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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/30347

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Title
Extreme Lobbyists and Policy Convergence
Creator
Creator Name
Hirata, Daisuke Hirata, Daisuke
平田, 大祐 平田, 大祐
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Kamada, Yuichiro Kamada, Yuichiro
鎌田, 雄一郎 鎌田, 雄一郎
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of California, Berkeley
Key Word
Interest groups
campaign contributions
Hotelling model
JEL
C72
D72
D78
Abstract (distribution restricted)
We consider a two-candidate election model with campaign contributions. In the first stage of the game, each of two candidates chooses a policy position. In the second stage, each of n lobbyists chooses the amount of contribution to each candidate. The winning probability of each candidate depends on the total amount of contributions that she raised from the lobbyists. In any equilibrium of our model, only extreme lobbyists contribute at any subgame, and the policies converge on the unique equilibrium path. Our results suggest that extreme lobbyists and their contributions do not necessarily cause policies to diverge.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2019-05
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2019-02
Number of Pages
41
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/30347