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<th>Cultural Pluralism and Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Unum or Ex Uno Plura?</th>
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At first glance, the term “cultural pluralism” and “multiculturalism” would seem to be synonymous. As the two concepts are propagated in academia, however, they are often quite different. Cultural pluralism is the older term. It has a more traditional connotation in that it suggests an acceptance of many cultures, democratically coexisting. It also conjures up the notion of the “melting pot,” and in the American context, assimilation and integration under the aegis of a common national identity. In contrast, multiculturalism accentuates ethnic and racial differences, and thus includes the doctrine of separatism and non-assimilation. The melting pot is replaced by the “salad bowl,” in which varied cultural ingredients retain their unique identities. Ethnic and racial groups play up their distinctive cultural habits and eschew integration.

Cultural pluralism is seen by its proponents as an “organizing principle of . . . society,” that “differences among national groups are a national resource,” and that the “common culture has been formed by the interaction of its subsidiary cultures.” In essence, a broader interpretation of the common culture is sought.

Universality

One of the inherent aspects of cultural pluralism is universality. In the American context, cultural ties with Europe are recognized and promoted because the “nation’s political, religious educational, and economic institutions were created chiefly by people of European descent.” A sense of (American) community is thereby encouraged—“a society and culture to which all citizens belong, in which there is a framework of speaking universally to the human condition. [Indeed], if there is no overall community with an agreed-upon vision of liberty and justice, if all we have is a collection of racial and ethnic cultures, lacking any common bonds, then we have no means to mobilize public opinion on behalf of people who are not members of our particular group.” Protecting and uniting individuals and individual rights is stressed. And in the American context, “what unites America . . . is a common commitment to the ideals of the Founding Fathers, notably in-

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2 Ibid., 288.
3 Ibid., 295.
dividual liberty and legal equality.”⁴ Thus, cultural pluralism emphasizes a shared experience of a common culture.⁵

At the same time, however, there is an acknowledgment that:

“American culture has been enriched by what individual groups brought to it. The distinguishing characteristic of American culture is its ability to incorporate so many disparate groups, creating a new whole from the many parts. What could be more American, for example, than jazz and film, two distinctive art forms created, respectively by blacks and immigrant Jews, but which all Americans think of as their own?”⁶

This is to say that there is a world of difference between a multicultural and a multiethnic society. The latter needs monoculturalism to survive. “Otherwise the differences and disputes . . . likely to arise between (sic) ethnic groups will be frozen into permanence by cultural distance.”⁷ In other words, a Balkanization of culture ensues. (Just look at Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia.) Moreover, a “monocultural society has a natural tendency to produce unified ethnicity over time, given intermarriage and shared experience.”⁸ In fact, only religious groups, such as orthodox Jews or the Amish, with strict rules against intermarriage, have been successful in preserving their distinct cultures.⁹

A Common Language

A multiethnic society, and concomitant cultural pluralism, also mandate a common language. In other words, advocates thereof view bilingualism (particularly in education) as counterproductive to a common culture. In America, the Founding Fathers insisted on English as a common language. Yet those of British descent were not the only ethnic group exerting influence at that time. In fact, English was chosen as the common national language over German by a margin of only one vote. A footnote to this statistic is that a 1796 proposal to publish 3,000 sets of federal laws in German was defeated by the House of Representatives—nine years after the founding of the nation.¹⁰

Moreover, cultural pluralists argue that one common language is advisable for eminently pragmatic reasons: political and economic discourse alone. In addition, “if several large linguistic groups retained their original language, then democratic debate in one national conversation would be progressively undermined. Ultimately, the nation would become like India, a battleground of ethnicities.”¹¹

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⁷ O’Sullivan, 44.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Chavez, 30.
¹⁰ O’Sullivan, 37.
¹¹ Ibid., 41.
Quotas and Affirmative-Action Programs

In addition to rejecting bilingualism, cultural pluralists also oppose racial/ethnic quotas and affirmative-action programs. While they point out that support among whites for equal job opportunity in America exceeded 90 percent as early as 1975, they also, for example, cite the statistic that only 50 percent of new students each year at the University of California, Berkeley are admitted according to traditional criteria of academic merit. In fact, a white student with a grade-point average of 3.5 (out of 4.0) and a Scholastic Aptitude Test score of 1,200 points (out of 1,600) has less than a five percent chance of being admitted. If the student is black, the chances are almost 100 percent.

Unfortunately, blacks achieve such grades and scores on an infrequent basis. In 1988, only 116 out of nearly 100,000 blacks scored above 699 (out of 900) on the verbal section of the SAT. Only 342 out of 100,000 scored that high on the math section. Moreover, fewer than 3,000 scored above 599 on either part of the test. The average white-black and Asian-black differential in the aggregate score was 198 points.

Moreover, that blacks and other minorities are admitted to universities in spite of low test scores is not necessarily a blessing for them. For affirmative-action quotas often misplace minority students in universities and colleges. Applicants who are at best academically qualified for a small state college are admitted to the state's university. In turn, those minority students who are qualified for the latter are almost automatically admitted to a nationally prestigious university, such as Harvard or Yale. The result is that these students are ill-equipped to compete academically with their white and Asian classmates.

In addition, the ensuing disparity in academic performance between the two groups leads to blacks and other minorities experiencing a loss of self-esteem and competitive rejection. A high drop-out rate amongst these groups is the most obvious manifestation. Moreover, "the high expectations of these minority students are typically eroded by the end of the first semester, when the natural difficulties of adjustment to college life are compounded by academic pressures more severe than those faced by other undergraduates."

It is then that campus separatism takes hold, for these minority students seek solace and empathy amongst their peers, for example, in the campus African-American Society or the Hispanic Student Association. And while such groups provide a social sanctuary, they do not provide a remedy for the students' academic problems. That is to say, they offer no remedial reading or mathematics programs.

Instead, students are told that they are suffering, not because they are inadequately prepared for their studies, but because of pervasive bigotry that makes it impossible for

12 Chavez, 26.
14 Ibid., 23.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 24.
18 Ibid.
them to advance. The outgrowth of this stance has been “racism hotlines” for minorities and “sensitivity seminars” for non-minorities.

Entitlements and Racial Identity

Inherent in such programs is the supremacy of entitlement over development for minorities. Shelby Steele calls this an “escapist racial policy” which “imputes a certain helplessness to [minorities].” He points out that Pennsylvania State University offers blacks $550 for “C” grades and $1,100 for anything higher. He challenges the notion that black self-respect is thereby promoted “when many white students would be embarrassed by so average a performance . . . Here black students learn to hustle their victimization rather than overcome it.”

Moreover, the upshot of such policies is the built-in assumption that only whites are capable of prejudice. In fact, a group of professors at a Michigan university supplied a rationale for such a double standard:

“Behavior which constitutes racist oppression when engaged in by whites does not have this character when undertaken by people of color. For example, a white person may not proclaim a lounge or campus organization only for whites. Yet there is an important place on this campus for Black Student Lounges, the Black Student Union, etc. Such associations do not oppress whites, because people of color are not in a position to deprive whites of their powers, opportunities and recognition they need to advance their interests.”

Thus can Gayatri Spivak, a professor of English and Cultural Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, assert that although it is essential to teach white students sensitivity to cultural diversity, tolerance should not be expected of minorities. He believes that they cannot be asked to “tolerate” a culture that, in his estimation, has “historically ignored them while simultaneously indoctrinating them.”

In the same vein, Molefi Kete Asante speaks of the “mutual conspiracy between race doctrine and educational doctrine in America,” in which Europe is “valorized.” Further, he states that “new information” changes attitudes in both minorities and white students. “Whites are not so apt to take a superior attitude when they are aware of the achievements of other cultures . . . On the other hand, African-Americans who are often as ignorant as whites about African achievements adjust their attitudes about themselves once they are exposed to new information [theories such as Cheikh Anta Diop’s, that ancient Egypt was a black civilization from which Western civilization developed].”

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19 Ibid., 25.
21 Ibid.
22 As quoted in d’Souza, 26.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 307.
Yet cultural pluralists, as opposed to multiculturalists, contend that such views are "filiopietistic and deterministic" in that they teach children that their identity is determined by their cultural genes. That something in their blood or their race memory . . . defines who they are and what they may achieve. That the culture in which they live is not their own culture, even though they were born there. That American culture is 'Eurocentric,' and therefore hostile to anyone whose ancestors are not European . . . the implication is that racial and ethnic minorities are not and should not try to be part of American culture . . . (italics added)."26

Moreover, the proponents of such views—the multiculturalists—are insisting "on treating race and ethnicity as if they were synonymous with culture. They presume that skin color, which . . . [is an] immutable trait, determine[s] values, mores, language, and other cultural attributes which, of course, are learned."27 (Ironically, it can also be argued that such attitudes promote a reverse Eurocentrism that is essentially racist.)

Cultural pluralists, however, promote a broader interpretation of culture, in which they say the culture belongs to us all. "You don’t have to be black to love Langston Hughes's (sic) poetry or . . . jazz."28 As Ralph Ellison once observed, the imagination is indeed impoverished if it is contended that blacks can learn only from the blacks, rather than also from whites. Frederick Douglass echoed this observation when he remembered being inspired at the age of twelve by reading the speeches of Edmund Burke, W.E.B. DuBois, Shakespeare, Balzac and Dumas.29

Cultural Unity vs. "Elitist" Eurocentrism

In sum, cultural pluralists stress what unites a culture rather than what divides it. They stress the "unum" over the "plura." In the American context, it is a "common commitment to the ideals of the Founding Fathers, notably individual liberty and legal equality. To be an American is to hold certain truths to be self-evident; it is not to be a member in (sic) a particular cultural or ethnic identity based upon that of the original settlers . . . "30

In contrast, multiculturalists (or "particularists," to use Diane Ravitch's term) believe that they are promulgating a doctrine that will "bring dignity to the dispossessed, and self-empowerment to the disempowered."31 They view the influence of Western civilization as pernicious and "Eurocentric" because of its inherent cultural imperialism. Some multiculturalists even perceive a mutual conspiracy between race doctrine and educational doctrine in America.32

Moreover, they reject any concept of universality because of racial and ethnic differences. Cornel West believes "universality has been used as a smokescreen for a particular

26 Ravitch, 277.
27 Chavez, 26.
28 Ravitch, 280.
29 O'Sullivan, 40.
30 Ibid., 41.
32 Asante, 302.
He further asserts that "the United States has become the land of hybridity, heterogeneity and ambiguity. It lacks the ability to generate national identity and ... [it] must deal with indigenous people's culture." He believes, as do his multiculturalist colleagues, that "we have to demystify this notion of Europe and Eurocentrism because 'Europe' is an ideological construct. It doesn't exist other than in the minds of elites who tried to constitute a homogeneous tradition that could bring together heterogeneous populations ... (italics added.)"

In the same vein, Kathleen Aguero asserts that "... the notion of culture in the United States today is too often synonymous with predominately white male, heterosexual, upper-class, Eurocentric interests (italics added.)" Thus, we see that the multiculturalists' concept of Eurocentrism is inextricably linked with elitism. In fact, the charge of elitism is one of the most commonly heard—along with "cultural imperialism" and even fascism. The onslaught of popular culture that began in the 1960s is viewed approvingly as a watershed in terms of undermining elitist notions of cultural hierarchy. Thus, multicultural becomes anti-culture, or at least anti-high culture, as Roger Kimball has observed.

This phenomenon leads, in turn, to cultural relativism: all cultures are of equal value, and toleration of all of them is the appropriate policy. Indeed, the "elitist" habit of passing judgment on cultures other than one's own is seen as another of the derivative evils of Eurocentrism. In this context, "values" are dismissed as intrinsically illegitimate. Thus, the "privileging of the 'unum' over the 'pluribus' (Ronald Takaki's phrase)" is regarded disapprovingly.

Moreover, Professor Takaki also views the American Founding as less an effort to make a universal principle (human equality), as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, the basis of the nation than as an excuse for "economic acquisition and expansion." He expands on this essentially Marxist interpretation by drawing a class-conscious analogy with Melville's Moby Dick. Those opponents of multiculturalism who expound notions of elitism are "our modern Captain Ahab's. [T]hey steer the course of the university curriculum. Their exclusive definition of knowledge has rendered invisible and silent the swirling and rich diversity below deck. [O]n college campuses today, the voices of many students and faculty from below deck are challenging such hierarchical power."

Takaki also promotes multiculturalism from a racial/ethnic perspective. "Our future will increasingly be multiethnic ..., a brave new multicultural world of Calibans of many different races and ethnicities." In this context, he takes Arthur Schlesinger to task for denouncing "the cult of ethnicity." "Behind Schlesinger's cant against multiculturalism ... [white European] group."33 He further asserts that "the United States has become the land of hybridity, heterogeneity and ambiguity. It lacks the ability to generate national identity and ... [it] must deal with indigenous people's culture."34

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34 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 112.
is fear. Will the center hold or will the melting pot yield to the Tower of Babel?"41 Takaki rejects Schlesinger's criticism and welcomes the idea that "as universities become contested terrains of different points of view, gray and monotonous clusters of Eurocentric knowledge can become brave new worlds, dynamic and multicultural (italics added)."42 Because minorities have been "traditionally excluded from the curriculum [they] are insisting that America does not belong to one group and neither does America's history."43

Integration and Assimilation

Such views are born out of the opposition to integration that became apparent in the 1960s (ironically, after passage of the Civil Rights Act). As Nathan Glazer notes, "Bland intercultural education has succumbed to the rather more forceful, multicultural education . . ."44 We now have an "apartness . . . that feeds multiculturalism."45 That is to say, assimilation, or "Americanization," as it was once called, is virtually a dead issue. (Indeed, "assimilation," once a key sociological concept, is no longer in the Encyclopedia of Sociology, nor is the word "Americanization" in any of the encyclopedias of the social sciences.)46

This development is, in large measure, a result of the fact that multiculturalists would seem to give short shrift to Martin Luther King's ideal that people should be judged by the content of their character rather than the color of their skin.47 Indeed, they would almost seem to believe that a person's character is determined by the color of his skin. Such beliefs lead multiculturalists such as Kolefi Kete Asante to reject any concept of national identity and to assert that "there is no common American culture."48

National Identity

Yet such an assertion is problematical, especially in the context of nationhood. And this resurrects an old conundrum: is America a nation or a culture—or both? On the one hand, the two terms seem to be mutually exclusive. The "universal nation" is an oxymoron. "Insofar as America remains universal—a nation of immigrants—it is not really a nation. And insofar as it becomes a nation, it ceases to be universal."49

However, America is not a nation like any other, for it is possible to become an American in a way that is not possible for someone to become, say, a German. While the infant American nation was largely homogeneous, it quickly became multiethnic because of immigration patterns which continue to the present day. Yet being an American extends

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41 Ibid., 115.
42 Ibid., 116.
43 Ibid., 117.
46 Ibid., 129.
47 Chavez, 28.
48 Asante, 308.
49 O'Sullivan, 43.
beyond race and ethnicity. It includes a cultural identity based on the institutions and language of the original settlers and the Founding Fathers. Anyone who becomes an American also becomes the heir of George Washington, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln. Thus does allegiance to common principles (of nationhood) get ineluctably defined as allegiance to a common culture.

To repeat, it is possible to become an American, and when people do, they create something new. Even though it “may have cultural characteristics that are predominately from one of the ethnic constituents . . . a predominance is not a totality.” It is also important to note here (again) that although multiculturalists argue that multiethnicity requires multiculturalism, the truth is that a multiethnic society will survive only if it is monocultural.

Cultural Relativism

In addition to emphasizing race and ethnicity over national identity, multiculturalists also tend to be cultural relativists, as noted earlier. They believe that “value judgments” are a product of Eurocentrism, and thus automatically invalid, because all cultures are equal. This assumption is derived from the (fallacious) logic that the relativity of all values is the same as the toleration of all values. “That all ‘values’ are relative does not mean . . . that they are equal or deserve equal treatment. It means only that each is equally unverifiable in the light of reason.” Put succinctly, there is a world of (moral) difference between having someone to dinner and having someone for dinner.

To make the point another way, if, as multiculturalists assert, all cultures are of equal merit and value, does that mean that it is valid to subject female children to clitorectomies, as is practiced in Africa? Does it mean that we should regard the crimes against humanity committed by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin as just a characteristic of cultures other than our own?

It would seem that multiculturalists seem to think that freeing themselves from their own culture is synonymous with objectivity. Yet in the process, they are advocating not teaching moral judgments:

“If any custom or law of people in any culture is as defensible as any other, what kind of judgment is possible? . . . Instead of mindlessly assuming that others’ ways of doing things have to be wrong, students will mindlessly assume these ways of doing things have to be right—or at least as good as anyone else’s. And by approving practices that would not be tolerated . . . in any democracy, they are saying that some people should be held to lower standards than others—a kind of moral superiority hardly consistent with multicultural education (italics added).”

Moreover, as John O’Sullivan has observed,

50 Ibid., 44.
51 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 37.
"the advocates of multiculturalism do not really respect cultures equally at all. They have a particular dislike of [Western] culture (even though they) depend on [its] intellectual methods and analytical tools, a general ignorance of what a culture is and a vague idea that ethnic cultures are like ethnic foods—the opportunity for a little grazing. Yet a culture is, after all, a complete way of thinking, feeling, and viewing the world. It is not a smorgasbord from which the diner can select his favorite bits and pieces at will."

**Unum vs. Plura**

O'Sullivan's observation brings us back to the distinction I have drawn between cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. The former emphasizes the "unum," that is, a national identity. Although multiculturalists view this as a negative term, in the American context, at least, it has positive connotations. As Nathan Glazer notes, the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the framers of the Constitution "did not define their Americanness as an ethnic characteristic even though they had the same ethnic origins. They emphasized . . . dependence on adherence to ideals, to universal principles." (In fact, the term "identity" was not even used. Only in the 1950s did it begin to be used in discussions of ethnic affairs.)

Until recently, assimilation and amalgamation were considered positive terms "[Even] intercultural education was a far cry from [multiculturalism] and presented no resistance to assimilation. It stood for tolerance, not for the maintenance of cultural difference and identity." Indeed, as both Linda Chavez and Nathan Glazer note, the urge to assimilate has been historically strong, particularly with the children of immigrants. And one key measure of assimilation is the rate of intermarriage between ethnic (and religious) groups. In fact, the percentage of intermarriage between third-generation Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites is almost 33 percent, a rate similar to that of young Asians. Indeed, the intermarriage rates approach those amongst Europeans. Even amongst blacks the rate is going up—although Glazer believes that they are one ethnic/racial group which has never assimilated.

As we have seen, in contrast to the cultural pluralists' emphasis on the "unum," the multiculturalists emphasize the "plura." As Glazer observes, apartness feeds multiculturalism. Thus, multiculturalists (particularists) believe that there is no such thing as a positive national identity. Rather, they think that identity can be defined only racially or ethnically. They further assert that universality cannot, or should not, exist. They believe that the "real division on the question of multiculturalism is between those who truly seek to maintain a Eurocentric hegemony . . . and those who truly believe in cultural pluralism without hierarchy."
Ironically, while multiculturalists advocate the encouragement of ethnic particularism, the equality of cultures, and the right of every culture to be judged on its own terms, they do not advocate the same for Western culture. Instead, they criticize the Western tradition in terms of “unmasking,” “demythologizing,” “decanonizing,” and “dehegemonizing”—all concepts depending on Western methods of critical analysis. “While ethnocentrism is to be encouraged for minority cultures, the traditional culture of the majority must be . . . non-discriminatory and bland.”

Moreover, some critics even assert that “insofar as multiculturalism means genuine diversity . . . the United States is becoming not more multicultural, but less. For when the whole culture is self-consciously ‘diverse,’ real diversity has disappeared. Real diversity is what the United States used to have—when [diverse groups] led, culturally, largely segregated lives . . . [Now] being American is . . . understood to mean wearing your ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual history—your differences—on your sleeve (italics added).”

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61 O’Sullivan, 40,
62 Ibid.