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NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: THEIR POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS

SHUJIRO YAZAWA

Introduction

More than a decade has passed since the mid-1970s when the concept of "new social movements" came into currency among social scientists, in particular those who sympathized with those movements that advocated peace, women’s rights, a clean environment, and regional autonomy. It has thus not been long enough for social scientists to form a basic consensus with regard to the concept. We could perhaps go even further and assert that there exists no agreement concerning what movements are, what the new form of social movements are, or the significance of social movements.

I point out this fact not to refute the concept of "new social movements." On the contrary, in the social sciences "new social movements" have drawn worldwide attention and they are quite important to any understanding of contemporary society. There is also a "relevant connection between the social sciences and social movements," especially in the case of the U.S., for example, where we find activists from the political movements of the '60s engaged in the '70s in studies of social movements. In Japan, however, there is much less continuity between social scientists and the '60s social movements. All the more, nonetheless, "new social movements" or the arguments concerning them can have a special importance for Japanese social sciences. This is because "new social movements" or "new social movement" studies drew new generations of scholars to the study of "social movements." This can be seen in the Japanese social sciences, especially in sociology, with the boom in social movement studies as a result of the entry of the younger generation into the field. In consideration of the above, I would like to affirm that if we develop the study of "new social movements" with emphasis on the "relevant connection between the social sciences and social movements," we can more fruitfully develop social movement studies as a whole.

This paper will firstly examine some of the "new social movement" studies proposed hitherto and describe the current state of research on the subject. Secondly, by presenting an analytical framework for an investigation of social movements in Okinawa, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, through which we can understand the current situation of "new social move-

1 Akira Takahashi, "New Social Movements in Late Capitalist Societies," Shiso, November, 1985 (No. 737), p. 3.
ments,” this paper will attempt to show the position the “new social movements” occupy within contemporary Japanese social movements as a whole.

I. What are “New Social Movements”? 

Jean Cohen, synthesizing a variety of approaches to social movements, recently defined “new social movements” within a framework encompassing the themes of the autonomy and self-defense of civil society against the state. She labelled them as part of a “project of a post-bourgeois civil society tied to post-materialist values.” This is clearly a synthesis of past studies of “new social movements.” For instance, C. Offe states that “new social movements,” in order to liberate a civil society from the state, seek “to politicize the institutions of civil society in ways that are not constrained by the channels of representative-bureaucratic political institutions, and thereby to reconstitute a civil society that is no longer dependent upon ever more regulation, control, and intervention.” Jurgen Habermas calls “new social movements” those which preserve and develop “the grammar of forms of life” that emerge in the areas of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization. They are in opposition to state administration and control, which can not create meaning, and penetrate into the life world which is the origin of meaning. Alan Touraine, who takes a different theoretical position from the former two in that he puts the state within a diachronic axis of analysis and social movements within a synchronic one, defines “new social movements” as “the creative source of new norms and identities” aimed at a “more ‘civil’ society.” This takes place in an environment in which classical civil society has been deconstructed by “permanent changes and statism.”

What specific kinds of social movements have taken the form of “new social movements”? The most common-sensical answer is given by Offe. As shown in Table 1, he defines politically relevant new social movements as those “that do make a claim to be recognized

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<td>Not recognized by political community as legitimate</td>
<td>“Private crime”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>“Terrorism”</td>
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<td>Recognized as legitimate</td>
<td>Sociocultural movements advocating religious etc. practices: “retreat”</td>
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<td>“Sociopolitical movements”</td>
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6 Claus Offe, Ibid., pp. 826–828.
as political actors by the wider community—although their forms of action do not enjoy
the legitimacy conferred by established political institutions—and who aim at objectives,
the achievement of which would have binding effects for society as a whole rather than just
for the group itself.” He cites four examples: (1) ecological or environmental movements;
(2) human rights movements, most importantly the feminist movements; (3) pacifist and
peace movements; and (4) movements advocating or engaging in “alternative” or “com-
munal” modes of the production and distribution of goods and services.

Other responses to the above question have been more problematic. Klaus Eder,
for example, calls “new movements”: (a) communal movements such as those encompassing
youth and feminists, and anti-industrial movements seeking alternative relations to nature;
and (b) various regional or anti-bureaucratic movements (such as those concerned with
energy, housing, and psychiatry) and student movements. He, furthermore, divides this
phenomenon into cultural and political movements. Cultural movements are those that
oppose present social life, whereas political movements challenge modern state domination.
According to his definition, however, “new movements” are not immediately “new social
movements.” Although political and cultural movements have always repeatedly appeared,
those ecology movements which “seem to crystallize all the aspects of protest into a his-
torically new social movement” and which draw society up to a higher level of develop-
ment, deserve to be called “new social movements.” He thus clearly differentiates “new
social movements” from populism and romanticism and links social movements with stages
of social development.

Touraine presents the following processes in the transformation of social movements.8
Included are seven stages, beginning in industrial society and ending in post-industrial soc-
ociety: (a) the decline of old social movements (workers’ movements); (b) widespread cultural
 crisis, threatening the foundations of existing society (counter-culture movements); (c) mas-
sive protest which rejects growth and a searches for new forms of balance; (d) liberal and
libertarian criticism of the state, seeking to replace a still confused social struggle (student
movements and feminist movements); (e) rejection of the concentration and exchanges of
power and a search for a communal utopia (ecology movements); (f) threatened categories
of people seeking to rediscover their identity while still accepting change (populist move-
ments); and (g) the emergence of new social movements (anti-technocracy movements,
ecology movements). The movements (a) to (c) take us away from industrial societies,
while (e) to (g) are collective actions leading toward post-industrial society. It is (d), be-
tween the two, where we find the current stage of social movements. Touraine admits
that it is not clear whether the ecological movement will become dissipated in contradic-
tions, come to support the old middle class, or whether instead—as he is inclined to feel
—it will develop into a battle against technocracy. According to Touraine’s arguments,
in such things as student movements, women’s liberation movements, ecology movements,
and populist movements we see the germs of “new social movements,” the full develop-
ment of which belongs to a future phase.

What is common to both Eder and Touraine is that they position “new social move-
ments” in relation to stages of social development or to societal types. By so doing, they

are able to successfully abstract what a typical "new social movement" is. On the other hand, however, their views may lead to a too narrow definition of "new social movements" and therefore "tease out of existing conflict behavior the dimension of a social movement." Furthermore, there are risks in obscuring the continuity between past and present and in hierarchically positioning the forms of social struggle. With the above in mind, we can accept Offe's proposition as the most appropriate definition of "new social movements" that we have to date.

II. The Characteristics of "New Social Movements"

Primarily on the basis of Offe's arguments, which emphasize that the characteristics of "new social movements" manifest themselves in their issues, values, modes of action, and actors, I would like to point out some of the characteristics of this phenomenon.

The first characteristic is that the main issues of "new social movements" are a physical territory; space of action; "life-world"; the body; health; and sexual identity; the neighborhood; city; and physical environment; cultural, ethnic, national, and linguistic heritage, and identity; the territory of survival of humankind in general.

The second is that "new social movements" value autonomy and identity, the decentralization of power, self-government, and self-help, as opposed to manipulation, control, dependence, bureaucratization, regulation, etc.

Third, the modes of action of "new social movements," by which large numbers of individuals become collective actors, are highly informal, ad hoc, discontinuous, context-sensitive, and egalitarian. Methods by which members of movements confront the external world and their political opponents are legal though "unconventional" in mobilizing public attention. Therefore, "new social movements" relate themselves with other political actors and opponents not through negotiation, compromise, or reforms, but through opposition alone. This is because such movements do not have anything to give in response to the others' compromise. For this reason, these movements tend to be independent and often on the grassroots level.

The fourth characteristic is that the actors of "new social movements" do not label themselves according to ready-made political or socioeconomic codes. More specifically, they do not use such terms as right/left or liberal/conservative. Nor do they rely on such socioeconomic codes as working class/middle class or poor/wealthy. Nonetheless, this does not mean that these actors are totally heterogeneous or amorphous. Generally speaking, they belong to the new middle class, or to a part of the old middle class, or to people outside of or peripheral to the labour market.

The fifth, deriving from the above characteristics, entails the fact that "new social movements" are partial and limited in that they always confine themselves to the social territory of "civil society" and focus on democratizing and rectifying the structures of everyday life.

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10 Claus Offe, Ibid., pp. 825-832.
forms of communication, and collective identity. This becomes especially clear when compared with left-wing movements which to date have emphasized more holistic and revolutionary concerns.11

To repeat, "new social movements" entail a self-limiting radicalism which seek to preserve and build a "civil society" against the interference of the state. In that they deal with the old theme of conflict between the state and civil society, it is problematic whether or not they can create new identities, organizational forms, confrontations, and conflicts.

III. The Transformation of Civil Society

Civil society as a theoretical model consists of three dimensions: political, economic, and social. Political civil society is concerned with the issues of human rights, law, and social contract. Economic civil society consists of ownership, Verkehr, and labour. Social civil society is comprised of voluntary association, pluralism (equality of values), and community.12 Civil society as an historical phenomenon, in particular in the period from the Bourgeois Revolution to the Industrial Revolution, entailed the totality of equal social relations among private producers liberated from the old status system. As capitalism permeated society, however, civil society itself was drastically transformed. It is now necessary for us to clarify how this civil society has changed.

First of all, let us examine the trends which destroyed the foundations of classical civil society. Salvador Giner classifies them into four categories, and states that paradoxically these became obvious after the Second World War, when civil society began to enjoy "exceptional material and ideological reinforcements."13

The first trend is corporatization. This refers to bureaucratization, occupational specialization, and the proliferation of formal organizations in every field of endeavour, and signifies the birth of "corporate society." As a result, the capability of individuals to compete and to associate is limited and only monopolized competition is allowed. The recent birth and development of neo-corporatism symbolize the pinnacle of this trend.

The second trend is the expansion of the state. The contemporary state as educator, administrator of public service, producer, consumer, owner, and invester penetrates all aspects of our social life, and changes the traditional relations between the state and civil society. As a result, the distinction between public and private and the state and civil society, which were once separated rigorously become fused and equivocal.

The third trend is congestion, including institutional congestion as a result of an increase in the number of corporations and the size of bureaucracy; legal congestion through excessive overregulation; physical congestion stemming from population increase; congestion of the populace based on the democratization of social life; and loss of the no-man's land. This

trend has fundamentally changed the conception of the limits of social space. The developing civil society had to continuously seek externality and no-man's land in order to escape the restrictions placed upon it. In other words, civil society has always tacitly presupposed the existence of externality. Consequently, civil society eventually led to the rise of international civil society, characterized by its uneven development and center-periphery structure. With congestion civil society inevitably falls into crisis.

The fourth trend is the increase of technoculture. The significance of knowledge and information has greatly changed and information technology, robotization, and artificial intelligence have developed. Although their influence on society has been well studied, continued careful observations will be required to analyze future changes. It is undeniable, however, at this time that such developments have the possibility of being far more compatible with "corporate society" than civil society.

The above four trends interact and lead civil society into a crisis. The crisis of civil society reaches the point of the "degeneration of the institutions and symbolic structures of civil society," and brings to its death society as a social body having various functions (with mechanisms for social control and which carry out socialization). In this sense, "new social movements" can be viewed as movements aimed at building "more civil" society against those forces which ruin civil society.

The problem now becomes whether these "new social movements" are temporary phenomena, merely passively resisting those forces ruining civil society and with little chance of forcing substantive change, or more durable phenomena with the potential for constructing a new, more civil society. If the former is the case, "new social movements" should be regarded merely as old ones in spite of their new issues. Only in the case of the latter can "new social movements" be situated at the center of our argument.

As J. Cohen indicated, arguments concerning the post-bourgeois form of civil society were made possible by J. Habermas' theory. Habermas analysed civil society, economics, and the state from the viewpoint of the rationalities of action and defined democratization as the increase of communicative interactions against instrumental, strategic, and norm-oriented actions. He proposes to more democratize society so that it can be compatible with the administration of the contemporary state and contemporary economy. His analysis indicates that the principles of civil society are open to various forms of institutionalization other than those found in bourgeois capitalist society and the monistic sovereign state. The project of post-bourgeois civil society becomes an attempt to rebuild autonomous social space contributing to communicative interactions against and within the contemporary rationalized economy and the state. This project challenges the given institutions of the state and economy, expands the principle of democratic association, and reactivates democratic institutions.

There are several things unclear in these arguments, however. "By dividing the focus of action theory between the abstract level of cultural development and the microsocial


level of individual socialization,"17 Habermas avoids analysis of those institutions and collective practices that make his norms realizable. In other words, he does not clearly develop his argument concerning post-bourgeois civil society. Although he pays a certain degree of attention to the uneven development within civil society and the formation of the center-periphery structure, his project of post-bourgeois civil society presupposes the center-periphery structure of an international civil society. In addition, he does not consider enough the meaning of the fact that many "new social movements" appear in the center of international civil society.

Generally speaking, theories on "new social movements" do not argue with regard to the socio-structural and institutional foundations on which the movements depend. Without those arguments the continued development of "new social movements" cannot be assured. Most theories have analysed the trends which bring civil society to crisis. But what changes could become the foundation for developing contemporary civil society? In this regard, Kiyoaki Hirata analyzed three layers of a city brought about by the development of capitalism: social space, communal space, and public space.18 He also shows whether and how these three layers have been actualized in relation to local self government, political parties, and vocational groups. He positions "new social movements" in relation to the formation of these new spaces. It is indispensable that we orient our analyses in such a direction.

IV. A Theoretical Framework of Analysis for Social Movements in Contemporary Japan19

In Japan, since the late '70s "new social movements" could be found in Tokyo, its suburbs, and various other large cities. In order to be continuous movements responsible for the project of post-bourgeois civil society, however, the movements must be able to connect the universal problems common to advanced societies with the particular and fundamental (radical) ones found in Japanese society.

Although Japanese postwar movements have always had this task, they have failed in their mission. In regards to the peace movements in particular, however, they have achieved not a few results in terms of the democratic reorganization of Japanese society and the maintenance of world peace. In the background was the new Constitution and its universal principles of peace and democracy, and Japan's loss of sovereignty after the war, creating a situation in which Japan was relegated to Third World nation status. Nonetheless, the movements were unable to sufficiently position themselves within the universal meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nor could they sufficiently position themselves

17 Jean Cohen, Ibid., p. 211.


19 The following perspectives have been developed through group discussions conducted in our research groups on social movements over the past three years. I thank our group members for allowing me to introduce these perspectives in this paper. The basic framework was established by Prof. Kokichi Shoji of Tokyo University.
within the fundamental (radical) meaning of Okinawa.

Okinawa (Ryukyu) as well as Hokkaido (Ezo) have been and are internal colonies of Japanese capitalism. The concept of internal colonialism was first used by Michael Hechter and others in the 1970s to refer to such relationships as that existing between England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. Between them there existed uneven developmental patterns and a situation in which contact between the former and the latter areas did not bring out ethnic homogeneity but instead promoted ethnic conflicts. Based on this conceptualization, Okinawa and Hokkaido can be classified as internal colonies. They were not only exploited for the development and expansion of Japanese capitalism but also were abandoned when its survival depended on it. In this sense, they were indispensable prerequisites for maintaining Japanese society and were the result of Japan's particular form of development.

Society in order to survive must define its boundaries and protect the inside from the outside. This is because human beings cannot live only on the basis of innate mechanisms of behavior, such as instinct, and must go beyond the fact that they themselves are part of nature. These boundaries, however, must stay ambiguous, for the only boundaries between man, society, and nature are artificial ones. Man and society have constantly shifted these boundaries in order to enable society to exist.

Further attention must be paid to the layer-structure of this boundary problem. This can best be understood in terms of the following six distinct levels and their interrelationships: (1) the level of society versus (external) nature, i.e., the problem of ecology; (2) society versus internal nature, in particular the problems of gender and generations; (3) society versus society—the problem of ethnicity; (4) the level existing among groups in society—the problem of classes and interest groups; (5) the level existing among functions in society—the problem of system; and (6) the level of society versus culture—the problem of consensus formation and value integration. If the concept of internal colony is reconsidered with the idea of the arbitrary transfer of boundaries in mind, it becomes clear that internal colonies are "peripheral" problems that come into being by the delineation of boundaries on these various levels. Hence internal colonies as such shed light on the essence, contradictions, and hidden dimensions of a given society.

The history of Okinawa, especially the Battle of Okinawa, realistically relates its role as an internal colony of Japanese society. Japanese imperialism tried to survive by severing Okinawa from the Japanese archipelago. Before it was completed, however, atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In this way of thinking, it becomes evident that what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an extension of events in Okinawa. This line of connection sheds light on the essence of and contradictions to be found within Japanese society. By viewing Okinawa, Hiroshima and Nagasaki as historically, logically, and essentially related, we can understand the above all the more clearly.

This logic of "the arbitrary transfer of the boundaries" is indispensable in examining the relationship between the U.S. and Japan after the War, as well as that between the U.S., Japan, and world society. With the development of nuclear weapons, the U.S. created the possibility for the destruction of human society. In so doing, it has subjected all of human

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society to the same fate, in other words, to a human community standing on its head. In terms of human society, of the new world society, American imperialism did much the same as what Japan did in Okinawa. Namely, when the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, she arbitrarily decided the boundaries of human society, by excluding Hiroshima and Nagasaki (and possibly Japan as a whole) from that society. After that, the U.S. has been doing essentially the same thing toward socialist countries, such as Cuba and Vietnam.

There now exists the problem of establishing the boundaries of society at the highest level—that related to the sovereignty (or the lack of it) of world society. From this stems the universality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the same time, we can also understand the basic relationship between world society and Japan after the war. This relationship is what Robert K. Merton called “the order of pecking” in which in this case world society pecks Japanese society and Japanese society pecks in turn her internal colonies. It also represents what Masao Maruyama referred to as “oppression transfer.” From this perspective, the intimate connection of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with Okinawa and the fundamentality (radicality) of Okinawa, Hiroshima and Nagasaki for Japanese society become manifested.

In short, we ought not to lose sight of the structural connection between the universal problems for all human beings, as in the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and fundamental (radical) problems in the Japanese nation, as is clear from the history and the current situation of Japan’s internal colony, Okinawa. It is this structural connection which is the task to be clarified by Japanese postwar social movements.

To reiterate, Japanese social movements after the war were not only unable to grasp the universal meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also unable to understand the fundamental (radical) significance of the problem of Okinawa. It was only after the Fifth Fukuryu-maru incident of March, 1954, when a movement gained force among housewives in Suginami-ward in Tokyo calling for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, that Japanese social movements began to position themselves within the universal meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When Okinawa became an American frontal base with the intensification of the Vietnam War after the mid-60s, the seriousness of the situation began to be understood nation-wide for the first time. At the same time, however, the ruling class of both countries soon realized that the "return" of Okinawa, considering the situation in Japan at the time, was beneficial for their continued domination. Japanese social movements were unable to effectively respond to this. In other words, movements, such as those formed by labour, farmers, residents, and students, could not deeply implant in Japanese society on more than a superficial level the universality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the fundamentality (radicality) of the problems of Okinawa. That is why before the sprouts of today’s “new social movements,” which have followed after the student and residents movements, they had lost sight of their own identity. The people participating in these movements constantly stressed the newness or novelty of what they were doing, but in reality they lost sight of what their real goal or purpose should be, that is those aspects which would have led to calls for more fundamental structural change in Japanese or world society.

While Japanese social movements after the war were reaching a stalemate, the post-war history of Japan moved approximately in the following sequence: the Pacific War; Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the enactment of the Japanese Constitution based on lessons learned.
from the pre-war period and the war itself; the enactment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, under which Japanese society has achieved unprecedented economic growth; and various comprehensive development plans. Through this skeletal view of the post-war history of Japan, we can see that the war and subsequent developments are intimately linked. Also, a quarter century later, after the return of Okinawa, this formula of “war and development” was enacted again on the island without any modification or reflection.

This formula was first brought to the main island of Okinawa. It involved itself with economic development in such an intensive manner that almost all the corals around the island were destroyed within a decade of its return. This same formula is now about to be brought to Ishigaki island. We thus see that the pecking order or the transfer of oppression from the Japanese mainland first manifested itself on the Okinawa main island and is now moving to Ishigaki island. This order has obviously the same structure as the pecking order of the U.S., by which atomic bombs were first dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the pecking order of Japan, which tried to survive by abandoning Okinawa, and the pecking order of Okinawa toward Okinawa itself. Furthermore, with these there is the same structural relation in the pecking order in regards to the close of the final stage of Okinawan developments: Japan as an economic giant—the export of development, leading to the export of environmental destruction into Southeast Asia—and massive starvation in the “fourth world,” such as in Africa. Hence, it would be correct to say that world society consists of a complicated layer-structure of various pecking orders. The basic structure of logic piercing through this layer structure is that of colonialism, internal colonialism, internal colonization, and colonization of the life world.

If this is correct, social movements must be able to firmly confront this situation.

V. The Possibilities and Limits of “New Social Movements”

In order to firmly confront the above basic structure, what is required of social movements? The first prerequisite is that they acquire a global view, a perspective of an international civil society, and a viewpoint of world society. Next, they must understand the nature of internal colonies, i.e., the periphery. This is of course closely connected with the situation concerning the peripheral regions of Okinawa and Hokkaido, as well as to racial and ethnic problems, in particular that relating to Koreans in Japan. These problems are the biggest obstacles for Japanese postwar social movements. Considering the fact that problems of race and ethnicity will increase in importance in the world and that nationalist movements will be one of the main social movements from now and into the 21st century, their importance becomes all the more obvious. Accordingly, whether or not

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22 For a relatively early study of the matter, see Udai Fujishima, Ethnic Movements in Japan, Kobundo, 1960.
not social movements acquire this outlook will very much determine their fate. Furthermore, social movements must understand that gender and environment/ecology are dominated by capitalist logic and that family and education, which create lasting values, norms, and meanings in society, are eroded by this same logic, in particular by the logic of domination and expansion.

When the relationship between Japanese citizen’s movements and labour movements became problematic, just at the time when there was an increase in movements calling for the ban of atomic and hydrogen bombs, the focus of the arguments became the relationship of the universality of the tasks of the movements and/or of the basis of movements themselves, as well as their class character. When resident’s movements later came to national attention in their efforts to combat environmental destruction, the issue became the relationship between the particularity or universality of the tasks/basis of the movements and their class character.

In consideration of the above, since the grounds on which the movements since the 1970s depend and their tasks are what we have called here the fundamentality24 (radicality) of racial, ethnic, gender, generation, and environmental or ecological problems, and the universality of the problems of consensus formation or value integration, it may be natural for many people to call them “new social movements.” If “new social movements” emphasize their “newness” unilaterally and disregard digging into the fundamental (radical) level of the Japanese society, however, or ignore the relations with the movements existing hitherto, such as labour movements, citizen’s movements, and resident movements, it may become difficult for these “new social movements” to achieve even their initial purposes. Social movements can develop dynamically only when the levels of the universality of the tasks/grounds, the particularity (locality), the class nature, and the fundamentality (radicality) are organically connected.24

In order to oppose the basic structure of contemporary society, social movements must intimately unite against contemporary imperialism (“world social movements”26 are what I have termed those movements which try to create a world in opposition to the structure of the submissive orders of nations), against internal colonies (these movements aim at “endogenous development”), and must include those movements which resist the crisis of civil society. Specifically, movements to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs, anti-nuclear peace movements, labour movements, “new social movements” (especially feminist movements and ecology movements) must be closely linked. The basic logic of social movements, in opposition to the basic logic of domination, is to create autonomy at every level of action and social relations. For this to be realized, it is necessary that everyday life be movements and that movements be everyday life. This begins with “reconsiderations of the modern mode of production and living.” To sever attitudes of submission from the mode of everyday life is of utmost importance. But this alone is not enough. Reform

24 I define the concept of fundamentality (radicality) following Kan Takayuki: the moments and characteristics of tribes in communal society which are beyond individuals linked internally with bodies. Takayuki Kan, Marx and Modern Society, Miraisha, 1982, p. 218.

25 In this respect, naturally, some institutional support is required. Additionally, in order to build a post-bourgeois civil society, it is important to work simultaneously for institutional reforms from the top as well as from the bottom. A. Arato & J. Cohen, Ibid., pp. 273–274.

of the mode of production must also be sought. "New social movements" can only achieve true significance by taking this broader perspective.

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