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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/25908

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Title
Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
Creator
Creator Name
Muto, Nozomu Muto, Nozomu
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Yasuhiro, Shirata Yasuhiro, Shirata
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Otaru University of Commerce
Abstract (distribution restricted)
We study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue　monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments. Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with strategy-proofness, efficiency, and participation even in the domain of substitute valuations, we find a restricted domain called per-capita goodsbidder submodular domain in which there exists a goods revenue monotone mechanism satisfying the above three conditions. The restriction is likely to be met when bidders’ valuations are similar. Finally, we provide a relation to the monopoly theory, and argue that per-capita goods-bidder submodularily is independent of the standard elasticity argument.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2013-10
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2013-13
Number of Pages
20
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/25908