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A STUDY OF THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF
ÄDILSHÄHĪ SULTANATE (A.D. 1489—1686)*

By HIROSHI FUKAZAWA

Lecturer of Asian Economy

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Preliminary Remarks

The Ädilshahi Sultanate was established in A.D. 1489 by Yusuf Ädil Khān with Bijāpur as its capital. It was one of the five Sultanates of the Deccan which sprang up after the dissolution of the Bahmani Sultanate. Until 1686, when it was annexed to the mighty Mughal Empire, it had eight Sultans on its throne, was the most extensive and powerful of the five Deccan Sultanates, and played an important part in the political and cultural history of medieval India.¹

The purpose of this article is, however, not to discuss the politico-cultural history of this Sultanate, but to analyse the institutions of local administration in its established territory, roughly from the Bhima to the Tungabhadra. Two broad questions have led me to study the subject.

First, the studies hitherto attempted on the medieval Deccan during the Muslim period appear to be mainly confined either to the chronological narration of political events or to the cultural history of the court.² This trend of research may be said to be due to two causes: (1) the source materials so far used have been mostly the court chronicles written

* Although the responsibility for writing this article as well as for its contents is solely mine, I am nevertheless greatly indebted to the guidance and instruction given by Prof. G.H. Khare of Bharati Ithās Sanshodhak Mandal, Poona, and wish to express my most sincere gratitude to him.

Moreover, an American scholar on Japanese literature, at present working in Tokyo, has kindly read through the typewritten draft of this article and improved it linguistically to a great extent. I wish to offer my hearty thanks to him.

¹ For the general political history of this Sultanate, see B.P. Modak: History of Bijapur Kings, Kolhapur, 1886.

by the court literati and similar scholars; and (2) the modern historians of India have been chiefly concerned with the political vicissitudes of the various dynasties. These fields of study are important and should be encouraged. But there is another problem of basic importance regarding the structure of the State in medieval India. That is, when the foreign Muslims settled in the Deccan as conquerors, how and through what institutions did they rule over the indigenous Hindus? This is the first question that has led to my present study. I have chosen the Adilshahi Sultanate because, apart from another reason to be mentioned below, a comparatively large number of contemporary records pertaining to the administrative institutions of this Sultanate are available.

The second broad question may be stated as follows. About the middle of the 17th century, Hindu political power revived in the Deccan. This revival, called the rise of the Marathas, began on the north-west frontier of the Adilshahi Sultanate and developed into a solid kingdom very rapidly. To account for this rapid rise of the Marathas it may be assumed that there must have been a certain institutional background prepared during the Adilshahi period, as well as the often described favourable political circumstances, the awakening of Hindu religious consciousness, and the extraordinary military genius of Shivaji. Accordingly, before we try to re-construct a vivid picture of the rise of the Marathas, is it not necessary to have a preliminary knowledge of the administrative institutions of the Adilshahi Sultanate in general? This has been the second question for my present study.

Now the procedure I have followed in this article is to analyse the relationship of the local administrative staffs with the central power on the one hand and with the people on the other, and more particularly to analyse the administrative functions and the methods of remuneration of the local administrative staffs.

When we approach our subject from that point of view, we have to recognize two basically different categories of administrative staffs in this Sultanate. One is the Hindu indigenous Hereditary Officers, often collectively called “Deshak”, whose prototype can be probably traced to the ancient period before the Muslim conquest. The Hereditary Officers included the Desai (or Deshmukh), the chief of a Pargana (or its minor division) containing roughly 10 to 200 villages; the Deshkulkarni (or Deshpande), the accountant and record-keeper. The main Persian chronicles regarding this dynasty are: (A) M. K. Firishta: Tārīkh-Firishta, Lucknow; English transl. by J. Briggs: History of the Rise of the Mohammedan Power in India, Calcutta, 1910, vol. III, pp. 1—187; and Urdu transl. by M. F. Ali Sahab: Tārīkh-Firishta, vol. III & IV, Hyderabad, 1928 & 1932. This famous work narrates the political history of the dynasty up to 1596 A.D. and hardly gives any information on the administrative institutions. (B) M.I. Zubairi: Basatin-us-Salatin, Bijapur, 1824. This was written 128 years after the fall of the Sultanate, and it is dangerous to rely upon it for institutional informations. B.P. Modak’s History of Bijapur Kings, op. cit., is a Marathi summary of this book. Another Marathi summary by G.H. Khare is included in Bhārat Itiḥās Sanshodhak Mandal’s Shīva Charitra Vritt Sangrah, vol. II, Poona, 1936. (C) M. Zahur: Muḥammad Nama (Kapurthala Library M.S.). Its English summary by B.D. Verma is in Shivaji Nibandhvali, vol. II, Poona, 1930, and Marathi summary by G.H. Khare in Shīva Charitra Vritt Sangrah, op. cit. It gives some information on institutions. (D) Sayyid Nurullah: Tārīkh-Alṭ Adil Shāh II (India Office Library M.S.). G.H. Khare’s Marathi summary is in Shivīa Charitra Vritt Sangrah, op. cit. (E) M. Nusrat: Alīnāma (India Office Library M.S.). G.H. Khare’s Marathi summary is in Shīva Charitra Vritt Sangrah, op. cit.

keeper of a Pargana (or its minor division); the Patil (or Muqaddam), the head of a village; the Kulkarni, the accountant and record-keeper of a village; the Sete, the head of a marketplace; the Mahajan, the accountant and record-keeper of a marketplace; and the Nâikwâdi, the guards of a fortress. In addition, there was often a Chauglâ, the assistant head of a village; and a Chaudhuri, the assistant head of a marketplace.

Another category of the administrative staffs were the “Sultan’s Bureaucrats”, whom we shall call Crown Bureaucrats or simply Bureaucrats in this article. The methods of local administration by means of the Bureaucrats may be classified into two, and these two methods seem to have corresponded roughly to two kinds of administrative divisions of the Sultanate. One method was to mark off the important regions of the territory into centrally administered Crown Districts called Muâmala or Qâlah and appoint a Crown Bureaucrat called the Havaldar (Manager) and his subordinates in each of them. The other method was to assign certain areas to high-class and middle-class Bureaucrats as their “fiefs” (usually called Muqâsâ) and make each of them administer the assigned area. Such fiefs were usually created in the areas called Parganas.

A few words of explanation, however, are necessary regarding the administration of the Parganas, because not all Parganas were assigned to the Bureaucrats. The administration of the Parganas was not carried out uniformly but in at least three different ways. The first way was to assign one or more Parganas to a high-class Bureaucrat as his fief and put it (or them) under his sole management. The second was to divide a part of a Pargana into small fiefs composed of one or more villages each, assign them to middle-class Bureaucrats, and attach the rest of the Pargana to the central Court. In this case the Desai (or the Deshmukh) of the Pargana was made responsible for administering the attached part of the Pargana. The third way was to attach the whole of a Pargana to the central government and put it under the administrative responsibility of the Desai, while a special Bureaucrat was occasionally sent to check his administration. These different methods will be referred to again later. In any case, it should be borne in mind that the administration of Parganas through assignment in fiefs was done by means of the first and second of these three administrative methods.

However, it must be pointed out that not all fiefs were confined to Pargana regions. Even a part of a Crown District (Muâmala or Qâlah) was often separated from the District and assigned to a middle-class Bureaucrat as his fief. Yet the portion of the Muâmala or Qâlah which was assigned in this way seems to have been only a small part of it, and a whole Muâmala or Qâlah was rarely given away as a fief. In short, small fiefs were given not only in Parganas but also in Crown Districts, whereas large fiefs were usually assigned in Pargana regions.

Briefly we may say that local administration by means of Bureaucrats was either carried out by the Havaldar and his subordinates in the Crown Districts or by the fief-holding Bureaucrats in their respective fiefs.

The foregoing preliminary remarks will cause us to divide our analysis into four topics. The first is to ascertain the geographical distribution of such administrative divisions as the Pargana, the Muâmala and the Qâlah, and to discover their respective administrative purposes. The second is to examine the functions and means of remuneration of the ubiquitous Hereditary Officers, especially of the Desais and Deshpândes, who held the highest power and responsibility among the Hereditary Officers. The third is to analyse the functions and
means of remuneration of the Havaldār directly appointed by the Sultan, as well as his relationship with his subordinates on the one hand and with the Hereditary Officers in his District on the other. And the fourth is to classify the kinds of fiefs assigned to the Bureaucrats and to examine the method of their management as well as the extent of "overlordship" of their holders.

2. Materials

The materials for our study are nearly 360 official documents of the 16th and 17th centuries published by Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal of Poona, and these can be classified as follows: (A) About 260 Ādilshahi Farmāns (Royal Decrees) selected and edited by Prof. G.H. Khare.⁵ (B) About 40 Khurdkhat, or orders issued by Havaldārs and Muqāsāls (fief-holders). (C) 5 Misāli or letters issued by middle-class Bureaucrats such as the Thānedār (Chief of Police). (D) About 25 Kaulnama, or assurance-letters issued by the Sultan, Havaldār, Muqāsāl, Thānedār, Desai and so on. (E) About 15 Māhazar, or decisions issued by the justice-assemblies. And (F) About 15 other miscellaneous records. Of these various documents, the Royal Decrees (A) were written in Persian, whereas the others are in the Marāṭhi language.⁶

In addition to the relative paucity of the records, there are certain difficulties caused by their regional and chronological distribution. First, the regional distribution of the records does not cover the whole of the established territory of the Sultanate. The areas left blank in the attached map (see p. 43) do not appear in the available records. Moreover, the density of distribution of the records is very uneven. The regions along the Krishnā River, and those around Bankāpūr, Mudgal, and Sholāpūr have more density than others. Though admitting the possibility that certain institutions may have been highly developed in those areas best represented in the records and that there may have been different institutions in other areas which do not appear in the sources, yet I have had to generalize my observations to a great extent. Second, the chronological distribution of the records is also very limited. No record has been found from the period extending from the establishment of the Sultanate to the middle of the 16th century. Even for the latter half of the 16th century only 17 Farmāns and 7 other records are found in our sources, and the rest of the records are all of the 17th century. This means that we cannot have any exact idea of the institutions in the formative period of the Sultanate, which is quite important for a study like the present one. It must therefore be noted that the institutions to be examined in this article are mainly of the 17th century and that conditions in the formative period can be suggested only occasionally.

Furthermore, very little work has been done so far on the institutional aspect of the Sultanate. Accordingly, this article does not claim to be more than a tentative study.

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⁵ G.H. Khare ed.: Persian Sources of Indian History (Aīthāsīk Fārsī Sāhitya), 5 vols., Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal, Poona, 1934—61. (Abbreviated as PSIH in the subsequent foot notes).

⁶ They are contained in Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal’s Shiva Charitra Sāhitya, 11 vols., Poona, 1926—58. (Abbreviated as SCS in the subsequent foot notes).

⁷ Apart from the general historical books such as those of J. Grant Duff, there is only one special article on this subject to the best of my knowledge. viz. P.M. Joshi: Adilshahi Administration, in Transactions of the All India History Congress, 1940, pp.1—13. Though instructive on some points, it is rather an old article and is not well documented.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF THE SULTANATE

The administrative Divisions of the Sultanate are: the Parganas; the minor divisions often found inside or outside a Pargana; and the Mu‘amala and Qâlah.

1. The Parganas

Pargana is a Persian term meaning “region” or “district”. It was introduced into India by the Muslim rulers and was widely used both in north India and the Deccan, being usually prefixed to the most important town of the region, e.g. Pargana Poona and Pargana Wâl. It is said that this term was introduced into the Deccan during the Tughluq period; viz. the first half of the 14th century. But it is not yet clear how such a division was created. On this matter we may point out several significant facts derived from Adilshahi records. The first fact is the great variety in the size of the Parganas. They varied in area from roughly 50 to 200 villages. This suggests that even if the Tughluq rulers introduced the Pargana divisions for the first time they did so not on a certain new principle (e.g. standard amount of land revenue), but by re-naming the indigenous local divisions which they found already in existence. This hypothesis is supported by two other facts. One is the existence of the divisional term Tappâ, which was commonly used in the Hindi, Marathi, Kanarese, Telugu and Gujarati languages with only a slight difference of meaning. It has been suggested that this term was an indigenous divisional term of the Hindus. Therefore a significant fact for our purposes is that the Adilshahi records show that Tappâ was often used as synonym for Pargana. For example, three Tappâs shown in a Farman are re-named as three Parganas in another Farman issued three days later, and Mr. K.V. Purandare also says that Tappâ was a synonym for Pargana. On the other hand, in the Mâval and Salsette regions where the Muslim influence penetrated in a later period and more slowly than in the other areas of the Deccan, Tappâ was more commonly used than Pargana. Of course it is not clear how old the divisional term Tappâ was. But when a supposedly indigenous term is used as synonym for a foreign one, it is reasonable to assume that the former is older. Thus we may assume that the Muslim conquerors re-named as Parganas the existing divisions called Tappâs, and that in certain localities the older term was not totally replaced by the new one but remained an official divisional term. Of course there are exceptions where the two terms were not used synonymously, in which Pargana was used to designate a wider area than a Tappâ (e.g. Tappâ Musekhore of Pargana Poona). Such a case suggests that several Tappâs were sometimes amalgamated into a Pargana. The second fact to be noted is that each of the Parganas had a Desaiship whose

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12 K.V. Purandare: op. cit., p. 5.
14 Ibid., vol. II, Nos. 34; vol. III, No. 55.
prototype is said to have existed in the pre-Muslim Hindu period, as will be pointed out later on. And Mr. K.V. Purandare says that the size of a Pargana depended on the size of the territory ruled over by a Desai (or a Deshmukh). Accordingly, we may assume that the Muslim conquerors converted the Tappa area controlled by the prototype of the Desai into a Pargana.

On the other hand, there were several Desais in many of the Parganas. Such a case may be explained by postulating that the Desaiship was later on divided among the family members of the original holder or partially transferred to others with the result that several Desais might come into being in a single Pargana. At any rate, although the total number of Parganas that existed in the Sultanate cannot be ascertained, I have found in the records at least 30 Parganas as shown on the attached map (see p. 43).

2. Minor Divisions inside and outside the Pargana

There were often minor divisions which were either included in and attached to a Pargana or were separate units outside of and independent of it. They were called Samt, Qaryāt, or Tarf. These terms are all of Arabic origin and were introduced into the Deccan by the Muslims. Mr. K.V. Purandare observes that Tarf was used in the Poona area, Samt in the Satārā area, and Qaryāt in the Deccan as a whole. There is hardly any doubt that the term Tarf, though found in other regions too, was mainly used in the Poona-Bhor areas as he says. But against his assertion, Samt is found not only in Satārā but also widely in other areas, and Qaryāt was used only in the Mān-Karhād-Kolhāpūr areas.

Now when we focus our attention on the cases where both Samt and Qaryāt were used in the same locality, we may point out two facts. First, in some cases the two terms had no clear difference in meaning but were used alternately. Second, in the Bankāpūr area at least, Qaryāt meant a minor division of the Samt, and in the same locality there was often another division called Hisār between the Samt and Qaryāt.

In any case, these minor divisions were not equal in their size. For example there were 51 villages in a Samt of Qalah Shāhdurg in 1627, whereas at about the same time only 10 villages were contained in the Qaryāt Sāswad to the south-east of Poona.

The irregularity of their size indicates that these minor divisions were also created not on a uniform basis but on the basis of indigenous circumstances. It may be quite right when Mr. K.V. Purandare explains that these minor divisions sprang up from the division of the Desaiship of the Pargana among the Desai’s family-members or its partial transfer to others and that some times the central government cut off a part of a Pargana, thus creating a new minor division, and appointed a new Desai (or a Deshmukh) there as a royal favour. And in fact we find one or several Desais in each of these minor divisions.

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15 K.V. Purandare: op. cit., p. 5.
16 K.V. Purandare: Ibid., p. 5.
20 Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 27.
21 Ibid., vol. V, No. 134.
22 K.V. Purandare; op. cit., p. 5.
23 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
MAP SHOWING THE ĀDILSHĀḤI SULTANATE PROPER ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF THE 17TH CENTURY

EXPLANATION

- Muāmala
  1. Bijāpur
  2. Muḥammadpur
  3. Raichūr
  4. Mudgāl
  5. Torgal
  6. Bankāpur
  7. Goa
  8. Miraj (Murtazābād)
  9. Sandalāpur (Sholāpur)
  10. Bidar
  11. Chaul (Pādshābād)
  12. Kalyān (Murānjan)
  13. Bivandi (Islamābād)

- Qālah
  1. Kopāl
  2. Badāmī (Sikandāryādād)
  3. Panālā
  4. Wasotā
  5. Parāṛī

- Sātārā
  6. Mandan
  8. Chandan
  9. Rohirā (Rāher)
  10. Rājgad
  11. Kondhāna
  12. Shāhdurg (Nāldurg)

- Pargana
  1. Kanakgitī
  2. Gangawati
  3. Gadag
  4. Hubulī
  5. Lakshmeshvar
  6. Mudhol
  7. Kāgal
  8. Kolhāpur
  9. Ranja
  10. Karhād
  11. Khatav
  12. Mān
  13. Phaltan
  14. Medī
  15. Utrauli
  16. Bhor
  17. Bīrwādī
  18. Kudāl
  19. Sirwar
  20. Wāl
  21. Poona
  22. Sūpa
  23. Indāpur
  24. Salsette
  25. Almala (Sindagīt)
  26. Ganjūtī
  27. Aland
  28. Mahidārī (Akalkot)
  29. Donki (Osmanābād)
  30. Pangri (Balst)
When there were several Desais in a minor division this may indicate that the Desaiship was not finally divided so as to result in other smaller divisions, but only shared among the Desai's family-members.

In brief we may conclude here that the various minor divisions inside and outside the Pargana originated with the division and sub-division of the Desaiship thereof. (In this article the term Pargana should be understood as including the minor divisions too.)

3. Mušmala and Qałlah

Both of these terms were Arabic in origin. The former originally meant "engagement" or "agreement," and the latter "fort" or "castle". Although it is not clear when these terms were introduced into the Deccan, the Adilshahi records clearly indicate that they were the terms for specific administrative divisions of the Sultanate which were administered by the Havaldar directly appointed by the Sultan himself. In this article I shall often use the term Crown District to designate both Mušmala and Qałlah.

We may point out two significant facts regarding the Mušmala and Qałlah. (1) Even if these terms were introduced into the Deccan before the Adilshahi period, the Adilshahi Sultans also created new Crown Districts (e.g. Qałlah Sháhadurg about 1560 and Qałlah Satārā in 1540). And (2) although there were small Crown Districts which comprised only 40 villages or so (e.g. Qałlah Satārā), it appears that the Crown District usually covered the area of a comparatively large Pargana, or often much larger than that, because many Districts included two to six minor divisions (Samt and Qaryāt), and Qałlah Sháhadurg covered the area of seven Parganas and one Qaryāt.

What kind of areas, then, were marked off as Crown Districts? The attached map may show that Mušmala were established in the confluent regions of important rivers (e.g. Sandalāpur, Raichūr, Torgal and Bankāpūr), in their valleys (e.g. Mudgal ad Mīra), in the port areas (e.g. Goa and Chaul), and in important traffic centers (Kalyān and Bivandi); they were scattered more along frontiers than in inner territories. In other words, Mušmala were created in such regions as were fertile in agricultural production with good water facilities, important in trade and traffic, or vital to military strategy. Similarly, the map shows that Qałlah Districts were established in the confluent areas of important rivers (Badāmī and Sháhadurg), in their valleys (Kopal, Panāla, Satārā, Manda, and Chandan), or in the strategical regions along the Western Ghats (Wasota, Parārī, Rahar or Rohirā, Rājgad and Kondhāna). In short we may say that both Mušmala and Qałlah Districts were situated in financially and militarily important zones.

In our records Mušmala and Qałlah are not used synonymously but designate separate administrative divisions different from each other. But it is difficult to ascertain the reason for creating two different sets of Districts. In both Mušmala and Qałlah a Havaldar and...
his subordinates were appointed to and undertook various official duties of the same kind, as will be discussed in detail later on. The same Havaldār was often transferred from one District to another.31 And there was a fort or a castle even in a Muūmala.32 Accordingly, there seems to have been no basic difference of administrative functions in the two kinds of Districts. Yet we may dare say that the Muūmala Districts were established more for financial than for military purposes, whereas the reverse was the case with Qālah Districts. Not only the terms themselves suggest such a difference, but we know that, as pointed out above, one of the locations of the Muūmala was the centres of trade and traffic while that of Qālah was strategic points along the Western Ghats and that although a considerable portion of revenue derived in the Qālah Districts was often reserved for maintenance or repairing of the fort,33 the same is not true of the Muūmala Districts.

III. HEREDITARY OFFICERS—ESPECIALLY DESAI (OR DESHMUKH) AND DESHKULKARNĪ (OR DESHPĀNDE)

1. Hereditary Officers in General

Of the terms Desai (or Deshmukh),34 Deshkulkarnī (or Deshpānde), Patil (or Muqaddam), Kulkarnī, Sete, Mahājan, and so on, only Muqaddam is of Arabic origin, the others being all indigenous Hindu terms. This suggests that at least the prototype of these Hereditary Officers had existed before the Muslim invasion. Indeed, the terms Patil, Kulkarnī, Sete and Mahājan have been found on some copper-plates of the 12th and 13th centuries discovered in south-western Mahārāshtra, although their function at that time is not very clear.35 On the other hand, we cannot trace the terms Desai (or Deshmukh) and Deshkulkarnī (or Deshpānde) to the pre-Muslim Hindu period. To the best of my knowledge the earliest documentary evidence of these terms goes back only to 1395, that is five decades after the establishment of Bahmani Sultanate.36 Nevertheless, according to Prof. A.S. Altekar, the prototype of the Deshmukh and Deshpānde also existed in the Rāshtrakūta period of the 8th to the 11th centuries, although different terms were used.37

While the exact functions and methods of remuneration of the prototypes of the Hereditary Officers during the Hindu period, even if they then existed, are not clear, the duties and methods of remuneration of the Hereditary Officers during the Muslim period and during the Ādilshāhī period in particular were clearly conceived as “mīrās” or “wāṭan”,

32 Ibid., vol. V, No. 96.
34 Broadly speaking the hereditary chief of a Pargana or its minor division was called Deshmukh in Mahārāshtra and Desai in Northern Karnātaka. But even in Mahārāshtra Deshmukh was often called alternately Desai. Ibid., vol. I, Nos. 40—50; vol. III, Nos. 4, 7, 9, 15, 16.
and the remuneration alone was usually called “inām” and other miscellaneous rights. The word inām meant something like “perpetual gift”. These three terms are all of Arabic origin. This fact indicates that the Muslim rulers of the Deccan, finding the prototypes of the Hereditary Officers, confirmed them and defined their functions and means of remuneration in terms of Muslim concepts so that they could be utilized as the indigenous local agents of the Muslim ruling power.

The office and remuneration of each Hereditary Officer from Desai to Mahājan during the Adilshahi period were confirmed and assured by the royal favour directly or at least ultimately not only in the Crown Districts but also in the fiefs of the Bureaucrats. Here “ultimately” means that while the fief-holder was entitled to and in fact did increase the remuneration of Hereditary Officers or appoint new ones in vacant posts in his fief, such a Hereditary Officer whose remuneration was thus increased or who was newly appointed by the fief-holder could get new status confirmed and assured by the Sultan only if the fief-holder or the Hereditary Officer was not rebellious against him. Moreover, the Sultan did increase the remuneration of the Hereditary Officer or appoint a new one in a vacant post even in the fiefs of Bureaucrats, and a Hereditary Officer whose established interests were infringed upon by the fief-holder of the place could appeal directly to the Sultan and get them restored and protected. In short, Hereditary Officers were basically the servants not of the Local Bureaucrats but of the Sultan himself.

The office and remuneration of the Hereditary Officers were hereditary nominally as well as actually, for many Farmāns and Kaulnāmas confirmed or re-confirmed them by such words as “after him, to his son and grandson” (bād o ba-aulăd va ahlād-i-o), “eternally” (abadi), “until the last day of the age” (tā yaum-ul-qiyām), and “from generation to generation” (vāfīshparafipareneh). The duties of the Hereditary Officers in general towards the Sultan were to hold to a sort of loyal sentiment variously called “loyalty” (halal-khwārī), “devotion of life” (jāfīshānī), “good wishes for the royal prosperity” (daulāt-khwāhī), and “faithfulness to the salt” (namak-halah), to pay into royal treasury a certain amount of tribute (peshkash, nazara, shernī) and a tax on their inām (inām-pattī) assessed at a much lower rate than the ordinary tax, and to perform the various official duties that will be discussed later in connection with the Desais and Deshkulkarnīs.

As mentioned above, the office including its remuneration was called mirās, which meant originally “inheritance” or “patrimony”. And in fact mirās could be divided, sold or transferred by its holder. But its division, sale or transfer was restricted in two ways: it had to be sanctioned by the Government and confirmed by the local society. These restrictions seem to have produced an important result that the Hereditary Offices were

38 e.g. SCS, vol. I, No. 40.
43 Ibid., vol. I, Nos. 9, 10, 11; vol. II, Nos. 13, 34; vol. III, Nos. 1, 2; vol. V, Nos. 101, 123, 124, 127—
9.
44 SCS, vol. II, No. 218 (division of Deshmukhi); Ibid., vol. III, No. 638; vol. IV, No. 716 (sales of Kulkarnīship); Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 618, 619 (sales of Patelship); Ibid., vol. VIII, No. 70 (for necessity of confirmation by local society).
generally monopolized by a few high castes of Hindus such as Brāhmans, Marāthās, Prabhūs and Lingāyats. A very few of the Hereditary Officers were Muslims and even they were most probably native converts rather than foreigners.  

2. The Desai (Deshmukh) and the Sultan

Now we shall discuss more concretely the basic relationship between the Desais and the Ādilshāhi Sultans.

When the Sultan confirmed or re-confirmed the office and remuneration of a Desai through the “favour and unlimited grace of the Sultan” (marāḥīm-i-pāḍshāhāna va fart-i-avāṭīf-i-ḵauvrāna), the Sultan gave notice of the matter to the local Bureaucrats or fief-holders, other Hereditary Officers, and the ordinary people of the region, and ordered them not to disturb him in performing his office and enjoying his remuneration.

What the Desai was commanded to do by the Sultan for this “royal favour” was: (1) to perform the official tasks to be discussed later on; (2) to remain loyal to the Sultan; (3) to pay the fixed annual tribute to the royal treasury,  

(4) to designate a person who would stand as guarantor for the Desai’s good conduct and loyalty (such a person being called zamān);  

(5) to pay the īnām-pattī either to the royal treasury through the Havaldār of the place or to the fief-holder in case the Pargana was assigned in fief. Moreover, the Desai of a Crown District was ordered by the Sultan to “obey the commands and rule of the Havaldār” (dar zabt va raft-i-Havaldār būdan), and the Desai of a Pargana assigned to a Bureaucrat was also ordered by the Sultan to “obey him (the fief-holder)” (dar mutābaḥāt-i-īshān būdan).

The Sultan ensured the loyalty of the Desai and supervised his services not only by means of the Bureaucrats in the Crown District, or the fief-holders and their agents in the assigned Pargana, but also by means of the Supervisor (here called Mahālḍār) specially sent by the central government in the case of a Pargana temporarily attached to the central Court and put under the administrative responsibility of the local Desai.

When the Sultan discovered through those measures any negligence or irregularity committed by the Desai, he would send him a Farmān, ordering him strictly to perform his duties or to stop the irregularity immediately and threatening him that his office and remuneration would be given to another person if the same thing re-occurred in future.

If the Desai was guilty of disobedience, disturbance or rebellion, the Sultan would either send an army from the central government or mobilize the troops maintained under the Havaldār and the Desais of other Parganas to crush the revolt and to arrest the Desai and send him to the capital. His office and remuneration would then be attached (amānat) to the Government and managed by a Bureaucrat temporarily sent out by the Court.

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46 e.g. PSIH, vol. V, No. 131.
47 Ibid., vol. V, No. 130. It is not clear whether other Hereditary Officers also had to nominate a surety to the Sultan.
48 SCS, vol. VIII, No. 9.
50 Ibid., vol. III, No. 34.
51 SCS, vol. IV, No. 721; vol. VI, No. 21.
53 Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 15, 16, 27.
Although the Sultan seems to have usually accepted a petition by the relatives of the offender later on and restored the office and remuneration to them, it happened at least occasionally that the mirás was permanently confiscated and granted anew to another Hindu who was suited to the royal favour.

In brief, we may say that the Desai, the most important Hereditary Officer of the region, was normally under the strict control of the Sultan.

3. Duties of the Desai

Both in a Crown District and a Pargana area, the duties of a Desai were generally expressed in the phrase, "to cause the soil to be cultivated and the region to prosper" (virāyat-ṛा maāmūr अा abādān sākhṭaṁ). In other words, the Desai was to carry out the defense of the region, maintain security, and administer justice in disputes so as to promote the prosperity of the region and increase the revenue of the Sultanate.

Maintenance of Security

Both in a Crown District and a Pargana area the Desai was responsible for maintaining the security of his region, for which he kept "his own troops" (jamālt-ỉ-khǔḍ) or "his own cavalry and infantry" (sāvārān va aḥshām-ỉ-khǔḍ) at his own expense. Such troops seem to have consisted of from a few dozen to several hundred soldiers. Though it is not clear whether the normal number of soldiers that the Desai was expected to keep or was allowed to keep was fixed by the Government, it is certain that he could increase the soldiery when necessary, and that the Government took it for granted that he would maintain his own troops.

The Desai was expected to suppress disturbances and settle disputes in his area even without receiving a specific order from the Court. Otherwise the Court, being informed about the matter, would censure the Desai for his negligence and command him to settle the matter immediately. For example, a Desai might be ordered by the Government to control the turbulent Patils and other Desais, to root out intruders in the fiefs, or even to subdue turbulence, deviation and rebellion committed by the fief-holders or local Bureaucrats, who were normally superior to him in the official hierarchy. A few words may be added to explain this point. The Desai's "obeisance" to the Havaldār or the fief-holder that has been referred to did not mean the former's total personal subordination to the latter. The Desai's first duty was, as mentioned above, to maintain his loyalty to the Sultan. As a part of this duty he was ordered by the Sultan to obey his local Bureaucrats, either Havaldār or fief-holder, so long as they were also faithful to their master. Accordingly, when the local Bureaucrats deviated from the principle of loyalty, it was a duty of the Desai

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54 Ibid., vol. III, No. 27.
58 PSIH, vol. II, No. 22.
59 Ibid., vol. II, No. 22; vol. III, Nos. 11, 48.
61 Ibid., vol. II, No. 25.
to the Sultan to subdue the rebellions.

Two further remarks may be added concerning the Desai's responsibilities for security. First, he was not authorized to give capital punishment to a criminal without an order from the central government.63 Second, the Desai and other minor Hereditary Officers were not only authorized but were compelled by the Government to bring back persons who had run away (parāgandā) from their home country.64 Even when people ran away owing to unbearable demands or oppression, the Desai had to bring them back to their villages and make them settle down and carry on the cultivation of the soil, even though it was also necessary for him to give them an assurance (qual) and consolation (dildārī) that such hardships would never occur in future.65

Military Duties

The Desais had to perform defensive and offensive activities along with their troops. When the military action was against a foreign power, it appears to have been usual for the Desais of Crown Districts to mobilize themselves under the command of the Havaldār, although it sometimes happened that they would receive a special order from the central government to come to the capital with their troops or to join a General sent out by the Sultan.66

Desais of Parganas assigned in fiefs seem to have followed the command of the fief-holder,67 while those of the Parganas attached to the Court were ordered to come to the capital or to fight under a General sent from the Court.68

In either case many Desais did participate in fighting against foreign enemies, and those who distinguished themselves in the war would have their inām increased69 or would receive a "royal robe of honour" (khilāt-i-fakhīr or Khirāt-i-shāhī) from the Sultan.70 One Desai seems to have fought so well against the Mughal invasion that he was granted the title of minister (vazīr) with 500 cavalry, and a fief (here called jāgūr) from the Sultan.71

Judicial Functions

The Desai's responsibilities concerning criminal offenses committed in his territory have been discussed before. Here we shall focus our attention on his civil judiciary functions; i.e., his adjudication of disputes over the property and rights connected with hereditary offices.

The parties to a dispute might put their case before the local Bureaucrats, the fief-holder, the Desai of the place,72 or directly before the central Court.73 When the central

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63 See footnotes Nos. 59 to 62.
64 PSIH, vol. V, No. 58.
71 Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 87, 88.
72 Ibid., vol. I, No. 8.
73 Ibid., vol. III, No. 48.
Court received the appeal, it would usually refer the case back to the local Havâldâr, the fief-holder, or the Desai of the place and order him to solve it "upon the evidence of the neighbours" (baitifâq-i-khalq-i-javâr) of the disputants. This phrase shows that the Desais as well as the local Bureaucrats or the fief-holders were not authorized to decide cases on their arbitrary judgement. To give justice "upon the evidence of the neighbours" meant to hold an assembly (Majâlis) composed of the disputants, the Desai and other Hereditary Officers, artisans, servants and farmers of the disputant's village or region, as well as several local Bureaucrats; to get evidence from each person separately who was considered to be well versed in the affair; to decide the case upon the evidence thus submitted; and to issue the document of decision (Mahazar) to the parties concerned in the name of the Majâlis. When the Majâlis could not settle the matter, it would refer the case to a "Divine Ordeal" (divya) between the parties. Since Dr. V.T. Gune has published a work on the judicial system of medieval Maharâshtra, we need not go into its details. We shall add only a few words on this topic. First, the local assembly of justice was not, as is often claimed, a romantic meeting for the self-control of the people's community without the participation of the State. It was participated in by the Desai and other Hereditary Officers along with several Bureaucrats of the region, both of whom represented the State power in their respective capacities vis-a-vis the people. Second, what is to be noted here, however, is not that the State power participated in the assembly but that the de jure authority of giving a decision in a case was not held by any individual, whether Havâldâr, fief-holder or Desai, but was held by the assembly itself, which included a number of ordinary people as its members, and that a decision which did not get the confirmation of the local society was considered invalid. In short, the judicial functions of the Desais as well as the Bureaucrats were confined normally to summoning the assembly, presiding over it, and confirming the decision made by it. Third, similar judicial system can be traced in ancient India. The Muslim dynasties seem to have confirmed and continued the same system. Whatever may have been their intention in maintaining it, there is no doubt that this system put a strong restriction on the Desai's power over his inâm village or the fief-holder's authority over his fief on the one hand, and played an important part in enforcing the local social will on the people and preserving the traditional socio-economic order among them on the other.

Revenue Collection

The Desai's duties and functions concerning security, military affairs, and judicial administration were basically the same both in a Crown District and in a Pargana area. But there seems to have been an important difference in his duties concerning revenue collection between the two kinds of administrative divisions. We shall discuss first the collection and management of revenue in the Pargana areas.

74 Ibid., vol. III, No. 48.
75 e.g. SCS, vol. II, Nos. 218, 341; vol. III, Nos. 577, 580, 637, 638; vol. IV, Nos. 699, 721; vol. VII, Nos. 7, 60; vol. VIII, No. 70.
76 Ibid., vol. VII, No. 1.
77 V.T. Gune: Judicial System of the Marathas, Poona, 1953.
78 Vide SCS vol. VIII, No. 70.
79 In this connection refer to Daniel Thorner: Feudalism in India, in Feudalism in History, ed. by R. Coulborn, Princeton Univ. Press, 1956, p. 147.
80 Radha Kumud Mookerji: Local Government in Ancient India, Delhi, 1958, chapt. V.
(A) As has been mentioned before, there were three ways of administering the Parganas: the first was to assign the whole of a Pargana to a Bureaucrat as his fief and leave it in his charge; the second, to assign part of a Pargana to middle-class Bureaucrats as their fiefs, attach the rest to the central government and put it in charge of the Desai of the Pargana; the third, to attach the whole of a Pargana to the central government, and put its administration under the Desai’s responsibility while sending a Supervisor (called Mahālādār) to check his administration. The method of revenue collection and the Desai’s role in it in the fiefs of Bureaucrats in regard to the first two types of administrative arrangements mentioned above will be discussed later when we bring our attention to the system of fief-management. Here we shall examine the Desai’s role in revenue collection in the Pargana (or its parts) temporarily attached to the central government.

In such a Pargana, the Desai held both the right and responsibility to collect the revenue and send it to the capital. A Farmān dated January 20, 1612 specifically forbids the Havālādār of Muḥāmala Torgal to meddle in the revenue collection of the neighbouring Pargana Gadag and states that the revenue of the Pargana will be collected by its Desai and sent by him to the capital.81 There are other Farmāns sent to various Parganas to the effect that the Desai should collect the revenue from the villages and send it to the Royal Presence (Ḥuṣūr) or the Royal Court (Dargāḥ).82 Of course it was not always the Ḥuṣūr or Dargāḥ to which the Desai was to send the revenue. Occasionally he was ordered to send it to some other places specified by the Court.83

Only a brief sketch will be attempted here of the procedure of revenue collection. The Desai and the Deshkulkarnī “assessed” (sanchnī) the revenue of each village in collaboration with its Patil and Kulkarnī and reported the assessed amount to the Court, which in turn examined the reported amount, determined the sum to be actually collected (jamābandī) and informed the Desai. The Desai was to collect the sum thus fixed from each village through its Patil and send it to the Court.84

Two more points will be added to the story of the Desai’s collection of revenue from the Pargana. (1) It was also the Desai’s responsibility to procure certain goods and materials specially required from the Pargana for the sake of military and other governmental activities,85 to procure the “forced labour” (bīgār) for building, military, and other government works, or to collect money in place of forced labour, employ the workers, pay them their wages, and send them to the place specified by the Government.86 (2) There were some Desais, too, who were given the revenue due from certain villages so as to supply the Government constantly with a fixed number of foot-soldiers (viz. recruitment-farming).87

(B) While it was the Desai who was responsible to collect the revenue in the attached Pargana and send it to the Government, in the Crown District the Havālādār held this right and responsibility. One Farmān clearly states that the Havālādār of a Muḥāmala sent the

82 Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 56, 65, 71.
83 Ibid., vol. III, No. 73.
84 SCS, vol. VIII, No. 8.
86 Ibid., vol. III, No. 55.
87 Ibid., vol. III, No. 81.
revenue collectors (Taḥṣildār) from his office to collect the revenue from villages. In other words, the Desai in a Crown District was deprived of the important function of direct collection of revenue.

However, it should not be imagined that the Desai had nothing to do with revenue collection in a Crown District. For example, the Havaldār and Clerks (Kārkunān) of Qālah Shāhdurg were ordered by the Sultan “not to perform the works necessary for security, the distribution (of revenue burdens among the villages), other works, justice, and so on without his (the Desai’s) agreement... (and) to understand properly his honour and customary rule.” And when the Patils in Muḥmala Sandalāpur pointed out to the Havaldār the unequal rates of revenue between the regions of the Muḥmala and requested him to equalize them, the Havaldār answered them, “Since we have obtained the agreement of Deshmukh (Deshmukhähā Katbā) to collect the revenue at these rates, we have already reported the matter to the Ḥuzūr. As we are not allowed to collect revenue (at a changed rate) without the permission (of the Ḥuzūr), we shall report your case to the Ḥuzūr and try to meet your wishes after we receive a reply (from the Ḥuzūr).” In brief, the Desai in a Crown District had neither the right nor the responsibility directly to collect the revenue and send it to the court. Nevertheless, it was necessary to get his agreement in distributing revenue-burdens or deciding revenue-rates.

4. Remuneration of the Desai

As remuneration for the performance of the duties discussed above, the Desai was authorized by the Sultan to enjoy perpetually a certain inām and other rights. A Desai’s remuneration usually consisted of the possession of several villages (inām gāon) as well as some lands (inām zamīn) in other villages of his region, and the right to receive some amount of money or materials from each of the ordinary villages thereof. But since the remuneration was granted and confirmed essentially by the “royal favour”, there was no fixed formula for its size applicable to all the Desais. Rather, the size of a Desai’s remuneration differed from one case to another according to various factors such as the distinguished services of the Desai’s family to the Sultanate, the financial and military situation of the Sultan, and, indeed, the generosity of an individual Sultan. Therefore we shall present only an example of a Desai’s remuneration that may be considered typical, and then discuss several important points about it.

Deshmukh Kanhoji Jedhe (alternately called Desai) of Tarf Bhor in Qālah Rōhirā was granted an inām in 1608—09 by the Nizāmshāhī dynasty which then ruled over this area. The inām consisted of two villages in the Tarf with all the items of revenue (kulbāb) and all kinds of customary dues (kulqānūn) of the two villages as well as the small dues (haqqlavāzima) and sāhāne sārī (?) from each of the villages of the Tarf. This inām was re-confirmed by the same dynasty in 1628.

This area was annexed to Ādilshāhī Sultanate in 1636. After some time, Deshmukh Kanhoji Jedhe appears to have rendered great service to Ādilshāhī Sultan against the Mughals. At any rate, Muhammad Ādilshāh granted him in 1637 another village in the

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89 Ibid., vol. V, No. 129.
90 sCS, vol. XI, No. 96, p. 66.
91 Ibid., vol. II, Nos. 203, 205.
Tarf as inām with "all the items of revenue (kulbāb) and all kinds of customary dues (kulvajūhat)." And again, in 1638 the Sultan upon the recommendation of the Havaldār of the Qalāh gave him as additional inām (isabat gāon) another village that had been enjoyed (bhogavatāh) by the Jeddhes for a long period of time. And two years later, in 1640, the Sultan issued a Fārmān to the Havaldār, Clerks (Kārkunān), Deshmukhs and Officers (Adhikāriyān) of Qalāh Rohirā, which states as follows:

"Kanoji Desmuk of Tarf Bhor of the above Qalāh petitioned to the Court: 'Village Anborah with its market-place (bāzār) and Village Karī since the time of Malik Ambar (Prime Minister of the Nizāmshahl Sultanate), and Village Chikalgāon and Village Nātanbī of the above Tarf through the favour (of the Adilshahi dynasty): the above four villages have been continued as my inām along with all items of revenue (kulbāb), all kinds of dues (kulvajūhat), miscellaneous customary dues (sāyar kānnāt), various emoluments (lavāzīmāt), and collection of items and shares (jamā-i-bābā va pattīhā) according to the Nizāmshahi Fārmān and the Fārmān (of the present dynasty). Besides these, small dues (haqq lavāzīmā), dues in cloth (patti pachori), and sāne sāri (?) (from each village of the Tarf) have also been continued (as mine). At present, however, the local Police Station (Thānah) denies the Fārmāns and creates disturbances. It demands money which the above villages have not paid hitherto. Please grant 'royal consideration to the matter.' What is the reason that the Thānah denies the Fārmāns, and creates disturbances and troubles on account of the money which the above villages have never paid before, while the above villages and other emoluments are to be enjoyed (by him) according to the Nizāmshahi Fārmān and the auspicious and holy Fārmān (of the present dynasty)? Therefore as soon as this Fārmān reaches there, acknowledge the above four villages with the market-place along with all items of revenue, all kinds of dues, miscellaneous customary dues, various emoluments and collection of items and shares, as well as the small dues, dues in cloth and sāne sāri (?) (from each village of the Tarf), as confirmed for the inām of the above Desmuk according to the Nizāmshahi Fārmān and the auspicious and holy Fārmān (of the present dynasty), and restore them to him."

Moreover it is ordered that the purchase-tax (zakāt patti), well-irrigation-tax (zakāt hundah), tax on the additional cultivation of wasteland (chikālvetah), coconut-tax (belekatti), shoe-tax (pāiposhi), feasting tax (mezbānī), nausel bel (?), consumption-tax (? kharhpatti), war-tax (jangpatti), the presents (peshkashi), taqaddama vajh ek māh āhudehār (?), mango-tax (anbaral), menial service of Mahār (pārevār), bedstead supplied by carpenter (palang sūtār), timber (sār), fines (gunhe), business-tax (muhtarfa), forced labour (bet va bīgār), tribute (farmāish), other dues in kind (ghairah mahāsul), betel-leaves (patakeni), and other dues (bāze bābāhā) which are levied at present or will accrue in future from the above villages shall be given to him.

"Do not disturb him hereafter. Do not raise objections in any way. Let his son and

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93 Ibid., vol. I, No. 44.
94 Ibid., vol. I, No. 45. Also see SCS, vol. II, No. 213.
95 Though the exact meaning of this term is not clear, Prof. G.H. Khare, the editor of the source-book, tentatively interprets that the chikal was a share of produce paid by a farmer who planted paddy on a wasteland of the village and the vetah was an additional tax on a part of the field in compensation to another part of the field lowly assessed.
grandson carry it on after him. Whosoever raises objections about the matter shall be considered a criminal against the Court. Do not demand the renewed Farmān every year. Make a copy of this Farmān and send the original to him. Carry out the order of this holy Farmān”.

One more story may be added to the foregoing. Two and a half months after the Farmān translated above, the same Deshmukh was given six tankhā (a unit of land-measurement) of black soil in another village as “perpetual inām” (inām-i-abādi) with “all items of revenue payable therefrom that are registered in the Government ledger at present or will be created in future” such as dues in kind (maḥsūl), dues in cash (naqdiyat), small dues (jamiā-i-lavāzimāt), forced labour (bet va bigār), tribute (farmaish) consumption-tax (? kharçpatti), sel bel (?), well-irrigation-tax (zakāt-i-hundl), tax on additional cultivation of the wasteland (chikāl vetah), tahapatti (?), coconut-tax (belekati), war-tax (jang-patti), the presents (peshkāsh), shoe-tax (pālposhi), feasting tax (mezbāni), and other miscellaneous items of cash and grains (sāyār abvāb-i-naqdl va jinnas).96

On the basis of the example given above, we may summarize the important aspects of a Desai’s remuneration as follows:

(1) The remuneration granted or confirmed by the previous dynasty was normally continued by the Ādilshāhi dynasty.

(2) The Sultans often granted a special favour to those Desais who had particularly distinguished themselves in service, and increased their remuneration.

(3) There was a surprising variety of taxes and dues levied in this Sultanate. Though the same kinds of taxes and dues were not always levied throughout the Sultanate, yet more or less similar kinds were exacted in other regions as well.

(4) What is particularly noteworthy here is not the variety of taxes itself, but the fact that neither the exact amount (or quantity) to be levied on each item nor the total amount (or quantity) due to the remuneration as a whole is shown in any way. This means that the remuneration was not fixed in amount or in quantity.97 In other words, the Desai was empowered to levy on his own discretion the dues and taxes on the items authorized by the Government. Of course this discretion given the Desai must have been normally restricted by the traditional customs and usages of the region, the violation of which would cause discontent and even absconding among the people. Yet even if the people ran away, the Desai was entitled to call them back to their villages, though he was also censured by the Government for his oppression and had to issue the assurance (qaul) and consolation (dildāri) to the people as mentioned before.

(5) What the Desai was granted by the Sultan was not only the right to appropriate the dues and taxes to himself but also a kind of overlordship of the inām villages and inām lands. For example, the Patil and Kulkarnī of one Deshmukh’s inām village were specifically ordered by the Sultan “to serve the Deshmukhship” (Deshmukhichī nafrāi karnē),98 and the Patil, Kulkarnī and people (rayānī) of another Deshmukh’s inām village were commanded by the Government “to obey his command and continue to respect him from one generation

96 PSIH, vol. I, No. 46.
97 To the best of my knowledge there is found only one instance where the cash dues given to the Deshmukh and Deshpande in addition to the inām villages were fixed in amount by the Court. Ibid., vol. III, No. 4.
to another. Thus we may conclude that the Patil, Kulkarni and people of a Desai's inām village were the servants and subjects not only of the Sultan but also of the Desai himself. Because of this overlordship, the Desai could increase the inām land and other perquisites of the Patil and Kulkarni of his inām village at his own discretion and such an increase could also be permitted and confirmed by the Government.

Nevertheless, the Desai's overlordship was restricted by local customs and judicial institutions. Namely, the Desai could not normally infringe upon the established offices and emoluments of the Officers such as Patil and Kulkarni in his inām village, for the offices and their perquisites had been, as mentioned before, assured by the Sultan's authority and confirmed as such by the local society. Not only the established office and perquisites, but also new emoluments added by the Desai himself, perhaps at the cost of a part of his own income, to the established ones could not be revoked by him once they were recognized both by the Government and by the local society. Even if the Desai tried to revoke such emoluments, the village Officer who enjoyed the new perquisites given him by the Desai could appeal to the nearby local Bureaucrats to summon a local assembly and re-confirm his rights.

5. Deshkulkarni (or Deshpande)

The Deshkulkarni was, in collaboration with the Desai, expected to participate in collecting revenue and sitting in the judicial assembly, and to write and keep various records. As literacy was an essential qualification for the Deshkulkarni'ship, the office was generally occupied by Brähmans.

While the Desai's function in revenue-collection differed between a Crown District and a Pargana area, the Deshkulkarni's role seems to have been practically the same in both kinds of areas. For example, the Havaldar of a Muāmala was ordered by the Sultan "to perform the assessment (sanchin), demand (talab), collection (taḥṣil), recording (maḥāzar), deduction (mafrūgh) and other tasks in regard to revenue with the agreement of his (the Deshkulkarni's) (ba-itifaq-i-o)......(and) not to perform administration (āmal) without his acknowledgement (be waqīf-i-o)." Both in a Pargana attached to the Court and in one assigned as fief the Deshkulkarni along with the Desai assessed and collected revenue from each village. It was also the Deshkulkarni who usually wrote the documents in the local assembly.

In return for performing these tasks, the Deshkulkarni was given a remuneration in the region by the Sultan which was usually half the size of, but quite independent from that of the Desai. As the Deshkulkarni's authority and power over his inām villages and inām lands appear to have been similar to those of the Desai, we need not go into detail about them.

99 Ibid., vol. VI, No. 23.
100 Ibid., vol. III, No. 577; vol. VII, No. 60.
102 Ibid., vol. VII, No. 60.
103 Ibid., vol. III, No. 577; vol. VII, No. 60.
104 PSIH, vol. III, No. 68.
105 SCS, vol. VIII, No. 9.
106 Ibid., vol. I, No. 45; vol. VIII, No. 63.
Only two points may be stressed. (1) The Deshulkarni's office and remuneration were not attached or subordinated to those of the Desai, but separately confirmed and assured by the Sultan so that the Desai was not allowed to infringe upon them. The Desai and the Deshulkarni, as Hereditary Officers distinct from each other, were commanded by the Sultan to co-operate and devote themselves to the service of the Sultanate. (2) Though the prototype of the Deshulkarni might be traced in the ancient period, it seems to have been during the Muslim period that his office and remuneration were established and organized as basically separate and independent from those of the Desai. If this was the case, we may presume that by separating the office of Deshulkarni from that of Desai and conferring upon the former a remuneration half as big as that of the latter, the Muslim dynasties utilized the Deshulkarni as a check against the administrative activities of the Desai.

Thus we may conclude as follows:

Though the case might be more or less the same with an indigenous dynasty, it was more inevitable for the alien dynasties to depend greatly upon the most influential social strata among the indigenous people for the daily administration over the local people who, moreover, had a different religion, and different customs and traditions from the new comers. It was the Hereditary Officers, and more particularly the Desais and Deshulkarnis that were recognized as representing the indigenous people, and utilized as such so as to make the Hindus administer the Hindus.

IV. DUTIES AND REMUNERATIONS OF THE HAVÄLDÄR OF CROWN DISTRICTS

While one pillar of the local administration was the indigenous Hereditary Officers, another pillar was the Crown Bureaucrats. We may, however, skip over the often decribed four groups of the latter: Foreign Muslims (Pardeshi), Native Converts (Deccanl), African Muslims (Habsi or Siddi), and the Hindu Bureaucrats. In this section we shall focus our attention upon the functions and rewards of the Havaldar of Crown Districts (Muâmalâ and Qâlah).

As has been pointed out before, there was a Havaldar in each Muâmalâ and Qâlah appointed personally by the Sultan. When the office was temporarily vacant or the Havaldar was absent, a Deputy (Nâib-i-Ghaibat) was appointed perhaps by the Sultan. Occasionally there was appointed a Sar-havaldar (a superior to the Havaldar). But this seems to have been rather exceptional and his functions were in any case similar to those of the Havaldar, so that we may ignore the Sar-havaldar in this article.

Below the Havaldar there were Army-Commanders (Sar-i-grohan) and Clerks (Karkunan) as well as the Hereditary Guards of the Fortress (Nâtkwâdiyân). In addition, the Sultan also appointed a Chief of the City Police (Kotwâl) in the capital of Bijâpûr as well as

110 For Nâtkwâdi see Ibid., vol. IV, Nos. 742—46 for instance.
perhaps in other capital cities of Crown Districts, and in the important towns there was a Police-Station (Thānah) the chief of which (Thānedār) was also probably appointed by the Sultan.\footnote{SCS, vol. I, No. 22; vol. II, Nos. 12, 357, 358; vol. III, Nos. 10, 74; vol. V, Nos. 74, 77, 136.} The most important of these Bureaucrats was the Havaldār.

As the Havaldār, his Deputy, and the Sar-havaldār occasionally appointed over the Havaldār were charged with the highest responsibility in the administration of a Crown District, most of them were naturally Muslims. For example, out of forty-one Havaldārs whose names appear in our Farmāns, only seven were Hindus, the remaining thirty-four being Muslim. Nine Deputies and seven Sar-havaldārs appearing in the Farmāns were all Muslims.

1. The Havaldār and the Sultan

We shall point out some aspects of the basic relationship between the Sultan and the Havaldār.

It appears to have been usual for the Sultan to get the agreement (qarār) of the Bureaucrat to whom he wanted to grant a favour by appointing him as a Havaldār. When appointed, the Havaldār was given a “royal robe of honour” and had to nominate his surety (zāmān or zāmānīt) as the security for his loyalty.\footnote{PSIH, vol. V, No. 96.}

The fact that the Sultan had to get the nominal agreement of the Bureaucrat for appointment and that some Havaldārs had such titles as “member of the royal assembly” (Majālsā or Majālsī-i-Ḥūzūr)\footnote{Ibid., vol. III, No. 57; vol. V, Nos. 77—80.} or “head of a royal department” (Maḥālārdār-i-Ḥūzūr)\footnote{Ibid., vol. V, Nos. 67—73; 85—87.} shows that the trusted and high-class Bureaucrats were usually appointed to this post.

As the appointment was made by the “royal favour,” however, there was no fixed tenure of office. There was frequent and irregular transfer of personnel at intervals varying from a few months to about three years. For example, in Muḥāma Sandalāpur, a total of fifteen Havaldārs occupied the office from September of 1640 to March of 1662.\footnote{Ibid., vol. V, Nos. 54—94.} It often occurred that a Bureaucrat who had been removed from the Havaldārship was reappointed to the same office after some time. For example, out of the fifteen Havaldārs referred to above, at least three occupied the office twice at different times during the above period. One Bureaucrat who had served as the Havaldār would be later appointed the Sar-havaldār of the same District.\footnote{Ibid., vol. V, Nos. 52, 61.} The reasons for these frequent personnel changes are not clear. Yet it is evident that the office of Havaldār was not hereditary and that frequent transfer restrained the Havaldār from making a special personal connection with a particular District.

It is said that there was the system of “official ranking” (so-called mansab) indicated by the number of troops to be maintained by a Bureaucrat in this Sultanate as in other Muslim kingdoms of India.\footnote{Vide H.G. Rawlinson ed: Source Book of Maratha History, Bombay, 1929, vol. I, P. 98} But our sources do not show the exact number of soldiers maintained by a Havaldār. We may simply suggest that as a Desāi who distinguished himself in the royal service was entitled to keep five hundred cavalrymen as well as hold the title of minister (vażīr),\footnote{PSIH, vol. III, No. 88.} a Havaldār might have kept far fewer soldiers than that. However, that
a Havaldar maintained a certain number of soldiers on his own account does not mean that all the Bureaucrats working under him in the Crown District were also his personal followers supported by himself. As mentioned before, the Army-Commanders (Sari-gurohan), Clerks (Karkunan) and Chief of the Police Station (Thanedar) were appointed separately, and at least the first and the last of the above Bureaucrats were appointed perhaps directly by the Sultan.

2. Duties of the Havaldar

A Farman specifically defines the general duties of the Havaldar as "to exert himself to the utmost in strengthening the fort, and in making the region cultivated and prosperous." Except for the specific emphasis on the security and strengthening of the fort, his general duties were almost the same as those of a Desai discussed before: viz. military affairs, security, administration of justice, and collection of revenue.

Military and Security Duties

There is no need to write in detail about the military and security duties of a Havaldar. We need to mention only three points concerning his responsibilities for security. (A) When individual peasants absconded from their village for some reason or other, it was the responsibility of the Havaldar to have the Hereditary Officers of the place call them back to the village. (B) Also when a mass of villagers ran away from the village because of illegal exactions or oppression by the Hereditary Officers, the local Bureaucrats, or the army, the Havaldar was to control the oppressors and to issue "assurance" (qaul) and "consolation" (dildari) to the villagers to come back and carry on the cultivation of the soil. (C) The Havaldar does not, however, appear to have been authorized to punish the offenders at his option. He was to exercise his punitive power on receiving specific orders from the Court.

Judicial Functions

The Havaldar's judicial function over civil disputes was basically the same as that of the Desai: his function was confined to accepting the appeal from the disputants, summoning an assembly of justice, often sitting in it himself, and confirming and executing the decision made by the assembly. The structure and the significance of such an assembly have already been discussed.

Revenue Collection

The Havaldar was directly responsible to the Sultan for collecting revenue from the
villages\textsuperscript{129} through his Collectors (Taḥṣildār) as well as the annual tribute to the Sultan from the Desai and other Hereditary Officers of his District,\textsuperscript{130} and for sending them to the royal treasury. It was also his duty to procure forced labourers and construction-workers temporarily required by the royal Court.\textsuperscript{131}

It should, however, be noted that the Havaldār was not a so-called institutional tax-farmer, for he was specifically ordered in a Farman "not to exact any addition from the villages (besides the authorized revenue). If you levy even a single additional penny and the villages complain of it to the Court, you must know that you have to compensate for the additional exaction and that the result will not be good. Obey the strict order on this matter and do not collect even a penny."\textsuperscript{132} As mentioned before, the Havaldār was to report the assessed amount of revenue of his District to the royal Court and, after getting its confirmation and sanction, to collect the actual revenue.\textsuperscript{133} This fact combines with the evidence of the above Farman to show that he was not regarded as some functionary like a tax-farmer.

Now we shall point out two important checks against the administrative tasks of the Havaldār. First, we have already discussed that although the Desai and Deshkulkarnī of a Crown District were to obey the commands of the Havaldār on the one hand, the latter also had to get the agreement of the former in the revenue-collection and other administrative tasks. That is, he was checked by the Hereditary Officers in his administration. Second, the royal Court occasionally sent a special Bureaucrat to the District to supervise (nigāh) the general administration of the Havaldār and report the matter to the Court.\textsuperscript{134} By these measures the Sultan tried to put his Havaldārs under complete control.

3. Remuneration of the Havaldār

A Farman, which announced the appointment of a Bureaucrat to the Havaldārship of Muḥāmala Sandalāpur, ordered the Clerks, Army-Commanders, Fort-Guards, Desais and ordinary people (jamāhīr) of the Muḥāmala to obey the command and rule of the new Havaldār and "to acknowledge the monthly salary (mushāhara) and the share of revenue (tankhwāh) for the Havaldārship (Havaldāri) in the same way as they have been continued hitherto."\textsuperscript{135} This Farman suggests that the Havaldār was paid a monthly salary probably from the royal treasury as well as a share of revenue from the District, and that those remunerations were so connected with the office of Havaldārship that the right to receive them was automatically transferred from the predecessor to the successor. No more information about the matter is available in our sources.

Yet a high-class Bureaucrat who was appointed a Havaldār was, besides the salaries mentioned above, favoured with a fief (muqāsā) "on account of his integrity" (dar wajh-i-istiqāmat), that was not always connected with a certain specific office. For example, one year after the appointment to the Havaldārship mentioned above, the same Bureaucrat, who

\textsuperscript{129} PSIH, vol. III, No. 37; vol. V, Nos. 68, 70, 71, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., vol. V, Nos. 54, 134.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., vol. V, Nos. 56, 66.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., vol. V, No. 68.
\textsuperscript{133} SCS, vol. XI, No. 96, P. 66.
\textsuperscript{134} PSIH, vol. V, No. 55.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., vol. V, No. 96.
was still in the office, was granted a village in the same District along with all items of its revenue except tobacco-tax, betel-leaves-tax and existing inams "on account of his integrity." The Sultan might have had conferred upon him not only one but several villages at different times and in different localities which, however, do not appear in our sources. At any rate what is important here is that the high-class Bureaucrat was favoured with a temporary overlordship of certain villages or areas "on account of his integrity."

Thus we may summarize the general position of the Havaldar as follows. (1) The Havaldar was a Bureaucrat of the Sultan whom the latter could appoint or discharge as he pleased. The District was not put under his sole management: the other Bureaucrats working under him were not his personal followers but the Sultan's Bureaucrats. His administration was checked by these middle-class Bureaucrats, by the special supervisor occasionally sent to his District, and by the Hereditary Officers of the District. Moreover his salaries were connected not with his person but with the office itself so that as soon as he was discharged he was no more entitled to them. In these senses we may characterize him as a "Patrimonial Bureaucrat" of the Sultan in Max Weber's terminology. (2) But he was not only a "Patrimonial Bureaucrat." He was also granted an overlordship of certain areas and held a certain number of troops at his own charge. In that sense he had traits of the "Feudal Bureaucrat", too.

This dual character of Bureaucracy was not confined to the Havaldar alone. It was the common characteristics of the high-class as well as many of the middle-class Bureaucrats of the Sultanate. Accordingly we shall now turn our attention to the "feudal" aspect of Bureaucracy and discuss the system of "fiefs" that was prevalent in this Sultanate.

V. FIEFS FOR THE BUREAUCRATS

1. Three Classes of Fiefs

Although small fiefs were often granted in Crown Districts, most of the fiefs and especially the big ones were usually assigned in Pargana areas as pointed out before.

When we closely examine a large number of Farmāns concerned, we can recognize broadly three classes of fiefs. They are what may be called Specified Fiefs, Office Fiefs, and Integrity Fiefs. While no technical term is attached to the first one, the last two are usually called muqāsā in our records, though the last one is also occasionally called jāgīr.137

Specified Fiefs

This class of fiefs was an assignment of a specified share (taqsim, an annual amount ranging from 200 Hons to 600 Hons or Rs. 800 to Rs. 2400) of the revenue from a village to the royal cavalry-men such as sillahdār, lashkārī-āfrād and lashkārī,138 in lieu of their


Ibid., vol. I, No. 38; vol. III, Nos. 69 (see also its footnote), 75.

138 These three kinds of cavalry-men may be defined as follows: Shillahdār, one who equipped himself with horse and arms and supported several followers on his own account; lashkārī-āfrād, one who armed himself with horse and arms on his own account and moved singly without becoming a member of a particular cavalry-regiment; and lashkārī, one who supplied himself with horse and arms and joined a certain cavalry-regiment.
monthly salary (mushâhara). It was given not by a special royal favour but in a more business-like manner so that when its holder did not maintain his horse and weapons, neglected to be present when commanded, absconded or died, the fief was immediately suspended.\footnote{139} And the holder was not entitled to rule over the village but only to receive the specified amount either through his agent (mutâliq) or directly from the Hereditary Officer of the place.

Office-Fiefs

This was an assignment of one or several villages with its (or their) revenue of all items (or with the exception of a few) to middle-class Bureaucrats such as army-commanders (Sari-grohân),\footnote{140} cavalry-captains (Havâldâr-i-afrâd),\footnote{141} infantry-captains (Jamaït-dâr)\footnote{142} and the clerks of various central departments such as Royal Secretariat (Maḥal-i-Shab-Navîs),\footnote{143} Department of Robes (Maḥal-i-Jâmâr-Khâna),\footnote{144} Department of Building (Maḥal-i-Īmârat-i-Ḥūzûr),\footnote{145} Department of Treasury (Maḥal-i-Khâwâs),\footnote{146} Department of Horses (Maḥal-i-Pâigâh),\footnote{147} Department of Furniture (Maḥal-i-Farâsh-Khâna),\footnote{148} and Department of Wagons (Maḥal-i-Vahâlî),\footnote{149} as well as the royal musicians (Tassiyân),\footnote{150} and some cavalry-men such as sillahdâr,\footnote{151} lâshkâr-i-afrâd,\footnote{152} and lâshkârî.\footnote{153} Just as the Specified Fief mentioned above, it was also given not by special royal favour but in a business-like manner and was so connected with certain offices such as those mentioned above that it was immediately stopped in case of negligence, transfer, discharge, or death.

There was, however, a significant difference between a Specified Fief and an Office Fief. While in the former what was assigned was not more than a specified amount of revenue, in the latter one or several villages were assigned along with its (or their) revenue the amount of which was, moreover, not clearly specified. In other words, the Office Fief conferred on the grantee a kind of overlordship of a certain area.

As regards the method of administering the fief, the fief-holder either entrusted its management to the Hereditary Officers of the village\footnote{154} or sent his own agents (mutâliqân) to it.\footnote{155} In any case he himself occasionally visited the fief for supervision.\footnote{156}

\footnote{139} e.g. PSIH, vol. III, Nos. 36, 38, 43, 46, 49, 58, 60–62.
\footnote{140} Ibid., vol. III, No. 40.
\footnote{141} Ibid., vol. III, No. 53.
\footnote{142} Ibid., vol. V, No. 112.
\footnote{143} Ibid., vol. III, No. 63.
\footnote{144} Ibid., vol. V, No. 69.
\footnote{145} Ibid., vol. V, No. 77.
\footnote{146} Ibid., vol. V, No. 108.
\footnote{147} Ibid., vol. III, No. 78.
\footnote{148} Ibid., vol. V, No. 138.
\footnote{149} Ibid., vol. V, No. 138. The clerks of these central departments were often jointly given a village as their fief.
\footnote{150} Ibid., vol. V, No. 95.
\footnote{151} Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 54, 57.
\footnote{152} Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 45, 54, 63.
\footnote{153} Ibid., vol. III, No. 48.
\footnote{154} Ibid., vol. III, No. 78; SCS, vol. V, Nos. 36, 38.
\footnote{156} SCS, vol. IV, No. 716.
Regarding the extent of his overlordship, we may point three aspects. Firstly even when the fief was granted in a Crown District, it was immunized from the daily administration of the Havaldar and his subordinates. Secondly it was at the holder's discretion to what extent and how to collect the revenue. And thirdly the Hereditary Officers of the village were bound to collect the revenue and submit it to the grantee at the risk of mortgaging their offices or paying fines in case of delay.

On the other hand, there were several important restrictions imposed on his overlordship. Firstly he was not authorized to infringe on the established office and rights of the Hereditary Officers of the village. Secondly he could not punish the Hereditary Officers of the village at his discretion. And thirdly, apart from the general control of the Government over the oppression and excesses committed by the fief-holder, there was the resistance of the Hereditary Officers and people of the village involving mass-abscondence against extra-customary exactions and oppression.

Now the third class of fiefs, the Integrity Fief, was the most important of the three in connection with the local administration of the Sultanate so that we must discuss it in a little more detail.

2. Integrity Fiefs

General Remarks

While the two classes of fiefs discussed above were granted in connection with certain offices and not by special royal favour but in a business-like manner, the Integrity Fief as we call it was given by the special royal favour "on account of the integrity" (dar wajh-i-istiqāmat) of the grantee and was not connected with a specific office, for the Farmans do not mention the specific name of the office held by the grantee but only enumerate various "eulogies" for him. However, when we look at the name of grantees, it becomes evident that many of them were high-class Bureaucrats who appear in general historical books of this Sultanate as various ministers, supreme commanders of the royal army (Sari-Khail-Mumālik), divisional commanders of the royal army (Sipāh-i-Salār), regional commanders of the royal army (Sari-sarinaubat), generals (Sardār), Havaldars of Crown Districts and so on.

Though the fiefs of this class were often as small in size as a village with all items of revenue, two villages with all items of revenue, and three villages with all revenue-items except two, yet those assigned to specially high-class Bureaucrats such as those mentioned

159 Ibid., vol. XI, No. 96.
160 Ibid., vol. IV, No. 716.
161 Ibid., vol. IV, No. 716.
162 Ibid., vol. II, No. 323; vol. IX, No. 64.
164 SCS, vol. VI, Nos. 16, 18.
165 Some Desais especially distinguished in service were also given this fief. PSIH, vol. II. Nos. 11, 12; vol. III, No. 6; vol. V, Nos. 51, 106.
166 Ibid., vol. III, No. 75; vol. V, Nos. 41, 72, 86, 89, 90, 98.
168 Ibid., vol. II, Nos. 11, 12.
above were generally big in size: e.g. thirty-two villages of a Samt with all revenue-items except two, a town (Qasbah) and fourteen villages of a Qaryat with all revenue-items, thirty-six villages of a Samt with all revenue-items except two, a Samt or a Qaryat with all revenue items, a Pargana with all revenue-items, several Parganas with all revenue-items, and so forth.

Three more remarks may be added. First, however big the size of it might be, the fief was normally not hereditary. For example, a document shows that Pargana Wāī was assigned as a fief to a total of thirty-two high Bureaucrats from 1489 to 1678. In this case the longest term of holding was twenty-seven years and nine months while the shortest was only three months and the average was six years. However, as the Integrity Fief was not connected with a specific office but was granted by the royal favour, it sometimes tended to continue with the same grantee for a considerably long period and occasionally became perpetual. Second, in accordance with the Muslim dominance among the high-class Bureaucrats as pointed out before in connection with the Havaldārs, most of the grantees of this class of fiefs appear to have been Muslims. For example, out of the thirty-two dignitaries who held Pargana Wāī as their fief as referred to above, thirty were Muslims as against two Hindus. Third, the holders of Integrity Fiefs had to maintain from some hundreds to five or seven thousand mounted men from the income of the fief, and to serve along with their cavalry in central as well as local tasks according to the wishes of the Sultan. There was no clear distinction between civil and military Bureaucrats in this Sultanate as in other Muslim kingdoms of India. The dignified Bureaucrats of the Court as well as the local ones often went to the battle-field in an emergency.

Organization of Fief-Management

(A) Agents (Mutaāliqān)

When a Bureaucrat was granted a fief in a certain area, he sent his agents out to manage it, and such agents were collectively called “mutaāliqān” in Persian Farmāns. The Marāthi records show that the mutaāliqān of the fief-holder (muqāsāt) were organized in a similar way as the Sultan’s Bureaucrats in the Crown District: there was appointed a General Manager (Havaldār) in the Fief-Office (Dīwān) in the chief city of the fief and a Chief of Police Station (Thānahār) in the Police Station (Thāna) established in

Ibid., vol. V, No. 87.

Ibid., vol. III, No. 35.


Ibid., vol. V, No. 119.

SCS, vol. VIII, Nos. 44, 70.
each of the important towns and vallages of the fief. Besides, Clerks (Kārkun) and foot-men (Hasham) were also assigned to the Diwān and every Thānā. The Marāṭhī records also show that the term Clerks (Kārkun), although sometimes it signified even Havāldār and Thānedār, generally included such agents as Office-Superintendent (Nigāvan), Head Clerk (Sardāftar), Captain of Stationed Soldiers (Sarnaubat), Treasurer (Majumudār), Pay-Master (Sabnis), Keeper of the Strongbox (Daftarkhās), Letter-Writer (Chitnis), and Persian Writer (Pārasnis).

Three points must be noted particularly in this connection. First, most of the agent-Havāldārs even of the Muslim fief-holders appear to have been Hindus. For example, out of eighteen agent-Havāldārs appointed in Pargana Wāl during the period from 1636 to 1667, fourteen were Hindus as against four Muslims. Second, the overwhelming majority of Clerks also seem to have been Hindus. So far as several Marāṭhī records show their names, all Clerks are Hindus except for the Office-Superintendent (Nigāvan) and the Captain of Stationed Soldiers (Sarnaubat) being Muslims. Third, at least some of the Hindu Clerks (e.g. Pay-Master and Letter-Writer) held their office as hereditary property (mirās).

The above three points clearly suggest that the big fief-holders, while most of them were Muslims, had to depend upon the administrative ability of the indigenous Hindus and especially the literate Brāhmans for the daily management of their fiefs and that while largely depending on them, they specifically appointed their co-religious Muslims to the posts of Office-Superintendent and Captain of Soldiers.

(B) Agents and Hereditary Officers

When the fief-holder sent his agents to the fief, he informed the Hereditary Officers thereof and ordered them “to obey them (agents) and...to accompany them day and night and perform the tasks”, “to regard what they say as what I say”, or “to join with them and express your good wishes.” Being commanded to obey the agents in these ways, the Desai and other Hereditary Officers in the fief were responsible for having the people cultivate the land and for collecting the revenue from the villages and bringing it to the nearby Thānā, while the Thānedār in his turn was to convey it to the Diwān of the chief city.

Overlordship of the Fief-Holder

(A) The fief-holder was entitled to appoint new Hereditary Officers to the vacant
to increase the existing inām of the Hereditary Officers\(^{197}\) as well as that of the temples and the priests residing in the fief.\(^{198}\) The newly appointed Hereditary Officers and those who got their ināms increased could have the matter confirmed by the Sultan if they so desired.\(^{199}\)

(B) There is no need to write much about the judicial functions of fief-holder and his agents. When they received an appeal from disputants over the hereditary offices and other civil rights in the fief, they would summon an assembly of justice, the composition and procedure of which have been commented upon before, and preside over the meeting.\(^{200}\) The significance of such a judicial system has also been pointed out.

(C) So far as the Persian Farmāns show, the fief-holder and his agents were not authorized to infringe on the established office and remuneration of the Hereditary Officers in the fief.\(^{201}\) If they violated them, the aggrieved Officers could and did appeal directly to the Sultan for restoration and protection of their established rights.\(^{202}\) Nor do they appear to have been entitled to punish the turbulent Hereditary Officers of the place at their own discretion, for a Farmān mentions that when a Desai illegally occupied two villages in a large fief held by a minister, the latter appealed to the Sultan and requested him to punish the offender.\(^{203}\)

(D) Finally, however, it is very important to note that a number of Marāthi records show that not all the large scale fief-holders and their agents abided by the above restrictions imposed by the Court or behaved in accordance with them. As a matter of fact they often tried to infringe upon the “inviolable” offices and ināms of Hereditary Officers as well as those of temples and priests in the fief. For instance, the agents of a new fief-holder used to inspect the mirās and inām of Hereditary Officers as well as those of temples and priests and required them to have them re-confirmed by their master.\(^{204}\) Otherwise, the agents often disturbed and sometimes even temporarily prevented the Hereditary Officers from enjoying their privileges.\(^{205}\) At any rate it was not always enough for those who enjoyed the mirās and inām to show the agents the royal documents that had confirmed them.\(^{206}\) They also had to obtain a confirmation-and assurance-letter (khurdkhat) issued by the new fief-holder.

Usually such an inspection and demand for the renewal of confirmation might not have aimed at more than impressing the authority of the fief-holder and his agents upon the Hereditary Officers and the people of the place. But at least occasionally they actually violated the established office of Hereditary Officers and punished them as they pleased.

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\(^{200}\) e.g. SCS, vol. I, No. 40; vol. IV, No. 699; vol. VII, No. 1; vol. VIII, No. 66.

\(^{201}\) PSIH, vol. III, Nos. 26, 91, 92; vol. V, Nos. 109, 111.


\(^{204}\) SCS, vol. III, Nos. 28, 526, 538, 539, 542, 545, 546, 550; vol. IV, No. 721; vol. VI, No. 60; vol. VII, No. 39; vol. VIII, No. 24.

\(^{205}\) Ibid., vol. III, Nos. 526, 528, 545; vol. VII, No. 39.

For example, a fief-holder involved himself in a dispute over the Desai ship, arbitrarily attached the office and its perquisites, and returned them to the holder after depriving him of Rs. 2400.207 Another instance tells the story that when the Patil and villagers absconded from the village due to a famine, the agent-Havaldar summoned the Patil to the Diwan, commanded him to carry on the cultivation of the soil and pay the revenue from the village, and threatened him “otherwise to deposit the Patilship with the Diwan so that other persons may carry it on, see that the soil is cultivated, and pay the revenue. Or your head shall be cut off by a sword for the revenue of the village.” And in fact he imprisoned the Patil, arbitrarily divided his office into three parts and gave two of them to other people.208

In short, the large fief-holders often had a tendency to ignore the restrictions imposed by the central government and to strengthen the de-centralizing “feudalization” of their overlordship over the fief.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We may summarize and conclude our study as follows:

(1) Not to mention other Hereditary Officers, the Desai was not de jure “overlord” of a Pargana or its minor division but a “royal servant” who was to collect revenue, maintain security and order, and perform other official tasks in his Pargana for the sake of the Sultan or his Bureaucrat holding a fief therein. But on the other hand, he not only maintained his own troops at his own charge and exercised such powers as defence, security, revenue-collection and justice over his Pargana, but also was entitled to a “perpetual overlordship” of certain villages, though the overlordship within them was normally restricted by the traditional judicial system supported by the royal authority.

(2) The Havaldar appointed in a Crown District was a Sultan’s “Patrimonial Bureaucrat” in Max Weber’s terminology, who supervised defence, security, revenue-collection and other official work for the sake of the Sultan and was to be discharged or transferred as the latter pleased. Yet he had an aspect of the “Feudal Bureaucrat” in the sense that he maintained troops on his own account and held a “temporary overlordship” of a certain area.

(3) This dual character was not confined to the Havaldar alone but was applicable generally to middle-class and particularly high-class Bureaucrats of the Sultanate. And when we examine closely the “feudal” aspect of the Bureaucracy, we find that any of the three classes of the fiefs that we have classified was given not in perpetuity but temporarily, and the overlordship contained in the second and third classes of fiefs was normally restricted by the Court concerning the matters of justice and punishment, the established office and perquisites of Hereditary Officers in the fief being, as it were, “inviolable”.

(4) In case of large fiefs held by high-class Bureaucrats, however, the condition of granting them was obscure “integrity”, and the overlordship was also extensive. Therefore as a matter of course there often was activity as well as the possibility on the side of the grantees to deviate from the restrictions imposed on the overlordship and to complete the

208 Ibid., vol. VIII, No. 70. This Patil, however, complained of the injustice to the succeeding fief-holder and got all of his office restored to him by an assembly of justice.
“de-centralized feudailization” of their power, and accordingly the subordination of the Hereditary Officers to the sef-holder also tended to be aggravated.

(5) Moreover, not only the large scale sef-holders but also the hereditary Desais and even the royal Havaldars had a great possibility of transforming themselves into the “overlords” of the entire regions in their charge, once the controlling mechanism of the Sultan over them as well as their sentimental and practical bond with him was weakened.

(6) In short, this Sultanate was a centralized monarchy which, however, widely contained various chances for de-centralization and regional independence. When such a movement took place, it would be carried out through the conflicts, struggles, compromises and alliances between the three parties, viz. the large scale sef-holder and his agents, Desais (or Desmukhs) and other Hereditary Officers, and the Bureaucrats of a Crown District. From the institutional point of view, the rise of Shivaji’s power might be called the most remarkable example of such a movement.

(7) On the other hand, the Adilshahi dynasty, as an alien one, had inevitably to utilize to a large extent the representative social strata of the indigenous Hindus and to depend heavily upon them for carrying on almost all the aspects of daily local administration of the Sultanate. A clear result of this situation was that there were constantly a great number of Hindus who had acquired the techniques of daily administration amidst the Muslim rule about the middle of the 17th century. And there is no doubt that the great rise, the rapid expansion, and the quick consolidation of Shivaji’s power resulting in the establishment of a solid Hindu kingdom was made institutionally possible only by the positive support and active participation of a large number of those Hindus who had trained themselves in the administrative routines under the Muslim rule. Accordingly we may say that the administrative foundation for the rise of the Marathas was already prepared in the Adilshahi Sultanate.

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