

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY TREATY REVISION IN JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES: 1951-1960†

TADASHI ARUGA*

It may be said that U.S.-Japanese relations entered a new phase around each turn of decade in the past thirty years: in 1951, there was the San Francisco Peace Settlement; in 1960, a new bilateral security treaty was concluded, and its ratification caused a political turmoil in Japan; in 1971, there were two "Nixon shocks," and the Okinawa reversion took place in the following year; and then in the 1980s, U.S.-Japanese relations began to have new importance as leading Americans came to recognize great potentiality in the development of the Pacific Basin community.

Seen from the vantage point of the mid-1980s, the San Francisco Peace and the episode of 1960 obviously belong to another era, during which the U.S. continued to play the role of the powerful, confident and generous protector of the Free World. Great change has taken place since 1960 in both countries, their mutual relations, and the international context of their relations, although the U.S.-Japanese alliance has survived these years of change.

This paper is the part one of a review of Japanese relations with the United States from 1951 to the present. The paper deals with mainly the years from 1951 to the early 1960s, with a main focus on the issue of security treaty revision. Although Japanese relations with the United States since the middle of the 1960s will be dealt with in another paper, the last section of this paper will attempt to place the issue in a historical perspective.

I. *The Making of the San Francisco Peace*

On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied powers, announcing her acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. In accordance with the Declaration, defeated Japan was to be placed under allied occupation and to go through a process of demilitarization and democratization. As the United States had already experienced trouble with the Soviet Union over allied policies concerning the control of the ex-Axis countries in Europe, Washington was determined to place Japan under substantially American control, instead of sharing the control with other powers.¹ The United States was able to claim a decisive voice in Japanese

*Professor (*Kyōju*) of Diplomatic History.

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¹ Harry S. Truman, *The Year of Decisions* [Vol. I of his Memoirs] (1955), p. 412.

affairs because of the preponderance of the American contribution in the Allied war effort in the Pacific War. Ultimately, the United States succeeded in monopolizing all real power for determining the Allied occupation policy in Japan, although it made minor concessions to its allies.

While official Washington had been determined not to give the Soviet Union a substantial voice in the control of Japan by the end of the war, it did not envisage for Japan any positive role in the future of international relations yet. Since the elimination of Japan as a menacing power was the primary interest of the United States, the American government considered it desirable to keep Japan disarmed permanently. A Four-Power (United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union) long-term disarmament treaty for Japan was a favorite idea of Secretary of State James Byrnes. A draft of a disarmament treaty for Japan was prepared by the U.S. State Department in the early months of 1946 and circulated to the other three major allied powers. The preamble of the draft treaty proposed that the Four Powers should take steps jointly to insure permanently the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. When Soviet leaders adopted a lukewarm attitude to the American proposal, the United States withdrew it. The idea of guaranteeing Japanese disarmament by a semi-permanent Allied Control Council, however, continued to be favored by East Asian specialists in the State Department. The earliest drafts of a peace treaty for Japan, which were compiled by the Department of State in the early months of 1947, contained provisions to this effect.²

Since whole Japan was placed under virtually American control, Japan, unlike Germany, was able to remain as a political entity. The Japanese retained a national government, albeit subordinate to the SCAP, and could seek a new national destiny that would be compatible with the policy of the allied powers. It was General Douglas MacArthur who tried to inspire them with a new vision of their nation: a democratic, peaceful Japan with no military forces. He was the spiritual father of Article IX of the new Japanese Constitution.³ Because of this constitution and the new national identity it embodied, those who were opposed to rearmament could claim legitimacy for their position. The Socialists and left-of-the-center intellectuals based their policy of unarmed neutrality on this legitimacy, and conservatives like Shigeru Yoshida cleverly made use of this legitimacy in charting a course for new Japan. Yoshida and his associates were advocates of the policy of military dependence upon the United States, but they resisted Washington's pressure for speedy rearmament.

A major reorientation of American policy toward Japan took place in 1947. Concluding that the two basic purposes of the initial occupation policy, that is, the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, had been achieved, General MacArthur publicly advocated in March 1947 an early peace settlement with Japan. In response to his proposal, the State Department began to compile the first draft of a peace treaty. As it has been mentioned, the draft still reflected America's primary interest in Japan at the end of the war: the elimination of Japan as a power. The impact of the cold war was not felt by the authors of the draft

² Takeshi Igarashi, "MacArthur's Proposal for an Early Peace with Japan and the Redirection of Occupation Policy toward Japan," *Japanese Journal of American Studies*, I (1981), p. 65.

³ Ikuhiko Hata, *Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi* [History of Japan's Postwar Rearmament] (Tokyo, Bungei shunju-sha, 1976) concludes that Article IX was a joint work of MacArthur and Japanese Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara. He argues that the article was a product of their political calculation, not of their idealism. He considers the article intended to neutralize the possible criticism among the Allied countries against the preservation of the status of the emperor. It is a very interesting interpretation. Nevertheless, it is true that MacArthur tried to inspire the Japanese with the vision of a peaceful nation.

yet. In July 1947, the United States proposed to the ten member states of the Far Eastern Commission that a conference be held on August 19, 1947, to discuss a peace treaty for Japan, and that delegates be representatives of states which were members of the Commission. The American government suggested that decisions at the conference be made by a simple two-thirds majority. This proposal was objected to by the Soviet and Chinese governments. Throughout 1947, a deadlock over procedural questions thus prevented the progress of a Japanese peace settlement. George F. Kennan and his associates in the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department strongly advised Secretary of State George Marshall to take advantage of Soviet and Chinese objections to suspend negotiations for a Japanese peace settlement. They considered the proposal for a peace settlement untimely and the draft treaty too severe toward Japan to be in the interest of the United States. Marshall accepted their advice and decided to suspend Washington's attempts for a Japanese peace settlement and to reconsider it later in the light of the new international situation. In 1948, official Washington adopted a policy of helping Japan in making speedy economic recovery and achieving political stability before the end of the occupation.⁴

Although change in American policy toward Japan was mainly the result of change in U.S.-Soviet relations, they were also at least partly due to the deterioration of the Nationalists' position in China. If postwar China, unified under a progressive leadership, had been able to develop her industry to some degree and to fulfill her role as America's junior partner in Asia, the United States would not have been in such a hurry to rebuild the economy of Japan. Moreover, if a unified Chinese government had existed under non-communist hegemony, such a government would have certainly been opposed to such a rebuilding of Japan. The American government would not have been able to disregard such opposition. With the deterioration of the Chinese situation, the importance of Japan in America's Asia policy was enhanced.

With the emergence of the People's Republic in China in 1949, the influence of the United States retreated to the periphery of the Asian Continent: the Philippines, the Ryukyus, Japan and the Aleutians. This was the line marked by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech he delivered to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, as the "defensive perimeter" in the Pacific area. Japan was placed in the center of the perimeter. Secretary Acheson said: "The defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security." Acheson stated emphatically that the United States had no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defense of Japan, and that regardless of the type of arrangements made, whether permanent or otherwise, "that defense must and shall be maintained." Thus he underwrote the importance of Japan as an asset in the American global position. As for the Ryukyu Islands, he stated that the United States would offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations at an appropriate time. "But," he added, "they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held."⁵

Obviously, the fall of China into the communist orbit had increased the importance of

⁴ Igarashi's article cited in note 2 is an excellent study on the theme which the title indicates.

⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (Jan. 23, 1950), pp. 111-17.

Japan and Okinawa to American defense positions. This fact was dramatically demonstrated by the visit of General Omar Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other members of the Joint Chiefs to Japan toward the end of January, 1950. When it became desirable from the military point of view for the United States to maintain military bases in Japan, it also became desirable from a political point of view to make Japan a full-fledged partner of America in the Far East by restoring its sovereignty. It was reported that Acheson told Senators in a secret session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States should reconstruct Japan as a bulwark against communism in Asia and encourage democratized Japan to spread its influence in the Far East. Since the fall of 1949, the State Department had favored an early Japanese peace treaty. It was when Acheson and British Foreign Minister Bevin had a series of conferences in September, 1949, that Acheson indicated there was agreement on the urgent need for a Japanese peace treaty. There was, however, considerable reluctance on the part of the Defense Department in going ahead with the treaty at that time. Reflecting the view of the Joint Chiefs, the Defense Department was afraid of the uncertainties involved in dealing with a once more sovereign Japan, no matter how friendly she was to the United States. Because of the Pentagon's reluctance, Washington could not move toward a Japanese peace settlement. It was here that an energetic coordinator of America's Japan policy appeared on the scene.

In April 1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed a Consultant in the State Department, with an understanding that his chief task would be to help the Secretary of State in Far Eastern affairs, including the Japanese peace settlement. Dulles was an influential Republican, and a close friend of Thomas Dewey and Arthur Vandenberg. Having served as the foreign policy advisor to Dewey during the previous Presidential campaign, he was generally regarded as a foremost spokesman of the Republican Party on foreign affairs. His appointment to this advisory post in the State Department was an attempt on the part of the administration to put its Far Eastern policy on a bi-partisan basis. Soon after he entered the State Department, he accepted the task of handling the Japanese peace settlement, and left Washington in June, accompanied by John Allison, Director of the State Department's Office of North-east Asia Affairs, for a fact-finding trip to Japan and Korea. About the same time, Defense Secretary Johnson and General Bradley started on an extensive tour of the Pacific area. By that time, preparatory talks on the Japanese peace settlement had made much progress. It was obvious that these two missions were concerned mainly with studying problems related to a Japanese peace settlement. Both groups spent considerable time talking with General MacArthur in Tokyo. Johnson and Bradley apparently were persuaded in these talks of the desirability of an early Japanese peace treaty.⁶ Dulles also talked with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. He suggested Japanese rearmament to the Prime Minister. This was the first occasion in which a responsible American official suggested to the Japanese government the American desire for the rearmament of Japan. Premier Yoshida, however, made a very reserved response to the suggestion, although he desired the post-peace treaty stationing of American military forces.⁷ While Dulles was in Japan, war broke out in Korea.

⁶ The importance of these talks in Tokyo in forming consensus within the U.S. Government on the Japanese peace issue was emphasized by Chihiro Hosoya, "The Road to San Francisco: The Shaping of American Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty," *Japanese Journal of American Studies*, I (1981), pp. 102-05.

It appeared for a while that the Japanese peace settlement would be delayed by the outbreak of the Korean War. But the American government soon concluded that the crisis made an early peace treaty with Japan more necessary than ever. Since speedy Japanese rearmament became exceedingly desirable for the United States, the American government wanted to restore Japanese sovereignty as soon as possible. Thus the Defense Department agreed with the State Department that the United States should endeavor to achieve an early Japanese peace settlement. On September 8, 1950, President Truman, approving a joint memorandum on the Japanese peace settlement submitted to him by the State and Defense Departments, authorized the Department of State to initiate negotiations with other governments on this matter.⁸ He appointed John Foster Dulles his Special Representative with the rank of Ambassador in charge of handling the Japanese peace treaty. The American government subsequently circulated a seven-point memorandum to the other governments in the Far Eastern Commission and asked for comments on it. The memorandum set forth the outline of American policy regarding the Japanese peace treaty.⁹ Point 1, which stipulated that the parties to the Peace would include any or all nations at war with Japan which were willing to make peace on the basis proposed and as might be agreed, clearly indicated that the American government had been determined to restore peace with Japan regardless of the attitude of the Soviet government. The phraseology of Point 3(c), relating to several former Japanese territories, which would certainly displease the Soviet Union, was another indication that the American government did not seek Soviet participation in the peace settlement. Point 3(b) stated that "Japan would agree to U.N. trusteeship with the U.S. as the administering authority of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands," and point 4 stipulated that "the Treaty would contemplate that, pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements such as U.N. assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area." Points 4 and 3(b) reflected American military interests, while Points 2 and 5, the support of Japanese admission into the United Nations and the waiver of claims arising out of war act, together with the conspicuous absence of any reference to limiting Japanese armament or industrial capacity, reflected American political interests. The American government did not want to hold a preliminary peace conference for drawing a draft treaty, because such a procedure would allow the Soviet government to obstruct American peace efforts. Therefore, the United States resorted to the tactics of negotiating individually with the British and other governments on the basis of the seven points, and of drawing up a final treaty text acceptable to most of those countries as well as to the United States. In order to preclude Soviet obstruction, the American government decided to make the Peace Conference not an occasion for discussions and negotiations, but an occasion for the signing of the prepared text by the governments who agreed with its contents.

Since the main purpose of the United States in the peace settlement was to make Japan a reliable ally in the Far East rather than to officially end the state of war, it was necessary for the American government to secure the agreement of the Japanese government with

⁷ Chihiro Hosoya, "Japan's Response to U.S. Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida Talks of January-February 1951," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics*, X (1981), p. 18.

⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter cited as *FRUS*] 1959, VI, pp. 1288-96.

⁹ *FRUS*, 1950, VI, pp. 1296-97.

American policy in the peace settlement. John Foster Dulles therefore visited Japan twice in 1951 to negotiate with Japanese leaders prior to the convening of the Peace Conference. Upon his arrival in Tokyo on January 25, Dulles declared that "we look upon Japan as a party to be consulted, and not as a vanquished nation to be dictated to by victors."¹⁰

When Dulles came to Japan in January of 1951, he had a series of talks with Premier Yoshida and other Japanese leaders. Japanese rearmament and national security were major topics in these talks. Dulles strongly urged the Japanese Premier to proceed to rearm Japan, so that Japan would soon be able to contribute to the common defense of the free nations in the Western Pacific. Yoshida maintained, however, that this was not possible, and argued that Japan ought to achieve economic recovery before attempting to rearm. The Japanese economy as it was would not be able to bear the burden of rearmament. Any hasty attempt in rearmament would play into the hand of the communists by bringing forth social unrest. He also mentioned the provision of the Japanese Constitution which renounced the possession of military forces and pointed out that the sentiment of the Japanese masses did not favor rearmament. He also expressed his fear that Japanese rearmament might encourage the resurgence of militarist elements in Japan and would certainly antagonize her neighbors. Thus he maintained that Japan had to depend on the United States for her security. For this purpose, Yoshida was quite willing to offer Japanese bases for the use of U.S. forces. General MacArthur showed a sympathetic attitude to the arguments of the Prime Minister. However, Dulles was not satisfied with Yoshida's vague promise for gradual rearmament in the future. When he persisted in demanding Yoshida to give him some concrete plan of rearmament, Yoshida handed him "Initial Steps for Rearmament," a hurriedly drawn-up document which promised that Japan would proceed, when the peace became effective, to create national defense forces of 50,000 army and navy personnel and to establish a ministry of national security.¹¹

The Japanese wanted to separate security arrangements from the peace treaty. If the stationing of foreign military forces was prescribed in the peace treaty, as was suggested by the "Seven Points," the Japanese felt it would be detrimental to Japanese honor as an independent state. It may be said, therefore, that the suggestion for a bilateral security treaty between Japan and the United States came originally from the Japanese government. But the final product was quite different from what was proposed by Japan. In the Japanese plan, the security arrangement was explicitly related to the United Nations Charter. According to the Japanese plan: (1) when the United Nations declared the existence of an aggressive action against Japan, the United States would take necessary measures to resist the aggression; (2) Japan would cooperate with the United States by every possible means to resist the aggression; (3) these provisions would not prevent the two countries from invoking the right of self-defense and taking appropriate steps, in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, whenever a military attack was made against Japan.

Dulles agreed to the separation of security arrangement from the peace treaty and

¹⁰ The *Asahi*, Jan. 26, 1951.

¹¹ This document is not released by Japanese Foreign Ministry. But the contents are known because two Tokyo newspapers somehow obtained its copies and published its contents. The *Tokyo*, May 13, 1977; The *Yomiuri*, Sept. 20, 1982. When Hosoya wrote the article cited in note 7, Japanese diplomatic documents relating to the peace settlement were not available for researchers. In September 1982, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened many important documents relating to the peace settlement to the public. But some documents, like this one, are still withheld.

presented his counter-proposal. His proposal did not make clear the relationship of the security treaty to the United Nations Charter. Neither did it mention the American obligation to cooperate with Japan to defend the latter should the latter be attacked. Dulles explained that the United States was bound by the Vandenberg Resolution, a resolution which authorized the United States to enter only "such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." He maintained that Japan could hardly be regarded as able to make continuous and effective efforts at self-help and to contribute to mutual aid. Therefore, he argued, the United States could not commit itself to defend Japan against attack. He emphasized that this was a provisional arrangement, and that it should be replaced by a fullfledged collective defense arrangement when Japan came to possess sufficient self-defense capabilities. The Japanese government proposed the ten-year limit of the treaty. The American government, however, did not accept the proposal. The Americans insisted that such a specification was unnecessary because the treaty was a provisional arrangement. The American view prevailed in subsequent negotiations and determined the basic character of the security treaty. Negotiations were resumed in April when Dulles came to Tokyo again. In July, the American government requested the Japanese government to change the draft of the security treaty to make it explicit that the United States could use its forces in Japan for the general purpose of maintaining international peace and security in the Far East. The Japanese government accepted this request.¹² The American commitment to the defense of Japan was further weakened this time. Yoshida's passive attitude toward rearmament, together with Dulles's fear of possible Senate criticism, probably were the causes of these changes.

The American government, together with the British government, invited the concerned countries to attend a peace conference to be convened in San Francisco on September 4. The Peace Treaty was signed on September 8 by the envoys of forty-nine nations. The Soviet Union and several other communist countries sent their delegations to the conference, but when their efforts to revise the treaty failed they refused to sign and quit the conference.

The Peace Treaty was basically an American document. Its main features reflected the nature of the American interest in Japan. The Treaty imposed no restrictions on Japanese armament, industry or international trade. In this stage, the Treaty was a generous one. But the generosity was primarily the reflection of the American interest in Japan as a stabilizing power in the Far East. The provision of the Treaty in regard to the Okinawa (Ryukyu) and Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands reflected the strategic interest of the United States in these islands. It did not bind the United States to propose to the United Nations that those islands be placed under its trusteeship. The United States was given an option. This meant that America might return the islands to Japan; but it also meant that the United States could keep the islands under its military control indefinitely.

On the same day the Peace Treaty was signed, a Security Treaty was also signed between the United States and Japan. The preamble to the Treaty stated that Japan, in view of its disarmed condition and the unstable Far Eastern situation, desired as a provisional arrangement that the United States should maintain armed forces in and about Japan, which the United States was willing to do, in the expectation, however, that Japan "will itself increas-

¹² Kumao Nishimura, *Anzen hoshō joyakuron* [The Security Treaty of 1951] (Tokyo, Jijitsushin, 1960), pp. 22-25; see also his *Sanfuranshisuko heiwa joyaku* [The San Francisco Peace Treaty] (Tokyo, Hara shobo, 1971).

ingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression. . . .”

In Japan the Peace Treaty met a mixed reception. Although its terms were generally regarded as rather generous for a defeated nation, the hostility of the Soviet Union and Communist China, two powerful neighbors of Japan, toward the San Francisco peace settlement caused profound anxiety for many Japanese. If a major war were to take place, such people feared that Japan, which had American military bases on her territory, would be in the forefront of a devastating war. Although the conservative parties welcomed the Peace Treaty and accepted the Security Treaty, a strong minority opinion was opposed to having the Peace Treaty tied to the Security Treaty. The Security Treaty was not welcomed wholeheartedly, even by many conservatives. The socialists were opposed to the Security Treaty more strongly than the Peace Treaty. However, both treaties were approved by substantial majority in the Japanese Diet by the middle of November, 1951.¹³

Dulles had an understanding with British Foreign Minister Morrison dating from June, 1951, that the U.S. would not invite either Chinese government, Communist or Nationalist, to the San Francisco Peace Conference, leaving it to sovereign Japan to decide which government of China it would conclude a bilateral peace treaty with. This understanding with the British government was disturbing to a number of U.S. Senators who suggested that Japan's free choice might not coincide with American expectations. Confronted with Senatorial pressure, Dulles decided to secure the pledge of the Japanese government to conclude a peace treaty with Nationalist China, not with the Communist regime, although such an attempt would be a betrayal of the spirit of his understanding with Morrison. In December 1951, Dulles again visited Japan for discussions with Premier Yoshida. Dulles suggested that if the Prime Minister addressed a letter to him explaining the attitude of the Japanese government toward China, it would greatly facilitate the ratification of the Treaty in the U.S. Senate. As a matter of fact, Dulles handed Yoshida a draft of the letter and forced the latter to write exactly as the former had drafted. Yoshida sent him the letter on December 24, which was published three weeks later. In this he declared: “My government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the Nationalist Government of China, if that Government so desires, a Treaty which will re-establish normal relations between the two governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of Peace. . . . I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime of China.”¹⁴ The publication of the letter aroused a storm of criticism in Japan. But the letter certainly facilitated the approval of the treaty by the United States Senate. The Senate approved the Treaty of Peace and the Security Treaty with an overwhelming majority on March 20, 1952. By that time, as provided in Article 3

¹³ The impact of the Peace on Japan's domestic politics was dealt with in detail by two very enlightening articles: Akihisa Hara, “Nichi'Bei ampo taisei to sengo no seiji katei: Kokusaiseiji to kokunai seiji no renkan kozo—Anpo kaitei zenshi e no sekkin,” [The Japan-U.S. Security System and Japanese Political Process] *Kokusai shoka daigaku ronso* (Kokusai Shoka University), No. 28 (1983), pp. 2–63; Takeshi Igarashi, “Sengo Nihon 'gaiko taisei' no keisei: Tai-Nichi kowa no teiketsu to seito seiji,” [The Shaping of the Postwar Japanese Stance] *Kokka gakkai zasshi*, Vol. 97, nos. 5–6, 7–8 (1984), pp. 343–409, 453–507.

¹⁴ For the text of the Yoshida letter, see: *FRUS, 1951*, VI, Pt 1, pp. 1466–67. For an incisive analysis of the Yoshida letter episode, see Chihiro Hosoya, “Yoshida shokan to Bei-Ei-Chu no kozo [The Yoshida Letter and Anglo-American Discord over Japan's Relations with China], *Chuo koron*, Nov. 1982 issue, pp. 72–87. The English version of this article was published in *International Affairs*, (Spring 1984). Hosoya's articles cited in this paper were all included in his book, *Sanfuranshisuko kowa e no michi* [The Road to the San Francisco Peace] (Tokyo, Chuo koron-sha, 1984).

of the Security Treaty, an executive agreement had been signed in Tokyo by Minister of State Katsuo Okazaki and by Special Ambassador Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary of Army Earl Johnson. On April 15, President Truman signed the Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. As a majority of the specified principal signatories had deposited their ratification of the Peace Treaty, the Treaty became effective on April 28. The Security Treaty became effective on the same day.

II. *The Background of Security Treaty Revision*

When the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty of 1951 was submitted to the Japanese Diet for approval, it was strongly opposed by the Socialists who represented the neutralist-pacifist segment of the public as well as the reformist Left. While they were split into the right and left wings over the issue of approving the "partial" peace treaty, they were united in opposing the security treaty. Although the conservatives accepted the security treaty, there was among them considerable discontent with its "unilateral" character which seemed to be unbecoming for a sovereign nation.

The security treaty of 1951 gave the United States the right to dispose its military forces in and around Japan without imposing any legal responsibility to defend Japan. The treaty provided merely that these forces "may be utilized to contribute" to the security of Japan. Furthermore, the United States, while assuming no definite responsibility to defend Japan, could use its forces in Japan for purposes not directly related to the defense of Japan. The phrase that its forces "may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" suggested the possibility that Japan could be used by the United States as a base for offensive operations. This unilateral character was the major source of dissatisfaction for conservative nationalists. The treaty contained an article which provided that U.S. forces could be utilized "at the express request of the Japanese government" to put down "large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan."¹⁵ Although many Japanese conservatives were then afraid of indirect aggression by the communist neighbors, they were not comfortable with such a provision which reminded them of the impotence of their nation. Premier Shigeru Yoshida's conservative rivals, expressing conservative nationalism, advocated rearmanent through constitutional revision, reexamination of reforms introduced under the occupation, and diplomatic quest for more independence, which included revisions in the security arrangement with the United States.

Naturally, Yoshida and his supporters in the Liberal Party had no intention to revise the security treaty which he himself had concluded. Instead of following nationalist sentiment to quest for more independence in military and foreign affairs, he wanted to concentrate Japanese energy to economic reconstruction. Although he fulfilled his promise to Dulles

¹⁵ This provision indicates that the American government was much worried about possible large-scale disturbances in Japan at that time. Communist-led guerrilla warfare was going on in Indochina, Malaya and the Philippines. The Japanese Communist Party, too, was shifting its emphasis on underground revolutionary activities. It may be recalled, in this connection, that Dulles warned the Japanese people of the Communist danger in his speech before the United Nations Association of Japan on April 23, 1951. He said: "I cannot in honesty say to you that menace of indirect aggression is illusory. This is a danger that is ever-present and all-pervading." Raymond Dennett and F.D. Burant, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1951* (1953), p. 462.

by legislating a pair of defense-relating laws in 1954, he attempted to keep Japanese rearmament at the slowest possible pace. Only through economic recovery, Japan could regain its international influence in the world dominated by the military super powers. Thus he had no desire to revise the "peace" Constitution; on the contrary, he recognized its political utility for the pursuit of his strategy of slow-pace rearmament.

Yoshida did not see any political merit in provoking pacifist-neutralist opposition by advocating constitutional revision.¹⁶ His policy was realistic, but the public began to be weary of his leadership. There was among them a growing feeling that Yoshida was excessively subservient to Washington. Having been in power since the occupation era, Yoshida could be identified with the era controlled by the United States.

Yoshida and his pragmatic followers had gained their power under the occupation and had brought forth the peace settlement of 1951. On the contrary, his more ideological rivals had been mostly outsiders of the occupation regime. Most of them had been "purged" several years, and some had been put into the Sugamo prison as war criminals or suspects for some time. Naturally, they were more critical of the legacy of the occupation—especially of its earlier phase. Although they had reentered into politics by 1951, they had not played any direct role in shaping the peace settlement. Thus they could take a more critical attitude toward the existing security arrangement. They tended to represent conservative nationalism in their challenge to Yoshida's leadership. Ichiro Hatoyama was their central figure. His illness had delayed his challenge to Yoshida. However, he finally succeeded in reaching the seat of power in December 1954. Yoshida tried to remain in premiership, but was forced to resign both premiership and Liberal Party presidency very grudgingly when his intention to call general elections was strongly opposed by his vice-prime minister. The primary reason for Yoshida's downfall was his long tenure, although a bribery scandal involving his lieutenants much eroded his popularity. The public wanted change in leadership and even the members of his own Liberal Party wanted it.

The new premier emphasized a "spirit of friendship and love" as the spiritual basis of his domestic and international policies. Sensing reduction in international tensions, Hatoyama took a positive attitude toward improving Japan's relations with her communist neighbors, contending that ways should be sought for peaceful coexistence with communist nations. He enjoyed great popularity for a while. As a result of the general elections held in February 1955, Hatoyama's Democratic Party considerably increased its seats in the Lower House at the sacrifice of the Liberals. In spite of increases, however, the governmental party still remained a minority in the Lower House. This lack of majority support for the government, and the prospect of a united socialist challenge, stimulated a movement among the Democrats and the Liberals for merger. In the fall of the year, the two parties merged to form the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). Almost simultaneously, the Left-wing and Right-wing

¹⁶ Although Yoshida never advocated revisions in the Constitution, Kishi said he heard from Yoshida that he had pondered over the feasibility of revising Article IX before the peace became effective. Such a revision, he had thought, might have a better chance while Japan was still under the occupation. But he had lost the chance to try it because of MacArthur's sudden dismissal and his successor's lack of charisma. Hara's article introduces this episode on the basis of his interview with Nobusuke Kishi. Hara, "Nichi-Bei anpo taisei . . .," p. 22. It was quite reasonable for Yoshida to think that, even though Japan should avoid hasty rearmament, it would be better if possible to remove the constitutional obstacle to Japanese rearmament. Nevertheless, Yoshida did not hesitate to use the Constitutional restriction as an excuse to resist U.S. pressure for more speedy rearmament.

Socialist parties united to form the Socialist Party. Thus emerged a situation which Japanese political scientists often call the "system of 1955."¹⁷ It was a two-party system with a conservative majority party and a socialist minority party. A wide gap continued to exist between the two parties in regard to security and defense matters.

Premier Hatoyama favored rearmament and the removal of Article IX from the Constitution, but constitutional revision was impossible since the Socialists occupied more than one-third of the seats of the Lower House. Besides, it was financially difficult for the Japanese government to expand the size of the annual budget to any large degree. Partly motivated by a wish to demonstrate to Washington the scope of its efforts toward rearmament, the Japanese government announced a Six-Year Plan in June 1955 for the development of the self-defense forces. This was in anticipation of the discussion of Japan's defense problems at meetings to be held by Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu with high American officials in Washington.

Shigemitsu, accompanied by Nobusuke Kishi, Secretary-General of the Democratic Party, and by Ichiro Kono, Minister of Agriculture, visited Washington toward the end of August. Shigemitsu and his colleagues hoped to negotiate for concessions by the United States on such matters as revision of the security treaty, return of the Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands and release of all war criminals. Official Washington, however, was in no mood to make favorable responses on these matters. The Japanese mission explained the Six-Year Plan for building up Japan's self-defense forces to the top civil and military officials in Washington. The plan envisaged the creation of a Japanese armed force of 200,000 men, including 183,000 ground troops by 1958. But the American experts appeared to believe that Japan should raise 350,000 men for her own defense by 1962.¹⁸ The Japanese plan failed to induce the Americans to agree to replacing of the present security treaty by a treaty of more mutuality.

When Shigemitsu proposed revision of the security treaty, he met a blunt rejection by Dulles. Shigemitsu explained that the treaty was thought of as unequal and therefore was not popular among the Japanese. Under the treaty, Japan had to provide the United States with military bases but the United States assumed no obligations in return. He desired to revise the treaty to make the United States assume the obligation of defending Japan. Referring to the Vandenberg Resolution, however, Dulles pointed out that the United States could commit itself to defend Japan only in a genuinely collective security arrangement. In a collective security arrangement, he said, Japan would have to assume military obligations beyond its own territories. Then he added that, although he wished very much to see Japan join such an arrangement, he understood that the constitutional provision and the current popular sentiment did not allow the Japanese government to take such a course. To this argument, Shigemitsu could not do anything but yield. Thus the joint communique stated "It was agreed that efforts should be made on a cooperative basis whenever practicable, to establish conditions such that Japan could assume primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland as rapidly as possible and be able to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific. It was agreed that when such conditions were brought about it would be appropriate to replace the present Security Treaty with one

¹⁷ Nihon seiji gakkai, ed., *55-nen taisei no keisei to hokai* [The Emergence and Disintegration of the System of 1955] *Nenpo seijigaku: 1977* (Tokyo, Iwanami, 1979).

¹⁸ *The Asahi*, Sept. 3, 1955.

of greater mutuality.”¹⁹ This joint communique aroused considerable criticism in Japan. The Foreign Minister was criticized for having promised that Japan would assume military obligations in the Western Pacific area in the future. The government explained that “and” in the context of the quoted sentence mean “thus,” and insisted that the sentence meant that Japan could contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific by assuming primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland.²⁰

Spurned by Washington, Hatoyama now turned to Moscow for a diplomatic achievement. As early as September 1954, Moscow had expressed its interest in normalizing relations with Japan. Japanese-Soviet negotiations for normalizing their mutual relations were held intermittently from June 1955 through October 1956. The American government was not pleased with Japan's negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In Japan, former Liberals of the Yoshida school showed a negative attitude to Hatoyama's eagerness. There was also an air of coldness toward the negotiations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister Shigemitsu's attitude, too, was sometimes ambivalent. This diplomatic issue became a subject of serious intra-party and bureaucratic political infighting.²¹ Finally, Hatoyama decided to visit Moscow himself and his visit resulted in normalizing Japan's relations with the Soviet Union by way of a joint declaration. This opened way for Japan to join the United Nations in December 1956. When Hatoyama retired after this diplomatic achievement, Tanzan Ishibashi was elected as his successor in December. Like Hatoyama, Ishibashi advocated improvement of Japan's relations with communist neighbors. Since Japan had opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Ishibashi now hoped to develop economic and political relations with the Peking regime. However, he became ill soon after the start of his administration and resigned in February 1957.²² Premiership was handed over to vice-prime minister Nobusuke Kishi.

Kishi, former bureaucrat who had served as a minister in General Tojo's wartime cabinet, was a statesman of considerable ability. Once held in the Sugamo Prison after World War II, he had made a phenomenal come-back to become an important political figure in postwar Japan. Kishi was a nationalist, but he was acutely aware of the American power. His vision of the rising new Japan was a Japan in firm partnership with the United States. Maintaining this partnership, Japan should play the role of a major power in Asia. It is very significant that Kishi visited South Asian countries in May 1957 for his first overseas trip as prime minister. Furthermore, he made his second trip to Southeast Asia in November 1957, which included a visit to Australia and New Zealand. He envisaged Japan's closer ties with non-communist countries in Southeast and South Asia. In a sense, his vision was a new version of the Greater Asia Coprosperity Area. Big differences were Japan's partnership with the United States and the lack of Japan's military power. His pet idea was a Southeast

¹⁹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*, p. 329.

²⁰ *The Asahi*, Sept. 4, 1955.

²¹ Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley, 1969). Washington's attitude toward Soviet-Japanese negotiations was discussed by James Morley, “The Soviet-Japanese Declaration,” *Political Science Quarterly*, LXII (1956), pp. 370-79.

²² Shigeru Hayashi and Kiyooki Tsuji, eds., *Nihon naikaku shiroku* [A History of the Japanese Cabinets] (6 vols., Tokyo, Daiichihoki, 1981), V, pp. 359-78, especially pp. 373-74. Rei Shiratori, ed., *Nihon no naikaku* [The Japanese Cabinets] (3 vols., Tokyo, Shin-hyoron, 1981), II, pp. 180-85; Eiji Tominomori, *Sengo hoshuto-shi* [A History of the Conservative Parties in Postwar Japan] (Tokyo, Nihon hyoron-sha, 1978), pp. 81-82.

Asian development fund, a device to combine U.S. money with Japanese technology.²³

The itinerary of his Asian trip included Taipei where he had talks with Chiang Kai-shek. Kishi gave importance to Japan's close ties with Nationalist China. Although he favored developing trade relations with the People's Republic, his intimacy with Taipei irritated Peking. The "Chinese National Flag" incident in Nagasaki and the reaction of the Kishi Cabinet which yielded more to Taipei's pressure than to Peking's gave Peking the opportunity to express its displeasure with Kishi. In May 1958 just before general elections in Japan, the Peking regime suspended its trade with Japan entirely, criticizing bitterly the policy of the Kishi cabinet.²⁴ This certainly dismayed Aiichiro Fujiyama who had become Foreign Minister in July 1957. He entertained an earnest hope to develop Japanese relations with Peking.²⁵ The Socialist Party blamed Kishi for this setback in Japanese relations with Peking.

Kishi liked to put U.S.-Japanese relations on a more equal basis. It required revision of the existing security arrangement, since he considered it too unilateral. Remembering, however, Dulles's cold response to Shigemitsu's plea for revision in 1955, Kishi took a cautious attitude to this issue in public statements. Socialist members often requested Kishi to state his policy on the issue in the Diet, arguing that the existing treaty should be "revised or abolished."²⁶ Thus the Socialists seemed to favor some kind of treaty revision, although their ultimate aim was the dissolution of security ties with the U.S. This way the Socialists hoped to represent Japanese nationalism dissatisfied with the unilateral nature of security arrangement. Expecting Washington's unwillingness to treaty revision, the Socialists apparently aimed at embarrassing the Kishi administration by raising the issue of treaty revision. Once Washington indicated its willingness to negotiate for treaty revision, however, they shifted their attitude to outright opposition to it.

Washington showed a much higher regard to Premier Kishi than it had shown to his two predecessors. He seemed to be more pro-American than his two predecessors and more eager than Yoshida in making Japan a positive partner of the United States. He was also

²³ Nobusuke Kishi, *Kishi Nobusuke kaiko roku: Hoshugodo to anpo jaitai* [The Memoirs of Nobusuke Kishi: The Creation of a United Conservative Party and the Security Treaty Revision] (Tokyo, Kosaido, 1983), pp. 319-22.

²⁴ For a general survey of the history of postwar Sino-Japanese relations and relevant documents, see Mantaro Furukawa, *Nicchu sengo kankei-shi* [A History of Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo, Hara Shobo, 1981) and Masaru Ikei, et al., eds., *Sengo shiryō Nicchu kankei* [Documents Relating to Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo, Nihon hyoron-sha, 1970). The diplomatic and internal political process which led to the breakdown of Tokyo-Peking relations is analyzed in detail by Atsushi Kusano, "Dai yonji Nicchu boeki kyotei to Nikka funso" [The Fourth Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement and Tokyo's Frictions with Peking and Taipei], *Kokusai seiji*, No. 66 (1980), pp. 19-35.

²⁵ "When the issue of treaty revision has been dealt with," Fujiyama often confided to his intimates during his tenure as Foreign Minister, "China should come next in our diplomatic agenda." He hoped that, when the Japanese ties with the United States had been reaffirmed by the conclusion of a new security treaty, consensus within the LDP could be secured more easily for his policy of building better relations with the People's Republic. There was considerable difference between Kishi's and Fujiyama's views regarding China policy, which became quite apparent during the 1960s. While Fujiyama was in office, he was preoccupied with the issue of security treaty revision. But he made several attempts to communicate to Peking his interest in better Sino-Japanese relations. For example, he appointed a China expert to a post in Japanese Embassy in Warsaw and let him contact Chinese diplomats there. See Aiichiro Fujiyama, *Seiji waga michi: Fujiyama Aiichiro kaisoroku* [Politics Is My Way: The Memoirs of Aiichiro Fujiyama] (Tokyo, Asahi shinbun-sha, 1976), pp. 172-75. I also received valuable information on Fujiyama's ideas from Professor Mitsuru Yamamoto, my colleague at Hitotsubashi, who had covered the Foreign Ministry as a newspaperman when Fujiyama was in office.

²⁶ The *Asahi*, Feb. 8, April 23, 1957.

relatively young and expected to continue his leadership role for some years. Besides, Japan's international position changed considerably in the time from the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. With the conclusion of an interim agreement with the USSR, Japan enjoyed normal diplomatic relations with all the major governments in the world except China's Peking regime. Japan also had been admitted to the United Nations. Japanese industries had made a remarkable recovery and the Japanese economy was now achieving rapid growth. The Liberal-Democratic government, headed by Premier Kishi, appeared capable of stabilizing the political situation in Japan under conservative control. Japan's military power, too, was growing in spite of the constitutional restriction. Thus, America's hope to have a reliable partner in Asia seemed now being fulfilled. American officials began emphatically to speak of Japan as a major power in Asia. When Premier Kishi visited the United States in June 1957, official Washington welcomed him warmly and gave him wide publicity. Secretary of State Dulles remarked that his visit opened up a new era in the relations of the two nations, an era which would be much more on a basis of cooperation than on a basis of the exercise by the United States of unilateral rights.²⁷ President Eisenhower invited Kishi to play golf with him, a gesture which symbolized the "new era." Dulles showed a more sympathetic attitude to Kishi's suggestion of security treaty revision than he had shown to Shigemitsu's.²⁸

But nothing definite along these lines came out of the conference. The Kishi-Eisenhower joint communique merely affirmed the transitional character of the security treaty of 1951, and stated the decision to set up an intergovernmental committee to study "problems arising in relation to the Security Treaty." This joint committee was organized soon afterward with Japanese Foreign and Defense Ministers, U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Commander in the Pacific Region as its members. Although the terms of agreement allowed the joint committee to discuss treaty revision, the committee limited in practice its function to discussing matters relating to the execution of the existing treaty.²⁹

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to study how the existing security arrangement could be revised. Knowing the difficulty of inducing the United States to assume the treaty obligation to defend Japan unless Japan was prepared to assume a similar obligation for U.S. Pacific possessions, Foreign Ministry officials did not hope revising the treaty itself. They thought of supplementing the treaty with several agreements, which would include American assurance of military cooperation with the Japanese self-defense forces in case of foreign aggression upon Japan and American promise of consultation with the Japanese government before making from Japanese bases combat operations outside Japan. Such supplementary agreements, they considered, would be enough to remove basic Japanese grievances. They felt that that much might be the maximum Japan could hope to achieve.³⁰

²⁷ Richard D. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1977*, p. 245.

²⁸ Kishi's memoirs, pp. 331-36; also see Kishi, Kazuo Yatsugi and Takashi Ito, *Kishi Nobusuke no kaiso* [Nobusuke Kishi Remembers] (Tokyo, Bungei shunju-sha, 1981).

²⁹ Fumihiko Togo, *Nichi-Bei gaiko sanju-nen* [My Thirty Years in U.S.-Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo, Sekai no ugoki-sha, 1982), p. 47.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-59.

III. *U.S.-Japanese Negotiations*

It is Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II who first suggested possibility of a new treaty to Japanese officials. He was probably urging Washington to respond positively to Japanese desire for treaty revision during the summer of 1958. It is certain that the ambassador played the key role in persuading Washington to agree to open negotiations with Tokyo.

In July 1958, Foreign Minister Aiiichiro Fujiyama conferred several times with Ambassador MacArthur on security matters. In their meeting of July 30, MacArthur stated that there were two ways of modifying the existing security arrangement: one was to supplement the present treaty by a series of new agreements on particular issues, and the other was to replace it by a new treaty of greater mutuality. Adding that he understood that the Japanese Constitution prohibited Japan to send armed forces overseas, the ambassador asked Fujiyama whether the Japanese government would prefer a new treaty of mutual assistance type if it was possible to devise such a treaty compatible with the Japanese Constitution. Fujiyama replied that he would like to consult the Prime Minister before answering the question. After Fujiyama's return from the U.N. General Assembly, he and Prime Minister Kishi himself held a meeting with MacArthur on August 25. Kishi expressed his preference of a new treaty, observing that only a new treaty could put U.S.-Japanese relations on a firm and stable basis. It was most likely that MacArthur had known Kishi's preference of a new treaty some time before and been studying the feasibility of concluding a new treaty with great sympathy. When he broached the idea of a new treaty of mutual assistance type compatible with the Japanese Constitution to Fujiyama, the ambassador was certainly confident for some reason that Washington would respond favorably to the proposal of negotiating a new security treaty. Later MacArthur told a Japanese diplomat that, when he had found Dulles hesitant to agree, he had taken the matter to more sympathetic Eisenhower, who had persuaded Dulles to agree.³¹

Early September, Fujiyama left Tokyo for Washington to confer with Dulles. In the meeting held on September 11, Dulles indicated his willingness to explore the possibility of agreeing on a new treaty. The joint communique issued by Dulles and Fujiyama on September 11 announced: "Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that with the reestablished position of Japan in the intervening years, the situation has now evolved to where it would be advantageous to re-examine the present security arrangements. . . . It was agreed that the two governments would consult further on this matter through diplomatic channels following Mr. Fujiyama's return to Tokyo."³²

According to Fujiyama's report in the Diet and his later recollection, he outlined for Dulles the main points of revision desired by the Japanese government as follows: 1) the treaty should be revised in such a way as to conform to the new international status of Japan; 2) the United States should assume the obligation to help defend Japan against attack; 3) Japanese obligations should be limited to those compatible with the Japanese Constitution; 4) Japan should be consulted before the United States changes the disposition and/or equipment of its forces in Japan, or uses bases in Japan for an operational purpose for the peace

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-99; also interview with Michitoshi Takahashi (then Chief of the Treaty Bureau), May 1982.

³² *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958*, pp. 482-83.

and security of the Far East; 5) the treaty should be effective for a limited period.³³ Thus Dulles knew the United States could not expect much from Japan in return for the concessions the U.S. was asked to make. He told Fujiyama that he was willing to negotiate a new treaty which might require the United States to concede much for insufficient gain because he regarded the spirit of friendship much more important than legal privileges and obligations.³⁴

It had been the policy of the United States, as implied in the Shigemitsu-Dulles communique of 1955, to agree to the revision of the treaty after Japan could assume military obligations outside Japanese territory. But the American government now indicated a willingness to begin negotiations for revision of the treaty even without any definite prospect regarding the revision of the Japanese Constitution. The American government probably felt that the constitutional restriction would not prevent the further development of Japanese armed forces. It might also have been that official Washington wanted to support this reputedly pro-American government by complying with its request. The U.S. government might have felt that the United States should make some small concessions if Japan could be converted from a passive to a more active partner in the Far Eastern defense system.

Beginning with the meeting of October 4, in which Kishi himself participated, Fujiyama, MacArthur and their respective aides often met to discuss treaty revision during the fall. Although Kishi and Fujiyama had in mind the general character of the revisions they wanted, they did not possess an articulate view on how the new treaty should be written. Foreign Ministry officials found it difficult to prepare a treaty draft conforming to Japanese constitutional restriction and at the same time meeting the American requirement of mutuality of assistance. Thus the Japanese side welcomed the U.S. side to submit a treaty draft as the basis for discussion. An American draft was handed to the Japanese in the meeting of October 4. The main features of the treaty may be summarized as follows: 1) the treaty is called the "treaty of mutual cooperation and security" and defines mutual cooperation broadly, including political and economic as well as security matters; 2) the parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their capacities to exercise the right of individual and collective defense against armed attack; 3) each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the Pacific area would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes; 4) the existing executive agreement regarding the use of Japanese bases by U.S. forces is to be continued under the new treaty; 5) after ten years, each party may give notice to the other party of its intention to terminate the treaty one year later. The American negotiators also

³³ The most useful collection of documents relating to the security treaty revision of 1960 is *Anpo kaitei no kiroku* [Records on the Problem of Security Treaty Revision] edited by the Research Staff of the Cabinet Office and printed for the use of government officials. It was not sold to the public. Also useful is Kiyooki Tsuji, ed., *Shiryo sengo 20-nen-shi: Seiji* [A Documentary History of Postwar Twenty Years: Politics] (Tokyo, Nihon hyoron-sha, 1966). See *Anpo kaitei no kiroku* [hereafter cited as *Kiroku*], pp. 24-26. Among the earlier studies on the security treaty revision of 1960, I referred to George Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo* (Princeton, 1966), a study of the anti-treaty revision movement; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley, 1962), which discussed in one chapter the domestic aspect of the treaty revision; I.M. Destler, et al., *Managing an Alliance* (Washington, D.C., 1976) which used the security treaty revision as one of the three cases to draw general observations on alliance politics between Japan and the United States.

³⁴ Fujiyama's memoirs, pp. 72-73.

submitted two supplementary documents, one of which provided that prior consultation with the Japanese government is required when the U.S. makes major changes in the deployment into Japan of armed forces or when the United States uses bases in Japan for military combat operations not directly related to the defense of Japan.³⁵ This American proposal showed that the American side had made effort to take into account the Japanese position stated by Fujiyama in his conference with Dulles.

Having studied this draft, the Japanese negotiators proposed several revisions. First, they wanted to delete the term "collective defense" from the text, since they thought that the Japanese constitution prohibits Japan to exercise the right of collective defense. It took some time for them to have the American side understand the point, but finally they persuaded the latter to drop the phrase. Secondly, the Japanese side could not agree to extend the treaty area to the Pacific region. This extension of the treaty area was a key to the mutuality envisaged by the Americans. Once Japan was freed from the constitutional restriction, the treaty would automatically become an alliance of full-fledged mutuality. Of course, the provision did not expect Japan to send its armed forces outside Japan under the existing Constitution, since there was the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." However, such extension of the treaty area was too drastic for Japan. MacArthur soon understood the political unfeasibility for the Japanese government to agree to such an extension, and appeared to begin to persuade Washington on the matter.³⁶ Prime Minister Kishi and other Japanese officials thought of including Okinawa and Ogasawara in the treaty area. Kishi defended the idea in the Diet on October 23. But there was strong public opinion opposing the inclusion of these islands in the treaty area and there was doubt about the constitutionality of such an arrangement. Within the government, the Minister in charge of the Defense Agency took a negative attitude toward the inclusion of these islands. Thus Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated on November 23 that the new treaty would not include these islands in the treaty area, adding that it could therefore be primarily characterized as a kind of base-lease treaty.³⁷

In other respects, the American proposal was largely satisfactory to the Japanese governmental leaders. It is likely that the Japanese negotiators did not insist on writing the "prior consultation" clause into the treaty itself, satisfied with the American proposal to put it into a supplementary document.³⁸ Once the U.S. negotiators took an understanding attitude regarding to the points the Japanese side had objected to, there emerged basic agreement on the nature of the treaty. By the time the Japanese government asked the U.S. side to suspend temporarily the negotiations because of disunity within the LDP in late November 1958, basic agreement had apparently reached between the negotiators with regard to the major points of the treaty. But this disunity prevented the Japanese government from submitting a Japanese draft to the American negotiators. It was Japanese domestic politics, this intra-LDP politics, that delayed the conclusion of negotiations for the new treaty.

³⁵ Togo, *Nichi-Bei gaiko*, pp. 70-73.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-78.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-80; *The Asahi*, Nov. 24, Dec. 1, 3, 16, 1958; *The Mainichi*, Nov. 16, 21, 1958.

³⁸ The Fujiyama Plan stated that a separate provision would be made regarding the requirement of "prior consultation." This may suggest that Fujiyama and Foreign Ministry officials had accepted the American proposal before the suspension of the negotiations in late November 1958.

IV. *Disunity within the LDP*

When Kishi and Fujiyama explained their policy to influential leaders of their own party after the latter's return from the United States in mid-September, those leaders quickly understood the nature of the revisions the Premier and the Foreign Minister had in mind. The revisions they intended were less matters of substance than matters of face and national feeling. If the United States assumed the obligation to defend Japan against attack, then the security arrangement would no longer be a one-sided one. If Japan could have a say regarding certain activities of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, then Japan's national prestige would be honored and the national feeling satisfied. Such revisions as envisaged could be carried out through amendments to the existing treaty. But the governmental leaders wanted a new treaty exactly because the revisions were matters of face and feeling. They wanted to dramatize their achievement by negotiating a brand new treaty, new not so much in substance as in form. Anybody could negotiate such minor revisions with the United States, they must have felt, once the U.S. government expressed its willingness to negotiate. Faction leaders did not want to see Kishi strengthen his hand by getting credit for such an easy task. They were also afraid that Fujiyama, wealthy businessman who had entered politics, might become a powerful leader in the near future, and they did not want to give him an easy diplomatic success. The Liberal Democratic Party was a coalition of several factions, each of which was headed by a factional leader. The Premier's leadership over the party was limited because he was primarily a boss of one faction and had to negotiate with other bosses, those within his coalition as well as those without his coalition.

Aiming at weakening faction leaders who were not in partnership with him, Kishi excluded them from the important party posts and largely excluded members of their factions from his second Cabinet.³⁹ This move was counter-productive for his leadership, since faction leaders outside his coalition tended to avenge his high-handedness by refusing to cooperate in carrying controversial pieces of legislation in the Diet. Their refusal to give their support to force the passage of the police practice bill in December 1958 was the case in point.⁴⁰ Naturally they did not show enthusiasm when Kishi and Fujiyama explained their plan of a new security treaty and the probability of securing such a treaty. They did not want Kishi to remain in power for long. Thus they showed only passive or negative response to the decision of the government to open negotiations with the United States, although the revision of the security arrangement was pledged in the party platform. Some faction leaders, such as Hayato Ikeda and Takeo Miki, voiced the opinion that it was too early for the government to open such negotiations. They said they were afraid that Japan would be obliged to make much greater effort in developing its defense capability.⁴¹

Even Ichiro Kono, an influential boss who was then in partnership with Kishi, caused much trouble for Kishi and Fujiyama by criticizing their plan of a new treaty. Just when

³⁹ Tsuneko Watanabe, *Habatsu* [Factions] (Tokyo, Kobundo, 1958) contains a detailed description of factions within the LDP.

⁴⁰ Hayashi and Tsuji, eds., *Nihon naikaku-shi*, V. pp. 414-15; Shiratori, *Nihon no naikaku*, II, pp. 205-09.

⁴¹ The *Mainichi*, Sept. 18, 28, 1958; the *Asahi*, Sept. 18, 19, 30, Oct. 14, 1958. Later, Ikeda joined the Kishi Cabinet and became a supporter of treaty revision. His initial lukewarmness was related to his mentor Yoshida's misgivings about the wisdom of the treaty revision. Miki, on the other hand, remained critical of Kishi's policy and did not vote for the new treaty in the Lower House.

they decided to drop the idea of including Okinawa and Ogasawara from the treaty area, Kono began to argue strongly for the inclusion of these islands. Kono and his supporters maintained that such an arrangement would strengthen Japan's say in matters concerning these islands. Some members even declared that the Japanese government should get some promise from the United States about the return of these islands to Japan.⁴² This opposition within the LDP embarrassed the governmental leaders because it prevented submission of a Japanese draft for the new treaty to the American negotiators. In addition, a political disturbance was precipitated by the government-sponsored bill to revise police practices in October. The vocal public did not favor this bill, and the Socialists also were strongly opposed to it. Labor, student and other leftish organizations staged mass demonstrations against the passage of the bill. As it was mentioned before, moreover, Kishi could not get the full support of other LDP chieftains in his fight for the bill. The Premier was forced to back down to pull together his support in the LDP toward the end of November.⁴³ Thus, the Japanese government had to ask the United States to suspend temporarily the negotiations for a new treaty. The U.S. government accepted the request, since there was no necessity to hurry. As Ambassador MacArthur remarked in January 1959, the United States was satisfied with the existing treaty.⁴⁴

After Kishi succeeded in consolidating his support in the LDP by reshuffling his cabinet in January 1959, the Foreign Minister submitted the so-called "Fujiyama Plan" to the policy discussion meeting of the party in February. The plan enumerated the provisions to be written in a new treaty. If we compare the Fujiyama Plan with the actual text of the treaty, we find no significant differences between them. This illustrates that the U.S. and Japanese negotiators had reached basic agreement on the major features of the new treaty. This is the reason why Fujiyama said several times in the early months of 1959 that the treaty could be concluded very soon.⁴⁵ Fujiyama recalled later that he had put into the plan the points already agreed and most likely to be agreed.⁴⁶ But the plan was not accepted by the party members. Right-wing groups wanted to keep the internal rebellion clause, while many members wanted to retain inclusion of Okinawa-Ogasawara in the treaty area. Other criticisms were also raised. Many members desired substantial revision of the executive agreement simultaneously with revision of the treaty itself. Kishi and Fujiyama wanted to keep the existing executive agreement as it was or revisions of the agreement at a minimum, leaving negotiations for substantial revisions until after conclusion of the treaty itself. They expected that negotiations for a substantial revision of the executive agreement would take much time, and they were afraid such negotiations would delay conclusion of the treaty if pursued simultaneously.⁴⁷

Finally, after lengthy discussions between governmental leaders and other party leaders, the two documents, "The LDP's Principles on the Treaty Revision" and "The LDP's Principles on the Revision of the Executive Agreement," were drafted and approved by the Party Council. The first document accepted the principles enumerated in the Fujiyama Plan.

⁴² The *Mainichi*, Nov. 3, Dec. 7, 1958.

⁴³ Hayashi and Tsuji, eds., *Nihon naikaku-shi*, V. pp. 422-28.

⁴⁴ The *Mainichi*, Jan. 5, 1959.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, Feb. 5, 8, 22, 1959.

⁴⁶ Fujiyama's memoirs, p. 88.

⁴⁷ The *Asahi*, Feb. 26, 28, Mar. 5-9, 1959; the *Mainichi*, Feb. 1, 5, 6, 9, 1959.

The second document, however, called for substantial revision of the executive agreement.⁴⁸ Although Kishi thus secured the formal support of the party, a number of party members still expressed misgivings on the nature of the projected treaty. For example, Kono insisted even then that the ten-year term of the treaty was too long. Others still revealed their lukewarm attitude occasionally.⁴⁹

Having secured the support of most of the party members for revision of the treaty, Foreign Minister Fujiyama was now able at last to reopen negotiations with Ambassador MacArthur. Negotiations finally were resumed on April 13. In the fifth meeting, held on May 23, agreement was reached on the provisions of the new treaty. Thus Fujiyama was able to outline in detail the provisions of the treaty in a public address on May 25.⁵⁰ The negotiators continued to meet regularly until January 1960. But these meetings were devoted to negotiations for a new executive agreement.⁵¹

The lack of unity among the LDP members encouraged the Socialist Party to organize an anti-treaty revision movement. Throughout 1959, mass demonstrations were held intermittently. But it still seemed unlikely that the treaty issue would bring forth a serious political crisis.

V. *The Rise of the Anti-Treaty Movement*

It would be appropriate now to turn to the rise of the anti-treaty movement. In October 1958, the Socialist Party (JSP) decided to oppose the security treaty revisions which Kishi intended to negotiate, predicting that the projected revisions would make security arrangement with the United States objectionable for pacifist-neutralist principles and more dangerous to Japan's peace.⁵² At that time, the JSP was primarily concerned with blocking the passage of the police practice revisions bill the Kishi Cabinet had suddenly submitted to the Diet. A national organization was organized by the JSP's initiative in cooperation with labor and other progressive organizations for the purpose of encouraging and coordinating mass movements to oppose the bill.

When Kishi had been forced to back down mainly because disunity among the LDP, the JSP wanted to continue this national organization by switching its purpose to conducting mass movement to oppose the security treaty revisions which the Kishi Cabinet was negotiating. However, such more moderate, less politicized labor organizations as *Zenro* and *Shinsanbetsu* did not support the JSP's proposal.⁵³ It was *Sohyo*, or the Japanese General Council of Labor Unions, the largest labor organization, which took in March 1959 the initiative to organize a national organization to conduct mass movement against Kishi's security treaty revisions and Japan's security tie with the United States itself. The JSP, having lost the initiative, decided to join the organization proposed by *Sohyo*, and reluctantly

⁴⁸ *Kiroku*, pp. 8-12.

⁴⁹ The *Asahi*, April 11, 1959; the *Mainichi*, Aug. 3, 1959; For intra-LDP frictions over the issue of treaty revision, see also Kishi's memoirs, pp. 498-99, 508-09, 532-33, 535; *Kishi Nobusuke no kaiso*, pp. 240ff.; Fujiyama's memoirs, pp. 93-98.

⁵⁰ The *Asahi*, May 24, 26, 1959.

⁵¹ *Kiroku*, pp. 62-63.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

agreed to cooperate with the Communists (JCP) in the organization. Since the JCP had considerable influence in peace organizations, it was impossible for the JSP to insist that the JCP should be excluded from the organization. However, the JSP succeeded in denying the JCP a full membership in the top decision-making body of the organization. The JSP also insisted successfully that the organization should be called the National Conference for Joint Struggle against Security Treaty Revisions, limiting its immediate purpose to opposing the treaty revisions the Kishi Cabinet was proposing.⁵⁴ Although it was its ultimate aim to dissolve Japan's security tie with the United States, the JSP was opposed to including this aim in the name of the new national organization. In this way, the Socialists hoped to win the support of more moderate elements of the public.

Although a national organization was thus established to conduct an anti-treaty revision campaign and coordinate mass movements, there was rivalry and infighting between the Socialists and the Communists. As it is known, the two parties were different in strength, organization and ideology. As a parliamentary party, the JSP was by far stronger than the JCP. The JSP was a component of the two-party system created in 1955, although its Diet members were only a little more than half of the LDP's members in the Diet.⁵⁵ Thus it was more appropriate to call the system a "one and half party system," as it was often dubbed. The JCP, on the other hand, had only one member in the Lower House and another in the Upper House. It had not recovered from the setback it had experienced in the days of underground violence. As a mass party, however, the JCP had more organizational strength than the JSP.

Like its conservative rival, the JSP lacked mass membership. It depended on votes by non-party member electorate and organizational and financial help by labor organizations in elections. Since its strength in the Diet was limited, the JSP had to depend on media opinions and mass movements and on their impacts upon factional rivalries within the LDP in blocking legislation which it was opposed to. The JSP's dependence on labor unions explains the reason why the party had to follow *Sohyo's* initiative, once the latter decided to take the initiative in organizing a national organization against security treaty revision. The party's dependence upon mass media and public opinions explains why it wanted to delete the phrase "Abolition of U.S.-Japanese Security System" from the name of the national organization. On the one hand, the Socialists did not want to look overly radical; at the same time they tended to take a tolerant attitude toward radical activist students and workers for they must depend on non-party member activists for mass movement. In short, the Socialists should please the more moderate public and appease radical activities.

The Socialists were encouraged by disunity within the LDP; but they themselves had their own internal disunity. Intraparty frictions between the right-wingers and left-wingers had continued after their merger in 1955. Since left-wingers were strong among the party workers, there had been strong pressure in the party to keep party discipline along the left-wing lines. Suehiro Nishio was the left-wingers' major target in their rightist-bashing campaign. When they tried to discipline Nishio for his rightist deviation in the fall of 1959, Nishio and his followers left the JSP, with the intention of organizing a new moderate socialist party. He wanted to take all of the right-wing elements from the JSP. But the major right-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-86.

⁵⁵ However, the JSP lost 38 seats in the Lower House and 18 in Upper House in the fall of 1959 because of the defection of the Nishio faction.

wing faction led by Jotaro Kawakami decided to remain in the JSP, preferring compromise to defection. The Nishio group first organized the Socialist Club in November 1959 and then launched the Democratic Socialist Party in January 1960. This split of the JSP foretold its gradual decline in the 1960s and 70s, although the new party has not made any remarkable growth, either. The birth of the new moderate socialist party did not benefit much the Kishi Cabinet, since the new party, which now supports the security treaty, was then opposed to the new security treaty. It preferred the old treaty and advocated gradual, step-by-step dissolution of security tie with the U.S.⁵⁶ If the defection of the Nishio group had some impact on the JSP's attitude toward the anti-treaty movement, it tended to drive the JSP to put more energized efforts into the movement, looking for a chance to bring forth Kishi's downfall.

The Communist Party had its own party organization composed of devoted party members. Their number was not enough to elect communists to the Diet. But it was the powerful asset for the party in conducting mass movements. Both the JSP and the JCP were opposed to treaty revision. But the JCP emphasized the purpose of "abolishing" the whole security arrangement with the United States itself, whereas the JSP tried to emphasize opposition to a new treaty, relegating the "dissolution" of the whole security tie with the United States to a task for the future. Behind this tactical difference, there was ideological and strategic difference between them. The Socialists aimed to move Japan toward a neutral position and thus stimulate global trends toward peace and disarmament. They wanted to take an equidistant position toward the two superpowers.⁵⁷ If they had strong sympathy to the Chinese People's Republic, it was primarily because of their sense of war guilt and of their sympathy to the Third World. Their sympathy to the Soviet Union was not pronounced. In March 1959, Inejiro Asanuma visited Peking and declared in his famous speech there that American imperialism was "a common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese peoples." He made this remark in the context of his "imperialist vs. its Asian victims" view, not in the context of the "socialist vs. capitalist" world view.⁵⁸ It was his view that both Japan and China were gaining strength that would enable them to struggle to retrieve their respective irredenta. Asanuma and his Socialist comrades considered that Japan had reached to the stage in which it was able to claim real independence for itself.

They observed that the Kishi government was trying to achieve the status of a more active partner within the anti-communist alliance with the United States and that it would create new international tensions in the Far East. Therefore, their target was the Kishi government, not the United States.⁵⁹ The Communists, on the other hand, took a sympathetic view of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic as peaceful countries. It was the day when the JCP had not yet quarrelled with either of them. Admittedly, they were for a neutral Japan with no military ties with other powers, but they did not stand for equidistance between the two super powers. Unlike the JSP, they held that Japan was still under U.S. control and that negotiations for a new security treaty had been initiated by Washington. Therefore their primary enemy was not the Kishi government but the United States. They wanted to make the mass anti-treaty revision movement anti-American rather than anti-

⁵⁶ *Kiroku*, pp. 313-15.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-83, 223.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-80, 222-223.

Kishi.⁶⁰ Since their enemy was formidable, the movement must be a persistent one. Thus they were opposed to excess in violence, especially excess committed by anti-party radical students. The major student organization, *Zengakuren*, was largely controlled by radicals, the Communist League or alias "Bund," who did not follow the JCP. They regarded themselves as the true vanguard of the masses and several times transformed demonstrations into violent actions. The JCP was openly hostile to student radicals and its members waged incessant infighting with the "Trotzkists" for the leadership of student movement.⁶¹ The "Bund" reciprocated hostility with the JCP, although both the JCP and *Zengakuren* joined the National Conference for Joint Struggle. The JSP did not approve violent actions by student radicals, but took a sympathetic attitude to them, highly evaluating their energy in mass movement and recognizing their value as a counter-balance against JCP's influence in the activist youth.⁶²

VI. *Political Turmoil in Tokyo*

Coordinated by the National Congress, the anti-treaty revision movement gradually rose in 1959. The National Congress sponsored ten mass-meeting-and-demonstration days in the year, succeeding in mobilizing 250,000 people for mass meetings on November 27.⁶³ There was, however, a feeling among the labor union leaders that it was not easy to mobilize many union members for a foreign policy issue.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, it was remarkable that labor unions, especially *Sohyo*-affiliated ones, succeeded in mobilizing many members in this movement. It was due to a considerable extent to Kishi's emphasis on law and order in domestic policy, which seemed to threaten the rights and interests of labor movement.

Meanwhile, negotiations between the two governments continued during the year. Finally in January 1960, complete agreement was reached on the texts of the new security treaty, the revised executive agreement and other related documents. The new treaty was signed in Washington by Premier Kishi and Secretary of State Christian Herter who had succeeded dying Dulles in April 1959.

The new treaty was formally called the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In the new treaty, as in the old one, the United States was granted in Article VI the privilege to use facilities and areas in Japan for its military forces "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." It had been one of the basic aims of the Japanese government in treaty revision to gain a voice regarding the actions and equipment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The United States acknowledged it as follows in a document attached to the treaty:

Major changes in the deployment in Japan of United States armed forces, major

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 224-66.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 291, 293-94.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁶³ *Kiroku*, p. 696. This number is based on an estimate by the Koan chosa shitsu, which may be translated as the Public Safety Research Office.

⁶⁴ Kikuo Nakamura, *et al.*, *Anpo Kaitei hantai undo no bunseki* [A Study of the Anti-Treaty Revision Movement] (1963), p. 101.

changes in their equipment and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than as conducted under Article V of said treaty shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the government of Japan.

But the document did not clarify how far the United States would be obliged to abide by Japanese opinion after such consultation was made. In this treaty, the United States assumed an obligation to help Japan to defend herself when she was attacked. In return, Japan assumed a similar obligation to act against attack on American forces in the Japanese territories in Article V. Japan also assumed an obligation to maintain and develop its capacities to resist armed attack in Article II. Although the treaty area was limited to territories under Japanese administration, it may be said that Japan was committed in some degree to cooperating with American policy in the general area of the Far East, for Article IV provides:

The Parties will consult together . . . at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Thus the new treaty changed Japan from the role of a passive to a more active partner in America's Far Eastern defense system while admitting to Japan several concessions which did not seem to be substantial to many Japanese. Precisely for these reasons, the new treaty was not accepted with enthusiasm by the Japanese public. Many Japanese were afraid that the new treaty obliged Japan to develop large-scale armed forces. And they were dissatisfied with the lack of a provision to restrict the activities of American forces stationed in Japan. The statement in an exchange of letters between Kishi and Herter on "prior consultation" was not satisfactory to them. There was doubt about how much the Japanese could insist on and there was concern that the prior consultation provision would make Japan a mere collaborator of American military policy without really having a negative to American actions. They wanted veto power, not merely consultation rights. They also criticized the ambiguous provision of Articles IV and VI, referred to usually as "the Far East clause." The area meant by the term "the Far East" was not clarified in the treaty. There was no such vagueness in similar provisions of other treaties. This provision probably was inserted as compensation to the United States for limiting the treaty area to the Japanese territory. The public felt that Japan would be more liable under the new treaty than under the old one to be involved in a war which occurred outside Japan. Many Japanese publicists and intellectuals, who were not necessarily leaning to the left, voiced doubt about the wisdom of concluding the treaty. As often has been the case for Japanese newspapers, no newspaper editorials took a clear stand on the new treaty. They simply stated that there were problems to be debated and hoped that the Diet would debate them thoroughly. This attitude tended to give legitimacy to doubts and questions.⁶⁵

By the time the treaty was submitted to the Lower House for deliberation in early February, its critics had raised many doubts and questions. But government spokesmen made no persuasive explanation in the Diet to dispel such doubts and questions. The public became increasingly suspicious of the merit of the new treaty, especially since the Foreign Minister gave conflicting answers to the questions about the geographical area meant by the

⁶⁵ For the text of the new treaty, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960*.

“Far East.” Because the government did not want to provoke bitter attack on the treaty, it was inevitable that its considered definitive answer lacked candor. But the apparent lack of candor caused further criticism. This episode was given wide publicity in the media, and the Socialists succeeded in discrediting the Kishi government in the public eye.⁶⁶ In an opinion survey conducted in January 1960, 29 percent of those polled regarded the new treaty as “good,” against 25 percent who regarded it as “bad.” In another opinion survey, conducted in March, those who regarded the treaty as “bad” increased to 36 percent, while only 21 percent regarded it as “good.”⁶⁷ Meanwhile, the U-2 Incident and the subsequent abortion of the Summit Conference increased anxiety regarding what a close alliance with the United States might bring. These events, together with the high-handed tactics taken by the government to push the treaty through the Diet gave the opportunity to the anti-treaty revision movement to mobilize great masses of the people in protest meetings and demonstrations.

The date for the Paris summit meeting had been set for May 16. It was just before the summit conference that the U-2 Incident took place. As the U-2 flights over Soviet territory were open violations of Soviet sovereignty, the American justification of the flights as “a distasteful but vital necessity” was hardly persuasive. Besides, the shifting position taken by official Washington immediately following the incident acutely revealed the lack of integrity and firm leadership in the U.S. government. The success of the summit meeting was now in a dark shroud. At the preliminary session of the Conference, President Eisenhower declared that the U-2 flights had been suspended and were not to be resumed. But this promise was too little and too late to satisfy Khrushchev. The Conference was adjourned the next day after it had been convened.

The disclosure of the secret mission of U-2 planes caused anxiety among the Japanese. In the previous September, a slender black plane with no identification marks had made an emergency landing in Fujisawa, a city near Yokohama. The United States military police arrived hurriedly at the spot to keep curious Japanese away from the plane. This incident was taken up later by a socialist representative in the Diet. The Japanese government explained that the aircraft was a weather observation plane belonging to the U.S. Air Force.⁶⁸ After the U-2 was shot down in the Soviet Union, it was reported that there were three U-2's stationed in Japan. American authorities announced that the U-2's operating from Japanese bases had been engaged in weather observation only. Prime Minister Kishi stated that as far as he knew, U-2's in Japan had never invaded the territorial air of other countries.⁶⁹ But most Japanese could not be satisfied with such assurances. The Soviet Union warned Japan of possible retaliation against bases for the U-2 planes which were invading the Soviet Union.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ As for discussions on the definition of the Far Eastern area, see the *Asahi*, Feb. 10, April 15, 1960; the *Mainichi*, Feb. 10, 12, 1960; the *Nihon keizai*, April 2, 1960.

⁶⁷ A nationwide opinion survey conducted by the *Asahi* on January 11–12, 1960. (It was published in the *Asahi*, Jan. 18, 1960) asked: “considering everything, do you think this treaty revision is good or bad?” To this question, 29% answered “good”; 25% answered “bad”; 6% gave other answers; 40% gave no answer. Another nationwide survey conducted by the *Mainichi* on March 14–16, 1960, which was published in the *Mainichi*, April 5, 1960, asked: “What do you think of the treaty?” To this question, 21% responded “good”; 36.0% responded “bad”; 15.3% responded “no interest”; 26.5% answered “I don't know.”

⁶⁸ The *Asahi*, Dec. 3, 1959.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, May 10, 1960.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, May 21, 1960.

As Japanese confidence in the honesty of the United States government was shaken, the people suspected that these planes must have been spying over mainland China and Siberia. They were filled with anxiety over the danger accompanying a military alliance with the United States. Their fear was intensified when Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that if a third power attacked an American base in Japan in retaliation for invasion of its territories by a U-2 plane, Japan was obliged to do its duty as prescribed in Article V of the new treaty.⁷¹ An alliance is a device for a state to increase its security in accordance with the logic of balance of power by forming military connection with another state or other states. Any alliance is not risk free by nature. The new U.S.-Japanese security treaty was no exception. In the atmosphere of May 1960, risks involved in the treaty, not its merits, tended to be dramatized. Naturally opposition to the new treaty gained strength.

Confronted with this situation, Prime Minister Kishi and his supporters were irritated. Instead of spending more time in deliberations of the treaty in the Diet, they hastened to get the approval of the Diet. And since the session of the Diet was to end on May 25, the Prime Minister and his party wanted to extend the session and push the treaty through quickly. On May 19, the Lower House Committee for House Management passed a resolution extending the session by fifty days. The opposition parties opposed this decision. They claimed that the decision was void because they had not been given a chance to speak. Speaker Ichiro Kiyose offered a compromise proposal, but this was rejected by the opposition parties. Attempting to prevent the opening of the plenary session, Socialist representatives squatted on the floor in front of the Speaker's room. The Speaker called in policemen and they began to remove the squatting representatives. The Speaker, supported by Liberal-Democratic members, struggled toward the Assembly Hall. It was almost midnight when he finally reached the Hall. Meanwhile, the Special Committee on the New Security Treaty was convened about 10:30 p.m. The Socialist members introduced a resolution of non-confidence in the Chairman. Chairman Saeki Ozawa, however, disregarded the motion and proceeded to recognize a Liberal-Democratic member who raised a point of order. The Liberal-Democratic member produced an urgent motion to terminate the deliberation of the new security treaty, the executive agreement and related bills and to take a vote on them at once. When the chairman took up this motion, the Socialist members rushed at the Speaker's table insisting on the priority of the non-confidence vote motion. While the meeting was in utter confusion, the Liberal-Democratic members shouted "aye" three times and retired from the room with a triumphant hurrah. This was the way in which the new Security Treaty and related bills were approved by the committee.⁷²

It was 11:49 p.m. when Speaker Kiyose announced the opening of the plenary session. Only Liberal-Democratic representatives were present. The Speaker proposed the extension of the Diet Session by fifty days, and this was approved unanimously. The plenary session was then adjourned, and reconvened at 0.05 am. The new security treaty, the revised executive agreement and several internal bills to implement the treaty were laid on the table. After a brief report by the chairman regarding deliberations by the Special Committee, the treaty, the executive agreement and the related bills were put immediately to a vote as a package and without discussion. They were approved unanimously. The opposition

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, May 11, 1960.

⁷² *Ibid.*, May 20, 1960; the *Mainichi* and the *Yomiuri*, May 20, 1960; *Kiroku*, pp. 148-50.

parties denied the validity of the approval and demanded immediate dissolution of the Diet. There were some prominent Liberal-Democrats who were critical of the forcing tactics of Prime Minister Kishi.⁷³ Leading newspapers bitterly criticized the Prime Minister and his Party. The press did not overlook the sit-down tactics taken by the Socialists, but they regarded the tactics of the Liberal-Democrats as a far more unpardonable violation of the spirit and procedures of parliamentary democracy. The vocal public was indignant at the extraordinary way in which the government handled such an important issue. Opposition to the treaty itself was now joined by opposition to the open disregard by the government of the spirit of parliamentary democracy. Various groups and associations, mostly non-political, demanded the resignation of Premier Kishi and the dissolution of the Diet. Anti-government demonstrations were repeated almost every day in Tokyo. Increasing numbers of people were mobilized, and the demonstrations spread into provincial cities. Important labor unions, including the National Railroad Workers Union, made short-hour strikes in protest against the government.⁷⁴

If Premier Kishi had been willing to postpone the voting on the treaty to the next session, he might eventually have secured its approval without bringing on political disaster. If he had called for general elections some time in the spring, he would have succeeded in securing the Diet's approval for the new treaty more easily and without much public criticism. Again, he had committed a tactical mistake.⁷⁵ Now he was afraid that if ratification were delayed his prestige and political power might be damaged. He therefore desired to secure ratification by June 19, the day President Eisenhower was to arrive in Japan. According to the Constitution, a treaty approved by the Lower House is automatically given the approval of the Diet after one month, even if it is pending in the Upper House. This was the reason why the Liberal-Democrats pushed the treaty through the Lower House early in the morning of May 20.

The Prime Minister obviously was thinking of the U.S. President's visit to Japan in connection with his own political fortune. If Kishi failed to invite Eisenhower because of political confusion in Japan, he would lose his political prestige and power. If the President were willing to visit as scheduled, Kishi might succeed in unifying a majority of the public by appealing to them to welcome a national guest. Many Japanese, however, had lost their enthusiasm toward the visit of the American President. Eisenhower was first expected to arrive in Japan after his Soviet tour as a champion of peace. But now he was coming as the U.S. leader in the cold war on a tour of the American defense perimeter in the Far East. Opponents of the Prime Minister were against inviting the President for it was obvious that Kishi was trying to make use of the visit for his own gain.

Even many Japanese very friendly to the United States did not favor the visit of the President at this time. When Presidential Press-Secretary James Hagarty came to arrange details of Eisenhower's schedule in Japan, he was surrounded by leftist demonstrators at Haneda Airport. After this incident, a number of prominent men, who wished to maintain the friendship between the U.S. and Japan, advised the American Embassy in Tokyo that

⁷³ The same as note 72.

⁷⁴ *Kiroku*, pp. 184-223.

⁷⁵ In his memoirs, Kishi tells that he wanted to hold general elections in February 1960, but he was strongly advised against doing it by LDP's Secretary General. He regrets that he thus lost the chance to call general elections to establish the legitimacy of his mandate. Kishi's memoirs, pp. 533-34.

the visit of the President be postponed to a more appropriate time.⁷⁶ But Ambassador MacArthur did not listen to such advice. He considered Kishi the most reliable pro-American leader and feared that his downfall might bring forth a less reliable man into power. Besides, having worked with him and Fujiyama for treaty revision, the ambassador had developed comradeship with them. It was hard for him to betray them at the time of their ordeal by cancelling Eisenhower's visit. Thus he continued to hope that Kishi would be able to control the situation.⁷⁷ In Washington, some doubt had been raised as to the wisdom of the President's visit to Japan. Senator Fulbright, for example, expressed his opinion on June 6 that it might be wise to postpone the visit in view of developments in the Japanese political situation.⁷⁸ President Eisenhower was determined to proceed with the visit, however, unless requested otherwise by the Japanese government. The American government felt that the Kishi cabinet would fall if the President cancelled his visit. And Washington was also afraid that Japanese politics would shift toward the left after such a fall. If the American government postponed the visit, official Washington felt, it would mean that the United States had yielded to the activities of the leftists. On the other hand, if the President proceeded to Japan in spite of the political confusion, and if he succeeded in helping Kishi to stay in power, this certainly would be regarded in the U.S. as a heroic achievement by the President.⁷⁹ Thus the President left Washington for his Far Eastern tour on June 12.

The anti-government movement was coming to a climax, mobilizing unprecedented numbers of citizens. Activities of students of the extreme left became violent. On the night of June 14, leftist students entered the yard of the Diet building. One female student was killed and many other students were injured in an ensuing battle with police. Kishi and his close associates thought of mobilizing part of the self-defense Forces to protect the American visitors against possible violence by student radicals. But Munenori Akagi, the Minister in charge of the Defense Agency, did not agree to the use of the self-defense Forces for such a purpose. If the self-defense Forces were employed to suppress violent, but unarmed activists, he feared, it would damage the image of the Self-Defense Forces.⁸⁰ On the following day, having heard the opinion of the Chairman of the Public Safety Commission, the Kishi Cabinet finally concluded that the government must ask President Eisenhower to postpone his visit to Japan.⁸¹ President Eisenhower was already in the Philippines, but he left for home without visiting Japan, the major destination of his trip. In Washington, Secretary Herter, called to testify before congressional committees, admitted that there had been some mistakes in judgment in evaluating the Japanese situation.⁸²

Premier Kishi continued to refuse to resign or to dissolve the Lower House. The treaty became automatically effective on June 20 without any action being taken by the Upper House. The government completed ratification procedures the next day. The United States Senate, which had been watching the situation in Japan, gave its approval of the treaty on

⁷⁶ Interview with Shigeharu Matsumoto of the International House of Japan, November 1981.

⁷⁷ My interpretation is based on I.M. Destler, *et al.*, *Managing an Alliance*, p. 22, which quotes from several cables from the Embassy to Washington.

⁷⁸ *The Asahi*, June 7, 1960.

⁷⁹ Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (New York, 1963), pp. 306-07; also see Eisenhower's memoirs, *Waging Peace, 1955-1961* (New York, 1965), p. 562.

⁸⁰ Munenori Akagi, *Watakushi no rirekisho* [My Life History] (Tokyo, 1973).

⁸¹ *The Asahi*, June 17, 1960.

⁸² *Ibid.*, June 22, 1960.

June 22. The exchange of ratification documents was made the next day in Tokyo, and the new treaty became effective immediately. Premier Kishi finally announced his intention to resign, and his Cabinet resigned on July 15. Three days later, Hayato Ikeda was elected Premier in an extra Session of the Diet participated in by the opposition parties. The political confusion which had shaken Japan for two months now subsided. The general election held in November returned the Liberal-Democrats to power with a large majority in the Lower House, and stabilized the Japanese political situation.

The Ikeda government played politics of "low posture," avoiding confrontation with the opposition parties. Instead of talking of constitutional revision and military build-up, Ikeda emphasized an growth policy aiming at doubling the income of the people. Meanwhile, the U.S. government under President John F. Kennedy refrained from putting pressure upon Japan to make speedy military build-up. The Japanese media took an exceedingly favorable attitude toward him. Opposition to the new security treaty was entirely tamed, and it was not much aroused even during the height of the Vietnam War.

* * *

Given the post-1960 history of the security treaty, it may seem rather strange that opposition to the treaty could mobilize such a mass of people in the first half of 1960. To be sure, consensus did not exist with regard to security and defense issues. Any important bill relating to these issues could not avoid strong resistance in the Diet and protest activities outside the Diet. It is my contention, however, that, if Kishi had very carefully mapped out his strategy of getting the approval of the treaty by the Diet, he might have gained it without bringing forth such a political turmoil. First of all, he should have consolidated his party behind him with much more tact. Besides, he committed several tactical mistakes, such as his attempt to enact the police practice bill and his failure to call general elections in early 1960. But there was also Kishi's personal factor. As many observers noted, the anti-treaty fever was primarily anti-Kishi, rather than anti-American. There was among the Japanese public considerable distrust of him, who had been a member of the Tojo Cabinet. Many Japanese suspected that he might be pushing Japan again toward her path of the past. This suspicion and fear, fuelled by several international events which happened to take place in the spring of 1960, brought forth a feverish anti-treaty movement.

In order to place the episode of 1960 in a longer historical perspective, I shall briefly discuss changes which have taken place since 1960 in Japanese domestic politics, Japan's international circumstances, and U.S.-Japanese relations, especially its psychological aspect.

The security treaty revision of 1960 took place when the system of 1955, an unbalanced two-party system was about to begin shaking. Until the first oil crisis occurred toward the end of 1973, Japanese economy made phenomenal expansion. It recovered from the "oil shock" in the second half of the 1970s and has been making much slower, but generally steady growth with a low rate of employment. Since a large mass of the ordinary people did have a share in the benefit of this economic growth in peace, the LDP has been able to maintain its credibility as the party in power. The JSP, on the other hand, has failed to adjust itself

⁸⁸ Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence* [an English edition of his *Amae no kozo*] (Tokyo and New York, 1973).

with this economic change. Its old socialism has lost much of former appeal. Many votes the party has lost have gone mainly to center parties and partly to the better organized JCP. In the place of an unbalanced two-party system, therefore, emerged a system composed of one dominant conservative party and several small center and left parties. With the advent of center parties, sharp conflict over security and defense issues has been mitigated.

Change in Japan's international circumstances also has removed intensity from domestic conflict over security issues. Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy toward the two Communist giants drastically changed Japan's international environment. Washington's sudden reapprochement with Peking gave "shock" to Tokyo, because relations with China had been a big issue in Japanese domestic politics. The Peking leaders, however, wanted to improve its relations with Japan as well as with the United States, and began to suggest that they did not mind U.S.-Japanese security ties. In 1960, Japan's security ties with the United States had appeared to be incompatible with each other. This change greatly weakened opposition to U.S. security ties in Japan. Although Soviet-American relations changed from detente to a new "cold war" in the early 1980s, this has not much increased opposition to security ties with the United States.

The episode of 1960 belongs to the old era also in the sense that it took place when there were wide gaps between the powers of the two nations. In 1960 Japan was not a "giant" in any sense. The Japanese regarded Japan as a defeated country just beginning to rise. They retained inferiority complex toward America. Because of this complex, Kishi wanted to replace the old security treaty with a new one. The same complex triggered the anti-security treaty fever as a form of national self-assertion. Along this inferiority complex, many Japanese revealed in 1960 the mentality which Takeo Doi termed as *amae* toward the U.S. They presumed, because of *amae* mentality, that Japan could enjoy American kindness whatever they did in opposition to a new security treaty. Many Japanese, including the JSP and *Sohyo* spokesmen, expressed their regret to what had happened to Presidential Press Secretary Hagarty and Ambassador MacArthur at Haneda. But they did not expect that such an event would incur ill-feelings among the American people and have serious repercussions upon Washington's attitude toward Japan. They rather expected that the United States would pay more attention to the Japanese national feelings. Their *amae* expectation was not misplaced. In 1960, the dominant American self-image was still America as the protector of the Free World. The Americans therefore could show indulgence toward Japan. Not only official Washington continued to express friendship to Japan, but also the American public showed few signs of anti-Japanese feelings. The U.S. government attributed everything that had happened in Japan to the conspiracy of international communism, and journalists and scholars knowledgeable about Japan explained that most of the demonstrators were not anti-American but anti-Kishi. The American public seemed to be satisfied with these explanations. Such indulgence can no longer be expected in American attitudes toward issues in U.S.-Japanese relations. Meanwhile the Japanese inferiority complex and *amae* mentality have been much weakened, and they are now more sensitive to the American feelings.