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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/28763

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Title
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
Creator
Creator Name
Lombardi, Michele Lombardi, Michele
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Glasgow
Creator Name
Yoshihara, Naoki Yoshihara, Naoki
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Key Word
Nash implementation
pure strategy Nash equilibrium
partial-honesty
Condition μ*
JEL
C72
D71
Abstract
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the n-person SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. It establishes a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for the partially-honest Nash implementation. If all individuals are partially-honest, then all SCRs that satisfy the property of unanimity are partially-honestly Nash implementable. The partially-honest Nash implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2017-08
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion paper series. A ; No. 662
NCID
AA11476336
Number of Pages
57
Appears in Collections
Discussion paper series / Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/28763