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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/30864

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Title
Asymmetric majority pillage games
Creator
Creator Name
Kerber, Manfred Kerber, Manfred
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Birmingham
Creator Name
Rowat, Colin Rowat, Colin
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Birmingham
Creator Name
Yoshihara, Naoki Yoshihara, Naoki
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
一橋大学
Key Word
power contests
core
stable sets
JEL
C71
D51
P14
Abstract
This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, “Pillage and property”), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games’ predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents’ intrinsic contributions to a coalition’s power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set’s existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2019-11
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion paper series. A ; No. 701
NCID
AA11476336
Number of Pages
32
Appears in Collections
Discussion paper series / Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/30864