initial attitude towards the aboriginals was that of assimilation. To be sure, he did not exactly encourage assimilation and his intention was rather based on his conception of equality. However, it ultimately meant assimilation for the indigenous populations which was unacceptable to them. Trudeau then gradually came to accept their rights, mostly by facing indigenous protest, not by his good will. Because he did not neglect culture and identity per se, he finally accepted that their rights as indigenous were to be protected by the Constitution. He justified this difference of attitude compared to Québec that while Québec had its own provincial government to protect itself, the indigenous did not. There was a need to compensate for the lack of indigenous institutions whose responsibilities were assumed by the federal government. Still, Trudeau continued to be wary of the whole concept of collective rights to the end.

The neo-nationalists, on the other hand, did not seem to have a difficult time acknowledging aboriginal rights. Laurendeau, whose mandate for the Commission did not include the indigenous, nonetheless mentioned them briefly in his blue pages, that they should be integrated rather than assimilated and that their cultural heritage should be preserved as a part of Canadian patrimony. Considering that this was written in the last half of the 1960s, Laurendeau’s perspective represents his deep understanding on minorities in general and his self-identification as a French Canadian neo-nationalist.

Bourassa’s highly opportunist attitude also surfaced in indigenous matters, his priority always being economic development and political opportunity. His typical attitude was very much reflected in the James Bay incident, where his sole purpose in signing the agreement was to silence those who were pursuing the lawsuit. In fact, considering that the Bourassa government elected in 1985 a) made Lévesque’s 15 principles and the resolution the foundations of their own policy towards indigenous matters without changing one thing (Morin, 1992), b) did not provide opportunity for the indigenous people to appear before the parliamentary forum (Morin, 1992) and c) did not have the Premier himself attend the first ministers’ conference, Bourassa’s indigenous policy was laissez-faire and indifference.
It may be going too far to say that his attitude proved that he was just an opportunistic nationalist even on Québec issues, nevertheless, his insensitivity towards indigenous issues cannot be denied.

Laurin, on the other hand, was very sensitive to indigenous matters. He sees the similarity between them and his own people, so much so that he acknowledged them in the preamble of the Charter and exempt them from the application of the language restrictions. He promised that an independent Québec would never be paternalistic, recognizing their self-governance in many areas especially that on language, even suggesting they have their own official languages in each indigenous community. It should be noted that as a melancholy nationalist, his conception of their similarity derives from the historical grievances as the conquered, which now had to be rectified.

Compared to all the above characters, Lévesque’s concern on the indigenous peoples, especially the Inuit far in the north, seems to differ greatly. For one thing, it was already in the beginning of the 1960s that he not only realized the significance of the issue but also started to act concretely. His initiative was further accelerated when he became Premier, assuming the portfolio himself. His concern derived both from the injustices that were imposed on the indigenous and also the fact that they had their own undeniable identity. It was less from the historical viewpoint but rather the concrete identity based on language and territory which he found similar to Québec’s. Thus, he insisted on the importance of language and that children should be educated in their own language for the sake of their identity.

However, his approach was less theoretical and more pragmatic. For one thing, he became aware of the situation of the Inuit when he visited the far north himself. He went and met with people directly and listened to their concerns and problems. As a Premier, not only collectively but also bilaterally, he met with numerous indigenous groups and representatives who each had their own specific problems. His concern for the indigenous peoples even prevailed over his own nationalism, attending the federal-provincial Conference held in Ottawa after the deep humiliation concerning the patriation of the Constitution. It was with true dialogue that Lévesque constantly established his way of thinking and policy, as Lévesque stated at the last Constitutional Conference he attended in 1985:
We must hope to be able to find together ways of defining our modes of coexistence by taking into account not only, and maybe not even principally, the sword of Damoclès which the judicial system is, but, first and foremost, the fact that we live together, that we rub elbows, as it were, on a daily basis in a given territory. (Québec, 1986, p.11)

It is clear that Lévesque was a pioneer in establishing a relationship based on trust and dialogue with the indigenous people.
Conclusion

This thesis was undertaken in order to answer two questions. The first task was to identify the many kinds of nationalisms of Québec to prove that nationalism is not synonymous with the independence movement. First, the author has assumed this task by identifying nationalisms from the diachronic perspective, going through the history of Québec in chapter two. It was observed, utilizing the BVPs of the survival theory, that the history of Québec can be roughly divided into five eras and four nationalisms. The first era was from French arrival in the seventeenth century to around 1790, when people first identified themselves as Canadiens. This corresponded to Position One of the BVP where victimization was denied and thus no visible nationalism was in place. However, it was certainly the era when the basics of the future Québec society were founded. This was followed by Position Three of the BVP, the time of rebellion from 1791 to 1840. The major reason for its failure was the lack of support from the masses and fear of assimilation, relying on the Catholic Church for their identity. This prevented them from achieving greater change which ended up reverting them to Position Two of the BVP. The traditional nationalism of the Canadiens français lasted until 1960, valuing traditional Catholic and rural values. It was a defensive and passive nationalism relying on the will of god, refusing to change the situation for themselves. However, the Quiet Revolution brought the people back to Position Three, starting to once again play an active role. Change was realized in many spheres of life with the emergence of the Québécois identity and it was also in this era that the separatism movement grew, which ended up with two referendum failures. Although there was a possibility for Québec to regress to Position Two due to this failure of independence, Québec has instead entered the era of a pluralistic distinct society which signified Position Four of the BVP, as we have seen in section two of chapter one. It does not deny nationalism but seeks pluralism as well, which is a major challenge that Québec is currently facing. It remains to be seen how Québec will further handle this difficult balance, but the most important thing is that nationalism is still very much alive, and that it should be considered a positive attitude.

From chapter three, the author has dealt with nationalisms of major Québec political players at
the individual level from a synchronic perspective, namely those of André Laurendeau, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Robert Bourassa and Camille Laurin as compared to René Lévesque. This was done in order to answer my first question, to identify many nationalisms, and also to respond to my second question: How was it possible for Québec to pursue a course towards embracing both nationalism and pluralism? The hypothesis was that Lévesque was the one who a) went beyond the dichotomy of melancholy nationalism and anti-nationalism and b) set the basis for and was able to act as a vehicle for Québec to pursue what Maclure claimed is a balancing of nationalism and pluralism. Especially crucial to this new Québec identity was the relationship between the majority and minority, namely anglophones and the indigenous, with whom the majority must construct a relationship based on trust. To this end, Lévesque was compared to the other figures on mainly four themes: nationalism, language including English and anglophones, cultural minorities and indigenous peoples. Here, the philosophy and ideology of each figure and nationalism will be outlined, also using the survival theory.

Trudeau was a typical Position One figure, who denied the victimized position of French Canadians in Québec and thus rejected Québec nationalism which he saw as a racist and fascist ideology. He even denied language laws for Québec, which he saw as humiliating. He was a liberal individualist in his own way, seeking the Just Society, but never actually represented his own people. His further rejection of the two nations theory and his support for bilingualism, especially that of individual bilingualism, strongly reflected this stance. His attitude towards indigenous peoples was an excellent illustration that only protecting individual rights was not enough, which he later reluctantly seemed to admit when enacting the Constitution. Moreover, his policy on multiculturalism was seen by Québec as harmful to their existence, separating language and culture thus treating French Canadians as just another minority within Canada.

In fact, although he left a deep impact on Canadian and Québec politics, many argue that his politics were ultimately erroneous and damaging (English, 2010). They insist that a more flexible strategy would have resulted in a better outcome than his insistence on bilingualism as the crucial response to the separatists and his denial of giving either special status to Québec or decentralization to
the provinces (English, 2010). McRoberts pointed out his vision was not shared entirely by most of his fellow Québec francophones since historically, as we have seen, the French Canadian conception of Canada is rooted on dualism, that Canada is composed of two distinct collectivities. Further, though Québec had a special role to play as the centre of the French Canadian collectivity, Trudeau’s vision of language rights was based upon individual human rights and denied any legal recognition of a francophone collectivity (1997). Thus, Trudeau’s conception of bilingualism was not realistic nor reflective of how the Québécois saw things, namely dualism.

Although Bourassa can be seen as having been in Position Three, fighting vigorously against Ottawa, he was essentially a political opportunist and pragmatist who did not seem to have a strong conviction towards nationalism. Although he shared Laurin’s observations on cultural insecurity and many of Laurendeau’s and Lévesque’s philosophies, especially those concerning French preferentialism, his indifference towards the indigenous issue was striking. Although he advanced important agreements for them, it was not from conviction but out of the sheer necessity of settling the inconvenient situations. In fact, Levine (1990) pointed out that Bourassa’s politics were influenced by two considerations: a) to appeal to PQ supporters to defuse the popularity of that party; and b) to please the traditional anglophone support for PLQ. It was always an impossible search for a middle ground in which cultural minorities and indigenous had no place. Moreover, his priority was always the economy, valuing the business sector when enacting his language law. In other words, as far as Bourassa was concerned, political calculation prevailed over philosophy. Still, in the end, regarding language and political independence, it has become as Bourassa hoped for: linguistic security through legislating without independence.

Laurin was a pure independentist who firmly believed that Québec needed to become independent no matter what. With his Charter of the French Language, he definitely injected pride for French Canadians and made Québec a proud French nation, realizing what Bourassa had hoped for. In this sense, Bourassa’s French preferentialism but almost bilingual approach was inadequate to secure the language situation, to which Laurin should be given credit for the results of his coercive approach,
acting as a very important vehicle for perhaps lifting Québec from Position Two towards even Position Four. However, the fact that he was trapped in the melancholy nationalist discourse, always referring to the historical grievances as the conquered and believing that independence alone would solve their problems, makes him a Position Two nationalist who will always be defeated. For Laurin, the anglophones and English were forever enemies. This meant two things. First, Laurin pursued unilingualism as much as he could with his Law 101, pursuing rights as if they were already sovereign. His unilingualism was not the strictest kind, one that would have abolished English institutions, but his firm stance against English cannot be denied. Second, anglophones and their language were to be degraded to just one of the minorities, elevating the status of cultural minorities in the same stroke. This was the same logic applied by Trudeau concerning Québec nationalism. In this sense, we cannot consider Laurin’s attitude of valuing the cultural minorities as a genuine gesture of tolerance. On the other hand, his concern for the indigenous population seems to have been more genuine, acknowledging the parallel between them and Québec. But here again, his historical reference rather proves his melancholy nationalism, which keeps him from more active and constructive initiative stressing too much on victimization.

Laurendeau was the very pioneer of the neo-nationalist narrative, who Lévesque genuinely respected to the extent that he only sought criticism from Laurendeau. Having been in Position Two as a young typical French Canadian who valued Catholicism, he himself emerged to Position Three to become a neo-nationalist. Thus, despite his position as co-chair of the B & B Commission, what he advocated was dualism and institutional bilingualism, emphasizing French preferentialism especially for language of work in Québec. Still, he was trapped in the narrative of threat of assimilation on two accounts. The first was, as with Laurin, that bilingualism would lead to the loss of French. This was perhaps a valid concern and the reality but it could also have prevented him from being more proactive. The second is more vital, which was the threat of the U.S. assimilating Québec. These two threats might have prevented Laurendeau from going on to Position Four and rather made him go back to Position Two, with “his occasional tendency to melancholy” (Maclure, 2003, p.66).
However, Laurendeau’s significance does not terminate with nationalist narratives. His pluralism and the importance of language carried a momentous vision for the future, realizing that “certain oversimplified kinds of identification become less and less possible” (B & B Commission, 1967, p.xlviii). He understood that monolithic identification was or would soon be impossible, even for those in Québec who pursued nationalism. Thus, what he sought to balance were a) the two peoples within Canada and b) “the ‘precarious being’ of the Québécois people and the increasingly hybrid nature of its ethos” (Maclure, 2003, p.67). Thus, he encouraged both cultural minorities and indigenous peoples to maintain their language and culture and to integrate rather than assimilate. Considering that it was still the 1960s when he made this comment, it showed considerable foresight. Still, his conception remained a typical majority-minority relationship with both immigrants and indigenous being the subject of preservation. If he had lived a little longer, he could perhaps have left us with a more detailed analysis of how he saw the differences of these two groups, rather than treating them both as mere minorities.

Now we reach Lévesque, whose nationalism and concern for minorities should by now have been made clear. Starting in Position One, with very little interest in Québec politics and interests instead aimed abroad as a journalist, he quickly proceeded to Position Three after the Radio-Canada strike and entered politics as a nationalist. He gradually became a sovereigntist who aspired for association but ultimately to make Québec an equal partner of English Canada, thus a faithful follower of the two nations theory. His strong nationalism was necessary to make English Canada realize that Québec could not be ignored and that Québec was an important part of Canada. Lévesque’s commitment to democracy was indeed essential to earning respect from other provinces, which further advanced his importance. As Godin pointed out, through his action and challenge, Lévesque forced English Canada to look in the mirror, to question, to see from another angle the place of Québec in Canada (2007). His sincere attitude was reflected in the language debate, where he always insisted that Québec was still part of Canada.

His French preferentialism was clear as with Bourassa and Laurendeau, vis-à-vis Laurin’s more unilingual approach. French preferentialism is actually the main feature of what Kymlicka (2001) called a societal culture. He explained:
By a societal culture, I mean a territorially-concentrated culture, centred on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, law, economy, government, etc.). I call it a societal culture to emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles. (p.25)

Supporting preferentialism rather than bilingualism is thus justified, to have French function as a common language of the Québec societal culture. But why not unilingualism? Kymlicka gave us further insight, citing two reasons. First is because “societal cultures within a modern liberal democracy are inevitably pluralistic” (2001, p.25). He did not specifically mention linguistic pluralism and rather mentioned that “diversity … is balanced and constrained by linguistic and institutional cohesion” (2001, p. 25) which seems to support unilingualism rather than preferentialism. However, Kymlicka also stated that “any national group engaged in a project of nation-building must respect the rights of other nations within its jurisdiction to protect and build their own national institutions” (2001, p. 29). Here, Kymlicka gave the example of Québec that “the Québécois are entitled to assert national rights vis-à-vis the rest of Canada, but only if they respect the rights of Aboriginals within Quebec to assert national rights vis-à-vis the rest of Quebec” (2001, p.29). Considering this responsibility that nations, whether nation-states or minority nations, have to pursue, Lévesque clearly followed this by officially recognizing not only the indigenous peoples as nations but also the English-speaking community in Québec as a historical minority within the Québec nation, referring it as a test to maturity. This was clearly in line with Laforest’s observation that the new Québec identity should build a relationship of trust particularly with anglophones and the indigenous (1995a). In this sense, it was Lévesque, not Laurin, who was solemnly assuming the role to act as a sovereign nation to pursue its responsibility.

As for the indigenous people, Lévesque saw them as constituting completely different nations with their own languages and territories. Hence, their languages were not officially recognized for the Québec nation but instead Québec officially recognized each as their own nation. Indeed, his greatest attachment among the three silos, namely the anglophones, cultural communities and indigenous, was for the indigenous peoples with whom Lévesque had a very special relationship, especially with many
Inuit leaders who admired him greatly (Godin, 2007; Poliquin, 2009). His concrete actions were obvious and genuine. As Bourassa stated, “Mister Lévesque … was probably one of the political leaders most sympathetic to the aboriginal issue” (1995, p.207).

Kymlicka stated that immigrants have traditionally accepted integrating into a societal culture including the requirement of learning the official language. However, they should also be able to “demand fairer terms of integration”, including the recognition that integration is a long-term process and the respect for immigrants’ identities and practices (2001, p. 30). In this sense, Lévesque’s demand to oblige immigrants from abroad to go to French schools is legitimate, even more so since their will for bilingualism and multilingualism was encouraged. Through constant dialogue, Lévesque tried to understand what their needs were and what should be done. Their existence was thus very important to Lévesque in keeping his senses and democracy. Thus for Lévesque, they were not mere minorities who needed charity but rather inspirations for him to become a fair politician and to avoid to become an excessive nationalist.

Considering his overall attitude and philosophy, he can be thought of reaching Position Four of the BVP, as a person who a) clearly went beyond the dichotomy of melancholy and anti-nationalisms without fear of assimilation, i.e. victimization and b) pursued both nationalism and pluralism. The former PQ Premier Pauline Marois remarked that the great force of René Lévesque was perhaps to have made Quebeckers learn to love themselves, necessary conditions to do great things and to dream of a better future (Godin, 2007). As a democrat who defended minority rights, his motivations indeed derived from the fact that he was a nationalist. Thus, his attitude as a firm Québécois nationalist can said to be the key factor for advancing Québec from Position Three to Four of the BVP, as Maclure (2003) indicated as a crucial condition for a modern Québec identity.

Learning from the philosophy of Lévesque, three things can be pointed out related to the current state of affairs. The first concerns French as the language of work and the multilingualism of immigrants. For a long time, it was thought desirable that immigrants shift to French rather than English, which was proved to be realized for the first time in the 2006 census (Gagnon, 2014). This desire is legitimate if
we consider that immigrants are now favouring French more than English. However, the problem was that this shift was referencing the *language spoken most often at home* as an indication to whether the person will change his/her mother tongue in the future especially when transmitted to the next generation (Corbeil & Houle, 2014). In other words, it was long thought desirable that immigrants and their descendants *assimilate* to French rather than English. Here, the author would like to sincerely point out that it should be considered desirable that ethnocultural minorities use languages other than French or English at home as a proof of multilingualism, where immigrants maintain their mother tongue in their private sphere. The importance should rather be whether they use French *at work*, as expressed by all five (anti) nationalisms, which can be different from language at home and further proves their multilingualism (Morin & Geloso, 2016). Moreover, although multilingualism has a tendency to be conceived as a threat (Morin & Geloso, 2016), it should be regarded as an asset for a society as was perceived by Lévesque, especially in the age of globalization and as a proof that nationalist linguistic policies are open to diversity.

Second, nationalism should not be considered evil or bad, especially that of minority nationalism which is usually seen as an ethnocentric and exclusive type of nationalism. Of course, those types of nationalism exist, even at the nation-state level. What is important is to realize that there are many types of nationalism, which should have been proved with this thesis. As Taylor (1994) mentioned:

> A society with strong collective goals can be liberal, …, provided it is also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals; and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights. (p.59)

In fact, nationalism can also be a source for further diversity, not only by creating a firm societal culture to which minorities have a clear sense of where and what they are integrating to, but also by expressing mutual respect with other nations both within and outside the nation in question. We must strive to find the right balance of nationalism and pluralism, all the more so in this globalized world where different people live together while the significance of national identity seems to be increasing rather than
decreasing, just as Lévesque had pointed out.

Third, the importance of dialogue cannot be denied. It was through constant communication that Lévesque was able to advance his thesis and understand what was necessary not only for the francophones but also for minorities. In fact, the Québec model of interculturalism significantly values dialogue as opposed to legalistic measures (Gagnon & Iacovino, 2016), an attitude highly practiced and cherished by Lévesque. It was a striking contrast to Trudeau who was basically theoretical and Bourassa who only communicated with those who matched his interests. Dialogue is a fundamental aspect for one’s identity and the politics of recognition and difference (Taylor, 1994) with which a healthier society can develop.

Lastly, some limitations for this thesis must be pointed out. One of the most important is that there were more nationalisms which could have been part of this thesis. There was Frank Scott, who was the mentor of Trudeau and participated in the B & B Commission, who was another example of anti-nationalism. There was Daniel Johnson, the UN Premier of Québec who advocated equality or independence and making Québec as French as Ontario was English. Claude Ryan, editor of Le Devoir and later leader of PLQ, was another figure who sometimes supported Lévesque and was strongly against the Charter. There was also Gérard Godin, who was briefly mentioned, a Minister at the Lévesque government. Brian Mulroney, a Progressive Conservative Prime Minister who embraced Québec’s distinct society and revised the Official Languages Act in 1988, could have also been included in the list. The nationalisms of any and all of these additional figures would be interesting for future study.

The author also acknowledges that the religious diversity brought in by immigrants from around the world is a more pressing issue than linguistic diversity in the modern world. Moreover, although the authority of Catholicism in Québec had diminished since the Quiet Revolution, individual religiousness has often endured, as we have seen, which influenced the conception of tolerance through Catholic personalism. In fact, Christianity has so intensely affected Western democracies that it is not very obvious, which rather proves that no nation-state can fully become religiously neutral. Under these
circumstances, religious diversity becomes difficult to achieve, an area which requires further analysis and solutions for greater religious pluralism.

Still, the author hopes to have made the point that nationalism and pluralism à la Lévesque had been a pioneering stance for modern Québec. It could also be a reference point for any nations that strive for both nationalism and pluralism. It would thus be the next step to adopt and practice Lévesque’s philosophy to different circumstances, challenging the universality of his thesis.
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